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FUNDAMENTALS OF CATHOLIC DOGMA

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JAMES CANON BASTIBLE, D.D.*

*TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY
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PREFACE

THIS Basic Course of Dogmatic Theology appears in place of B. Bartmann's († 1938) Basic Course which has been out of print for years. Derived from practical experience of theological instruction, it is primarily intended to meet the needs of students. My aim was to present the essentials of Church teaching and the foundation of such teaching in clear and concise form. On didactic grounds the matter was very extensively correlated. As the framework of a basic course could not be exceeded, only the most important pronouncements of Official Church Teaching, only individual significant scriptural texts, and only one or two patristic texts could be quoted verbatim. The history of the development of dogma has been kept within the minimum limits indispensable for the understanding of Church doctrine. The scriptural and patristic texts were, on principle, quoted in their translation. Anyone desirous of seeing the original texts can easily find them in the Bible; most of the patristic texts quoted or indicated may be found in the *Enchiridion Patristicum* of M. J. Rouet de Journel (Freiburg i Br. 1947). On account of the brevity aimed at, the speculative establishment of doctrine had to give place to the positive. The many indications to the works of St. Thomas are intended to be a pointer to deeper study. The reader is directed to the appropriate Articles in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique* and to the *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* of G. Kittel.

The present Basic Course is constructed on the framework of the lectures of my teacher Michael Rackl († 1948 as Bishop of Eichstätt) and of Martin Grabmann († 1949), and I venture to hope that it breathes their spirit. It was Grabmann who urged me to publish this work. I acknowledge with thanks that I found many hints and ideas in various religious textbooks particularly in those of Bartmann, Diekamp, Pohle and Van Noort. I am indebted to the Most Reverend Dr. Alfred Kempf in Oberzell bei Würzburg for assistance in reading proofs and for the preparation of the Index of Persons.

May this book contribute to the extension of the knowledge of the Church's teaching, to the deepening of the understanding of this teaching, and to the awakening of the religious life !

Eichstätt
15th August, 1952.

LUDWIG OTT.

FOREWORD

To the First English Edition

THIS book by Dr. Ludwig Ott is a conspectus of all Dogmatic Theology and quite the most remarkable work of compression of its kind that I have encountered.

The book will appeal particularly to busy priests who are anxious to review quickly the teaching from Tradition, from the Bible, and from reason on any particular point of doctrine. It will be specially useful to students who desire to revise rapidly, in the vernacular, the tracts which they are presenting for examination. It makes available for educated laymen a scientific exposition of the whole field of Catholic teaching. Finally, Dr. Ott's work will be invaluable for use as a text-book by those priests whose duty it is to present to students, in a systematic way, the teaching of the Catholic Church.

The Mercier Press has performed a service of major importance in making this work available in English. A special word of praise is due to the translator, Dr. Patrick Lynch, whose careful and accurate work made my task relatively simple.

Personally I am happy to be associated with the first appearance in English of this work. I believe it will prove to be of such importance and lasting value as to justify fully the labour which has gone into its production.

University College
Cork

JAMES BASTIBLE

FOREWORD

To the Second English Edition

THE exhaustion of the first edition, in such short time, is most gratifying. It may, perhaps, be interpreted not only as an indication of the need which the book fills but also as a tribute to the book itself. In this connection it is of considerable interest to note that Dr. Ott's work has appealed not only to priests and religious but to a very wide circle of layfolk.

As the author mentions in his preface, the object is to provide a basic course. In the light of this the book is amazingly comprehensive. The references to disputed questions are, of course, very much in outline but students of theology find them valuable in that they recall to their minds problems which they have studied in detail elsewhere. The very many references to sources and the bibliography will appeal to those desiring to study particular points more fully than they are dealt with here.

This second English edition embodies the many changes made in the second and third German editions. Further, in this edition, all Latin quotations have been translated wherever this seemed necessary to enable a reader, whose Latin is rusty, to follow the text with ease.

Every effort has been made to eliminate inaccuracies, but, doubtless, some slips have been overlooked in this book with its quarter-million words. I shall be very grateful for any help by readers in correcting these in future editions.

University College
Cork

JAMES BASTIBLE

ABBREVIATIONS

- AAS = Acta Apostolicae Sedis
AS = Anathema Sit. This signifies that the preceding proposition is officially condemned by the Church and is heretical.
CIC = Codex Iuris Canonici
D = H. Denzinger—C. Rahner, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*
DThC = Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique
PG = J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*
PL = J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*
S. th. = S. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*
S.c.G. = S. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. Concept and Object of Theology

1. Concept

The word theology, according to its etymology, means "teaching concerning God" (*λόγος περὶ θεοῦ*, de divinitate ratio sive sermo : St. Augustine, De civ. Dei VIII I). Thus theology is the science of God.

2. Object

The material object of theology is firstly God, and secondly, created things under the aspect of their relation to God : *Omnia pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum ut ad principium et finem*. In sacred science all things are considered under the aspect of God, either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. S. th. I 1, 7.

As regards the Formal Object a distinction must be made between natural and supernatural theology. Natural theology was first expounded by Plato. It is called by St. Augustine, in agreement with Varro, *Theologia Naturalis*, and since the 19th century it is also called theodicy. It is the scientific exposition of the truths concerning God, in so far as these can be known by natural reason and thus may be regarded as the culmination of philosophy. Supernatural theology is the scientific exposition of the truths about God under the light of Divine Revelation. The formal object of natural theology is God, as He is known by natural reason from creation ; the formal object of supernatural theology is God, as He is known by faith from revelation (cf. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei VI 5 : S. th. I 1, 1 ad 2).

Natural and supernatural theology differ : (a) in their principles of cognition, unaided human reason (*ratio naturalis*), reason illuminated by faith (*ratio fide illustrata*) ; (b) in their means of cognition, the study of created things (*ea quae facta sunt*), divine revelation (*revelatio divina*) ; (c) in their formal objects, God as Creator and Lord (*Deus unus, Creator et Dominus*), God one and three (*Deus Unus et Trinus*).

§ 2. Theology as a Science

1. The Scientific Character of Theology

a) According to the teaching of St. Thomas, theology is a true science, because it uses as principles the securely founded basic truths of Divine Revelation and draws from these new knowledge (theological conclusions) by a strict scientific method and unites the whole in a closed system.

But theology is a subordinate science (*scientia subalternata*) because its principles are not immediately evident to us in themselves, but are taken

over from a higher science, from the truths communicated to us by God in revelation (cf. S. th. I 1, 2 : Sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science namely the knowledge possessed by God and by the Blessed ; *Sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum*).

The questions posed by the Schoolmen were exclusively those pertaining to speculative theology. The development of historical research at the beginning of the modern era led to an extension of the concept of "science" which permits its application to positive theology also. By "science" in the objective sense is understood today a system of methodically worked-out knowledge about a unitary object. Theology possesses a unitary object, uses a methodical process adapted to the object, and unites its results in a closed system. The dependence of theology upon Divine authority and that of the Church does not derogate from its scientific character, because theology belongs to the revealed truth given by God into the hands of the Church, and therefore these cannot be dissociated from the object of theology.

b) Theology transcends all other sciences by : the sublimity of its object ; by the supreme certainty of its knowledge which is based on the infallible knowledge of God ; and by its practical purpose which is eternal bliss, i.e., the ultimate destination of mankind (cf. S. th. I 1, 5).

c) According to St. Thomas theology is both a speculative and a practical science, since, in the light of Divine Truth, it contemplates on the one hand, God, the First Truth, and things in their relation to God and on the other hand it contemplates the moral actions of man in relation to his supernatural ultimate goal. Speculative theology is the more noble since theology is concerned above all with Divine Truth. Thus the final aim even of Moral Theology is to bring men to the perfection of the knowledge of God (S. th. I 1, 4).

The medieval Franciscan School appraises Theology primarily as a practical or affective science, because theological knowledge by its very nature is aimed at moving the affections or the will. The main object of moral theology is the moral perfection of man : *ut boni fiamus* (St. Bonaventura, Proemium in IV libros Sent. q. 3).

The ultimate reason for the various answers to the problem lies in the various estimations of the hierarchy of the powers of the human soul. St. Thomas and his School, with Aristotle, recognise the primacy of the intellect, the Franciscan School with St. Augustine, that of the will.

d) Theology is "Wisdom," since its object is God the ultimate origin of all things. It is the supreme wisdom since it contemplates God, the ultimate origin, in the light of the truths of revelation communicated to man from the wisdom of God Himself (cf. S. th. I 1, 6).

2. A Science of Faith

Theology is a science of faith. It is concerned with faith in the *objective sense* (*fides quae creditur*) that which is believed, and in the *subjective sense* (*fides qua creditur*) that by which we believe. Theology like faith accepts, as the sources of its knowledge, Holy Writ and Tradition (remote rule of faith)

and also the doctrinal assertions of the Church (proximate rule of faith) But as a science of faith it seeks by human reason to penetrate the content and the context of the supernatural system of truth and to understand this as far as possible. St. Augustine expresses this thought in the words : " Crede, ut intelligas " Believe that you may understand (Sermo 43, 7, 9) ; St. Anselm of Canterbury, with the words : " Fides quaerens intellectum " Faith seeking to reach the intellect (Proslogion, Proemium) and : " Credo, ut intelligam " I believe that I may understand (Proslogion I) ; Richard of St. Victor with the words : " Properemus de fide ad cognitionem. Satagamus, in quantum possumus, ut intelligamus, quod credimus " (De Trinitate, Prologus). Let us hasten from faith to knowledge. Let us endeavour so far as we can, to understand that which we believe.

3. Classification

Theology is a unitary science, as it has a single formal object : God and the created world, in so far as they are the objects of Divine Revelation. As Revelation is a communication of the Divine knowledge, so theology is, in the words of St. Thomas, a stamp or impression imposed by the Divine knowledge, which is unitary and absolutely simple, on the created human spirit (S. th. I 1, 3).

Theology is, however, divided into various branches and departments according to its various functions, which are all sub-divisions of the one theological science :

- a) *Dogmatic Theology*, which includes *Fundamental Theology*, i.e., the basis of Dogmatic Theology.
- b) *Biblical-historical Theology* : Biblical introduction, Hermeneutics, Exegesis ; Church History, History of Dogmas, History of Liturgy, Church Legal History, Patrology.
- c) *Practical Theology* : Moral Theology, Church law, Pastoral Theology, including Catechetics and Homiletics.

§ 3. Concept and Method of Dogmatic Theology

1. Concept

On the ground of its proposition to the faithful by the Church the whole field of supernatural theology could be called dogmatic theology. In point of fact, however, only the theoretical truths of Revelation concerning God and His activity are dealt with in dogmatic theology (*doctrina credendorum* : the science of things to be believed), while the practical teachings of Revelation regulating the activity of men are the object of moral theology (*doctrina faciendorum* : the science of things to be done). Thus dogmatic theology can with Scheeben (*Dogmatik, Einleitung* n. 2) be defined as " the scientific exposition of the whole theoretical doctrine revealed by God about God Himself and His activity and which we accept on the authority of the Church."

2. Method

The method of dogmatic theology is both positive and speculative. Positive dogmatic theology is concerned with doctrines that have been proposed to our belief by the Teaching Authority of the Church (*dogmatic factor*) and that are contained in the sources of Revelation, Scripture and

Tradition (Biblical-Patristic factor). In so far as it defends the doctrine of the Church against false conceptions, it becomes controversial theology (apologetic or polemic factor).

Speculative dogmatic theology, which is identical with the so-called scholastic theology, strives as far as possible for an insight into the truths of faith by the application of human reason to the content of revelation.

The positive and speculative methods must not be separated from each other. The ideal lies in the harmonious coalescence of authority and reason. This is, indeed, expressly prescribed by Ecclesiastical Authority: Pope Pius XI, in the Apostolic Institution "*Deus scientiarum Dominus*" 1931, directs that Sacred Theology "is to be presented according to the positive as well as to the scholastic method." The speculative exposition is to proceed "according to the principles and teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas" (Article 29) (cf. St. Thomas, *Quodl.* IV 9, 18).

§ 4. Concept and Classification of Dogma

1. Concept

By dogma in the strict sense is understood a truth immediately (formally) revealed by God which has been proposed by the Teaching Authority of the Church to be believed as such. The Vatican Council explains: *Fide divina et catholica ea omnia credenda sunt, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur et ab Ecclesia sive solemnii iudicio sive ordinario et universali magisterio tanquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur.* D 1792. All those things are to be believed by divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the Word of God written or handed down and which are proposed for our belief by the Church either in a solemn definition or in its ordinary and universal authoritative teaching.

Two factors or elements may be distinguished in the concept of dogma:—

- a) An immediate Divine Revelation of the particular Dogma (*revelatio immedia divina* or *revelatio formalis*), i.e., the Dogma must be immediately revealed by God either explicitly (*explicite*) or inclusively (*implicite*), and therefore be contained in the sources of Revelation (Holy Writ or Tradition).
- b) The Promulgation of the Dogma by the Teaching Authority of the Church (*propositio Ecclesiae*). This implies, not merely the promulgation of the Truth, but also the obligation on the part of the Faithful of believing the Truth. This Promulgation by the Church may be made either in an extraordinary manner through a solemn decision of faith made by the Pope or a General Council (*iudicium solemnne*) or through the ordinary and general teaching power of the Church (*Magisterium ordinarium et universale*). The latter may be found easily in the catechisms issued by the Bishops.

In this view, which is the usual one, and which is principally expounded by the Thomists, the Truth proposed in the dogma must be immediately and formally contained in the sources of Revelation either explicitly or implicitly. According to another opinion, however, which is held by the Scotists, and also by several Dominican theologians (M. M. Tuyaeerts, A. Gardeil, F. Marín-Sola), a Truth can be proposed as a dogma, if it be only mediately or virtually contained in the sources of Revelation, that is, in such a manner that it may be derived from a Truth or Revelation by the aid of a truth known by Natural Reason. The Scotist view permits greater room for play in the formal action of the Teaching

Authority and makes it easier to prove that the Dogma is contained in the sources of Revelation but its validity is challenged on the ground that the Truth of the Dogma is supported not solely by the authority of the Revealing God, but also by the natural knowledge of reason, while the Church demands for the dogma a Divine Faith (*fides divina*).

Dogma in its strict signification is the object of both Divine Faith (*Fides Divina*) and Catholic Faith (*Fides Catholica*); it is the object of the Divine Faith (*Fides Divina*) by reason of its Divine Revelation; it is the object of Catholic Faith (*Fides Catholica*) on account of its infallible doctrinal definition by the Church. If a baptised person deliberately denies or doubts a dogma properly so-called, he is guilty of the sin of heresy (CIC 1325, Par. 2), and automatically becomes subject to the punishment of excommunication (CIC 2314, Par. 1).

If, despite the fact that a Truth is not proposed for belief by the Church, one becomes convinced that it is immediately revealed by God, then, according to the opinion of many theologians (Suarez, De Lugo), one is bound to believe it with Divine Faith (*fide divina*). However, most theologians teach that such a Truth prior to its official proposition of the Church is to be accepted with theological assent (*assensus theologicus*) only, as the individual may be mistaken.

2. Protestant and Modernistic Conception

a) Protestantism rejects the Teaching Authority of the Church, and consequently also the authoritative proposition of the content of Revelation by the Church. It claims that the Biblical Revelation attests itself. In spite of this, and for the sake of unity of doctrine, a certain connection is recognised between dogma and the authority of the Church. "Dogma is the valid teaching of the Church" (W. Elert). The liberal movement of the newer Protestantism rejects not only the authoritative doctrinal proclamation of the Church, but also the objective Divine Revelation, by conceiving Revelation as a subjective religious experience, in which the soul enters into contact with God.

b) According to Alfred Loisy († 1940) the conceptions which the Church represents as revealed dogmas are not truths which have come from Heaven, and which have been preserved by religious tradition in the exact form in which they first appeared. The historian sees in them "the interpretation of religious facts acquired by the toil of theological mental labour" (*L'Evangile et l'Eglise*, Paris, 1902, 158). The foundation of the dogma is, according to the modernistic viewpoint, subjective religious experience, in which God reveals Himself to man (religious factor). The totality of religious experience is penetrated by theological science and expressed by it in definite formularies (intellectual factor). A formulary of this kind is then finally approved by the Church Authority, and thus declared a dogma (authoritative factor). Pope Pius X has condemned this doctrine in the Decretum "*Lamentabili*" (1907), and in the Encyclical "*Pascendi*" (1907). (D 2022, 2078 et seq.)

As against Modernism, the Catholic Church stresses that dogma according to its content is of truly Divine origin, that is, it is the expression of an *objective truth*, and its content is *immutable*.

3. Classification

Dogmas are classified :

a) According to their content as : General Dogmas (*dogmata generalia*) and Special Dogmas (*dogmata specialia*). To the former belong the fundamental truths of Christianity, to the latter the individual truths contained therein.

b) *According to their relation with Reason* as : Pure Dogmas (dogmata pura) and Mixed Dogmas (dogmata mixta). The former we know solely through Divine Revelation, e.g., The Trinity (mysteries), the latter by Natural Reason also, e.g., The Existence of God.

c) *According to the mode by which the Church proposes them*, as : Formal Dogmas (dogmata formalia) and Material Dogmas (dogmata materialia). The former are proposed for belief by the Teaching Authority of the Church as truths of Revelation ; the latter are not so proposed, for which reason they are not Dogmas in the strict sense.

d) *According to their relation with salvation* as : Necessary Dogmas (dogmata necessaria) and Non-necessary Dogmas (dogmata non-necessaria). The former must be explicitly believed by all in order to achieve eternal salvation ; for the latter implicit faith (fides implicita) suffices (cf. Hebr. II, 6).

§ 5. The Development of Dogma

1. Heretical Notion of Dogmatic Development

The Liberal Protestant concept of dogma (cf. A. von Harnack) as well as Modernism (cf. A. Loisy) assumes a substantial development of dogmas, so that the content of dogma changes radically in the course of time. Modernism poses the challenge : "Progress in the sciences demands that the conceptions of the Christian teaching of God, Creation, Revelation, Person of the Incarnate Word, Redemption, be remoulded" (cf. D 2064). Loisy declares : "As progress in science (philosophy) demands a new concept of the problem of God, so progress in historical research gives rise to a new concept of the problem of Christ and the Church." (Autour d'un petit livre, Paris 1903, XXIV.) In this view there are no fixed and constant dogmas ; their concept is always developing. The Vatican Council condemned Anton Günther's († 1863) application of the idea of development in this sense to dogmas as heretical : Si quis dixerit, fieri posse, ut dogmatibus ab Ecclesia propositis aliquando secundum progressum scientiae sensus tribuendus sit alius ab eo, quem intellexit et intelligit Ecclesia. If anybody says that by reason of the progress of science, a meaning must be given to dogmas of the Church other than that which the Church understood and understands them to have let him be anathema. A.S. D 1818. In the Encyclical "Humani Generis" (1950), Pope Pius XII rejected that dogmatic relativism, which would demand that dogmas should be expressed in the concepts of the philosophy ruling at any particular time, and enveloped in the stream of philosophical development : "This conception," he says, "makes dogma a reed, which is driven hither and thither by the wind" (D 3012).

The ground for the immutability of dogmas lies in the Divine origin of the Truths which they express. Divine Truth is as immutable as God Himself : "The truth of the Lord remaineth for ever" (Ps. 116, 2). "Heaven and earth shall pass away : but my word shall not pass" (Mk. 13, 31).

2. Development of Dogmas in the Catholic Sense

a) From the material side of dogma, that is, in the communication of the Truths of Revelation to humanity, a substantial growth took place in human

history until Revelation reached its apogee and conclusion in Christ (cf. Hebr. I, 1).

St. Gregory the Great says: "With the progress of the times the knowledge of the spiritual Fathers increased; for, in the Science of God, Moses was more instructed than Abraham, the Prophets more than Moses, the Apostles more than the Prophets" (in Ezechielem lib. 2, hom. 4, 12).

With Christ and the Apostles General Revelation concluded. (*sent. certa.*)

Pope Pius X rejected the liberal Protestant and Modernistic doctrine of the evolution of religion through "New Revelations." Thus he condemned the proposition that: "The Revelation, which is the object of Catholic Faith, was not terminated with the Apostles." D 2021.

The clear teaching of Holy Writ and Tradition is that after Christ, and the Apostles who proclaimed the message of Christ, no further Revelation will be made. Christ was the fulfilment of the Law of the Old Testament (Mt. 5, 17; 5, 21 et seq), and the absolute teacher of humanity (Mt. 23, 10: "One is your master, Christ"; cf. Mt. 28, 20). The Apostles saw in Christ: "the coming of the fullness of time" (Gal. 4, 4) and regarded as their task the preservation, integral and unfalsified, of the heritage of Faith entrusted to them by Christ (1 Tim. 6, 14; 6, 20; 2 Tim. 1, 14; 2, 2; 3, 14). The Fathers indignantly repudiated the claim of the heretics to possess secret doctrines or new Revelations of the Holy Ghost. St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer III 1; IV 35, 8), and Tertullian (De praesc. 21) stress, against the Gnostics, that the full truth of Revelation is contained in the doctrine of the Apostles which is preserved unfalsified through the uninterrupted succession of the bishops.

b) As to the *Formal* side of dogma, that is, in the knowledge and in the ecclesiastical proposal of Revealed Truth, and consequently also in the public faith of the Church, there is a progress (accidental development of dogmas) which occurs in the following fashion:

1) Truths which formerly were only implicitly believed are expressly proposed for belief. (Cf. S. th. I; II, 1, 7: quantum ad explicationem crevit numerus articulorum (fidei), quia quaedam explicite cognita sunt a posterioribus, quae a prioribus non cognoscebantur explicite. There was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly, which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them.)

2) Material Dogmas are raised to the status of Formal Dogmas.

3) To facilitate general understanding, and to avoid misunderstandings and distortions, the ancient truths which were always believed, e.g., the Hypostatic Union (unio hypostatica), Transubstantiation, etc., are formulated in new, sharply defined concepts.

4) Questions formerly disputed are explained and decided, and heretical propositions are condemned. Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei 2, 1; ab adversario mota quaestio discendi existit occasio (a question moved by an adversary gives an occasion for learning).

The exposition of the dogmas in the given sense is prepared by theological science and promulgated by the Teaching Authority of the Church under the

direction of the Holy Ghost (John 14, 26). These new expositions of dogmatic truth are motivated, on the one hand, by the natural striving of man for deeper understanding of Revealed Truth, and on the other hand by external influences, such as the attacks arising from heresy and unbelief, theological controversies, advances in philosophical knowledge and historical research, development of the liturgy, and the general assertion of Faith expressed therein.

Even the Fathers stress the necessity of deeper research into the truths of Revelation, of clearing up obscurities, and of developing the teachings of Revelation. Cf. the classical testimony of St. Vincent Lerin († before 450). "But perhaps someone says: Will there then be no progress in the religion of Christ? Certainly there should be, even a great and rich progress . . . only, it must in truth be a progress in Faith and not an alteration of Faith. For progress it is necessary that something should increase of itself, for alteration, however, that something should change from one thing to the other." (Commonitorium 23.) Cf. D 1800.

5) There may be also a progress in the confession of faith of the individual believer through the extension and deepening of his theological knowledge. The basis for the possibility of this progress lies in the depth of the truths of Faith on the one hand, and on the other in the varying capacity for perfection of the human reason.

Conditions making for a true progress in the knowledge of Faith by individual persons are, according to the declaration of the Vatican Council, zeal, reverence and moderation: *cum sedule, pie et sobrie quaerit*. D 1796.

§ 6. Catholic Truths

Corresponding to the purpose of the Teaching Authority of the Church of preserving unfalsified and of infallibly interpreting the Truths of Revelation (D 1800) the primary object (*obiectum primarium*) of the Teaching Office of the Church is the body of immediately revealed truths and facts. The infallible doctrinal power of the Church extends, however, secondarily to all those truths and facts which are a consequence of the teaching of Revelation or a presupposition of it (*obiectum secundarium*). Those doctrines and truths defined by the Church not as immediately revealed but as intrinsically connected with the truths of Revelation so that their denial would undermine the revealed truths are called *Catholic Truths* (*veritates catholicae*) or Ecclesiastical Teachings (*doctrinae ecclesiasticae*) to distinguish them from the *Divine Truths* or Divine Doctrines of Revelation (*veritates vel doctrinae divinae*). These are proposed for belief in virtue of the infallibility of the Church in teaching doctrines of faith or morals (*fides ecclesiastica*).

To these Catholic truths belong:

1. *Theological Conclusions* (*conclusiones theologicae*) properly so-called. By these are understood religious truths, which are derived from two premisses, of which one is an immediately revealed truth, and the other a truth of natural reason. Since one premiss is a truth of Revelation, theological conclusions are spoken of as being mediately or virtually (*virtualiter*) revealed. If however both premisses are immediately revealed truths, then the conclusion also must be regarded as being immediately revealed and as the object of Immediate Divine Faith (*Fides Immediate Divina*).

2. *Dogmatic Facts* (*facta dogmatica*). By these are understood historical

facts, which are not revealed, but which are intrinsically connected with revealed truth, for example, the legality of a Pope or of a General Council, or the fact of the Roman episcopate of St. Peter. The fact that a defined text does or does not agree with the doctrine of the Catholic Faith is also, in a narrower sense, a "dogmatic fact." In deciding the meaning of a text the Church does not pronounce judgment on the subjective intention of the author, but on the objective sense of the text (D 1350: *sensum quem verba prae se ferunt*).

3. *Truths of Reason*, which have not been revealed, but which are intrinsically associated with a revealed truth, e.g., those philosophic truths which are presuppositions of the acts of Faith (knowledge of the supersensual, possibility of proofs of God, the spirituality of the soul, the freedom of will), or philosophic concepts, in terms of which dogma is promulgated (person, substance, transubstantiation, etc.). The Church has the right and the duty, for the protection of the heritage of Faith, of proscribing philosophic teachings which directly or indirectly endanger dogma. The Vatican Council declares: *Ius etiam et officium divinitus habet falsi nominis scientiam proscribendi* (D 1798).

§ 7. Theological Opinions

Theological opinions are free views on aspects of doctrines concerning Faith and morals, which are neither clearly attested in Revelation nor decided by the Teaching Authority of the Church. Their value depends upon the reasons adduced in their favour (association with the doctrine of Revelation, the attitude of the Church, etc.).

A point of doctrine ceases to be an object of free judgment when the Teaching Authority of the Church takes an attitude which is clearly in favour of one opinion. Pope Pius XII explains in the Encyclical "*Humani generis*" (1950): "When the Popes in their Acts intentionally pronounce a judgment on a long disputed point then it is clear to all that this, according to the intention and will of these Popes, can no longer be open to the free discussion of theologians" (D 3013).

§ 8. The Theological Grades of Certainty

1. The highest degree of certainty appertains to the immediately revealed truths. The belief due to them is based on the authority of God Revealing (*fides divina*), and if the Church, through its teaching, vouches for the fact that a truth is contained in Revelation, one's certainty is then also based on the authority of the Infallible Teaching Authority of the Church (*fides catholica*). If Truths are defined by a solemn judgment of faith (definition) of the Pope or of a General Council, they are "*de fide definita*."

2. Catholic truths or Church doctrines, on which the infallible Teaching Authority of the Church has finally decided, are to be accepted with a faith which is based on the sole authority of the Church (*fides ecclesiastica*). These truths are as infallibly certain as dogmas proper.

3. A Teaching proximate to Faith (*sententia fidei proxima*) is a doctrine, which is regarded by theologians generally as a truth of Revelation, but which has not yet been finally promulgated as such by the Church.

4. A Teaching pertaining to the Faith, i.e., theologically certain (*sententia ad fidem pertinens*, i.e., *theologicæ certa*) is a doctrine, on which the Teaching

Authority of the Church has not yet finally pronounced, but whose truth is guaranteed by its intrinsic connection with the doctrine of revelation (theological conclusions).

5. Common Teaching (*sententia communis*) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of the free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally.

6. Theological opinions of lesser grades of certainty are called probable, more probable, well-founded (*sententia probabilis, probabilius, bene fundata*). Those which are regarded as being in agreement with the consciousness of Faith of the Church are called pious opinions (*sententia pia*). The least degree of certainty is possessed by the tolerated opinion (*opinio tolerata*), which is only weakly founded, but which is tolerated by the Church.

With regard to the doctrinal teaching of the Church it must be well noted that not all the assertions of the Teaching Authority of the Church on questions of Faith and morals are infallible and consequently irrevocable. Only those are infallible which emanate from General Councils representing the whole episcopate, and the Papal Decisions *Ex Cathedra* (cf. D 1839). The ordinary and usual form of the Papal teaching activity is not infallible. Further, the decisions of the Roman Congregations (Holy Office, Bible Commission) are not infallible. Nevertheless normally they are to be accepted with an inner assent which is based on the high supernatural authority of the Holy See (*assensus internus supernaturalis, assensus religiosus*). The so-called "*silentium obsequiosum*," that is "reverent silence," does not generally suffice. By way of exception, the obligation of inner agreement may cease if a competent expert, after a renewed scientific investigation of all grounds, arrives at the positive conviction that the decision rests on an error.

§ 9. Theological Censures

By a theological censure is meant the judgment which characterises a proposition touching Catholic Faith or Moral Teaching as contrary to Faith or at least as doubtful. If it be pronounced by the Teaching Authority of the Church it is an authoritative or judicial judgment (*censura authentica or iudicialis*). If it be pronounced by Theological Science it is a private doctrinal judgment (*censura doctrinalis*).

The usual censures are the following: A Heretical Proposition (*propositio haeretica*). This signifies that the proposition is opposed to a formal dogma; a Proposition Proximate to Heresy (*propositio heresi proxima*) which signifies that the proposition is opposed to a truth which is proximate to the Faith (*Sent. fidei proxima*); a Proposition Savouring of or Suspect of heresy (*propositio haeresim sapiens or de haeresi suspecta*); an Erroneous Proposition (*prop. erronea*), i.e., opposed to a truth which is proposed by the Church as a truth intrinsically connected with a revealed truth (error in *fide ecclesiastica*) or opposed to the common teaching of theologians (error *theologicus*); a False Proposition (*prop. falsa*), i.e., contradicting a dogmatic fact; a Temerarious Proposition (*prop. temeraria*), i.e., deviating without reason from the general teaching; a Proposition Offensive to pious ears (*prop. piarum aurium offensiva*), i.e., offensive to religious feeling; a Proposition badly expressed (*prop. male sonans*), i.e., subject to misunderstanding by reason of its method of expression; a Captious Proposition (*prop. captiosa*), i.e., reprehensible because of its intentional ambiguity; a Proposition exciting scandal (*prop. scandalosa*).

As to the form of the censures a distinction is made between *Damnatio Specialis*, by which a censure is attached to an individual proposition, and the *Damnatio in Globo*, in which censures are imposed on a series of propositions.

BOOK ONE

The Unity and Trinity of God

PART I

The Unity of God : His Existence and Nature

SECTION I

The Existence of God

CHAPTER I

The Natural Knowability of the Existence of God

§ 1. The Possibility of the Natural Knowledge of God in the Light of Supernatural Revelation

1. Dogma

God, our Creator and Lord, can be known with certainty, by the natural light of reason from created things. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council defined : *Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, creatorem et Dominum nostrum per ea, quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, A.S.* "If anybody says that the one true God, Our Creator and Lord cannot be known with certainty in the light of human reason by those things which have been made, anathema sit " D 1806 ; cf. 1785, 1391.

The Vatican definition stresses the following points : 2) The object of our knowing is the one true God, our Creator and Lord, therefore an *extra-mundane*, personal God. b) The subjective principle of knowledge is natural reason in the condition of fallen nature. c) The means of knowledge are created things. d) The knowledge is from its nature and manner a knowledge of certitude. e) Such knowledge of God is possible, but it is not the only way of knowing Him.

2. Scriptural Proof

According to the testimony of Holy Writ, the existence of God can be known : a) from nature : Wis. 13, 1-9. V. 5 : "For by the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the creator of them may be seen." Rom. 1, 20 : "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. His eternal power and His divinity also : so that they are inexcusable." The knowledge of God witnessed to in these two passages is a natural, certain, immediate and easily achieved knowledge.

b) From conscience : Rom. 2, 14 et seq : "For when the Gentiles, who know not the (Mosaic) law do by nature these things that are of the law ; these, having not the law, are a law to themselves. Who shew the work of the law written in their hearts." The heathens (that is) know naturally, without supernatural revelation, the essential content of the Old Testament

law. In their hearts a law has been written whose binding power indicates a Supreme Lawgiver.

c) From history : Acts 14, 14-16 ; 17, 26-29. St. Paul, in his discourses at Lystra and at the Areopagus in Athens, shows that God reveals Himself in beneficent works also to the heathens, and that it is easy to find Him, as He is near to each of us : "For in Him we live, and move and are" (17, 28).

3. Proof from Tradition

The Fathers, in referring to the assertions of Holy Scripture, stress the possibility and the facility of the natural knowledge of God. Cf. Tertullian, *Apol.* 17 : "O testimony of the soul, which is by its nature Christian" (*O testimonium animae naturaliter christianae*). The Greek Fathers preferred the cosmological proofs of God which proceed from external experience ; the Latin Fathers preferred the psychological proofs which flow from inner experience. Cf. Theophilus of Antioch, *ad Autolyicum* 1 4-5 : "God has called everything into existence from nothing, so that His greatness might be known and understood through His works. Just as the soul in man is not seen, as it is invisible, but is known through the movement of the body, so God cannot be seen with human eyes ; but He is observed and known through providence and His works. Just as one, at the sight of a well-equipped ship which sweeps over the sea and steers towards a harbour, becomes aware that there is a helmsman on her, who directs her, so also one must be aware that God is the director of everything, even though He is not seen with bodily eyes, as He cannot be apprehended by them." Cf. St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 11, 9, 1 ; St. John Chrysostom, in *ep. ad Rom.* hom. 3, 2 (to 1, 19).

4. Innate Idea of God

Taking their stand on the authority of the Fathers, many Catholic theologians, for example, Ludwig Thomassinus, Heinrich Klee, Anton Staudenmaier, Johannes von Kuhn, taught that the idea of God is not acquired by deductive thinking from the world of experience, but is innate in man (*idea innata*). Certainly many of the Fathers, for example, St. Justin (*Apol.* 11, 6) and St. Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* V. 14, 133, 7) characterised the knowledge of God as automatic "not learned" "automatically learned" "implanted" self-taught : or as "a gift of the soul" (*animae dos* : Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* 1, 10). St. John of Damascus says : "The knowledge of the existence of God is implanted (by Him) in all in their nature" (*De fide orth.* 1 1). But as the same Fathers teach that we must win the knowledge of God from the contemplation of Nature, therefore, according to their conception, what is innate is not the idea of God as such, but the ability easily and to a certain extent spontaneously to know the existence of God from His works. Cf. St. Thomas, in *Boethium De Trinitate*, q. 1. a 3 ad 6 : *eius cognitio nobis innata dicitur esse, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse*. The knowledge of Him is said to be innate in us in so far as we can easily know the existence of God by means of principles which are innate in us.

§ 2. The Possibility of a Proof of God's Existence

The Existence of God can be proved by means of causality. (*Sent. fidei proxima*.)

The traditionalists, L. E. Bautain († 1867) and A. Bonnetty († 1879), having been reproved by the Teaching Authority of the Church, signed the assertion that reason can with certainty, prove the existence of God : *Ratiocinatio potest*

cum certitudine probare existentiam Dei. D 1622, 1650. Pope Pius X extended the Vatican Definition of the natural knowability of God in the anti-Modernist oath (1910) by the more exact statement, that the existence of God can formally be proved through reason by means of the principle of causality: *Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali rationis lumine per ea quae facta sunt, hoc est, per visibilia creationis opera, tamquam causam per effectus certo cognosci, adeoque demonstrari etiam posse*. God, the beginning and end of all things can be known with certainty, by the natural light of reason, as a cause is known by its effects, from those things that are made, that is by the visible works of creation and can equally be demonstrated (to be). D 2145.

The possibility of the proof of God flows:

a) From the dogma of the natural knowability of God; for the proof of God's existence is distinguished from the elementary knowledge of God only in that the basis for the knowledge is proposed in a more scientific form.

b) From the fact that since the time of the Fathers, theologians have adduced proofs of the existence of God. Cf. Aristides, *Apol.* 1, 1-3: Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolyicum* 1 5: Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 17, 4 et seq.: 18, 4; St. Augustine, *De vera religione* 30-32: Conf. X 6; XI 4; St. John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 1 3.

Scholasticism, in its greatest exponents, has unshakably adhered to the demonstrability of the existence of God. The scholastic proofs of God found their classical formulation in St. Thomas Aquinas (S. th. 1 2, 3: S.c.G. 1 13). It was only in the era of late scholasticism that influential representatives of nominalism (Wilhelm of Ockham, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Peter of Ailly), in consequence of their scepticism, began to doubt the certainty of the proofs of God's existence.

These proofs are based on the absolute validity of the principle of causality, which St. Thomas formulates thus: *Omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur* (moveri=transition from potency to act). While Kant, under the influence of David Hume, limited the validity of this to the world of experience, St. Thomas establishes its transcendental validity, which far surpasses the world of experience, by reference to the self-evident principle of contradiction. S. th. I 1, 2, 3.

§ 3. Errors Regarding the Natural Knowability of God

1. Traditionalism

Traditionalism, which developed as a reaction against the rationalism of the Enlightenment, proceeds from the view that God, in a comprehensive primitive Revelation, bestowed on man simultaneously with speech a sum of religious and moral basic truths, which have been reproduced in mankind through tradition. General reason (*raison générale*) or common sense (*sens commun*) guarantees the unfalsified transference of the original heritage of the Revelation. The individual receives it through oral teaching. Reason cannot achieve of itself the knowledge of the existence of God (scepticism). The knowledge of God is, like every religious and moral knowledge, a knowledge of faith: *Deum esse traditur sive creditur*. The chief exponents of traditionalism in its strict form are L. G. A. de Bonald, F. de Lamennais and L. E. Bautain. It was represented in a moderated form by A. Bonnetty and G. Ventura. This theory was condemned by Pope Gregory XVI (D 1622/27), Pope Pius IX (D 1649/52) and by the Vatican Council (D 1785 et seq. 1806).

The semi-traditionalists of the School of Löwe (G. C. Ubaghs, † 1875) admit, indeed, that natural reason from the contemplation of natural things

can with certainty recognise the existence of God, but only on the supposition that it has already, through instruction, imbibed the idea of God originating from the primitive Revelation.

Traditionalism is to be rejected on philosophical and theological grounds : a) Language does not generate concepts, it presupposes them. b) Acceptance of the Revelation presupposes, according to reason, knowledge of the Revealing God, and the certain conviction of the truth of His testimony.

2. Atheism

The systems of agnosticism, scepticism, and Kantian criticism deny the certain knowability and the demonstrability of the existence of God, but can be associated with the belief in a Divine Being. They are based on the principle : We do not know and we shall not know (*Ignoramus et ignorabimus*).

Negative atheism is inculpable ignorance regarding the existence of God. Positive atheism (materialism, pantheism) directly denies the existence of a supramundane, personal Divine Being. It was condemned by the Vatican Council. D 1801-1803.

As far as the possibility of atheism is concerned, it cannot be denied that there are atheistic doctrinal systems (materialism, pantheism) and practical atheists, that is, people who live as if there were no God. The possibility, that there are also subjectively convinced theoretical atheists, is founded in the spiritual and moral weakness of man, and on the fact that the proofs of God are not immediately, but only mediately evident. But as the knowledge of God can easily be gained from the contemplation of nature and the life of the soul, it will not be possible permanently to adhere to an honest and positive conviction of the non-existence of God. An inculpable and invincible ignorance regarding the existence of God is not possible for a long time in a normal, grown-up person, in view of the facility of the natural knowledge of God attested in Holy Writ and in Tradition. Cf. Rom. 1, 20 ; *ita ut sint inexcusabiles*.

Kant's Critique

While Kant in his pre-critical period recognised the possibility of the proofs of God, and even developed the ideological proof of God (cf. the article published in 1763 : "The only possible ground of proof for a demonstration of the existence of God"), in his critical period he denied the validity of all proofs of God (cf. the "Critique of Pure Reason" which appeared in 1781). According to Kant, the only object of theoretical reason is the world of phenomena ; the supersensual is withdrawn from it. The validity of the principle of causality is limited to things perceptible to the senses. In order to refute the individual proofs of God's existence, Kant sought to show that they all go back to the ontological argument, by deriving from the concept of the Supreme Reality its factual existence. Nevertheless, Kant believed in the existence of God and designated this belief the postulate of practical reason.

Kant's philosophy exercised a decisive influence on the Protestant theology of the 19th century. From the standpoint of the Kantian doctrine of cognition it rejected the rational foundation of religion, and with it the intellectual proofs of the existence of God, and taught that religious truths must be perceived, not by reason, but through religious feeling, which affirms the existence of God and by which we live in God. They claimed that it is on this subjective religious experience that Faith is founded. The consequence is a sharp separation of the spheres of knowledge and of Faith (Jacobi Schleiermacher, Ritschl, A. Harnack).

4. Modernism

The cognitional theoretical basis of Modernism is agnosticism, according to which human rational cognition is limited to the world of experience. Religion

according to this theory, develops from the principle of vital immanence (immanentism) that is, from the need for God which dwells in the human soul. The truths of religion are, according to the general progress of culture, caught up in a constant substantial development (evolutionism).

CHAPTER 2

The Supernatural Knowability of the Existence of God

§ 4. God's Existence as an Object of Faith

1. Dogma

God's existence is not merely an object of natural rational knowledge, but also an object of supernatural faith. (*De fide.*)

In the beginning of all the formulas of the Faith stands the fundamental article: *Credo in unum Deum*. I believe in one God. The Vatican Council teaches: *Sancta catholica apostolica Romana Ecclesia credit et confitetur unum esse Deum*; The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is a God. D 1782. The denial of God's existence is condemned as heresy by the same Council. D 1801.

According to Hebr. 11, 6 faith in the existence of God is an indispensable condition of salvation: "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who wishes to approach God must believe that He is: and that He is a rewarder to them that seek Him." But only supernatural Faith in Revelation is effective unto salvation (cf. D 798, 1173).

The supernatural Revelation of the existence of God confirms the natural knowledge of God, and enables the existence of God to be known easily by all with certainty and without any admixture of error (D 1786; *ab omnibus expedite, firma certitudine et nullo admixte errore*)—relative or moral necessity of the Revelation (cf. S. th. I 1, 1; S.c.G. I 4.)

2. Knowledge and Faith as Regards the Same Object

It is a disputed point whether one and the same person can at the same time have knowledge and faith in the existence of God. Many outstanding scholastic theologians (Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus) and many later theologians (Suarez) assert that such is possible, because the formal object is different (natural insight—Divine Revelation), and because both acts or habits belong to different orders of being (nature-grace). St. Thomas, on the contrary, teaches: "It is impossible for the same truth to be known and believed by the same person": *impossible est, quod ab eodem idem sit scitum et creditum* (S. th. 2 11, 1, 5). As ground for this he submits that the clear insight into the truth associated with knowledge cannot co-exist with the obscurity of faith. It is, however, possible, that the same truth could be known by one person and believed by another. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, it is also possible for the same person at the one time to have a natural knowledge of the existence of God as the originator of the natural order, and a supernatural faith in the existence of God as the originator of the supernatural order, because the supernatural faith comprehends truths which are not contained in natural knowledge (difference of the material object). (Cf. S. th. 2 11 1, 5.)

SECTION 2

The Nature of God

CHAPTER I

The Knowledge of the Nature of God

§ 5. The Natural Knowledge of the Nature of God in This World

As the knowledge of the existence of a thing is not possible without some cognition of its constitution, so in the natural knowledge of the existence of God there is always a certain knowledge of His Nature. Every single proof of God reveals a definite perfection of the Divine Nature. The naturally achievable knowledge of God is deepened and extended by supernatural revelation.

1. Constitution of our Natural Knowledge of God in This World

a) Mediate knowledge

Our natural knowledge of God in this world is not an immediate, intuitive cognition, but a mediate, abstractive knowledge, because it is attained through the knowledge of creatures. (*Sent. certa.*)

In opposition to the teaching of the Church, Ontologism (Malebranche, † 1715, Gioberti, † 1852) teaches that, even in this life, we possess from nature an immediate, intuitive knowledge of God, and that in the light of the immediate knowledge of God we become cognisant of created things. The order of knowledge must correspond to the order of being. God, as the First Being, must therefore also be the primary object of knowledge: *Primum esse ontologicum debet esse etiam primum logicum* (Gioberti).

Ontologism is incompatible with the doctrine of the General Council of Vienna (1311/12), according to which the soul requires the supernatural light of glory for the immediate knowledge of God (D 475). In 1861 and 1887 the Holy Office rejected several ontological assertions. (D 1659 et seq., 1891 et seq.).

Holy Writ proves, on the one hand, that the natural knowledge of God is attained through created things (cf. Wis. 13, 1 : *operibus attendentes* : Rom. 1, 20 : *per ea quae facti sunt*), and on the other hand, that no human being is capable of seeing God immediately, but that the vision of God is reserved for the other life. Cf. 1 Tim. 6, 16 : "He inhabiteth light inaccessible ; whom no one hath seen, nor can see." 1 Cor. 13, 12 : "Now we see Him through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face."

Ontologism also contradicts the testimony of consciousness, and in its consequences leads to pantheism and rationalism. The ontologists, quite wrongly,

appeal to the teaching of St. Augustine of the knowledge *in rationibus aeternis*; for St. Augustine without doubt teaches a mediate cognition of God, which proceeds from the contemplation of the human soul or of the external world, and which ascends to God.

b) Analogical cognition

Our knowledge of God here below is not proper (cognitio propria) but analogical (cognitio analogica or analogica). (Sent. certa.)

While cognition properly so-called comprehends an object through its own mental form (per speciem propriam) or by immediate vision, analogical cognition comprehends an object through an alien form (per speciem alienam). In the cognition of God in this world we apply concepts gained from created things to God on the ground of a certain similarity and ordination of the created things to Him as their efficient and exemplary cause. There is a relation of analogy between the creature and the Creator which is founded on the fact that the creature is necessarily made to the likeness of the Creator. This analogy is the basis of all natural knowledge of God (cf. Wis. 13, 5). This so-called analogy of being (analogia entis) is sharply rejected by K. Barth as the "invention of anti-Christ." Despite this analogy or similarity, there is a much greater dissimilarity between the creature and the Creator, namely the dissimilarity between the finite and the infinite.

2. Method of the Natural Knowledge of God Here Below

Our cognition of God in this world, comes as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite taught, by the three-fold way of affirmation, negation and eminence.

a) The way of Affirmation or Causality (*θέσις*) proceeds from the consideration that God is the efficient cause of all things, and that the efficient cause contains in itself every perfection which is in the effect. From this it follows that God, the Originator of all creatures, possesses every true perfection of the creatures. The pure perfections are formally ascribed to God. The mixed perfections, which contain something finite in their concept, are ascribed to God in a transferred sense (metaphorically or anthropomorphically) only.

b) The way of Negation (*ἀφαίρεσις*) denies to God every imperfection which is found in created things, also the circumscription attached to imperfections of created things, deriving from their finiteness. Such negation of an imperfection implies affirmation and eminence (for example, infinite=absence of limit, i.e., fullness of being).

Under the influence of the theology of the Neo-platonists, certain individual Fathers make use of such formulations as: "God is not substance, not light, not life, not sense, not spirit, not wisdom, not goodness" (Pseudo-Dionysius, Myst. theol. c. 3). They do not wish to deny to God these perfections, but to assert that these perfections do not belong to God in the same manner as they do to creatures, but in an infinitely higher manner.

c) The Way of Eminence enables us to deduce, from the finite perfections of creatures, the possession by God of infinite analogous perfections.

The three modes of cognition complement one another. For the attributing of a perfection to God demands the attribution of it to Him eminently, and the negation of every imperfection. Cf. Eccles. 43, 29 (G 27) et seq. St. John of Damascus, De fide orth. I 12.

3. Imperfection of the Knowledge of God Here Below

God's Nature is incomprehensible to men. (*De fide.*)

Our knowledge of God in this world is a composition of many inadequate concepts, and on account of this composition, it is necessarily limited and imperfect. The 4th Lateran Council (1215) and the Vatican Council, call God "incomprehensible" (*incomprehensibilis*), the Lateran Council also calls Him "ineffable" (*ineffabilis*). D 428, 1782. Cf. Jer. 32, 19 (according to the Vulgate: *Magnus consilio et incomprehensibilis cogitatu*: "great in council and incomprehensible in thought"). Rom. 11, 33: "How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His ways!"

The Fathers, notably St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, defend the incomprehensibility of the Divine Essence by indicating the infinity and the sublimity of God in comparison with all creatures, against the Eunomians, who assumed an exhaustive (adequate or comprehensive) cognition of God, and indeed even in this world. St. Augustine says: "More true than our speech about God is our thinking of Him, and more true than our thinking is His Being" (*Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur et verius est quam cogitatur*; *De Trin.* VII 4, 7). Only God possesses a comprehensive knowledge of God; for the Infinite Being can be completely comprehended by an Infinite Intellect only. Cf. S. th. I 12, 7: "God whose Being is infinite, is infinitely knowable. No created understanding can, however, know God in an infinite manner."

4. Truth of the Knowledge of God in This World

Although our knowledge of God in this world is imperfect, still it is true, because God really possesses the perfections attributed to Him, and because we are conscious of the analogous character of our knowledge of God and of our assertions concerning Him.

§ 6. The Supernatural Knowledge of the Divine Essence in the Other World

1. Reality of the Immediate Vision of God

The blessed in Heaven possess an immediate intuitive knowledge of the Divine Essence. (*De fide.*)

Pope Benedict XII defined in the dogmatic constitution "*Benedictus Deus*" (1336): *vident* (sc. *animae sanctorum*) *divinam essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratione obiecti visi se habente, sed divine essentia immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente*. They (the souls of the just) see the divine essence by an intuitive vision and face to face, so that the divine essence is known immediately, showing itself nakedly clearly and openly, and not mediately through any creature. D 530. The Council of Florence (1438/45) determined the object of the knowledge of God in the other world as follows: *intui*ri (sc. *animas sanctorum*) *clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est*. (to know God one and three as He is) D 693.

The most apposite passage in Holy Writ is 1 Cor. 13, 12, in which the Apostle contrasts the mirror-like, enigmatical and piecemeal knowledge of

God in this world with the immediate and clear knowledge of God in the other world: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner: but then face to face. Now I know in part: but then I shall know even as I am known." St. John describes the future state which is prepared for the children of God on earth, with the words: "We shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is" (*videbimus eum, sicuti est*: 1 John 3, 2). Cf. Mt. 5, 8: 18, 10; 2 Cor. 5, 7.

The older Fathers, using the simple words of Holy Scripture, teach that the angels and saints are vouchsafed a real vision of God, and behold Him face to face. Cf. St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* IV 20; V 7, 2. Since the middle of the 4th century, some Fathers, like St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, appear to dispute the possibility of an immediate vision of God. Their assertions in point of fact can, however, be explained as being directed against Eunomius, who claimed an immediate cognition of God, even in this world. In contrast to this, the Fathers stress that the knowledge of God in this world is mediate, in the next world immediate, but not comprehensive. St. John Chrysostom compares the vision of God in the other world with the sight of the transfigured Christ on Tabor and says: "What shall be said when Royalty Itself appears, when the palace is opened, and it is permitted to view the King Himself, no longer enigmatically nor in a glass, but face to face, no longer in faith but in vision" (*Ad Theodorum lapsus* I 11).

To the corporeal eye, even in the transfigured state, God is invisible, since God is a pure spirit, and the corporeal eye is able to see corporeal objects only. St. Augustine, *Ep.* 92 and 147; *S. th.* I 12, 3.

2. Object of the Immediate Vision of God

a) The primary object of the immediate vision of God is the Infinite Divine Essence in its Triune fullness of personal life (*ipse Deus trinus et unus, sicuti est*). D 693.

b) The secondary object consists in the extra-Divine things, which are seen in God as the origin of all things. The scope of this knowledge is different in the individual blessed according to the grade of their immediate cognition of God; the latter, however, is determined by the measure of their supernatural merits (D 693). One may assume with St. Thomas that the glorified spirit in God in any case sees all that pertains to it. Cf. *S. th.* III 10, 2: *nulli intellectu beato deest, quin cognoscat in Verbo omnia, quae ad ipsum spectant* (nothing is lacking to the knowledge of a beatus of things which pertain to him; he knows all (these) in the Word).

3. Supernatural Character of the Immediate Vision of God

The Immediate Vision of God transcends the natural power of cognition of the human soul, and is therefore supernatural. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Vienne (1311/12) rejected the false teaching of the Beghards and Beguines: *quod anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam elevante ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum*. That the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see and enjoy God. D 475. According to the general

teaching of theologians, the immediate vision of God is a gift absolutely exceeding the natural potentiality of every created and creatable intellect and hence it is absolutely supernatural.

Holy Scripture asserts that the immediate knowledge of the Divine Essence is inaccessible to natural reason. 1 Tim. 6, 16. "God habiteth light inaccessible : whom no one hath seen, nor can see." The vision of the Divine Essence belongs by its very nature, only to God. John 1, 18 : "No man hath seen God ; the Only Begotten God (Vulg : Son), who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." Cf. Mt. 11, 27 ; John 6, 46 ; 1 Cor. 2, 11.

Speculatively the absolute supernatural character of the immediate vision of God may be demonstrated from the principle : *Cognitum est in cognoscente, secundum modum cognoscentis*. As the nature is so is the cognition. When the mode of being of the object of cognition is higher than the mode of being of the subject of cognition, then the latter is from its nature incapable of immediately knowing the object of cognition in its essence. God is Subsistent Being (*ipsum esse subsistens*) while every created intellect has a communicated being (*esse participatum*) only. Therefore it lies beyond the cognitive power of every created intellect immediately to know the Essence of God. Cf. S. th. I 12, 4. On account of its absolute supernatural character the immediate vision of God is a mystery *stricté dictum* (strictly so called).

One may, with St. Augustine and St. Thomas, assume that the human intellect can, even on earth, be elevated supernaturally and exceptionally (*et supernaturaliter et praeter communem ordinem*) to the immediate vision of God. As examples are quoted Moses (Ex. 33, 11 ; Num 12, 8) and St. Paul (2 Cor. 12, 2 et seq.). Cf. St. Augustine, Ep. 147, 13, 31-32 ; S. th. I 12, 11 ad 2.

4. Necessity of the Light of Glory for the Immediate Vision of God

The possibility of the elevation of the soul to the immediate vision of God is founded on the one hand, on the soul's likeness to God, i.e., on its immateriality (Gn. 1, 26 et seq.), and on the other hand, on the omnipotence of God. Cf. S. th. I 12, 4 ad 3.

The soul, for the Immediate Vision of God, requires the light of glory. (*De fide. D 475.*)

Lumen gloriae is as necessary for the mode of cognition of the state of glory as is *lumen rationis* for the mode of cognition of the state of nature, and *lumen fidei* for the mode of cognition of the state of faith. It consists in a lasting supernatural perfecting of the human power of cognition, through which it is inwardly strengthened for the vital act of the immediate vision of the Divine Essence. (Cf. S. th. I 12, 5 ad 2 : *perfectio quaedam intellectus confortans ipsum ad videndum Deum.*) In its ontological nature it must be considered as a supernatural operative habit bestowed upon reason. The habit of the light of glory dissolves the habit of faith. The expression which is first found in St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas, goes back to Ps. 35, 10 : *in lumine tuo videbimus lumen*.

5. Limits to the Immediate Vision of God

God's Essence is also incomprehensible to the blessed in Heaven. (*De fide.*)

The blessed in Heaven also possess no adequate or comprehensive cognition of the Divine Being. God is for every created spirit even in the state of supernatural elevation, incomprehensible (*incomprehensibilis*). Cf. D 418, 1782 : Jer. 32, 19 (according to the Vulgate : *incomprehensibilis cogitatu*). In the times of the Fathers, St. John Chrysostom especially, in his 12 Homilies Dei *incomprehensibili*, has defended the incomprehensibility of God against the Eunomians.

The intrinsic basis of the incomprehensibility of God lies in the boundless abyss between the Infinite Divine Spirit and the finite created spirit. The finite spirit can understand the infinite Essence of God in a finite manner only : *Videt infinitum, sed non infinite*. Cf. S. th. I 12, 7 ad 3.

§ 7. The Supernatural Knowledge of the Divine Being in This World through Faith

The order of grace in this world is a preliminary stage and a preparation for the glory in the world to come : *gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur, quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in nobis*. S. th. 2 II, 24, 3 ad 2. Supernatural faith here below corresponds to the immediate vision of God in the other world ; *lumen fidei* corresponds to *lumen gloriae*. Faith is a kind of anticipation of the vision of God in the world to come.

1. Relation to the Natural Knowledge of God

Knowledge of faith is distinguished from natural knowledge of God by the principle of cognition (*ratio fide illustrata*), the means of cognition (*revelatio divina*), and the formal object (God, as He is known through Revelation : *Deus unus et trinus*). The principal object of supernatural faith lies in the mysteries of faith which are known by Divine Revelation (*mysteria in Deo abscondita, quae, nisi revelata divinius, innotescere non possunt* : D 1795). The Divine Revelation guarantees the infallible certainty of the truths of Faith (*certitudo evidentialae*). The truths of Faith have therefore a higher degree of certitude than the natural truths of reason. But from the viewpoint of clarity or intelligibility (*certitudo evidentialae*) the natural truths of reason are higher than the truths of Faith, because in the former we possess an inner insight, in the latter, however, we do not. In this sense the frequently cited saying of Hugo of St. Victor († 1141) is valid, namely, that the certitude of Faith is of a lower grade than natural knowledge (*De sacramentis christ. fidei* I 10, 2 : *Fidem esse certitudinem quandam animi de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constitutam*). Cf. S. th. 2 II 4, 8.

2. Relation to the Immediate Vision of God

In relation to the vision of God in the other world the supernatural cognition of Faith, although it also is a participation in the Divine self-cognition, is still imperfect. The basic truths of Faith are beyond the power of comprehension of the human reason, and even after the Revelation, still remain obscure and mysterious. 2 Cor. 5, 7 : "We walk by faith and not by sight." Cf. D 1796. As supernatural Revelation takes its concepts from the created world, so also the cognition of Faith is analogical. 1 Cor. 13, 12 : "Now we see through a glass in a dark manner."

CHAPTER 2

The Nature of God in Itself

§ 8. The Biblical Names of God

As the Nature of God cannot be adequately conceived by the mind, it cannot be expressed in a perfectly corresponding name. Hence the Fathers designate God as "unnameable, inexpressible" (*ἄρρητος*, ineffabilis) and "nameless" (*ἄνώνυμος*). The manifold names which Holy Writ applies to God express more the Operations than the Nature of God. According to the various operations, God can be called by various names, for which reason Pseudo-Dionysius calls Him the "Many-named" (*πολυνώνυμος*) or the "All-named" (*πανώνυμος*). Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *De div. nominibus* I, 6; 12, 1; St. John of Damascus, *De fide. orth.* I 12.

Following Scheeben (*Dogmatik* I. n. 84 et seq.), the seven "Holy Names" of the Old Testament may be divided into three groups, the first of which determines the relation of God to the world and to mankind (El=The Strong, the Powerful: Elohim=He Who possesses the Fullness of Power: Adonai=Lord, Commander, Judge). The second group designates more the intrinsic perfections of God (Schaddai=The Mighty One, Eljon=The Highest; Kadosch=The Holy). The third group comprehends the proper name and the essential name (Jahweh).

The real name of the true God is Jahweh. It is linguistically derived from hawa, a related form of haje=to be; it means; he is. The Septuagint renders the form 'ehje=I am (or 'ascher 'ehje=the I am) by which God designates Himself in Ex. 3, 14 by *ὁ ὢν*=The Being One, while it regularly paraphrases the form Jahweh by the expression *κύριος*=Lord, which was a current Greek designation for God. God Himself revealed His name to Moses, when He, in answer to the question as to His name, replied "I AM WHO AM" ('ehje 'ascher 'ehje). "You shall say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS, hath sent me to you. . . . The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, hath sent me to you. This is my name for ever, and this is my memorial unto all generations." (Ex. 3, 14 et seq.) According to Ex. 6, 3 God Himself revealed Himself, in the first instance to Moses, by His proper name of Jahweh, while He appeared to the Patriarchs as El schaddai. The Biblical narrator used the name Jahweh, foreseeing the later Revelation, even in the story of Paradise, and puts it into the history of the Patriarchs, even into the mouth of the fathers and of God Himself. (Gn. 15, 2, 7.) In agreement with this, Gn. 4, 26, "This man began to call upon the name of the Lord," is not to be understood as an invocation of the name of God in virtue of the use of the word Jahweh, but as a general adoration of God. In the pre-Mosaic era the name Jahweh cannot with certainty be established either within or without Israel. The New Testament takes over the Old Testament designations of God as found in the Septuagint, and makes the appellation Father, which occurs only in a few places in the Old Testament, the centre of the Christian Revelation.

§ 9. The Physical and Metaphysical Nature of God

1. The Physical Essence of God

The physical essence of God is the totality of the Divine perfections which are

factually identical among themselves. Cf. the enumeration of the Divine attributes by the 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council. D 428, 1782.

2. The Metaphysical Nature of God

The metaphysical nature of God is the basic determining factor of the Divine Essence. According to our analogical conception, it is the fundamental note of the Deity which distinguishes It from all created things, and which is the source and origin of all the other Divine perfections. Various opinions have been advanced on this point :

a) The Nominalists wrongly place the metaphysical essence of God in the sum of all His perfections (*cumulus omnium perfectionum*) and thus equate the physical and the metaphysical essence.

b) The Scotists see the metaphysical essence of God in His radical infinity (*infinitas radicalis*), that is, in that quality by which God possesses all perfections in infinite measure. This view, however, leaves unsolved the question of the final basis of the infinity. Infinity is a mode of being only, not the metaphysical essence itself.

c) Many Thomists would find the metaphysical essence of God in His absolute intellectuality, which they define either as absolute spirituality (*intelligere radicale*), or as formal intellectuality (*intelligere actuale, intellectio subsistens*). Against both opinions the objection is made that they do not give the ultimate root of all perfections, but a characteristic derived therefrom. Absolute Spirit-Being implies absolute being, *intelligere subsistens* presupposes *esse subsistens*.

d) The opinion best founded in Scripture and Tradition is that the metaphysical essence of God consists in this that It is Subsistent Being (*ipsum esse subsistens*). As distinct from created things, which have received being (*. . . existentia*) from another being (*esse participatum*), God has His Being of Himself and through Himself by virtue of His own perfection of Essence. God is Being Itself, the Absolute Being, the Subsisting Being. In God essence and existence coincide. The concept of Absolute Being excludes all non-being, and all merely potential being. Consequently, God is pure act (*actus purus*) without any admixture of potentiality (*actus purus sine omni permixtione potentiae*).

This opinion, which follows the Thomistic definition, is held by many theologians, who conceive the metaphysical essence of God to be *Aseity*, which, however, is not to be understood in the negative sense of not having been made (*ἀγενεσία*) or in being independent of a cause since this is only a mode of being, but in the positive sense of self-actualisation.

Foundation

a) In Ex. 3, 14 et seq., God revealed His proper name and His essential name : "I AM WHO I AM," that is, I AM HE Whose Essence is expressed in the words : "I am." God is therefore purely and simply Being (He who is ; *ὁ ὢν*). His Essence is Being. Israel, however, did not yet grasp the full sense of the Revelation vouchsafed to it ; it understood the name Jahweh as He who is always, the Constant, the True, the Helper, as He had shown Himself to be in the history of Israel (cf. Is. 43, 11). Later Scriptural texts express the absolute being of God by designating Jahweh as the First and Last, as the Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and End, as He Who Is, Who Was, and Who Shall

Come. Cf. Is. 41, 4; 44, 6; 48, 12; Acts, I, 4, 8, 17; 21, 6; 22, 13. Wis. 13, 1 calls God, as does Ex. 3, 14 He Who Is (*τὸν ὄντα*) and contrasts Him with the visible things which have received being from Him. The characteristic of absolute Being, expressed in the name Jahweh, distinguishes God from all non-living beings. Cf. Is. 42, 8: "I am the Lord; this is my name. I will not give my glory to another, nor my praise to graven things."

b) The Patristic writers and the Schoolmen accept the name of the Divine Essence given in Ex. 3, 14, and regard Absolute Being as that concept by which we state the Essence of God most fundamentally. St. Hilarius, full of wonderment at the Divine self-designation, says: "Nothing can be conceived which is more appropriate to God than Being" (De Trin. I, 5). St. Gregory Nazianzus remarks on Ex. 3, 14: "God was always, is, and will always be: or rather, He is always; for 'was' and 'will be' are divisions of our time and of nature which is in constant flow. But He is the Constant Being; and thus He called Himself, when He answered Moses on the mountain. He holds sealed off in Himself the whole fullness of being, which has neither a beginning nor an end, like an endless and boundless ocean of being, transcending every notion of time and (created) nature" (Orat. 45, 3). St. Augustine, referring to Ex. 3, 14, says that God has called Himself the Very Being (*ipsum esse*). He alone is the immutable Being, which is the True Being (Enarr. in Ps. 134, 4). St. John Damascene remarks that the name "He Who Is" (*ὁ ὢν*) is the most appropriate of all the Divine names. (De fide orth. I 9).

St. Bernard says: "One may call God good or great or blessed or wise or whatever one will, all is contained in the phrase 'Est' (=He is)" (De consid. V 6). St. Thomas teaches: "Cuius (sc. Dei) essentia est ipsum suum esse" (De ente et essentia c. 6). As only in God is essence one with existence, he sees in the name "He Who Is" (*qui est*) the appropriate proper name of God. S. th. I 13, 11.

c) The concept of *ipsum esse subsistens* (in the positive sense) fulfils all conditions necessary for the determination of the metaphysical essence of God.

d) *Ipsum Esse Subsistens* does not designate a mere mode of being, but that perfection which, according to our analogical thinking, is fundamental to God and which is the summing-up of His Essence. Cf. The proofs of God which proceed from *esse participatum* (participated Being) to *Subsistent Being*.

β) *Ipsum Esse Subsistens* distinguishes God fundamentally from all created things, which only possess being, but which are not being itself. The being of created things is a limited being, and in comparison with the Being of God it is more non-being than being. "They cannot be compared with Him, because they are from Him: but compared with Him they are not, because the True Being is an immutable being, and that is He alone" (Enarr. in Ps. 134, 4). *Ipsum Esse Subsistens* also distinguishes God from abstract or general being; for the latter is of such a nature that it has not any objective reality without the addition of further characteristics, while the Absolute Divine Being is such that nothing can be added to it. Abstract being is the poorest concept in point of content, while absolute being is the richest. Cf. St. Thomas, De ente et essentia c. 6.

Ipsum Esse Subsistens is the root from which all the other Divine perfections may logically be derived. As God is the Absolute Being he must contain in Himself all the perfections of being. Cf. S. th. I 4, 2 ad 3. Nulla de perfectionibus essendi potest deesse ei, quod est ipsum esse subsistens.

Appendix

Hermann Schell († 1906) sought to give the concept of the Divine *Ascity* a richer content by extending the idea of causation to God, and formulated the dictum : *Deus est causa Sui* (God is His Own Cause). He claimed that *Ascity* is to be conceived as self-causation, self-realisation, self-inauguration of the Divine Essence. God, according to him, is not the fullness of being, as the Schoolmen asserted, but the fullness of activity and of life.

Schell's concept of God, which goes back to Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas, contradicts the principle of causality, according to which all that is moved must be moved by another thing, as well as the principle of contradiction on which the principle of causality is based ; for an essence which causes itself must have been effective before it exists, that is, be and not be. God is not *causa sui*, but *ratio sui*, that is, He has the reason of His existence in Himself. In a wider, improper sense, following the precedent of St. Jerome (In ep. ad Ephes. II 3, 14 : *ipse sui origo est suaeque causa substantiae*), individual Schoolmen apply the concept "*causa sui*" to God. St. Augustine rejected the idea of the Divine self-origination and with it self-causation. Cf. De. Trin. I 1, 1. Sc. G. I 18 : *nihil est causa sui ipsius ; esset enim prius seipso, quod est impossibile*. (nothing is the cause of itself since that implies that it had existed prior to itself, which is impossible).

SECTION 3

The Attributes or the Qualities of God

§ 10. The Attributes of God in General

1. Concept

The attributes or properties of God are perfections which, according to our analogical mode of thinking, proceed from the metaphysical substance of God and belong to it. Hence, we only know being of the absolutely simple Divine Substance "in part" (1 Cor. 13, 9), i.e., in a multiplicity of inadequate concepts, by which we know individual perfections of God truly but inadequately.

2. Difference between the Attributes and the Essence of God

a) The Divine Attributes are really identical among themselves and with the Divine Essence. (*De fide.*)

The reason lies in the absolute simplicity of God. The acceptance of a real distinction (*distinctio realis*) would lead to acceptance of a composition in God, and with that to a dissolution of the Godhead. In the year 1148, a Synod at Rheims, in the presence of Pope Eugene III, condemned, on the instance of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, the doctrine of Gilbert of Poitiers, who, according to the accusation of his opponents, posited a real distinction between God and Godhead (*Deus-Divinitas*), between the Divine Persons and Their properties (*Pater-paternitas*), and, according to the accounts of his opponents, also, between the Divine Essence and the Divine Attributes. This accusation can hardly be demonstrated from Gilbert's writings. Against this doctrine, the Synod asserted the factual identity of God with the Godhead, that is with the Divine Nature and the Persons, as well as of God and His Attributes: *Credimus et confitemur simplicem naturam divinitatis esse Deum nec aliquo sensu catholico posse negari, quin divinitas sit Deus et Deus divinitas . . . credimus, nonnisi ea sapientia, quae est ipse Deus, sapientem esse, nonnisi ea magnitudine, quae est ipse Deus, magnum esse est.* (We believe and confess that the divine nature in itself is (identical with) God nor, in any way consonant with Catholic doctrine, can we deny that the divinity is God and God is the divinity. . . . We believe that God is wise by that wisdom which is God Himself, that God is great by that greatness which is God Himself). D 389. The Union Council of Florence explained in the *Decretum pro Jacobitis* (1441): "(in God) all is one, where an opposition of relation does not exist." D 703.

In the Greek Church, the 14th century mystic-quietistic Sect of the Hesychasts or Palamites (so-called after the monk Gregory Palamas († 1359) taught a real distinction between the Divine Essence (*οὐσία*) and the Divine Efficacy or the Divine attributes (*ἐνέργεια*). While the former was claimed to be

unknowable, the latter was claimed to be vouchsafed to humanity in a condition of contemplative prayer (*ἡσυχία*) through an uncreated Divine light ("Taborlight"). With this they distinguished a higher and a lower, an invisible and a visible side of the Godhead.

Holy Scripture indicates the identity of the Essence and the attributes of God, when it says: "God is charity" (John 4, 8). St. Augustine teaches: "What God has, that He is" (*Quod habet, hoc est*: De civ. Dei XI 10, 1). Gilbert's opponents summed up the ecclesiastical doctrine advanced against his error in the words attributed to St. Augustine: *Quidquid in Deo est Deus est*.

Again, the distinction is not a mere mental distinction, as the Eunomians in the 4th and 5th centuries, and the Nominalists in later medieval times taught. According to the Eunomians, all names and attributes of God are synonyms, which express nothing other than *agennésie* (ingeneratedness) in which we apparently adequately comprehend the Essence of God. According to the Nominalists the distinguishing of several qualities has no basis in the Divine Essence itself, but only in the various operations of God (*distinctio cum connotatione effectuum*—a distinction connoting effects).

Against the acceptance of a mere logical distinction there is the fact that Holy Scripture refers to many attributes of God. To explain these away as mere synonyms is incompatible with the dignity of Holy Writ. Again the perfections appearing in the works of God presuppose that God as their Originator Himself possesses them. God is not good because He does good, but He does good because He Himself is good.

c) According to the Scotists, the difference between God and His attributes is formal (*distinctio formalis*). A formal difference lies between a real and a purely mental difference. But the acceptance of the notion of various formalities of being which are (actualiter) present in God, previous to and independent of our thinking, is contrary to the absolute simplicity of the Divine Substance.

d) According to the general teaching, the difference is to be conceived as a virtual difference (*distinctio virtualis* or *rationis ratiocinatae sive cum fundamento in re*—a virtual distinction, a distinction of ratiotivative reason with a foundation in reality). The distinguishing of many attributes in God has a factual basis in the infinite fullness of the Divine Being. Even if God's Nature is in itself absolutely simple, yet we can only know it in a multiplicity of concepts. Cf. S. th. I 13, 4: *nomina Deo attributa licet significant unam rem, tamen quia significant eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma* (although the names attributed to God signify the same reality, yet because they signify it under many and diverse aspects, they are not synonymous). The assumed virtual difference is to be more exactly determined as *distinctio virtualis minor*, since one Divine perfection implicitly includes the other.

3. Classification

The Divine attributes are classified into:

a) Negative and positive (infinite—power); b) incommunicable and communicable (ingeneratedness—goodness); c) absolute and relative (holiness—mercifulness); d) attributes of being, and of being-active, also quiescent and active attributes (simplicity—omniscience).

CHAPTER I

The Attributes of the Divine Being

§ 11. The Absolute Perfection of God

That is perfect, in which nothing is lacking which according to its nature it should possess. Cf. S. th. I 4, 1 : *Perfectum dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis*. That is absolutely perfect, which unites in itself all possible excellences and excludes all deficiencies. That is relatively perfect which has a finite nature and possesses all the advantages corresponding to this nature.

God is absolutely perfect. (*De fide*.)

The Vatican Council teaches that God is infinite in every perfection (*omni perfectione infinitus*). D 1782. Cf. Mt. 5, 48 : "Be ye therefore perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect !" Holy Writ indirectly expresses the absolute perfection of God by stressing His self-sufficiency and His independence of all other substance (cf. Rom. II, 34 et seq. : Is. 40, 13 et seq. ; Acts 17, 24 et seq.) and teaches that God contains in Himself all perfections. Ecclus, 43, 29 : "He is all" (*τὸ πᾶν ἐστὶν αὐτός*). Cf. Rom. II, 36. Ps. 93, 9. The Fathers base the absolute perfection of God on the infinite fullness of being of God. They represent God's perfection as an essential, universal perfection which transcends all perfection. St. Irenaeus says : "God is perfect in everything, like unto Himself, all light, all reason, all essence, and the source of all goodness" (Adv. Haer. IV 11, 2). St. John of Damascus teaches : "The Divine Essence is perfect, is in no way deficient in goodness, in wisdom and in power. It is without beginning, without end, eternal, boundless—in short, absolutely perfect" (*De fide orth.* I 5). Cf. Ps.-Dionysius, *De div. nominibus* 13, 1.

St. Thomas bases the absolute perfection of God speculatively on the fact that God, as the First Cause of all created things, virtually contains in Himself all the perfections of the created, and that He, as the *ipsum esse* subsists includes in Himself Eminently every being and thus, every perfection. Cf. S. th. I 4, 2. In regard to the attribution to God of perfections which are in creatures, the saying is valid : the pure perfections are in God *formaliter* and *eminenter* (formally and eminently), the mixed, *virtualiter et eminenter* (virtually and eminently).

§ 12. God's Infinity

That is infinite which has no end, no bound. Cf. S. th. I 7, 1 : *Infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo, quod non est finitum*. The infinite is distinguished according to potentiality (*infinitum potentiale*) and according to actuality (*infinitum actuale*). The potentially infinite can be multiplied infinitely, but in reality it is finite and limited. On account of the indefiniteness of the limits, it is also called *indefinitum*. Further, one distinguishes between the relative and the absolute infinite. The former is infinite in a definite connection (for example duration), the latter is infinite in every respect.

God is actually infinite in every perfection. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council says of God that in reason and will and in every perfection He is infinite (*intellectu ac voluntate omnique perfectione infinitus*). D 1782. Cf. Ps. 146, 5: "Of His wisdom there is no measure." Ps. 144, 3: "Of His greatness there is no end" (Sept. and Vulg.: infinite).

The Fathers call God infinite, boundless, uncircumscribed (*ἀπειρος ἀόριστος ἀνεπύρακτος*, infinitus, incircumscriptus). According to St. Gregory of Nyssa, God is "in every way without limit" (*Quod non sint tres dii*: PG 45, 129). As He is "according to His nature boundless," He cannot be comprehended in a human concept (C. Eunomium 3; PG 45, 601). Speculatively, the absolute infinity of God may be based on the concept of the "ipsum esse subsistens." As God does not originate from another Being, and as He is in no wise composed of parts, there exists in Him no basis for a limitation of His Being. Cf. S. th. I 7, 1.

§ 13. God's Simplicity

That is simple which is not composed, and on that account also not divisible. The composition is a physical one when a thing is composed of parts which are really distinct from one another, whether substantially (material and form, body and soul) or accidentally (substance and accidents). The composition is a metaphysical one, when a thing is composed of logical or metaphysical parts (e.g., determinations of being such as "*potency and act*," "*genus and specific difference*").

God is absolutely simple. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council teach that God is an absolutely simple substance or nature (*substantia seu natura simplex omnino*). D 428, 1782. The expression *simplex omnino* asserts that with regard to God any kind of composition, whether physical or metaphysical, is out of the question. From this it follows that:

1. God is a pure spirit, that is, God is neither a body nor a composition of body and spirit. The Old Testament, it is true, represents God in a visible human form by the employment of many anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms. Indirectly, however, it expresses God's spirituality by representing Him as supreme over matter and as the ruler of matter. Men, in distinction to God, are often called "flesh" (cf. Is. 31, 3). The New Testament designates God explicitly a Spirit. John 4, 24: "God is a spirit." 2 Cor. 3, 17: "The Lord is a spirit."

The viewpoint of the Audians or Anthropomorphists, who, in a false interpretation of Gn. 1, 26 held God to be a psycho-physical Being, as men are, was rejected by the Fathers as a foolish heresy (*stultissima haeresis*; St. Jerome). Tertullian, under Stoic influence, and starting from the assumption that everything actual is corporeal, ascribes to the spiritual essences, to God and to the soul a certain corporeality. Adv. Praxeas 7: *Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie.*

Speculatively, the immateriality of God is implied by His pure actuality. Since there exists in God no potency, and since for matter potentiality is essential, there can therefore be no matter in God. Cf. S. th. I 3, 1 and 2.

2. God is an absolutely simple spirit, that is, in God there is no composition of any kind, of substance or accidents, of essence and existence, of nature and person, of power and activity, of passivity and activity, of genus and specific difference. Holy Writ indicates the absolute simplicity of God when it equates the Essence of God with His Attributes. Cf. 1 John 4, 8 : "God is charity." John 14, 6 : "I am the way, the truth and the life." St. Augustine says of the Divine Nature : "It is called simple because it is that which it has, except that which is said of one Person in relation to the Other" (De civ. Dei XI 10, 1).

Speculatively the absolute simplicity of God may be derived from His pure actuality. Pure Act is incompatible with any kind of composition, for the composed thing comes later than the composing parts and is dependent on these. Further, a composed thing presupposes an origin, which brings the parts together and thus the parts are in potency to the whole. Cf. S. th. I 3, 7. The existence of virtual differences between the essence and the attributes of God and between the attributes themselves does not controvert the absolute simplicity of God, because the individual attributes do not designate parts of the Divine Essence, but the whole Divine Essence, although from different points of view.

§ 14. God's Unicity

There is only One God. (*De fide.*)

Most of the Symbols of Faith expressly teach the Unicity of God. The Nicene-Constantinople Symbol declares : Credo in unum Deum. (I believe in one God) D 54, 86. The 4th Lateran Council (1215) declares : Unus solus est verus Deus. (The true God is one alone) D 428 : cf. 1782. Opposed to this basic Christian dogma are heathen polytheism, and gnostic-manichaeism which posit several eternal principles.

It is a basic doctrine of the Old Testament and of the New Testament Revelation that there is only one God. Dt. 6, 4 (Mk. 12, 29) : "Hear O Israel : The Lord our God is one Lord." St. Paul, the Apostle of the Heathens, insistently stresses against heathen polytheism, the necessity of belief in the one God. 1 Cor. 8, 4 : "We know that an idol is nothing in the world and that there is no God but one." Cf. Acts, 14, 14 ; 17, 23 : Rom. 3, 29 : Eph. 4, 6 ; 1 Tim. 1, 17 : 2, 5. The heathen Gods are not true Gods, but lies and vanity (Jer. 16, 19) and nothingnesses (Ps. 95, 5). Cf. Wis. 13-15. Against the gnostic-manichaeism, which traces all evils in the world to an evil principle, Holy Script teaches that natural evil or metaphysical imperfections originate from God's Decree (Dt. 32, 29 : Is. 45, 6 et seq.), but that moral evil has its basis in the misuse of freedom (Rom. 5, 12).

The Fathers base God's unicity on His absolute perfection and on the unity of the world-order, and defend it against the heathens, the gnostics and the Manichaeans. Tertullian writes against Marcion : "That which shall be valid as the highest greatness, that must stand unique and must have no equal, in order not to cease to be the highest essence. . . . But as God is the supreme essence our ecclesiastical truth has with justice declared : If God is not One then there is no God" (Adv. Marc. I 3). Cf. Pastor Hermas. Mand. L 1 : St.

Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. I 10, 1 ; II 1, 1-5 : Tertullian, Apol. 17. De praescr. 13 , Origen, C. Celsum I 23 : St. John of Damascus, De fide orth. I 5.

St. Thomas speculatively derives the Unicity of God from His simplicity, from the infinity of His perfections, and from the unity of the world. S. th. I 11, 3. The history of comparative religion shows that religious development did not proceed from polytheism to monotheism but on the contrary from monotheism to polytheism. Cf. Rom. I, 18 et seq. Again it is not demonstrable that Jahweh up to the time of the Prophets, was merely the national God of the People of Israel, so that in spite of the veneration of a single God, the belief in the existence of several Gods was firmly adhered to (henotheism). "It is not the national God which has become a world God, but the world-God entered on Sinai into a covenant of association with Israel" (E. Kalt, Bibl. Reallexikon I² 721).

§ 15. God's Truth

One distinguishes an ontological, a logical and a moral truth (*veritas in essendo, in cognoscendo, in dicendo et agendo*—truth in being, in knowing, in saying, in acting).

1. God's Ontological Truth

Ontological truth, or "truth of things" consists in the agreement of a thing with its idea (*adaequatio rei cum idea eius sive cum intellectu*). It is the being of the things themselves in so far as it is knowable. Being and truth are convertible terms (*Ens et verum convertuntur*.)

The One God is, in the ontological sense, The True God. (*De fide*.)

The 4th Lateran and the Vatican Council designated God a True God (*Deus verus*), because He alone fully corresponds to the idea of God. Cf. Jer. 10, 10 ; Jo. 17, 3 ; I Thess. 1, 9.

God, as *Ipsium Esse Subsistens* (subsistent being) is both Being and Truth Itself (*αὐταλήθεια*). God, as exemplary and efficient cause, gives all extra-divine things their knowability together with their being. Every created thing is the realisation of a Divine Idea, which is imitated in the created spirit. In so far as all actual and possible things reflect the Being of God, He is All Truth (*παναλήθεια*). As God's Being is elevated over all created being, so also His truth or knowability transcends the truth or knowability of created things ; to this extent He is the Supreme Truth (*ὑπεραλήθεια*).

2. God's Logical Truth

Logical truth or "truth of thought" consists in the agreement of thought with things : *adaequatio intellectus cum re*. The perfection of the truth of cognition is dependent on the perfection of the intellect.

God possesses an infinite power of cognition. (*De fide*.)

According to the teaching of the Vatican Council, God is "infinite in understanding" (*intellectu infinitus*). D 1782. Ps. 146, 5 : "Of His wisdom there is no end." Cf. Ps. 43, 22: 93, 11 ; 138, 1-6. The object of the Divine knowing is the Divine Essence. In this way God knows all created things in their origin. As in God the subject (of cognition), the object (of cognition), and the act of cognition, are identical, it follows that God is The Absolute Logical Truth. Thus every error is excluded from God (*qui nec falli . . . potest* : who cannot be deceived. D 1789).

3. God's Moral Truth

Moral truth comprehends veracity (*veritas in dicendo* or *veracitas*—truth in speech) and faithfulness (*veritas in agendo* or *fidelitas*—truth in action). Veracity is the agreement of speech with knowledge ; *adaequatio sermonis cum intellectu*. Fidelity is agreement of action with speech ; *adaequatio actionis cum sermone*.

a) God is absolute Veracity. (*De fide*.)

The Vatican Council says of God that He cannot deceive (*qui . . . nec fallere potest*). D 1789. Cf. D 1782 : *omni perfectione infinitus* (infinite in every perfection). Holy Scripture bears witness to the veracity of God and to the incompatibility of a lie with His Essence. John 8, 26 : "He who has sent me, is true." Tit. 1, 2 : "God who lieth not." Hebr. 6, 18 : "It is impossible for God to lie." Cf. Rom. 3, 4.

b) God is absolutely faithful. (*De fide*.)

Cf. D 1789, 1782, Ps. 144, 13 : "The Lord is faithful in all His works." 2 Tim. 2, 13 : "If we believe not He continueth faithful. He cannot deny Himself." Mt. 24, 35 : "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass." Cf. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 123, 2 : *Veritas enim (divina) nec falli potest nec fallere*. (Divine truth can neither deceive nor be deceived.)

§ 16. God's Goodness

1. God's Ontological Goodness

As ontological truth is being in relation to intellect, so ontological goodness is being in relation to will : *Bonum est ens, in quantum est appetibile*. A thing is good (*bonum quod*) in itself if it possesses the perfections corresponding to its nature ; relatively good (*bonum cui*) if it is suitable to perfect others (*bonum est diffusivum sui*—good tends to communicate itself to others).

God is absolute ontological Goodness in Himself and in relation to others. (*De fide*.)

The Vatican Council teaches that God is infinite in every perfection (*omni perfectione infinitus* : D 1782) and that in the creation He communicates His goodness to creatures (*per bona, quae creaturis impertitur* : D 1783).

As "*Ipsium Esse Subsistens*" God is substantial goodness or Goodness Itself (*αὐταγαθότης, ipsa bonitas*). As the origin of all created things and of all created goodness God is The All Good (*παραγαθότης, bonum universale*). In virtue of the infinite chasm between the Divine Goodness and created goodness, God is the Highest Good (*ὑπεραγαθότης, summum bonum*). God alone is The Substantial Good (Luke 18, 19 : "None is good but God alone"). Creatures possess a derived communicated goodness only (1 Tim. 4, 4 : "For every creature of God is good"). The absolute ontological goodness of God is the basis of His Infinite Bliss. In knowing and loving Himself as the Supreme Good He is infinitely blissful in the possession and enjoyment of Himself.

God is absolute ontological goodness in relation to others, in so far as He is the *causa exemplaris, efficiens* and *finalis* (exemplary, efficient and final cause) of all created things. Rom. 11, 36 : "For of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things."

2. The Moral Goodness (Holiness) of God

Moral goodness or holiness consists in freedom from sin and the purity of moral behaviour. The ultimate basis of freedom from sin and of purity of morals lies in the agreement of the will with the moral norm.

God is absolute Moral Goodness or Holiness. (*De fide.*) D 1782.

In Holy Mass the Liturgy praises God as the Holy One. Holy Writ bears witness to the holiness of God both negative and positive. Dt. 32, 4: "God is faithful and without any iniquity." Ps. 5, 5: "Thou art not a God that willest iniquity." Ps. 76, 14: "Thy way, O God, is in the holy place." Is. 6, 3: "Holy, holy, holy, the Lord God of hosts, all the earth is full of his glory." The word "holy" (*kadosh* = exempted from profanity) expresses not only God's sublimity over all worldliness (objective holiness) but also His sublimity over all sinfulness (subjective holiness), as the comparison between God's holiness and the uncleanness of the Prophets shows (6, 5-7). The twofold repetition of the word means that God is in the highest grade or absolutely holy. The tremendous distance between the holiness of God and the sinfulness of man is demonstrated in the term used by Isaias and also in the Psalms (70, 22; 77, 41), "the Holy one of Israel."

God is Substantial Holiness, because His Will is identical with the supreme moral norm. The sinlessness of God is, therefore, not merely a factual state of being free from sin (*impeccantia*), but an intrinsic (metaphysical) impossibility of sinning (*impeccabilitas*).

3. God's Benignity (*benignitas*)

God is absolute Benignity. (*De fide.*) D 1782.

God's benignity reveals itself in that He bestows on created things countless gifts in the natural and supernatural order, and thus permits them to participate in His goodness (creation, preservation, providence, redemption, sanctification). Cf. Mt. 6, 26 et seq.: Ps. 144, 15 et seq.: John 3, 16: Rom. 8, 32.

(Appendix: God's Beauty)

God is absolute Beauty. Cf. D 1782. God unites in Himself, in the most perfect manner, the three requisites, which, according to St. Thomas (S. th. I 39, 8) belong to the concept of the beautiful: a) *integritas sive perfectio*: God is absolutely perfect; b) *debita proportio sive consonantia*: God in spite of His infinite fullness of being, is absolutely simple; c) *claritas*: God as a pure and absolutely simple spirit is the clearest and brightest Being. His beauty is a substantial beauty which encompasses and infinitely transcends all the beauty of the created world. According to Wisdom 13, 3-5, from the beauty of the creation one can conclude to the much greater beauty of the Creator. Ps. 95, 6: "Praise and beauty are before him: holiness and majesty in his sanctuary" Cf. Ps. 103, 1: Wis. 7, 29: St. Augustine. Conf. X 27, 38; XI 4, 6.

§ 17. God's Immutability

That is mutable which goes from one condition to another. In consequence of the finite nature of its being every creature is mutable.

God is absolutely immutable. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council teach that God is immutable (*incommutabilis*) D 428, 1782. Holy Scripture excludes all change from God

and positively ascribes to Him absolute immutability. James 1, 17: "With whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration." Ps. 101, 27 et seq.: "They (the heavens) shall perish but thou remainest and all of them shall grow old. And as a vestment thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed. But thou art always the selfsame. And thy years shall not fail." Cf. Ps. 32, 11; Is. 46, 10; Hebr. 6, 17. Mal. 3, 6 indicates in the Divine Name of God the basis of the absolute immutability of God: "For I am the Lord, and I change not." Life and activity are associated with God's immutability. Cf. Wisdom 7, 24. 27. St. Augustine says: "God knows to act in restfulness and to rest in activity." *Novit quiescens agere et agens quiescere* (De civ. Dei XII 17, 2).

The Fathers exclude all change from God. Tertullian stresses that the Incarnation of the Logos involved no change or mutation in God: "Furthermore God must be held to be unchangeable and immutable, because He is eternal" (Adv. Prax. 27). Origen opposes to the stoical teaching of God's corporeality and His consequent mutability the Christian teaching of God's absolute immutability, for this he adduces proof from the Holy Writ (Ps. 101, 28; Mal. 3, 6); he also rejects the reproach by Celsus that God's Incarnation implied a change for the worse (C. Cels. I 21; IV 14). St. Augustine derives God's immutability from His absolute plenitude of being which is expressed in the name Jahweh: "Being is a name which connotes immutability. For all that changes ceases to be what it was and commences to be what it was not. True Being, Genuine Being is possessed only by Him who does not change" (Sermo 7, 7).

St. Thomas bases the absolute immutability of God on His pure actuality, on His absolute simplicity and on His infinite perfection. Mutability includes potentiality, composition, and imperfection, and is thus irreconcilable with God as the *actus purus*, the absolutely simple and absolutely perfect Essence. S. th. I 9, 1. When God operates *ad extra* (outside Himself), for example, in the creation of the world, He does not effect a new act, but He enters on a new realisation of the eternal resolve of His divine will. The decree of creation is as eternal and immutable as the Divine Essence with which it is factually identical: only its effect, the created world is temporal and mutable. Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei. XII 17, 2.

§ 18. God's Eternity

Eternity is a duration without beginning and without end, without sooner and later, a "permanent now" (*nunc stans*). The essence of eternity is the absolute lack of succession. Boethius gave the classical definition: *Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio* (Eternity is the perfect and simultaneous total possession of interminable life) (De consol. phil. V. 6). From eternity in the strict sense must be distinguished the "aevum" or the "aeviternitas," that is, the duration of the created spirits, which have indeed a beginning, but no end, and which, in their substance, are subject to no mutation.

God is eternal. (*De fide.*)

The dogma asserts that God possesses the Divine Being without beginning and without end, and without succession in a constant undivided now. The *Symbolum Quicumque* declares: *Aeternus Pater, Aeternus Filius, Aeternus Spiritus Sanctus et tamen non tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus*. (Eternal Father,

Eternal Son, Eternal Holy Ghost and yet not three eternal beings but one.) D 39. The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council attribute to God the predicate "eternal" (aeternus). D 428, 1782.

Holy Writ bears witness to the individual grounds of the Divine eternity. The negation of beginning and end is expressed in Ps. 89, 2: "Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world were formed: from eternity and to eternity Thou art God." The absolute lack of succession is seen in Ps. 2, 7: "The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." Jo. 8, 58: "Before Abraham was made, I am." Cf. Ps. 101, 27 et seq.; 89, 4; 2 Peter 3, 8.

The Fathers, in their conflict with the heathen world, familiar with the genealogies of gods, expressly attest God's eternity. Cf. Aristides, *Apol.* 1, 4; Tatian, *Or.* 4, 3; Athenagoras *Suppl.* 10; St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* II 31, 2. St. Augustine says that God's eternity is a constant present: "The eternity of God is His Essence itself, which has nothing mutable in it. In It there is nothing past, as if it were no longer, nothing future, as if it had not yet been. In It there is only 'is,' that is, the present" (*Enarr.* in Ps. 101, 2, 10).

§19. The Immensity or Immeasurability of God and His Omnipresence

Immensity or spacelessness connotes the negation of spatial limitation; omnipresence expresses the relation of God to real space. Immeasurability is a negative and absolute attribute; omnipresence is a positive and relative one.

1. God's Immensity

God is immense or absolutely immeasurable. (*De fide.*)

The Symbol *Quicumque* teaches: *Immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus Spiritus Sanctus, sed tamen non tres immensi, sed unus immensus.* (Father Immense, Son Immense, Holy Spirit Immense and yet not three immense beings but one.) D 39. The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council apply to God the attribute "immeasurable" (*immensus*) D 428, 1782.

Holy Writ bears witness to the sublimity of God over all spatial measure. The universe does not suffice to encompass Him: 3 Kings 8, 27: "For if heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain thee how much less this house, which I have built." Is. 66, 1: "Heaven is my throne, and the earth my footstool." Cf. Job 11, 7-9.

The Fathers call God incomprehensible, uncircumscribed, immeasurable (*ἀχώρητος, ἀπερίγραπτος, immensus, incircumscriptus*). Cf. Pastor Hermæ *Mand.* 1, 1: "For the very first thing, believe, that there is only one God . . . who encompasses everything, while He alone cannot be encompassed." Cf. Athenagoras, *Suppl.* 10; St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* II 30, 9. Speculatively, the immeasurability of God is to be based on His infinite fullness of being. This permits no limitation, including limitation of space.

2. God's Omnipresence

a) Reality of God's omnipresence

God is everywhere present in created space. (*De fide.*)

God's omnipresence is an object of regular and general teaching and is contained in the dogma of the Infinity of God as the part is contained in the whole

Holy Writ describes the omnipresence of God in picturesque language in Ps. 138, 7 et seq.: "Whither shall I go before thy spirit? or whither shall I flee before thy face? If I ascend to the heavens, thou art there; If I descend into hell, thou art present. If I take my wings early in the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there also shall thy hand lead me and thy right hand shall hold me." Jer. 23, 24: "Do I not fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord." Acts 17, 27 et seq.: "God is not far from every one of us; 28. for in Him we live, and move and are." Cf. Dt. 4, 39; Wis. 7, 24; 8, 1.

From God's omnipresence St. Clement of Rome concludes to the fear of Him: "Where shall one flee and how shall one escape Him who spans the All" (Cor. 28, 4). Cf. Theophilus of Antioch *Ad Autolycum* II 3; Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 32, 7; St. Cyprian, *De Dom. Or.* 4. The first monograph on the substantial presence of God in the whole world and in all the parts thereof and on the indwelling of God in the just, was written by St. Augustine in his, "*Liber de praesentia Dei ad Dardanum*" (Ep. 187).

St. Thomas speculatively bases the omnipresence of God on His all-causality. As the origin of being, He is intrinsically present in everything as long as it exists. S. th. I 8, 1.

b) More exact determination of the omnipresence.

Since the time of Petrus Lombardus (Sent. I 37, 1) theologians more closely determine the omnipresence of God as a presence according to power (per potentiam—dynamic presence), according to knowledge (per praesentiam sive scientiam—ideal presence), and according to essence (per essentiam—essential or substantial presence). Through this essence He is present substantially in all things, including the created spiritual essences (angels, demons, human souls), as the immediate origin of their existence. Cf. S. th. I 8, 3. The substantial omnipresence of God is to be more closely defined as a repletive presence, that is, the whole Divine Essence fills the whole created space and every one of its parts. On account of the absolute simplicity of God, however, the repletive omnipresence must not be conceived as an infinite extension (expansion or diffusion) of the Divine Substance.

In addition to this general, natural, presence of God, there is also a special supernatural presence or indwelling of God, by the supernatural efficacy of His grace, in the soul of the just man (John 14, 23; 1 Cor. 3, 16; 6, 19), in the house of God (Ps. 131, 13 et seq.) and in Heaven (Mt. 6, 9). The indwelling of God in the humanity of Christ on the basis of the Hypostatic Union is unique (Col. 2, 9: "In Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead corporeally").

CHAPTER 2

The Attributes of the Divine Life

Life is a) the being of the living (i.e., a substance with the ability to self-movements); b) life-actuation, i.e., self-movement, self-actuation (S. th. I 54, 2 ad 1). The spiritual functions of knowing and willing are the most perfect form of self-actuation. These are found in all fullness in God. Consequently, God possesses life in all fullness. S. th. I 18, 3 ad 2. *Sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere, ita est suum vivere.*

The Vatican Council calls God the Living God (*Deus vivus*). D 1782. Holy Writ frequently speaks of the Living God and of the life of God. God confirms its assertions: "As true as I live." The people of Israel swear: "As true as God lives." Jesus calls Himself "the Life." John 14, 6: "I am the way, the truth and the Life." Cf. John 5, 26; 1 John 5, 20.

St. Augustine bases the perfection of the Divine Life on the identity of this with the Absolute Divine Being. *De Trin.* VI 10, 11: "In Him (in the Son of God) is the first and highest life. For Him life and being are not two different things, but being and life is one and the same." As God is the origin of creation for creatures, so He is also the origin of life for them. *Ps.* 35, 10: "With thee is the fountain of Life." *Acts* 17, 25: "He giveth to all life and breath and all things."

I. The Divine Knowledge or Knowing

§ 20. The Perfection of Divine Knowledge

1. God's Knowledge Is Infinite. (*De fide*.)

The Vatican Council says of God that in His power of cognition He is infinite (*intellectu infinitus*). D 1782. Holy Writ designates God as the God of knowledge (*Deus scientiarum*: 1 Sm. 2, 3) and declares that His wisdom is without measure: *Sapientiae eius non est numerus* (*Ps.* 146, 5). Cf. *Ps.* 138, 6; *Rom.* 11, 33.

Speculatively, the infinity of the Divine knowledge may be based:

- a) On the reality of created intelligence, for according to the relationship of cause and effect, this supreme created perfection must be contained in God as its origin, and indeed in an infinite manner.
- b) On the order and finality of the world, which postulates a Creator and Director of the highest intelligence.
- c) On the absolute immateriality of God; for the immateriality is the foundation of knowing, and the degree of the power of cognition is determined by the degree of immateriality. Cf. *S. th.* I 14, 1: *Cum Deus sit in summo immaterialitatis, sequitur, quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis.* (Since God is at the summit of immateriality it follows that He is at the summit of knowledge.)

2. God's Knowledge Is Purely and Simply Actual

As God is pure act (*actus purus*), there is in His knowing no transitions from potency to act, no habitus, no succession, and no progress from the known to the unknown. God's knowing is neither potential nor habitual, neither successive nor discursive. God knows all in one single indivisible act (*simplici intuitu*). Cf. *S. th.* I 14, 7.

3. God's Knowledge Is Subsistent

God does not only possess an activity of knowledge, but is Himself knowledge. His knowing is, in consequence of His absolute simplicity, really identical with His Essence. Cf. *S. th.* I 18, 3 ad 2: *Deus est suum intelligere.* (God is His own understanding.) *S. th.* I 14, 4: *intelligere Dei est eius substantia.* (The understanding of God is His own substance.)

4. God's Knowledge Is Comprehensive

From the infinity of His power of knowing it follows that God completely encompasses His infinite knowledge, and thereby comprehends Himself. Cf. S. th. I 14, 3 : *Tanta est virtus Dei in cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas eius in existendo . . . Unde manifestum est, quod tantum seipsum cognoscit, quantum cognoscibilis est. Et propter hoc seipsum perfecte comprehendit.* "God's power of self-comprehension is as great as His reality in Being. . . . Therefore it is obvious that He comprehends Himself as far as He is comprehensible. Therefore He comprehends Himself perfectly." Holy Writ bears witness to the comprehensive character of the Divine knowledge in 1 Cor. 2, 10 : "The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God." Cf. Mt. 11, 27.

3. God's Knowledge Is Independent of Extra-Divine Things

The Divine intellect is not determined to knowledge from without but from within through the Divine Essence. Extra-Divine objects are not the cause (*causa determinans*), but only the aim (*terminus*) of the Divine knowledge. Further, God does not know the extra-Divine objects through intelligible "species" imprinted from without ; for an intellect which knows by means of a species distinct from itself stands in the same relation to this as does potency to act. God, however, is *actus purus* (pure act). Cf. S. th. I 14, 4 : *In Deo intellectus intelligens et id, quod intelligatur, et species intelligibilis et ipsum intelligere sunt omnino unum et idem.* (In God the intellect understanding and the thing understood are the same reality and the intelligible species and the act of understanding itself are entirely one and the same.)

God knows extra-Divine things in His Own Essence, as He is the *causa exemplaris* and the *causa efficiens* of real things and for possible things—the Exemplar.

While exhaustively knowing His creative causality He also knows therein all the operations which flow or which can flow from this, and indeed, just as comprehensively as He knows Himself. 1 John 1, 5 : "God is light and in Him there is no darkness."

§ 21. Object and Division of the Divine Knowing

1. The Divine Self-cognition (*Scientia contemplationis*)

The primary and formal object of the Divine Cognition is God Himself.

God knows Himself immediately, that is, without a medium in quo, (i.e., an object through the cognition of which one attains to the cognition of another). The medium sub quo (= *lumen intellectus*, i.e., the light of intelligence) and the medium quo (= *species intelligibilis*) are in the act of the Divine Self-cognition identical with the Divine Essence. Cf. S. th. I 14, 2 : *Deus se per seipsum intelligit* (God knows Himself through Himself).

2. The Divine Knowledge of Extra-Divine Things

The secondary and material object of the Divine knowledge consists of the extra-Divine things. These are divided into the purely possible, the real, and the conditionally future.

a) God knows all that is merely possible by the knowledge of simple intelligence (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*). (*De fide*.)

On the teaching of the Church cf. D 1782. Holy Writ teaches that God knows all things and hence also the merely possible. Est. 14, 14 : "O Lord

who hast the knowledge of all things." 1 Cor 2, 10 : "The spirit (of God) searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God." In comprehending His infinite imitability and His omnipotence, God knows therein the whole sphere of the possible. S. th. I 14, 9.

b) God knows all real things in the past, the present and the future (*Scientia visionis*). (*De fide*.)

On the teaching of the Church cf. D 1782. Holy Writ asserts the universality of the Divine Knowledge in numerous passages. Ecclus. 23, 29 : "All things were known to the Lord before they were created so also after they were perfected." God's providence which extends even to the smallest detail presupposes an equally extensive knowledge. Cf. Ps. 146, 4 : "Who telleth the number of the stars : and calleth them by name." Ps. 49, 11 : "I know all the fowls of the air." Job 28, 24 ; Ecclus. 1, 2 et seq. ; Mt. 6, 26 et seq. ; 10, 29 et seq. Holy Writ also ascribes knowledge of the heart to God. Acts 15, 8 : "God who knoweth the hearts." Ps. 7, 10 : "The searcher of hearts and reins is God." I Pa. 28, 9 : "The Lord searcheth all hearts and understandeth all thoughts." Cf. Ps. 68, 6 ; 138, 1-6. The knowledge of hearts is an exclusive privilege of God. 3 Kings 8, 39 : "Thou only knowest the heart of all the children of men." For humanity, on the other hand, the human heart is unsearchable (Jer. 17, 9). Cf. St. Clement of Rome, Cor. 21, 3, 9 ; 27, 6 ; 28, 1. When God, in His self-comprehension beholds His infinite operative power, He knows therein all which He, as the main effective cause, actually comprehends, i.e., all reality. The difference between past, present and future does not exist for the Divine knowledge, since for God all is present.

By the knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*) God also foresees the future free acts of the rational creatures with infallible certainty. (*De fide*.)

The Vatican Council teaches : "Omnia enim nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius (Hebr. 4, 13), ea etiam, quae libera creaturarum actione futura sunt." "All things are naked and open to his eyes, even those things that will happen through the free actions of creatures." D 1784, cf. D 3017. Holy Scripture attests this truth in the clearest fashion in Ps. 138, 3 et seq. : "Thou hast understood my thoughts from afar off : my path and my line thou hast searched out."

John 6, 65 : "Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that did not believe and who he was that would betray him." The Fathers preferred to appeal to the prophecies. Tertullian, Adv. Marc. II 5 : "What shall I say about His foreknowing ? This has as many witnesses as it has made Prophets." Prescience and freedom

The dogma of human freedom (D 815) is not abrogated by the dogma of the infallible certainty of the Divine prevision of future free actions. The Fathers point to the eternal character of the Divine knowing and conclude that the Divine foreknowledge imposes as little compulsion on future actions as human remembering does on the past. Cf. St. Aug. De libero arbitrio III 4, 11 : "As thou through thy remembrance dost not oblige that which is past to have occurred, so God through His prescience does not compel that which shall be in the future to happen."

Speculative Theology makes a distinction between antecedent necessity (*necessitas antecedens*) and consequent necessity (*necessitas consequens*). This latter follows the action, and therefore does not involve freedom; according to the principle of contradiction it flows from the reality of an action since what really is cannot be non-effective. The future free actions foreseen by God follow infallibly or necessarily, not by antecedent but by consequent necessity. St. Thomas uses the distinction between *necessitas consequentis* and *necessitas consequentiae* in the same sense. The former asserts that an effect necessarily follows from its cause; the latter expresses a logical necessity, such as exists, for example, between the premisses and the conclusion of a syllogism. In our case, if God, in His timeless knowing, sees something present, then according to the principle of contradiction it is inevitable that it really happens. Cf. S. c. G. 167: *De verit* 24, 1 ad 13.

c) God also knows the conditioned future free actions with infallible certainty (*Scientia futuribilium*). (*Sent. communis*.)

By these are understood free actions of the future which indeed will never occur, but which would occur, if certain conditions were fulfilled. The Molinists call this Divine knowledge *scientia media*, because it stands between the *scientia necessaria* (or *naturalis*), by which God knows everything which is independent of His free will, i.e., Himself and His ideas, and the *scientia libera*, by which God knows everything which depends on His free will, i.e., every reality beside Himself. The Thomists deny that this knowledge of the conditioned future is a special kind of Divine knowledge which precedes the decrees of the Divine Will.

That God possesses the certain knowledge of conditioned future free actions (*futuribilia*) may be positively proved from Scripture. Mt. 11, 2: 1: "Woe to thee, Corozain! Woe to thee, Bethsaida! For if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes." Cf. 1 Sm 23, 1-13; Wis. 4, 11.

The Fathers assert Divine foresight of conditioned future things when they teach that God does not always hear our prayer for temporal goods, in order to prevent their misuse; or that God allows a man to die at an early age in order to save him from eternal damnation. Cf. the work of St. Gregory of Nyssa: "De infantibus, qui praemature abripiuntur."

Speculatively, the Divine foreknowing of conditioned future things is based on the infinite perfection of the Divine knowing, on the infallibility of the Divine providence, and on the practice of prayer in the Church.

§ 22. The Medium of the Divine Prescience of the Free Actions of Rational Creatures

The medium of cognition in which God from eternity foresees all extra-Divine objects and therefore also all real future and conditioned future actions of rational creatures with infallible certainty, is His own wisdom. On the question as to how God in His own Essence foresees future free actions, opinions diverge.

a) According to St. R. Bellarmine († 1621) the Divine prevision of the future free actions of rational creatures is founded on the fact that God possesses a *cognitio supercomprehensiva* of the created will. The creature's will is the origin of the

free actions. Now when God perfectly knows the cause, He also knows the effects proceeding from it. Against this explanation it is to be objected that the supercomprehensive cognition of the free will establishes only a morally certain prevision of future free actions. But the Divine prevision is absolutely certain.

b) Thomism, scientifically established by the Dominican theologian Dominicus Bañez († 1604), teaches that God knows the future free actions of creatures in His eternal volitional decrees: the absolute future in absolute, the conditioned future in conditioned or hypothetical decrees. God has from all eternity in these decrees laid down the totality of the world-order also in regard to free creatures. The realisation of the eternal decrees of God in time occurs through the fact that God, through a physical intervention, the "*praemotio physica*" infallibly moves creatures to the actions intended by Him, in a manner, however, suitable to the nature of creatures, so that unfree creatures act from necessity, free creatures with freedom. In His eternal decrees, God foresees with infallible certainty the free actions of creatures predetermined by Him.

c) Molinism, deriving from the Jesuit theologian Louis Molina († 1600) explains the infallible Divine prescience of future free actions by recourse to "*scientia media*," which precedes the Divine decrees of will conceptually, not in time, and which is independent of them. Through *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* God knows from all eternity how every creature endowed with reason will act in all possible circumstances (stage 1). Through *scientia media* He knows how it would act in all possible conditions, in the case of new conditions being realised (stage 2). In the light of *scientia media* He then resolves with the fullest freedom to realise certain determined conditions. Now He knows through *scientia visionis* with infallible certainty, how the person will, in fact, act in these conditions (stage 3).

Critique

Thomism very effectively stresses the all-causality and over-lordship of God over everything created, but does less justice to the fact of human freedom. It is difficult in fact to reconcile "*praemotio physica*" with human freedom. Molinism, on the other hand, defends human freedom, but weakens the all-causality and the absolute independence of God. The mode of the *scientia media*, which is the basis of the whole system, remains unexplained.

§ 23. The Divine Knowing as Origin of Things

1. Creative Wisdom

As the idea of the artist illuminates and directs his willing and activity in the execution of a work of art, so also the ideas of God which are factually identical with His knowledge, direct His Divine Willing and the Divine Activity in extra-Divine operations. Divine knowledge in association with Divine Will is the exemplary and efficient cause (*causa exemplaris* and *causa efficiens*) of all finite things. According to the terminology of Holy Writ, this practical Divine Knowledge is called wisdom. As the cause of the existence of things, it is called creative wisdom (*sapientia creatrix*). Cf. Ps. 103, 24: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Pro. 3, 19: "The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth." Wis. 7, 21: "Wisdom the worker of all things taught me."

Among the Fathers, St. Augustine particularly developed the doctrine of the Divine Ideas, in association indeed with the Platonic doctrine of ideas, which he christianised. He posited as existing in the Divine Mind the ideas conceived by Plato as hypostases eternally existing parallel with God, and by explaining

these as Divine Thoughts eternally identical with the Divine Essence, in which God is cognisant of His infinite imitability through finite created things. He regards the Divine Ideas as the origin of things. De Trin. XV 13, 22 : "All His creatures, the spirits and the corporeal He does not know because they are, but they are because He knows them. That is, nothing which He would create was unknown to Him. Because He knew, He created ; He did not know because He created." Cf. S. th. I 14, 8.

2. Regulating Wisdom

The Divine Wisdom is also regulating wisdom (*sapientia disponens*), because it communicates finality and order to things ; gives them laws (*legislative wisdom*) and guides them to their ultimate destination (*educative wisdom*). Wis. 11, 21 : "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight."

3. Governing Wisdom

The Divine Wisdom is also a controlling and governing wisdom (*sapientia gubernans*). As such it coincides with Divine providence, Wis. 8, 1 : "She reacheth therefore from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly."

II. The Divine Willing

§ 24. The Perfection of the Divine Willing

1. God's Divine Will is Infinite. (*De fide*.)

The Vatican Council teaches that God, in His will, is infinite (*voluntate infinitus*). D 1782. Holy Scripture sees in God's free will the ultimate basis of the world-order (Ps. 134, 6 : "Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps"), and considers the will of God as the supreme norm of morality (Mt. 6, 10 : "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven"). The Fathers defend the freedom of God's will against the fatalism of the heathens.

Reason arrives at the notion of the Infinite perfection of the Divine volition from the fact of the created will. Since the will is a pure perfection it is predicated of God formally, but also infinitely and eminently. The categorical imperative also of the moral law points to a will which controls humanity.

2. God's volition like God's knowing is purely and simply actual, subsistent and independent of all extra-Divine things.

As God is Pure Act (*Actus Purus*) there is, in His willing, no transition from potency to act, no habitus, no sequence of individual acts of will, but one single successionless act of willing. His will, by virtue of the absolute simplicity of God, is factually identical with the Divine Essence. S. th. I 19, 1 : *sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita suum velle* (just as His intelligence is His essence so is His will). The things external to God are not determining reasons, but merely the goal of the Divine volition. God's absolute fullness of being excludes concupiscible love (*amor concupiscentiae*). God's ardent longing for the salvation of mankind (cf. Is. 65, 2) is an expression of His Beneficent Love (*amor benevolentiae*), which shows itself in the communication of benefits to creatures.

3. The affections in God, corresponding to His nature, are purely spiritual manifestations of His volition. The basic affection is love, which in God is factually identical with His Essence : "God is charity" (1 John 4, 8). Among the other

affections, there is in God, in infinite intensification, that of joy or bliss (in se et ex se beatissimus : D 1782). As far as hate is concerned there is in Him, on account of His absolute holiness, the hate of abomination (odium abominationis) towards sin, but not the hate of enmity (odium inimicitiae) towards the person of the sinner. Cf. Ps. 5, 7 : "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Wis. 11, 25 : "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made ; for thou didst not appoint or make anything, hating it." Other affections such as longing, sadness, hope, anger, can be attributed to God only in an anthropomorphic sense. Anger in Holy Writ means the punitive justice of God.

§ 25. The Object of the Divine Volition

1. The Divine Self-love

The primary and formal object of the Divine will and of the Divine love is God Himself. The Vatican Council teaches : *Necessario amat seipsum* (He loves Himself necessarily). D 1805. Holy Writ bears witness to the fact that God has co-ordinated the whole creation to Himself as its final end. Prov. 16, 4 : "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." Cf. S. th. I 19, 1 ad 3 : *Objectum divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia* (The object of the Divine Will is His own Goodness which is His essence).

Speculatively the love of God for Himself and its necessity arises from the fact that God is the Supreme Good and that He in His comprehensive self-knowledge completely knows His infinite amiability. From this knowledge there necessarily flows the infinite love of God for Himself.

2. God's Love for His Creatures

Things external to God are the secondary and material object of the Divine will and of the Divine love. The Vatican Council teaches that God called into existence all creatures most freely (*liberrimo consilio voluntate ab omni necessitate libera*, D 1783, 1805). Holy Writ stresses God's love for His creatures. Wis. 11, 25 : "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of those things which thou hast made."

God's love for His creatures is a love of complacency (*amor complacentiae*), that is, God loves creatures in so far as they participate in a finite manner in His perfections and have their final end in Him. Further, God's love for creatures is a benevolent love (*amor benevolentiae*), that is, God loves creatures not with a receiving, but with a bestowing, and therefore a most unselfish love. God's love is not motivated by the creature's goodness, but is itself the cause of that goodness. *Amor Dei est infundus et creans bonitatem in rebus* (The love of God infuses and creates goodness in things). (S. th. I 20, 2). Cf. 1 John 4, 10 : "In this is charity ; not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us." The degree of God's love for creatures is one and the same in the inner-Divine act ; in the extra-Divine created effect, however, it is different according to the grade of its amiability.

3. The Relationship of the Divine Will to Evil

a) Physical Evil

God does not (*per se*) desire physical evil, for example, suffering, illness, death, that is not for the sake of the evil or as an aim. Wis. 1, 13 et seq. : "For God has not made death : neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living

For He created all things that they might be." However, God wills physical evil, natural evil as well as punitive evil, per accidens, that is, as a means to a higher end of the physical order (for example, for the acquisition of a higher life), or of the moral order (for example, for punishment or for moral enlightenment). Ecclus. 11, 14 : "Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and riches are from God." Cf. Ecclus. 39, 35 et seq. ; Am. 3, 6.

b) Moral Evil

Moral evil, that is, sin, which according to its nature is a revolt against God, is willed by God neither per se nor per accidens, that is, neither as an end nor as a means to an end. The Council of Trent has condemned as heretical, the contrary doctrine of Calvin D 816, cf. Ps. 5, 5 : "Thou art not a God that willest iniquity." God simply permits sin (permissive solum ; D 816), because He has consideration for man's freedom (Ecclus. 15, 15 et seq.), and because He possesses the wisdom and the power to cause good to arise from evil. Gn. 50, 20 : "Ye thought evil against me, but God turned it into good." Cf. St. Augustine, Enchiridion II. In the final end, moral evil will serve the supreme aim of the world, the glorification of God, in as much as it reveals His mercy in forgiving and His justice in punishing.

When Holy Writ says that God hardens man in evil (Ex. 4, 21 ; Rom. 9, 18) the intention is not to represent God as the proper originator of sin. The hardening is a punishment which consists in the withdrawal of grace. Cf. St. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 53, 6 : "God blinds and hardens in such a fashion, that He deserts and does not help" (deserendo et non adiuvando).

§ 26. The Physical Properties of the Divine Will

1. Necessity and Freedom

God loves Himself of necessity, but loves and wills the creation of extra-Divine things, on the other hand, with freedom. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declared against gnosticism, Manichaeism, fatalism, pantheism, cosmological optimism : Si quis dixerit, Deum non voluntate ab omni necessitate libera, sed tam necessario creasse, quam necessario amat seipsum (If anybody says that God created things not in virtue of a will free from all necessity, but in virtue of the necessity by which He necessarily loves Himself, let him be an anathema), A.S.D. 1805. Holy Writ attests God's freedom in the creation, in the Redemption, in the administration of the grace of Redemption. Ps. 134, 6 : "Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps." Eph. 1, 5 : "Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself according to the purpose of His will." 1 Cor. 12, 11 : "Dividing to every one according to His will." St. Clement of Rome wrote : "He will do all things when He wills and how He wills" (Cor. 27, 5).

The imperfection which belongs to created volition must not be ascribed to the notion of the Divine freedom. Therefore the Divine freedom is not libertas contrarietatis, that is, a freedom to choose between good and evil ; for the possibility of willing evil is indeed a sign of freedom, but it is not of the essence

of freedom, and signifies rather imperfection: *velle malum nec est libertas nec pars libertatis, quamvis sit quoddam libertatis signum* (De verit. 22, 6). The Divine freedom is positively to be defined as *libertas contradictionis*, that is, the freedom to act or not to act (for example, to create the world), and as *libertas specificationis*, that is, freedom to choose between various good or indifferent actions (for example, to create this or that world).

2. Omnipotence

Power is the principle which executes that which reason knows and the will commands: (*principium exsequens id, quod voluntas imperat et ad quod scientia dirigit*) (S. th. I 25, 1 ad 4). God's omnipotence connotes that He has the power to execute all that He may wish, that is, all that is real and possible.

God is almighty. (*De fide.*)

The Apostles' Creed confesses: *Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem*; as do similarly all the other symbols of faith. Cf. D 428, 1782. Holy Writ stresses the omnipotence of God in His name El, especially in the composition El schaddai (*παντοκράτωρ* omnipotens). It attests that nothing is impossible for God. Luke 1, 37: "No word shall be impossible with God." Mt. 19, 26: "With God all things are possible." Mt. 3, 9: "For I tell you: God is able of these stones to raise children to Abraham." The Fathers very often ascribe to God the attribute "Almighty."

Speculatively, God's omnipotence flows from His being pure act. The efficacy of a thing is determined by the grade of its real being: (*Unumquodque agit secundum quod est in actu*) (S. th. I 25, 1 ad 1). To God's Infinite Reality of Being there corresponds an (intensively) Infinite Power. This extends over the whole sphere of real and possible being (extensively infinite). As God's power is identical with God's Essence, it cannot imply anything which contradicts the Essence and the Attributes of God. Thus God cannot change, cannot lie, can make nothing that has happened not to have happened (contrary to the teaching of St. Peter Damian), cannot realise anything which is contradictory in itself. 2 Tim. 2, 13: (He cannot deny himself) *negare seipsum non potest*. Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei V 10, 1; S. th. I 25, 4.

God has determined in a certain mode His omnipotence, by freely choosing to realise one definite world-order from many possible such orders. God's might, which activates itself in the framework of the real world-order, is called "*potentia ordinata*" to distinguish it from His "*potentia absoluta*."

3. Supreme Dominion

God is the Lord of the heavens and of the earth. (*De fide.*) D 1782.

In virtue of His Divine omnipotence God has supreme dominion. This implies an unlimited right of government (*dominium iurisdictionis*), and an unlimited dominion over all created things (*dominium proprietatis*), and demands from rational creatures unreserved obedience. This is realised in practice in the acceptance of His Revelation, in the fulfilling of His Commandments, and in adoration. God's right of lordship and of property belong to Him in virtue of His creation of the world and His redemption of mankind. Cf. Ps. 144, 11 et seq.; Est. 13, 9 et seq.; 1 Tim. 6, 15; Ps. 23, 1 et seq.; 88, 12; 1 Cor. 6, 20.

§ 27. The Moral Attributes of the Divine Will

1. Justice

While justice in the wider sense is synonymous with integrity or subjective holiness, it is, in the narrower and proper sense, the constant will to give to each what is due to him : *constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum uniuersis tribuendi* (Ulpian).

God is infinitely just. (*De fide*.)

According to the teaching of the Vatican Council God is "infinite in all perfection," therefore also in justice. D 1782. Holy Writ attests God's justice in numerous passages. Ps. 10, 8 : "For the Lord is just, and hath loved justice." Ps. 118, 137 : "Thou art just, O Lord : and thy judgment is just." The Fathers defend God's punitive justice against Marcion, who saw an irreconcilable contrast between the just and punitive God of the Old Testament and the benevolent and merciful God of the New Testament, and therefore, concluded that there must be two Gods. St. Irenaeus shows that God's justice cannot exist without benevolence, nor God's benevolence without justice. Cf. St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* III 25, 2-3 ; IV 40, 1-2 ; Tertullian, *Adv. Marcionem* I-III.

As God is the Creator and the Lord of the universe, there is no norm of justice which transcends Him, but God is Himself the Supreme Norm. *Deus sibi ipsi est lex* (S. th. I 21, 1 ad 2). Justice according to the law (*iustitia legalis*), which orders the legal relationship of the individual to the community, is predicated of God to the extent that He, through the natural law and the moral law, co-ordinates creatures to the common good. Commutative justice (*iustitia commutativa*), which regulates the legal relationship of the individual to the individual, cannot in the proper sense, be attributed to God, as the association of equality between the Creator and the created. The creature, on account of his complete dependence on the Creator, cannot by a service impose upon the Creator the obligation of a counter-service. Distributive justice (*iustitia distributiva*), which regulates the legal relationship of the community to the individual, belongs to God in the proper sense. God, having by His free resolve created the world, by His wisdom and goodness gives to His creatures everything that they need for the fulfilment of their tasks and for the achieving of their aims. God manifests His distributive justice further in that He, as a judge with no respect of persons, Rom. 2, 11, rewards the good (*iustitia remunerativa*) and punishes the wicked (*iustitia vindicativa*).

The punishment ordained by God for the sinner is not merely a means of improvement and warning, as Benedict Stattler († 1797) and Georg Hermes († 1831) taught, but is above all retribution for the insult offered to God, and reparation for the moral order disturbed by sin. Dt. 32, 41 : "I will render vengeance to my enemies, and repay them that hate me." Rom. 12, 19 : "for it is written 'revenge is mine, I will repay', saith the Lord." The punishment of Hell is, on account of its eternal duration for the damned, vindictive only (Mt. 25, 41-46). On the other hand, the vindictive character of God's penal justice must not be taken to the point that God owes it to His justice, not to remit sin without full atonement, as, following the precedent of St. Anselm of Canterbury († 1109), was taught by Honoré Tournely († 1729), and Fr. X. Dieringer († 1876). He, being the Supreme Lord and Ruler, owes nothing to any higher authority, so there also belongs to Him the right of pardoning, that is, the freedom to forgive sins to the repentant sinner, without a corresponding atonement, and even without any atonement. Cf. S. th. III 46, 2 ad 3 ; I 25, 3 ad 3.

2. Mercy

God's mercy is His benevolent goodness in so far as it removes the tribulation of creatures, especially the tribulation of sin.

God is infinitely merciful. (*De fide.*)

On the teaching of the Church, cf. D 1782 : omni perfectione infinitus. The Church prays : Deus, cuius misericordiae non est numerus et bonitatis infinitus est thesaurus (God of whose mercies there is no end and who is an infinite treasure-house of goodness.)

God, as the Most Perfect Essence, is not subject to the passion of sympathy—God cannot suffer—but He exercises mercy by the removal of defects : misericordia est Deo maxime attribuenda, tamen secundum effectum, non secundum passionis affectum (S. th. I 21, 3). Holy Writ testifies to no attribute of God more insistently than to that of mercy. Ps. 102, 8 : "The Lord is compassionate and merciful : long-suffering and plenteous in mercy." Ps. 144, 9 : "The Lord is sweet to all : and His tender mercies are over all His works." Cf. Ps. 117, 1, 4 ; Ps. 135 ; Wis. 11, 24 et seq. ; Luke 6, 36 ; 2 Cor. 1, 3 ; Eph. 2, 4. God's mercy is most magnificently shown in the Incarnation of the Son of God for the purpose of the Redemption (Luke 1, 78 ; John 3 16 ; Tit. 3, 4 et seq.). In the Incarnation, the Son of God assumed a human nature in which He could also experience the movement of sympathy. Hebr. 2, 17 : "Wherefore it behoved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, that He might become a merciful and faithful high priest before God, that He might be a propitiation for the sins of the people." Cf. Hebr. 4, 15 et seq. The Evangelists, especially St. Luke, describe the mercy of the God-man towards all those in tribulation, especially towards sinners.

In God mercy and justice are wonderfully inter-connected. Ps. 24, 10 : "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth (*misericordia et veritas*), to them that seek after His covenant and His testimonies." (Cf. Ps. 84, 11.) God's distributive justice is rooted in mercy ; the ultimate reason why God gives to His creatures natural and supernatural grace, and rewards their good works, is His love and mercy. The rewarding of the good and the punishing of the wicked is not merely a work of the Divine Justice, but also an operation of the Divine Mercy, as He rewards beyond merits. (Mt. 19, 29 : centuplum accipiet) and punishes less than is merited. (S. th. I 21, 4 ad 1.) On the other hand, the remission of sin is not merely a work of mercy, but at the same time, a work of justice, as God demands from the sinner repentance and atonement. The harmonious association of God's mercy and justice is magnificently shown in the death of Jesus Christ on the Cross. Cf. John 3, 16 ; Rom. 3, 25 et seq. ; S. th. I 21, 4.

God's mercy is not merely an expression of His love and of His goodness, but at the same time a promulgation of His Majesty and of His Power. Wis. 11, 24 : "But thou hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things." Cf. The prayer of the Church : "God, thou revealest thine almighty power mostly out of consideration and pity" (10th Sunday after Whit).

God's veracity and fidelity were treated in connection with God's ontological truth (§ 15), His moral goodness and His charitable goodness in connection with His ontological goodness (§ 16).

PART 2

The Doctrine of the Triune God

SECTION I

The Dogmatic Formulation and Positive Foundation of the Dogma of the Trinity

CHAPTER I

The Antitrinitarian Heresies and the Doctrinal Decisions of the Church

§ 1. The Heresies

1. Monarchianism

At the end of the 1st century, Judaic heretics, Cerinthus and the Ebionites, holding rigidly to the doctrine of one person in God, denied the divinity of Christ (St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I 26). Towards the end of the 2nd century, the so-called monarchianists taught that there was only One Person in God (monarchiam tenemus : Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 3). According to its attitude towards the Person of Jesus Christ, monarchianism falls into two main divisions :

a) Dynamic or adoptionist monarchianism teaches that Christ is a mere man, even although born in a supernatural manner from the Holy Ghost and of the Blessed Virgin (ψιλὸς ἀνθρώπος). At His baptism, He was equipped by God with Divine Power in extraordinary measure, and was adopted by Him in place of a son.

The principal exponents of this erroneous doctrine were Theodotus of Byzantium, who brought this doctrine to Rome in 190, and who was excommunicated from the Church by Pope Victor (189—198) ; Paul of Samosata, Bishop of Antioch, who was deposed as a heretic at a Synod at Antioch in the year 268 and Bishop Photinus of Sirmium, who was deposed by a Synod of Sirmium in 351.

b) Patripassianic or modalist monarchianism accepts the True Divinity of Christ, but admits only one Person in God, by teaching that the Father had become man in Jesus Christ, and had suffered.

The principal representatives of this pernicious teaching were Noëtus of Smyrna, against whom St. Hippolytus wrote (Philosophumena IX 7—10 ; X 27 ; Contra haeresim Noëti), and the Asia Minor Confessor, Praxeas, who was refuted by Tertullian (Adv. Praxeas). Sabellius extended this false doctrine to the Holy Ghost, and taught that in God there was one Hypostasis and Three Prosopa (πρόσωπον = actors' masks, roles) corresponding to His three different modes of Revelation (modi). The Uni-Personal God revealed Himself as a Father in the Creation, as a Son in the Redemption, as the Holy Ghost in the works of sanctification. Pope Callistus (217—222) excluded Sabellius from the

ecclesiastical community. Sabellianism was combated in a rather unhappy fashion by the Alexandrian Bishop Dionysius the Great (c. 247—264), and was authoritatively condemned by Pope Dionysius (259—268). D 48—51.

2. Subordinationism

In contrast to Sabellian modalism, subordinationism admits three different Persons in God, but denies the consubstantiality of the Second and Third Persons with the Father, and therefore their True Divinity.

a) Arianism. The Alexandrine Presbyter Arius († 336) taught that the *Logos* does not exist from all eternity. He is not generated from the Father, but is a creature of the Father, produced by Him from nothing before all other creatures. According to His Essence He is unlike the Father (*ἀνόμοιος*, hence the designation Anhomoiains) is mutable and capable of development. He is not, in the proper and true sense, God, but only in the improper sense, in so far as He, in anticipation of His merits, was adopted by the Father as a Son. This erroneous doctrine was condemned at the First General Council at Nicaea (325). The Council drafted a creed, which confesses Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, His generation from the substance of the Father, His true Divinity and His consubstantiality with the Father. D 54.

The Semi-Arians took up a middle position between the strict Arians (anhomoiains) and the defenders of the Nicene Creed (Homousians). They rejected the expression *ὁμοούσιος*, because they believed that it favoured Sabellianism, but admitted that the *Logos* was similar to the Father (*ὅμοιος*, thus called Homoiains) either similar in all things (*ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα*) or similar in Nature (*ὁμοιοούσιος*, and therefore called Homousians).

b) Macedonianism. The Pneumatomachi (=Combators against the Spirit), a sect of the Semi-Arians, which is said (probably incorrectly) to have been founded (Didymus, De Trin. II 10) by the Semi-Arian Bishop Macedonius (360 deposed, † before 364), extended the notion of Subordinationism to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost by declaring the Holy Ghost to be a mere creature, a mere ministering Spirit like the angels (on the strength of Hebr. 1, 14). Against this error, St. Athanasius, the great Cappadocian Fathers (Basil, Gregory, Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa), and Didymus of Alexandria defended the divinity of the Holy Ghost and His consubstantiality with the Father and with the Son. Macedonianism was condemned at the Synod at Alexandria (362) under the presidency of St. Athanasius, at the Second General Council of Constantinople (381) and again at a Roman Synod (382) under the presidency of Pope Damasus (D 74—82). The Council of Constantinople made an important addendum to the Nicene Symbol and by ascribing divine attributes to the Holy Spirit asserted His Divinity, indirectly at least: *Et in Spiritum Sanctum Dominum et vivificantem ex Patre procedentem cum Patre et Filio adorandum et conglorificandum, qui locutus est per sanctos Prophetas* (and in the Holy Spirit the Lord and giver of life who proceedeth from the Father who together with the Father and the Son is to be adored and glorified; who spoke by the prophets).

3. Trinitarianism

a) The Christian commentator on Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus († about 565), identified nature and person (*οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*) and thus came to Monophysitism and in the doctrine of the Trinity, to Trinitarianism. The Three Divine Persons are, according to him, three individuals of the God-head, as three men are three individuals of the species man. Thus he would replace the numerical unity of the Divine nature by a mere specific unity.

b) Roscelin, a Canon of Compiègne († about 1120), was a nominalist. According to him the individual alone possesses reality. He therefore taught that the Three

Divine Persons were three separate realities (*tres res ab invicem separatae*), which are connected with one another morally only through the agreement of will and power, just as three angels or three human souls might be. His teaching was combated by St. Anselm of Canterbury, and condemned at a Synod at Soissons (1092).

c) Gilbert of Poitiers (†1154) according to his opponents (e.g., Bernhard of Clairvaux), posited a real difference between Deus and Divinitas, and a real difference between the Divine Persons and the Divine Essence, so that there would result a quaternity in God (Three Persons plus Godhead). This teaching, which is not obvious in Gilbert's writings, was rejected at the Council of Rheims (1148) in the presence of Pope Eugene III. (D. 389 et seq.)

d) The Abbot Joachim of Fiore († 1202) conceived the unity of the Three Divine Persons as a collective unit (*unitas quasi collectiva et similitudinaria*). His teaching was rejected at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and the teaching of Peter Lombardus, which he had attacked, was solemnly approved (*Caput Damnamus*: D 431 et seq.).

e) Anton Günther († 1873) taught that the Absolute determined Itself three times successively in a process of self-development, as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The Divine Substance, he asserted, is thus trebled. The Three Substances are then attracted through consciousness, to one another, and thus make up a formal unity.

4. Protestantism

Although Luther contested the traditional trinitarian terminology, he held fast to belief in the Trinity. Cf. the Schmalkaldic Articles, P. I Art. 1—4. The subjectivism preached by him, however, led finally to his denial of the dogma of the Trinity. Socianism, established by Faustus Sozzini († 1604), from its basic rationalistic attitude expounded a strict unitary concept of God, which did not admit of a plurality of Divine Persons. It declared Christ to be a mere man, the Holy Ghost an impersonal Divine Force.

The newer rationalistic Theology holds generally to the traditional terminology, but sees in the Three Persons only the personification of the Divine Attributes, such as might, wisdom and goodness. According to Harnack, the Christian concept of the Trinity developed from the polemic between Christianity and Judaism. At first only the duplex formula "God and Christ" existed as antithesis to God and Moses; later, the Holy Ghost was added.

§ 2. The Doctrinal Decisions of the Church

In God there are Three Persons, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Each of the Three Persons possesses the one (numerical) Divine Essence. (*De fide.*)

The terms "essence, nature, substance," refer to the Divine "Being," which is the same for the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, while the terms "hypostasis and person" refer to the three owners or bearers of the Divine Being. See § 17, 1.

1. The oldest authoritative doctrinal formulation of the Church's belief in the Trinity is the Apostle's Creed, which, in the form of the ancient Roman baptismal symbol, served as the basis of catechumenical instruction and as a baptismal confession of faith since the 2nd century. It is based on the trinitarian formula of Baptism. Mt. 28, 19. Cf. D 1-12.

2. A letter of Pope Dionysius (259-268) "of epoch-making significance" (Scheeben, *Gotteslehre* n. 687), to Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria, rejected Sabellianism, Tritheism and Subordinationism. D 48-51.

3. The Nicene Creed, which arose out of the defensive struggle against Arianism, specially stresses the true Divinity of the Son and His consubstantiality (homously) with the Father. D 54.
4. The *Symbolum Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum* (Nicaeo-Constantinople Creed), the authoritative doctrinal confession of faith of the Second General Council of Constantinople (381), which arose out of the defensive struggle against Arianism and Macedonianism, stresses, side by side with the Godhead of the Son, also the Godhead of the Holy Ghost. D 86.
5. A Roman Synod under Pope Damasus (382) offers a summarised condemnation of the ancient antitrinitarian errors, above all of Macedonianism. D 58-82.
6. The *Symbolum Quicumque* (Athanasian Creed), which stems, not from St. Athanasius, but from an unknown Latin author of the 5th or 6th century, contains in very clear and readable form a synopsis of the teaching of the Church on the Incarnation and the Trinity. Against Sabellianism it lays particular stress on the Trinity; against Trinitarism, on the numerical Unity of God. D 39 et seq.
7. The most complete formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity in a Creed since the times of the Fathers is found in the Symbol of the 11th Synod of Toledo (675), which is composed mosaic-like out of texts from the Fathers (above all from St. Augustine, St. Fulgentius, St. Isidore of Seville), and of former Synods (especially that of the 6th Synod of Toledo, 638). D 275-281.
8. Of significance in the Church formulation of the Trinity dogma in the middle ages, are the 4th Lateran Council (1215) which rejected the tritheistical error of Joachim of Fiore (D 428 et seq.), and the Council of Florence, which, in the *Decretum pro Jacobitis* (1441), gave a summarised, comprehensive exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, which can be regarded as the key-stone of the dogmatic development (D 703 et seq.).
9. In later times there is the doctrinal assertion of Pope Pius VI, from the Bull "*Auctorem Fidei*" (1794), in which he rejects the expression used by the Synod of Pistoia, "*Deus unus in tribus personis distinctus*," on account of its endangering the notion of the absolute simplicity of the Divine Essence, and declares that it is more correct to say: *Deus unus in tribus personis distinctis*. D 1596.

CHAPTER 2

Proof of the Existence of the Trinity from Scripture and Tradition

I. The Old Testament

§ 3. Indications of the Trinity of God in the Old Testament

As the Old Testament Revelation is but a shadowy picture of the New Testament (Hebr. 10, 1), so in the Old Testament there is no clear communication of the Mystery of the Trinity but merely indications.

1. God often speaks in the plural form of Himself. Gn. 1, 26 : "Let us make man to our image and likeness !" Cf. Gn. 3, 22 ; 11, 7. The Fathers understood these passages in the light of the New Testament Revelation, to mean that the First Person was addressing the Second Person, or the Second the Third Person. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 20, 1. The plural form may be explained with more probability as the plural of majesty which is really singular.

2. The Angel of the Lord in the Theophanies of the Old Covenant is called Jahweh, El and Elohim, and reveals Himself as Elohim and Jahweh. By this it is indicated that there are two Persons, who are God : One, who sends, and One who is sent. Cf. Gn. 16, 7-13 ; Ex. 3, 2-14. The Older Fathers understood Is. 9, 6 as referring to Jahweh (*magni consilii in angelus*, according to the Septuagint) and in Mal. 3, 1 (*angelus testamenti*) the Logos. The Later Fathers, especially St. Augustine, and the Schoolmen, held that the Logos here revealed Himself by the mediation of an angel.

3. The Messianic prophecies postulate a distinction of Persons in God in so far as they distinguish God and the Son of God. Ps. 2, 7 : "The Lord hath said to me : thou art my Son, this day I have begotten thee." Is. 9, 6 : "The government is upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called, Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace." Is. 35, 4 : "God himself will come and will save you." Cf. Ps. 109, 1-3 ; 44, 7 ; Is. 7, 14 (*Emmanuel* = God with us) ; Mich 5, 2.

4. The Sapiential Books represent the Divine Wisdom as an Hypostasis side by side with God. It has proceeded from God (according to Proverbs 8, 24 et seq., by birth) from all eternity, and co-operates in the creation of the world. Cf. Prov. 8, 22-31 ; Wis. 7, 22-8, 1 ; 8, 3-8. In the light of the New Testament Revelation (John 1, 1 et seq. : Hebr. 1, 3), one may well see in the wisdom of the Old Testament a pointer to the Divine Personality of the Word.

5. The Old Testament frequently speaks of the "Spirit of God," or of the "Holy Ghost." By this is to be understood not a Divine Person, but "a power proceeding from God, which gives life, bestows strength, illuminates and impels towards the good" (P. Heinisch). Cf. Gn. 1, 2 ; Ps. 32, 6 ; 50, 13 ; 103, 30 ; 138, 7 ; 142, 10 ; Is. 11, 2 ; 42, 1 ; 61, 1 ; 63, 10 ; Ez. 11, 5 ; Wis. 1, 5, 7. In the light of the New Testament Revelation many of these passages (especially Ps. 103, 30 ; Is. 11, 2 ; Ez. 36, 27 ; Joel 2, 28 ; Wis. 1, 7 ; cf. Acts 2, 16 et seq.) were referred by the Fathers and the Liturgy to the Person of the Holy Ghost.

6. It was believed that one might, perhaps, be entitled to see an indication of the Three Divine Persons in the light of the New Testament Revelation in the Trisagion, in Is. 6, 3, and in the threefold sacerdotal blessing in Num. 6, 23 et seq. It must be borne in mind however that in the Old Testament the treble number is an expression of intensification. In Ps. 32, 6, besides Jahweh His Word and His Spirit are mentioned and in Wisd. 9, 17, His wisdom and His Holy Spirit. The word, the wisdom and the spirit are here, however, not mentioned as single persons, but as powers of God.

The attempts to derive the Christian concept of the Trinity from the late Jewish Theology or from the Jewish-Hellenistic doctrine of the logos of Philo have failed. The "Memra Jahweh," that is, the word of God and the "Holy Ghost," are in Jewish Theology, not Divine Persons side by side with Jahweh

but circumlocutions of the name of Jahweh. The Logos of Philo is the instrument of God in the creation of the world. Although He is called the firstborn Son of God and a Second God, He is still to be conceived as a personification of the Divine Power only. He is essentially different from the Logos of St. John. "The Logos of Philo is basically the epitome of the power of God working in the world, even if He often appears as a Person, but the Logos of St. John is the eternal consubstantial Son of God and therefore a Person."

II. The New Testament

§ 4. The Trinitarian Formulae

1. The Evangelists

a) In the narrative of the Annunciation, the Angel, according to St. Luke 1, 35, says: "The Holy Ghost (*πνεῦμα ἅγιον*) shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy who shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." Cf. St. Luke 1, 32: "He shall be great and shall be called the Son of the Most High."

Three Persons are named: The All Highest, the Son of the All Highest and the Holy Ghost. However, on account of the neutral form of the Greek word (*πνεῦμα*) and of the absence of the article, the fact that the Holy Ghost is a distinct person does not clearly emerge, but its implications are clear if we compare this passage with Acts 1, 8 in which the Holy Ghost and His action are differentiated. Acts 1, 8: "But ye shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you."

b) The Theophany after the baptism of Jesus is regarded as a Revelation of the Trinity. Mt. 3, 16 et seq.: "He saw the Spirit of God, (*πνεῦμα θεοῦ*; Mk. 1, 10 *τὸ πνεῦμα*; Luke 3, 22 *τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον*; John 1, 32 *τὸ πνεῦμα*) descending as a dove and coming upon Him and behold a voice from Heaven saying: This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." The speaker is God, the Father. Jesus is the Son of God, in fact the only one and therefore the true and proper Son of God; for the words "beloved Son" . . . in biblical language mean usually the "only Son" (cf. Gn. 22, 2. 12. 16; Mk. 12, 6). The Holy Ghost appears under a special symbol as an independent, personal Essence side by side with the Father and the Son.

c) In His solemn address at the Last Supper, Jesus promises another Helper (Paracletus), the Holy Ghost or the Spirit of Truth, Whom He Himself and the Father would send. John 14, 16: "And I will ask the Father: and He shall send you another Paraclete that He may abide with you for ever." Cf. St. John 14, 26 and 15, 26. The Holy Spirit who is sent, is clearly distinguished as a Person from the Father and the Son who send Him. The appellation "Paracletus" and the activities attributed to Him (teaching, giving witness) presuppose His personal subsistence.

d) The Mystery of the Trinity is most clearly manifested in the mandate of Jesus to go and baptise. Mt. 28, 19: "Going therefore, teach ye all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." That there are here three distinct persons, emerges as regards the Father and the Son from their relative opposition, as regards the Holy Ghost

from the fact that He is completely co-ordinated to the Two Persons, which would not be if spirit here meant merely an essential attribute. The unity of essence of the Three Persons is indicated in the singular form "in the name" (*εἰς τὸ ὄνομα*). The genuineness of the passage is guaranteed by the unanimous tradition of all manuscripts and translations. In the *Didache* it is cited twice (7, 1 and 7, 3).

2. The Apostolic Epistles

a) St. Peter uses a trinitarian formula of blessing in the introduction of his first letter. 1 Peter 1, 1 et seq.: "To the chosen strangers . . . according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, unto the sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience and to sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ."

b) St. Paul concludes the second Letter to the Corinthians with a trinitarian blessing. 2 Cor. 13, 13: "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God and the communication of the Holy Ghost be with you all."

c) St. Paul counts three different kinds of gifts of the Spirit and ascribes them to three donors—the Spirit, the Lord (Christ), and God. 1 Cor. 12, 4 et seq.: "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but the same God who worketh all things." The substantial unity of the Three Persons is indicated by the fact that the same works in V. 11 are appropriated to the Spirit alone. Cf. Eph. 1, 3-14 (chosen by God the Father redeemed through the blood of Christ, signed with the Holy Spirit); Eph. 4, 4-6 (One Spirit, One Lord, One God).

d) The Tri-personality and the unity of essence in God is most perfectly expressed in the so-called *Comma Ioanneum* 1 John 5, 7 et seq.: "And they are Three who give testimony [in Heaven: the Father, the Word and the Holy Ghost. And these Three are One. And there are Three that give testimony on earth.]" The genuineness of the words in brackets, however, is subject to the gravest doubts as they are missing in all the Greek biblical manuscripts up to the 15th century, in all the Oriental translations, also in the oldest and best Vulgate manuscripts, and are not used by the Greek and Latin Fathers in the great Trinitarian controversies of the 4th and 5th centuries. The passage is first found in the writings of the Spanish heretic Priscillian († 385) though in a heretical form (*haec tria unum sunt in Christo Jesu*). From the end of the 5th century on they are more often cited (484 in a *Libellus fidei* of North African Bishops: St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Cassiodor). As they have been adopted in the official Vulgate editions, and have been used by the Church for centuries, they may be regarded as an expression of the Church's teaching. Further, they enjoy a status as a testimony of Tradition. Even if the passage be not a genuine constituent part of the Vulgate, it is nevertheless authentic, that is, free from error dogmatically. In the year 1897 the Congregation of the Inquisition declared that the genuineness of the passage could not with certainty be denied or doubted. In recent times the doubts concerning its authenticity have grown and the Holy Office, in 1927, declared that, after careful examination of the whole circumstances, its genuineness could be denied. D 2198.

§ 5. The New Testament Doctrine of God the Father

1. The Fatherhood of God (derived sense)

Holy Writ often speaks of the Fatherhood of God in a derived or metaphorical sense. The Triune God is the Father of created things, above all, of creatures endowed with reason, by virtue of their creation, preservation and providence

(natural order), and especially their elevation to the state of grace, and kinship with God (supernatural order). Cf. Dt. 32, 6; Jer. 31, 9; 2 Sm. 7, 14; Mt. 5, 16, 48; 6, 1-32; 7, 11; John 1, 12; 1 John 3, 1 et seq.; Rom. 8, 14 et seq.; Gal. 4, 5 et seq.

2. The Fatherhood of God (In a true and proper sense)

Revelation teaches that there is also in God a fatherhood in the true and proper sense which belongs to the First Person only, and which is the model of God's fatherhood of man, and of all created paternity (Eph. 3, 14 et seq.). Jesus referred to God as His Father in a unique and exclusive sense. When He speaks of the Father in heaven He says either: "My Father" or "Thy Father," or when appropriate "Your Father," but never "Our Father." (The "Our Father" is not Jesus' prayer for Himself, but the prayer of His disciples: cf. Mt. 6, 9.) Assertions of Jesus, which testify to His identity of essence with the Father, prove also that His Sonship and the Fatherhood of God are to be understood in a proper physical sense. Cf. Mt. 11, 27: "And no one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him." John 10, 30: "I and the Father are One." John 5, 26: "For as the Father hath life in Himself, so He hath given to the Son also to have life in Himself." St. John calls Jesus the Only Begotten Son of God, St. Paul the only Son of God. John 1, 14: "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father." John 1, 18: "The only-begotten God (Vulg.: Son), who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared Him." Cf. John 3, 16, 18; 1 John 4, 9; Rom. 8, 32: "That spared not even His own Son"; cf. Rom. 8, 3. John 5, 18: "Hereupon therefore the Jews sought the more to kill Him because He said God was His Father making Himself equal to God."

§ 6. The New Testament Doctrine of God the Son

1. The Johannine Doctrine of the Logos

a) The Logos, according to St. John, is neither an attribute nor an impersonal power of God, but a Person. This is indicated in the absolute designation $\delta \lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \varsigma$, and is clearly expressed in the words: "The word was with God" ($\delta \acute{\omicron} \lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \varsigma \circ \eta \nu \pi \acute{\rho} \omicron \varsigma \tau \acute{\omicron} \nu \theta \epsilon \acute{\omicron} \nu$). The preposition "with" ($\pi \acute{\rho} \omicron \varsigma$) expresses that the Logos was side by side with God (therefore not in God) and co-ordinated to God (cf. Mk. 9, 19). The assertion in V. 11: "He came unto His own" and in V. 14: "The Word became flesh" can only refer to a Person, not to a Divine attribute.

b) The Logos is a different Person from God the Father ($\delta \theta \epsilon \acute{\omicron} \varsigma$). This follows from the fact that the Logos was with God (V. 1 et seq.), and notably from the identification of the Logos with the Only-begotten Son of the Father. V. 14: "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father" (cf. V. 18). Therefore, between Father and Son there is a relative opposition.

c) The Logos is a Divine Person. V. 1: "And the Word was God" ($\kappa \alpha \varsigma \theta \epsilon \acute{\omicron} \varsigma \eta \nu \delta \lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \varsigma$). The true Deity of the Logos is implied also by the Divine attributes of the creation of the world ascribed to Him: ("All things

were made by Him." V. 3), and of eternity ("in the beginning was the Logos": V. 1). The Logos also appears as God in that He is represented as the Originator of the supernatural order, in so far as He, as the Light, is the Dispenser of truth (V. 4 et seq.), and as the Life, the Dispenser of the supernatural life of grace (V. 12). V. 14, "full of grace and truth."

2. The Pauline Doctrine of the Identity of Christ's Image and Likeness with God

Hebr. 1, 3 calls the Son of God the "Brightness of the glory and figure of the substance of God." Cf. 2 Cor. 4, 4: Col. 1, 15 et seq. The designation of Christ as the reflection of the glory of God (*ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης*) indicates the similitude of essence or the identity of essence of Christ with God the Father ("Light of Light"). The expression "Figure of the substance of God," (*χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*) indicates also the personal independence of Christ side by side with the Father. That here is meant not a created, but a truly Divine image of God the Father, is shown by the Divine attributes which are ascribed to the Son of God—the creation and preservation of the world, its purification by Him from sin, His sitting at the right hand of God (V. 3), His exaltation above the angels (V. 4).

§ 7. The New Testament Teaching concerning God the Holy Ghost

Even if the word *πνεῦμα* in individual passages of Holy Writ means the spiritual Nature of God or an impersonal Divine Power, still it may be shown from numerous passages that the Holy Ghost is a Divine Person distinct from the Father and from the Son.

a) The Holy Ghost is a real person. This is testified to by the trinitarian formula of baptism, Mt. 28, 19, the name Paracletus=helper, representative, which belongs to a person only (John 14, 16, 26; 15, 26; 16, 7) cf. 1 John 2, 1, in which Jesus Christ is called our Paracletus (=representative, advocate with the Father), and by the fact that personal attributes are ascribed to the Holy Ghost; for example, the teaching of truth (John 14, 16; 16, 13), the giving of testimony for Christ (John 15, 26), the knowledge of the mysteries of God (1 Cor. 2, 10), the forecasting of future events (John 16, 13; Acts 21, 11), the installation of bishops (Acts 20, 28).

b) The Holy Ghost is a Person distinct from the Father and from the Son. This is attested by the Trinitarian Formula of Baptism, the appearance of the Holy Spirit at the baptism of Jesus under a special symbol, and especially the parting discourses of Jesus, in which the Holy Ghost is distinguished, as one who is given or sent, from the Father and the Son who send Him (John 14, 16, 26; 15, 26).

c) The Holy Ghost is a Divine Person. The name "Holy Ghost" and the name "God" are used alternately. Acts 5, 3 et seq.: "Ananias, why has Satan tempted thy heart that thou shouldest lie to the Holy Ghost? Thou hast not lied to men, but to God." Cf. 1 Cor. 3, 16; 6, 19 et seq. In the Trinitarian Formula of Baptism, the Holy Ghost is made equal to the Father and to the Son who are truly God. Again, Divine attributes are ascribed to the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost possesses the fullness of knowledge: He

teaches all truth, presages future things (John 16, 13), searches the innermost secrets of God (1 Cor. 2, 10) and has inspired the Prophets in the Old Covenant (2 Peter 1, 21; cf. Acts 1, 16). The Divine power of the Holy Ghost is revealed in the miracle of the Incarnation of the Son of God (Luke 1, 35; Mt. 1, 20), and in the miracle of Pentecost (Luke 24, 49; Acts 2, 2-4). The Holy Ghost is the Divine Distributor of grace (1 Cor. 12, 11) and the Grace of justification in the baptism (John 3, 5), and in the Sacrament of Penance (John 20, 22). Cf. Rom. 5, 5; Gal. 4, 6; 5, 22.

§ 8. The New Testament Doctrine of the Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons

The biblical teaching of the Trinity of the Persons in God can be reconciled with the basic biblical doctrine of the unicity of the Divine Nature (Mk. 12, 29; 1 Cor. 8, 4; Eph. 4, 6; 1 Tim. 2, 5), only if the Three Divine Persons subsist in One Single Nature. The numerical unity or identity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons is indicated in the trinitarian formulas (cf. especially Mt. 28, 19: in nomine) and in individual authors, who discourse on the mutual co-inherence (perichoresis) of the Divine Persons (John 10, 38; 14, 9 et seq.; 17, 10; 16, 13 et seq.; 5, 19). Christ has explicitly declared the numerical unity of His Divine Nature with that of the Father in John 10, 30: "I and the Father are One" (ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατήρ ἐν ἐσμέν). St. Augustine comments on this: "Quod dixit 'unum,' liberat te ab Ario; quod dixit 'sumus,' liberat te a Sabellio". (That He said "one" preserves us from Arianism; that He said "we are" preserves us from Sabellianism). (In Ioan, tr. 36. 9).

The Church's term for the numerical Unity of Essence of God is the expression *ὁμοούσιος* which was sanctioned by the Council of Nicaea (325).

The Cappadocians use the formula: One Essence—three hypostases (*μία οὐσία — τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*) by which they understand the Unity of Essence in the sense of numerical, not of specific unity.

III. Tradition

§ 9. The Testimony of Tradition for the Trinity of God

1. Testimonies from the Liturgy of the Ancient Christian Church

a) The Ancient Christian Baptismal Liturgy contains a clear confession of the belief in the Trinity. According to the testimony of the Didache baptism was already administered in ancient Christian times "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" through the triple dipping or triple pouring of water. Cf. St. Justin, *Apologia*, I 61; St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* III 17, 1; Tertullian, *De baptismo*, 13; Origen, *In ep. ad Rom.* 5, 8; St. Cyprian, 73, 18.

b) The Apostle's Creed, which, in its older form, is identical with the ancient Roman Symbol used in baptism, is built up on the trinitarian formula of baptism. The rules of faith handed down by the Church authors of the second and third centuries are an extension and paraphrase of the trinitarian symbol of baptism. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* I 10, 1; Tertullian, *De praescr.* 13; *Adv. Prax.* 2, *De virg.* vel. 1; Origen, *De principiis* I praef. 4—10; Novatian, *De Trin.* 1. The whole doctrine of the Trinity is extraordinarily clearly represented in the

private statement of faith directed against Paul of Samosata by St. Gregory Thaumaturgos († about 270).

c) The belief in the Trinity is also expressed by the ancient Christian doxologies. Christian antiquity knows two forms, the co-ordinating form : Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost ; and the subordinating form : Glory be to the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost. As the latter was misinterpreted by the Arians in a heretical subordination sense, St. Basil altered it as follows : Glory be to the Father with the Son together with the Holy Ghost *δόξα τῷ πατρὶ μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ σὺν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ* (De Spiritu Sancto I, 3). Cf. Martyrium. S. Polycarpi 14, 3.

2. The Ante-Nicene Fathers

St. Clement of Rome writes (about 96) to the Community of Corinth : " Have we not one God and one Christ and one Spirit of Grace " (46, 6). He designates God and the Lord Jesus Christ and the Holy Ghost as the belief and the hope of the elect (58, 2). St. Ignatius of Antioch († about 107) not only teaches the Deity of Christ in the most definite fashion, but also employs trinitarian formulas. Magn. 13, 2 : " Be ye subject to the Bishop and to one another, as Jesus Christ to the Father according to the flesh, and the Apostles to Christ and to the Father and to the Spirit." Cf. Magn. 13, 1 ; Eph. 9, 1.

The Apologists sought with the aid of Philosophy (concept of the Logos) to win a scientific understanding of the mystery of the Trinity, but did not always keep themselves free from subordination expressions. St. Justin teaches that the Christians adore Jesus Christ the son of the True God in the second place, after the Creator of the universe and then the Prophetic Spirit (Apol. I 13). Athenagoras (about 177) replies to the reproach of atheism : " Who should not wonder when he hears those called atheists who acknowledge God the Father and God the Son and the Holy Ghost and teach their power in unity as well as their distinction in order ? " (Suppl. 10). More exact expositions of the Church belief in the Trinity are to be found in St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer. I 10, 1 ; IV 20, 1. Epideixis 6 et seq. ; 47) and especially in Tertullian (Adv. Praxeam). The last-mentioned teaches against Sabellianism the Trinity of the Divine Persons (ecce enim dico alium esse Patrem et alium Filium et alium Spiritum ; The Father and the Son and the Spirit are distinct ; c. 9), but holds just as decisively to the unity of the Substance (unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis, qui unus Deus ; The one God is one in substance, one in status, one in power ; c. 2) Origen already uses the expression *ὑποστάσις* (In ep. ad Hebr. I, 3). The expression *τριάς* as the designation of the tri-personal nature of God is first used by Theophilus of Antioch (Ad Autol. II 15) ; the corresponding Latin expression, *trinitas*, is first used by Tertullian (Adv. Prax. 2 ; De pud. 21).

In pre-Nicene times, the Roman Church most clearly expressed belief in the tri-personality and consubstantiality of God in the famous dogmatic doctrinal composition of Pope Dionysius (259—268) addressed to Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria, in which the Pope rejects Tritheism, Sabellianism and Subordinationism (D 48—51). The decision of the Nicene Council was no novelty, but an organic development of the primitive Trinitarian doctrine which was in the deposit of faith of the Church from the very beginning and the implications of which were gradually developed and made clear by scientific theology.

3. The Post-Nicene Fathers

The post-Nicene Fathers especially had the task of scientifically establishing and defending, against Arianism and Semi-Arianism, the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and, against Macedonianism, the identity of essence of the

Holy Ghost with that of the Father and the Son. Those who were especially notable in this connection were St. Athanasius the Great († 373) and the three outstanding Cappadocians, St. Basil the Great († 379), St. Gregory Nazianzus († about 390) ("the theologian"), and St. Gregory of Nyssa († 394), St. Cyril of Alexandria († 444), and among the Latin Fathers, St. Hilary of Poitiers († 367), "the Athanasius of the West," and St. Ambrose of Milan († 397). Primitive Christian doctrine on the Trinity reaches its apex in the outstanding work of St. Augustine († 430), *De Trinitate*.

CHAPTER 3

The Triple Personality of God

§ 10. The Internal Divine Processions in General

1. Concept and Reality

In God there are two Internal Divine Processions. (*De fide*.)

By procession is understood the origin of one from another. One distinguishes external procession (*processio ad extra* or *per transiens*), and internal procession inwards (*processio ad intra* or *per immanans*). A procession is said to be external when the terminus of the procession goes outside the principle from which it proceeds. Thus creatures proceed by external procession from God, their Primary Origin, but the processions of the Son and the Holy Ghost are an immanent act of the Most Holy Trinity. An Internal-Divine Procession signifies the origin of a Divine person from another through the communication of the numerically one Divine Essence.

The Creeds teach us that there are two internal Divine Processions: the Begetting of the Son and the Procession of the Holy Ghost. Cf. D 86. By reason of these Processions there are in God three Hypostases or Persons really distinct from one another. The expression "Procession" or "Issue" (*ἐκπόρευσις*, *processio*) comes from Holy Writ. John 8, 42: "From God I proceeded (*Ego ex Deo processi*). John 15, 26: "the Spirit of Truth who proceedeth from the Father" (*Spiritus veritatis, qui a Patre procedit*). According to the context, however, both passages are to be referred, not to the Eternal Processions of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, but to their temporal missions into this world. These missions, however, are the reflected images of the eternal processions.

2. The Subject of the Internal Divine Processions

The Divine Persons, not the Divine Nature, are the subject of the Internal Divine processions (in the active and in the passive sense). (*De fide*.)

The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) espoused the teaching of Peter the Lombard against the attacks of the Abbot Joachim of Fiore, and declared: *Illa res (sc. substantia divina) non est generans neque genita nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat, et Filius, qui gignitur, et Spiritus Sanctus, qui procedit*. (The Divine Substance) does not generate nor is it generated nor does it proceed; It is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated and the Holy Ghost who proceeds. D. 432. Rationally always refers the producing and the being produced to a person. Historically the doctrine derives from the axiom: "*actiones sunt suppositorum*" (actions are to be predicated of supposita). Cf. S. th. I 39, 5 ad 1.

§ 11. The Procession of the Son from the Father by Way of Generation

The Second Divine Person proceeds from the First Divine Person by Generation, and therefore is related to Him as Son to a Father. (*De fide.*)

The Athanasian Creed confesses: *Filius a Patre solo est, non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus.* (The Son is from the Father alone not made not created but generated) D 39. Cf. the Nicene Confession of Faith (D 54).

According to the testimony of Holy Writ the first and second Persons stand to each other in the relationship of a true and proper fatherhood and sonship. The characteristic biblical name for the First Person is the name Father, that of the Second Person the name Son. The Father is more closely designated as "own Father" (*πατήρ ἴδιος*; John 5, 18), the Son as "own Son" (*υἱὸς ἴδιος*; Rom. 8, 32), as the "only born Son" (*υἱὸς μονογενής*; John 1, 14, 18; 3, 16, 18; 1 John 4, 9); as "beloved Son" (*υἱὸς ἀγαπητός*; Mt. 3, 17; 17, 5); as "true Son" (*verus Filius*; 1 John 5, 20 Vulg.). Thus the Son is distinguished from the adopted children of God (Rom. 8, 29). A true and proper filiation is, however, based on a true generation only. The eternal generation of the Son from the Father is directly expressed in Ps. 2, 7 and Hebr. 1, 5: "Thou art my son; this day I have begotten thee." Cf. Ps. 109, 3, according to the Vulgate: *Ex utero ante luciferum genui te* (according to the new translation of the Biblical Institute: *ante luciferum tamquam rorem, genui te* (Before the daystar, like dew, I begot thee)). The Fathers and the Councils of the 4th century establish the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father from the eternal generation.

§ 12. The Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son by way of Spiration

The Procession of the Third Person is, with reference to its Biblical proper name, called Spiration (*πνεύσις spiratio*).

1. The Teaching of the Church

The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and from the Son as from a Single Principle through a Single Spiration. (*De fide.*)

Since the 9th century, the Greek Orthodox Church has taught that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone. A Synod at Constantinople in the year 879, under the Patriarch Photius, rejected the "filioque" of the Latins as heretical. In contrast to this, the Second General Council of Lyons (1274) declared: *Fideli ac devota professione fatemur, quod Spiritus sanctus aeternaliter ex Patre et Filio non tanquam ex duobus principiis, sed tanquam ex uno principio, non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione procedit.* (The Holy Ghost eternally proceeds from Father and Son as from one principle and by one spiration.) D 460. Cf. the Creed of the Synod of Toledo in the year 447 (D 19), the Athanasian Creed (D 39), the Creed of the 11th Council of Toledo (675) (D 277,) the Caput Infirmi of the Fourth Lateran Council (D 428), and the *Decretum pro Graecis* as well as the *Decretum pro Jacobitis* of the Union

Council of Florence (D 691, 703 et seq.). In the Niceno-Constantinople Creed the addition "et filio" was first added by the Third Synod of Toledo, in the year 589.

2. Proofs from Holy Scripture

a) The Holy Ghost, according to the teaching of Holy Writ, is not merely the Spirit of the Father (Mt. 10, 20 : "It is the Spirit of the Father that speaketh in you"; cf. John 15, 26 : 1 Cor. 2, 11 et seq.), but also the Spirit of the Son (Gal. 4, 6 : "God sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts"), the Spirit of Jesus (Apostles 16, 7 : "And the Spirit of Jesus suffered them not"), the Spirit of Christ (Romans 8, 9 : "Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of His"), the Spirit of Jesus Christ (Phil. 1, 19 : "through the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ"). If the designation "spirit of the Father" expresses an original reference to the Father (=spiramen Patris or spiratus a Patre), as the Greeks admit, then the expression "Spirit of the Son" must analogously express an original connection with the Son (=spiramen Filii or spiratus a Filio).

b) The Holy Ghost is sent not only from the Father (John 14, 16, 26), but also from the Son, John 15, 26 : "The Paraclete Whom I will send you from the Father"; cf. John 16, 7 ; Luke 24, 49 ; John 20, 22. This external mission (ad extra) is to a certain extent the continuation of the Eternal Procession in time. From the mission one can therefore infer the Eternal Procession. The eternal production corresponds to the mission, and the eternal being produced corresponds to the being sent. As, according to the testimony of Holy Scripture, the Holy Ghost is sent from the Father and from the Son, it must be inferred that He is produced by the Father and by the Son.

c) The Holy Ghost receives His knowledge from the Son. John 16, 13 et seq. : "What things soever He shall hear He shall speak. He shall glorify me ; because He shall receive of mine and shall show it to you." The hearing and receiving of knowledge can be understood of a Divine Person only in the sense that He receives the Divine Knowledge and, with it, the identical Divine Essence from all eternity from another Divine Person through communication of Essence. As the Holy Ghost receives His knowledge from the Son He must proceed from the Son as the Son, who receives His knowledge from the Father (John 8, 26 et seq.), proceeds from the Father. St. Augustine comments on this passage : "from each He will hear it, from whom He proceeds. Hearing is for Him knowing, but knowing is Being." (In Ioan. tr. 99, 4.)

That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and from the Son as from One Single Principle and through One Single Spiration, is clear from John 16, 15 : "All that the Father has, is mine." If the Son, by virtue of His eternal generation from the Father, possesses everything that the Father possesses except the Fatherhood and the ungeneratedness which are not communicable, then He must also possess the power of spiration (vis spirativa) and with it the being a Principle in relation to the Holy Ghost.

3. Proof from Tradition

The Latin Fathers preferred the co-ordinating formula : *ex Patre et Filio* (Filioque), the Greek the subordinating formula : *ex Patre per Filium*. Ter-

tullian employs both forms, but explains the co-ordinating formula in the sense of the subordinating one. Adv. Prax. 4 : "I do not derive the Spirit otherwise than from the Father through the Son (a Patre per Filium). Op. cit. 8 : "the Third is the Spirit proceeding from God (the Father) and from the Son (a Deo et filii), as the third from the root through the bud is the fruit." St. Hilary, under Greek influence, uses the subordinating formula : "From thee (the Father) through him (the Son) is thy Holy Spirit" (De Trin. XII 56). St. Ambrose teaches that "the Holy Ghost, since he proceeds from the Father and the Son, cannot be separated from the Father nor from the Son" (De Spiritu Sancto I 120). St. Augustine establishes the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son (de utroque) by a detailed scriptural proof (In Ioan. tr. 99, 6 ; De Trin. XV 27, 48).

Origen uses the subordination phrase : "the Holy Ghost is the first of everything by the Father through the Son" ; "The Son gives to His hypostasis not only that he is, but also that he is wise, understanding and just" (Comm. in Ioan. II 10 (6), 75-76). St. Athanasius declares : "The same peculiar relationship in which we know the Son to be with the Father, governs, as we shall find, also that which is between the Spirit and the Son. And as the Son speaks : 'All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine (John 16, 15),' so we shall find, that all this is also through the Son in the Spirit" (Ep. ad Serap. 3, 1). St. Basil teaches that "the goodness and the sanctity and the kingly dignity characteristic of God the Father is transmitted from the Father through the Only-begotten to the Spirit" (De Spiritu Sancto 18, 47). The three Cappadocians (Basil, Gregory Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa) compare the relationship of the three Persons to each other with the links of a chain. The example is based on the subordinating formula "from the Father through the Son."

St. Didymus of Alexandria, St. Ephiphanius of Salamis and St. Cyril of Alexandria employ, even if not exclusively, the co-ordinating formula (filioque). Cf. St. Epiphanius, Ancoratus 7 : "the Holy Ghost is from the same Essence of the Father and of the Son." 16. 8 : "From the Father and the Son, the third according to his name." Cf. Didymus, De Spiritu Sancto 34 ; Cyril of Al ; Thes. de sancta et consubst. Trin. 34.

St. John of Damascus rejects the notion that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, nevertheless he teaches that He is the Spirit of the Son and that He proceeds through the Son from the Father (De fide orth. 18, 12). In saying this he does not deny that the Son is a Principle of the Holy Spirit, but only that unlike the Father He is not the Primitive Principle.

The co-ordinating formula (filioque) and the subordinating formula (per filium) concur essentially, in so far as they both attest that both the Father and the Son are the Principle of the Holy Ghost and they also complement each other. While in the former the unity and the indivisibility of the Principle are above all expressed, the latter effectively stresses that the Father is the Primitive Principle (cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. XV 17, 29 : de quo procedit principaliter), and that the Son as "God from God" is the Derived Principle, in so far as He, with His Essence, also receives the power of spiration from the Father. Cf. D 691.

4. Scholastic Proof from Reason

As the real difference of the Divine Persons derives exclusively from an opposition of the original relationships (D 703) there would exist no basis for the hypostatic distinction between the Son and the Holy Ghost, if the Holy Ghost did not also proceed from the Son. Cf. S. th. I 36, 2.

SECTION 2

Speculative Explanation of the Dogma of the Trinity

CHAPTER I

Speculative Explanation of the Internal Divine Processions§ 13. The Son proceeds from the Intellect of the Father by way of Generation. (*Sent. certa.*)

1. Teaching of the Church

The Roman Catechism (III, 9) teaches : " Of all examples which are adduced with a view to an explanation of the nature and manner of this eternal generation, that appears most nearly to approach the matter, which is taken from the intellectual activity of our soul, for which reason St. John calls the Son of God the ' Word.' For just as our spirit, knowing itself, produces a picture of itself, which theologians have called a ' word ' so God also, in so far as human can be compared to Divine, knowing Himself, generates the Eternal Word (*ita Deus seipsum intelligens Verbum aeternum generat.*)" Thus the generation of the Son from the Father is to be conceived purely as an intellectual generation or as an act of intellect (*generatio per modum intellectus*).

2. Positive Foundation

The Second Person is called the " Word of God " in Holy Writ. This name indicates that the Son is the Word (*verbum mentis*), generated by an act of cognition, or the product of the knowledge of the Father. The name " Wisdom," which is a personal name of the Second Person (cf. the Old Testament sapiential doctrine ; 1 Cor. I, 24), and therefore indicates the mode of His origin, indicates that the Son is generated through an act of cognition (*per modum intellectus*) of the Father. The designation : " Image of the invisible God " (Col. I, 15) or " Figure of the substance of God " (Hebr. I, 3), indicates that the generation of the Son occurs through that activity of the Father, which tends to produce a likeness of Himself, that is, through the activity of cognition.

St. Ignatius of Antioch applies to Christ the designation " Word of God " (*αὐτοῦ [τοῦ θεοῦ] λόγος* ; Magn. 8, 2), " Disposition of the Father (*τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ γνώμη* ; Eph. 3, 2), " Knowledge of God " (*θεοῦ γνώσις* ; Eph. 17, 2). Justin compares the generation of the Son with the coming of the word from the intellect (Dial. 61, 2). Athenagoras of Athens calls the Son of God " the Thought (*νοῦς*) and the Word (*λόγος*) of the Father " (Epid. 39). Augustine explains the divine generation as an act of the divine self-knowledge : " The Father generated by uttering His Word Who is equal to Him in all things " (De Trin. XV 14, 23).

3. Speculative Foundation

The Trinitarian "Processions" are the activities of a spirit, i.e., knowing or willing. In the divine act of cognition every reality is present which is essential to the concept of generation. Generation is defined according to Aristotle, as: *origo viventis a principio vivente coniuncto in similitudinem naturae* (the origin, from a conjoined living principle, of a living being with a like nature). The likeness which is essential to the concept of generation pertains to the act of knowledge only; for by knowledge there is produced an image (*similitudo*) of the object known. An act of will, on the contrary, presupposes a certain similarity between its object and the person willing (S. th. I 27, 4 ad 2). God the Father, by knowing Himself, produces the Perfect Image of Himself, i.e., the Son Who is identical in nature with Him.

What the object of the Divine act of cognition is, by which the Father generated the Son, is disputed. According to St. Thomas it is everything which is contained in the knowledge of the Father: primarily (*principaliter et quasi per se*) that which is the object of the necessary Divine knowledge, i.e., the Divine essence, the Divine Persons, possible things; and secondarily (*ex consequenti et quasi per accidens*) that which is the object of free Divine knowledge, i.e., the things of reality which God decided from eternity to fulfil. Cf. *De verit.* 4, 4-5; S. th. I 34, 1 ad 3.

§ 14. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the will or from the mutual love of the Father and of the Son. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Roman Catechism teaches that the "Holy Ghost proceeds from the Divine Will, inflamed, as it were, with love (a divine voluntate veluti amore inflammata)" (I 9, 7).

The biblical name of the Third Person, "Holy Ghost" "*πνεῦμα ἅγιον*," (Pneuma = wind, breath, respiration, life principle, soul) designates a principle of movement, of activity. As the personal name of a Divine Person, the name Pneuma indicates that the Holy Ghost, through an activity of the Divine Will, proceeds as the Spiritual Principle of Divine Activity (*per modum voluntatis*). Again, the verb *πνεῖν*, spirare, expresses a relationship to the will. Compare the expressions: *amorem spirare*, *odium spirare*, *spirans minarum* (Acts 9, 1). The personal name "Holy" similarly indicates a procession from the will, as holiness has its seat in the will. Scripture and Tradition ascribe the works of love to the Holy Ghost. Cf. Rom. 5, 5: "The charity of God is poured forth into our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us." The appropriation of the works of love to the Holy Ghost has its basis in the personal character and ultimately in the origin of the Holy Ghost. It is, therefore, to be inferred that the Holy Ghost "proceeds" by an act of love (*per modum amoris*). For this reason the Fathers call the Holy Ghost "Love" (*amor*, *caritas*, *dilectio*, *vinculum amoris*, *osculum amoris*). The 11th Council of Toledo (675) declared: "*(Spiritus Sanctus) simul ab utrisque processisse monstratur, quia caritas sive sanctitas amborum esse cognoscitur.*" (that the Holy Ghost proceeds from both is seen by this that He is known as the love or sanctity of both.) D 277.

The designation "Love" is connected with the designation "gift" or "donation" (*δωρεά δώρον*, *donum*, *munus*), which the Fathers ascribe to the

Holy Ghost following Holy Writ. Cf. Acts 2, 38 : "And you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." Acts 8, 20 : "Keep thy money to perish with thee : because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money." St. Augustine, *De Trin.* XV 19, 33-36. As a gift is the expression of love, so also this personal name of the Holy Ghost indicates His origin *per modum amoris*, and points to the fact that the Holy Ghost is the mutual love-gift of the Father and of the Son.

The object of the Divine will, by which the Father and the Son produce the Holy Ghost, is primarily (*principaliter et quasi per se*) that which God necessarily wills and loves, i.e., the Divine essence and the Divine Persons, and secondarily (*ex consequenti et quasi per accidens*) that which He freely wills and loves, i.e., created things and, according to some theologians, also merely possible things.

§ 15. The Holy Ghost does not proceed through generation but through spiration. (*De fide.*)

The Symbol *Quicumque* says of the Holy Ghost: *nec genitus sed procedens*. D 39 ; Cf. D 277, 703. The Holy Ghost is, therefore, not the Son of God. Scripture and Tradition speak only of one or the Only-Begotten Son of God, the Logos. In Tradition, generation and filiation are not applied to the Holy Ghost. Cf. St. Athanasius, *Ep. ad Serap.* I, 16 ; St. Augustine, *C. Maxim.* II 14, 1.

The distinction between generation and spiration may be founded in this that the intellect, out of which the Son is generated, and the will, out of which the Holy Ghost proceeds, are virtually different in God, and also in the fact that knowing but not willing produces that likeness (to the knower) which is essential to the concept of generation. In knowing just as in generating the aim is similarity (*similitudo rei intellectae*), but in willing this likeness is presupposed (*similitudo est principium amandi*). The Holy Ghost is indeed, just as the Son, of like substance with the Father, but He does not possess the identity of substance by reason of His proceeding. Cf. S. th. I 27, 4. The Spiration of the Holy Ghost does not therefore, conform to the notion of generation.

The distinction between the active generation and the active spiration is neither real (there is no contrast of relation ; D 703) nor merely logical (the Holy Ghost is not generated ; D 39) but a virtual distinction such as exists between the Divine Knowing and the Divine Willing.

CHAPTER 2

The Divine Relations and Persons

§ 16. The Divine Relations

1. Concept of Relation

By relation is understood the ordination of one thing to another (*respectus unius ad alterum* : S. th. I 28, 3). Three elements belong to the concept of relation, i.e. : 1. The subject (*subiectum*). 2. The aim (*terminus*). 3. The basis

(fundamentum) of the relation. The essence of the relation lies in being ordained to another (*esse relatiui est ad aliud se habere* : S. th. I 28, 2). A distinction is made between real and mental (logical), mutual and unilateral relations. Between the subject and the terminus of a relation there exists a relative opposition.

2. Four Real Relations in God

The two internal Divine processions establish in God two pairs of real mutual relationships. Accordingly, there exist in God four real relations : a) the relationship of the Father to the Son : the active generation or paternity (*generare*) ; b) the relationship of the Son to the Father : the passive generation or filiation (*generari*) ; c) the relation of the Father and of the Son to the Holy Ghost : the active spiration (*spirare*) ; d) the relation of the Holy Ghost to the Father and to the Son ; the passive spiration (*spirari*).

The teaching of Holy Writ concerning the Divine relations is found in the personal names Father, Son and Holy Ghost (*Spiritus = spiratus*). It was scientifically elaborated by the Fathers of the 4th and 5th century, in the Eastern Church by the Cappadocians (Basil, Gregory Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa) and Cyril of Alexandria, in the Western Church by St. Augustine, followed by Fulgentius and Boethius. Gregory Nazianzus said : "Father is neither a name of the being nor of the activity but a name of the relation (*σχῆμα*), which demonstrates the relationship of the Father to the Son and of the Son to the Father." (Or. 29, 16). Augustine teaches : "Although Father and Son are different this is not a difference in the substance but in the relationship" (*non secundum substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relationem*, De Trin. V 5, 6). The official Church teaching embodies this doctrine of the relations which has been developed by the Fathers and theologians. Cf. the Creed of the 11th Synod of Toledo (D 278 ff) and the Decretum pro Jacobitis of the Council of Florence (D 703).

From the dogma of the Trinity of God it follows that the mutual relations in God are not merely logical or mental, but real relations. Otherwise the trinity of persons would be reduced to a mere logical trinity. The difference of the Three Divine Persons is not founded in the Divine Essence, but in the mutual relation of the Persons to one another.

3. Three Really Distinct Relations in God

Of the four real internal-Divine relations three stand in opposition to one another, and are therefore really distinct from one another, namely, the Fatherhood, the Sonship and the Passive Spiration. The Active Spiration stands in opposition to the Passive Spiration only, but not to the Fatherhood and to the Sonship ; consequently it is not really distinct from the Fatherhood and the Sonship, but only virtually distinct.

4. The Relations in God are really identical with the Divine Nature. (*De fide*).

The Synod of Rheims (1148) declared against Gilbert of Poitiers, who was accused of teaching that there is a real distinction between the Divine Persons and the Divine Relations (e.g., between the Father and the Fatherhood), "that there are no realities in God, whether they be called relations or proprieties or singularities or unities or other such, which exist from eternity, and which

are not identical with God (*quae non sint Deus*).” D 391 The Council declares : *Quidquid in Deo est, Deus est* (Whatever is in God is God). The Union Council of Florence declares : (*In Deo*) *omnia sunt unam, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio* (In God everything is one except there be an opposition of relation). D 703. Between the Divine Relations and the Divine Nature however, no relative opposition exists.

The intrinsic basis is the absolute simplicity of the Divine Essence, with which real composition of substance and relations is incompatible.

Between the relations and the Divine Essence there exists, however, not merely a purely mental, but a virtual distinction, in so far as in the relation the ordination to the terminus of the relation is included, while in the concept of the Essence this ordination is missing : *manifestum est, quod relatio realiter existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem et non differt nisi secundum intelligentiae rationem, prout in relatione importatur respectus ad suum oppositum, qui non importatur in nomine essentiae*. S. th. I 28, 2.

§ 17. The Divine Persons

1. The Concepts Hypostasis and Person

The Church, in its teaching concerning the Dogma of the Trinity, uses the philosophical concepts essence, nature, substance, hypostasis and person (cf. *Caput Firmiter* of the 4th Lateran Council (1215) : *Tres quidem personae, sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino*). The concepts essence, nature and substance characterise the physical essence of God common to the Three Persons, that is, the totality of the Perfections of the Divine Essence. An hypostasis is an individual complete substance existing entirely in itself, an incommunicable substance (*substantia singularis completa tota in se or substantia incommunicabilis*). A Person is a hypostasis endowed with reason (*hypostasis rationalis*). The classical definition comes from that of Boethius (*De duabus naturis* 3) : *Persona est naturae rationalis individua (=incommunicabilis) substantia* (a Person is the individual (incommunicable) substance of a rational nature). Hypostasis and nature are related to each other in such a manner that the hypostasis is the bearer of nature and the ultimate subject of all being and acting (*principium quod*), while the nature is that through which the hypostasis is and acts (*principium quo*).

2. The Relations and the Persons

The three mutually opposite relations of Fatherhood, of Sonship and of the Passive Spiration are the Three Divine Hypostases or Persons. The Fatherhood constitutes the Person of the Father, the Sonship constitutes the Person of the Son, the Passive Spiration constitutes the Person of the Holy Ghost.

A person is an incommunicable substance. The Divine Relations are substantial since they are really identical with the Divine Essence : *quidquid est in Deo, est eius essentia* (S. th. I 28, 2). But incommunicability belongs to the three relations of Fatherhood, Sonship and Passive Spiration only since the active spiration is common to the Father and to the Son ; consequently only these three Relations are persons. Accordingly, each Divine Person is a subsistent incommunicable, internal Divine Relation. Cf. S. th. I 29, 4 : *Persona divina significat relationem ut subsistentem* (a Divine Person signifies a subsistent relation).

3. In God all is one except for the opposition of relations. (*De fide*).

From the doctrine of the Divine Relations there flows the so-called basic trinitarian law, which was first formulated by St. Anselm of Canterbury (*De processione Spiritus S. 2*), and which was solemnly asserted by the Council of Florence in the *Decretum pro Jacobis* (1441). (*In Deo*) omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio (*In God all is one where there is not an opposition of relation*) (D 703). According to this assertion, the real distinction of the Persons rests exclusively on the opposition of the relations.

§ 18. The Divine Personal Properties (Proprietates) and Notions

1. The Proprietates

By *proprietates* is understood a distinguishing property, which belongs to One Divine Person only, and distinguishes It from the Other Two. The *proprietates* are divided into personal or person-forming (*proprietates personales* or *personificae* (*ιδιώματα ὑποστατικά*; (D 428), and *proprietates of the Persons* or distinguishing properties (*proprietates personarum* (*ιδιώματα τῶν ὑποστάσεων*)). To the former class belong the three opposed or person-forming relations of Fatherhood, Sonship and the Passive Spiration. To the second class belongs originlessness (*innascibilitas*, *ἀγεννησία*) as a *proprietates* of the Father. The active spiration is a common property of two Persons, the Father and the Son, and is, therefore, not a *proprietates* in the strict sense. (S. th. I 32, 3 : *Communis spiratio non est proprietates, quia convenit duabus personis*.)

The “unspiratedness” (*ἀνευστία*) of the Father and of the Son, the “ungeneratedness” and the “unfruitfulness” of the Holy Ghost are not reckoned among the properties because the properties express an excellence or a dignity (whence also the designation *ἀξιώματα*, dignitates).

The Fathers generally recognise “ungeneratedness” as a *proprietates* of God the Father only, although the meaning of the word expresses the negation of generation and in this sense would apply also to the Holy Ghost. The Fathers regard it as signifying not only “not being generated” but also having no origin (*ἀγενήτος* = *ἀμάρχος*); *ingenitus* = *sine principio*), and “being the origin of the two other Persons.” St. John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* I 8 : “The Father alone is ungenerated (*ἀγέννητος*); for He has His Being not from another person.” Cf. D 275, 277 (11th Synod of Toledo : *Solus Pater est ingenitus*).

2. The Notions

The notions are distinctive characteristics of the Divine Persons by which they are known. Factually they coincide with the properties. S. th. I 32, 3 : *Notio dicitur id, quod est propria ratio cognoscendi divinam personam*. The notions of the individual Persons are : a) *Innascibility* and *Active Generation* as a cognitive mark of the Father : b) *Passive Generation* as a mark of cognition of the Son ; c) *Passive Spiration* as a cognition-mark of the Holy Ghost. The *Active Spiration* is a common characteristic of the Father and of the Son, and is therefore not compatible with the strict concept of the notion (distinctive characteristic). The *Notions* are internal Divine activities which characterise the Persons and distinguish them, as contrasted with the essential acts, which are common to the Three Persons. In God there are two notional acts, notional knowing

through which the Father generates the Son, and notional willing (love) through which the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Ghost. The notional and the essential acts are factually identical; they are only virtually different. When speaking of notional acts we think of the Divine Nature from the point of view of its relations, when speaking of essential acts we think of the Divine Nature in an absolute way.

§ 19. The Trinitarian Perichoresis (Circumincession)

By the Trinitarian Perichoresis (περιχώρησις, ἐνπαρεῖς; circumincessio, later circuminsessio) is understood the penetration and indwelling of the Three Divine Persons reciprocally in one another.

The Three Divine Persons are in One Another. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Florence, in the Decretum pro Jacobis (1441), declared with St. Fulgentius (*De fide ad Petrum* I, 4): Propter hanc unitatem Pater est totus in Filio, totus in Spiritu Sancto: Filius totus est in Patre, totus in Spiritu Sancto: Spiritus Sanctus totus est in Patre, totus in Filio (Because of this unity the Father is wholly in the Son and wholly in the Holy Ghost, the Son is wholly in the Father and wholly in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost is wholly in the Father and wholly in the Son). D 704. Christ testifies that the Father is in Him, and that He is in the Father. John 10, 30: "I and the Father are one." 10, 38: "Believe the works that you may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father." Cf. John 14, 9 et seq.: 17, 21. The indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the Father and in the Son is indicated in 1 Cor. 2, 10 et seq.

The expression περιχωρεῖν is used for the first time by St. Gregory of Nazianzus (*Ep.* 101, 6) to characterise the relation of the two natures in Christ (Christological Perichoresis). St. John Damascene (*De fide* orth. I 8; I 14; III 5) used it as a technical term for the coinherence of the two natures in Christ, as well as for the circumincession of the Three Divine Persons. Through the translation of the works of St. John Damascene by Burgundia of Pisa (about 1150) the expression, in the Latin rendering "circumincessio," became current in the Theology of the Occident. "Circumincessio" later became "circuminsessio." The word circumincessio expresses more the idea of the active penetration, the latter circuminsessio more the idea of the passive coinherence. The former corresponds more to the Greek, the latter more to the Latin way of looking at it.

In the Greek conception of the Trinity the Perichoresis plays a greater rôle than it does in the Latin. The Greeks commence with the idea of the Father and thence proceed to the Son by the outpouring of the Divine Life by the Father to the Son, and thence through the Son to the Holy Ghost. Through the emphasis on the mutual penetration of the Three Persons, it emphasises strongly the unity of the Divine Essence. The Latin way of thinking proceeds from the Unity of the Divine Essence and thence develops the concept of the internal Divine Processions into the Trinity of the Persons. Thus in the Latin notion the idea of the unity of the Essence stands in the foreground.

The fundamental basis of the Trinitarian Perichoresis is ~~is~~ one Essence of the Three Persons. Cf. S. th. I 42, 5.

§ 20. The Unity of the Divine Operation *ad extra*

All the *ad extra* Activities of God are common to the Three Persons. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran Council (1215), teaches in the chapter *Firmiter*, that the Three Divine Persons are the sole principle of all things (*unum universorum principium* : D 428). The Council of Florence declares in the *Decretum pro Jacobitis* (1441) : *Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non tria principia creaturae, sed unum principium.* D 704. Cf. D 254, 281, 284.

'Tritheism' is opposed to this teaching of the Church because it denies not only the unity of the Divine Being but also the unity of the Divine operations. According to A. Günther († 1863) the realisation of the Divine world-idea is exclusively the work of the second Person, and the conversion of the creation to God is exclusively the work of the third Person.

Christ testifies to the unity of His working with the Father, and bases it on the unity of Nature. John 5, 19 : "What things soever (the Father) doth these the Son also doth in like manner." John 14, 10 : "But the Father who abideth in Me, He doth the same works." Holy Writ asserts the unity of the operations of the Divine Persons also by ascribing the same works, for example, the realisation of the Incarnation, the bestowal of the supernatural gifts of grace, the forgiveness of sins, to different persons. Cf. Luke 1, 35 ; Mt. 1, 20 ; Phil. 2, 7 ; Hebr. 10, 5 (Incarnation) ; 1 Cor. 12, 4 et seq. (gifts of grace) ; Mt. 9, 2 ; Luke 7, 48 ; 23, 34 ; John 20, 22 (forgiveness of sins).

The Fathers base the unity of operation on the unity of the Divine Nature, which is the "*principium quo*" of the Divine Activity. St. Augustine, *De Trin.* I 4, 7 : "As the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost are inseparable, so they work inseparably." *Sermo* 213, 6, 6 : "The works of the Trinity are inseparable" (*Inseparabilia sunt opera Trinitatis*).

§ 21. The Appropriations

By *appropriation* is understood a mode of predication in which the properties and activities of God which are common to the Three Persons, are attributed to an Individual Person (*appropriare nihil est aliud, quam commune trahere ad proprium* : *De verit.* 7, 3).

The purpose of the appropriations is to make manifest the differences in the Divine proprietates and persons (*manifestatio personarum per essentialia attributa* S. th. I 39, 7). In order that this purpose be achieved, only those common attributes and activities are appropriated to an Individual Divine Person, which exhibit a certain relationship to the proprietates of the Person concerned.

Holy Writ ascribes the effecting of the Incarnation to the Father (Hebr. 10, 5) and to the Holy Ghost (Luke 1, 35 ; Mt. 1, 20) and allocates the bestowing of the gifts of grace to the Third Person (1 Cor. 12, 4 et seq.), although the operation of God *ad extra* is common to the Three Persons.

The appropriations in Holy Scripture, and in the Fathers, and those made by the theologians can, following Scheeben (*Dogmatik, Gotteslehre* n. 1046 et seq.), be divided into four classes :

- a) The appropriation of the substantive names of God (*θεός, κύριος*). Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 5 et seq.; John 3, 16 et seq.; Gal. 4, 4. 6 (*θεός*=God the Father, *κύριος*=God the Son).
- b) The appropriation of the absolute attributes of God (Power, Wisdom, Goodness). Cf. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christ.* I 5, 5: *In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu Sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia.* St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* II 1: *Eternity is in the Father; beauty is in the Image (Word); and use (happiness) is in the Gift (Paraclete) [infinitas in aeterno (=Patre), species in imagine (=Filio), usus in munere (=Spiritu Sancto).]*
- c) The appropriation of the works of God (*causa efficiens, causa exemplaris causa finalis*, following Rom. 11, 36: resolution, execution, completion).
- d) The appropriation of the cult of adoration and sacrifice (the Father as recipient, the Son and the Holy Ghost as mediators). Cf. S. th. I 39, 8.

§ 22. The Divine Missions

The concept of "mission" (*missio ad extra*) according to the teaching of St. Thomas (S. th. I 43, 1), comprises two elements: a) a relation between the one sent and the sender as *terminus a quo* (The one sent stands in a relation of dependence to the sender, in the Divine Persons, on account of their identity of essence, it can be a dependence according to origin only; b) A relation between the one sent and the object of the mission (*terminus ad quem*). The object of the mission is the presence of the One sent at a definite place. In the sending of a Divine Person, in view of the substantial omnipresence of God in the created world, there is question only of a new kind of presence. Thus the concept of sending implies not only the eternal procession, but also a new kind of presence in the created world: *missio includit processionem aeternam et aliquid addit, sc. temporalem effectum* (S. th. I 43, 2 ad 3). The temporal missions, therefore, reflect the "notions" of the Divine Persons: The Father sends only, but is not sent; the Son is sent and sends. The Holy Ghost is sent only, but does not send.

The Father sends the Son: the Father and the Son send the Holy Ghost. (*Sent. certa.*)

The 11th Council of Toledo (675) declares: *Hic igitur Spiritus Sanctus missus ab utrisque sicut Filius a Patre creditur* (we believe that the Holy Ghost is sent from both [the Father and the Son] as the Son is sent from the Father). D 277; cf. D 794.

Holy Writ testifies to:

- a) The mission of the Son by the Father; cf. John 3, 17; 5, 23; 6, 58; 17, 18; Gal. 4, 4: "God sent His Son."
- b) The mission of the Holy Ghost by the Father; cf. John 14, 16. 26; Gal. 4, 6: "God sent the spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, : Abba, Father."
- c) The mission of the Holy Ghost by the Son; cf. John 15, 26; 16, 7; Luke 24, 49: "And I send the promise of the Father upon you." Holy Writ does not

speak of the Father as being sent but only of His coming and indwelling. John 14, 23 : "If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and We will come to him and make our abode with him."

The missions are divided into visible and invisible, according to whether the new presence of the person sent is sensibly perceptible or not. The Incarnation of the Word is a visible mission (*missio substantialis*) as is also the mission of the Holy Ghost under the visible Symbol of the dove or tongues of fire (*missio repræsentativa*). The invisible sending follows on the bestowal of sanctifying grace, and has as its object the indwelling of God in the soul of the just. In Holy Writ the indwelling is generally ascribed to the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. 3, 16 ; 6, 19 ; Rom. 5, 5 ; 8, 11) ; but with the Holy Ghost the Father and the Son also come to dwell in the souls of the just (John 14, 23 ; 2 Cor. 6, 16).

CHAPTER 3

The Relation of the Trinity to Reason

§ 23. The Mysterious Character of the Dogma of the Trinity

1. The dogma of the Trinity is above human reason

The Trinity of God can only be known through Divine Revelation. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The absolutely mysterious character of the dogma of the Trinity is, indeed, not defined, but it is contained in the doctrine of the Vatican Council, that among the truths of Faith "there are mysteries concealed in God, which can be known on the basis of Divine Revelation only"; *mysteria in Deo abscondita, quæ nisi revelata divinitus innotescere non possunt* (D 1795). Christianity has always regarded the dogma of the Trinity as the most fundamental and most profound mystery of Faith. The sublimity of the dogma of the Trinity over natural rational knowledge is indicated in Mt. 11, 27 : "None knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him." Cf. John 1, 18 ; 1 Cor. 2, 11.

The Fathers often emphasise the mysterious character of the dogma of the Trinity and the necessity of Faith. St. John Damascene says : "It is known and adored in Faith (the Trinity), not by investigating, examining and proving. . . . You have to believe that God is in three Persons. How sublime is this above all questions. For God is inconceivable" (*De hæc., epil.*). Cf. Ambrose, *De fide* I, 10, 64 ; 12, 78 ; 13, 84. Augustine, *In Ioan. tr.* 97, 1 ; 21, 3. Gregory of Nyssa, *Or. cat.* 3.

The necessary reasons (*Rationes necessariae*), adduced by St. Anselm of Canterbury and Richard of St. Victor, are in fact only grounds of congruity, which pre-suppose the Revelation of the Trinity and belief in it. The attempt of Anton Günther, under the influence of Hegel, to derive the Trinity of God on purely rational grounds from the Divine self-consciousness, was a failure.

Natural reason can know God from the created things only as their origin. But the perfections of God which reveal themselves in created things, for example, power, wisdom, goodness, are common to the Three Divine Persons. Consequently, natural reason can know God only in His Unity of Nature, but not in His Trinity of Persons.

2. Capacity of Reason

The Vatican Council says of the mysteries of Faith that even "after the promulgation of the Revelation and its acceptance of Faith, they remain covered by the veil of Faith and hidden in a certain obscurity" (1796). This applies, *par excellence*, to the dogma of the Trinity as the basic dogma of Christian belief.

Nevertheless, reason enlightened by Faith can correctly apprehend and represent the true sense of the dogma from the explanations of the Church and from the testimonies of Revelation. Further, it can, through analogues derived from created things, throw a light on the mystery and bring it nearer to the understanding, for example, in the comparison of the internal-Divine processions with human self-knowledge and self-love. Also the objections brought against the dogma can be refuted by reason. The dogma of the Trinity is, in fact, beyond reason (*supra rationem*) but not contrary to reason (*contra rationem*). Cf. D 1797.

Objections.

The rationalist argument that according to the dogma of the Trinity three is equal to one and one is equal to three, is refuted by pointing out that the Divine Persons are not in the same respect three and one, but in one respect three, namely, according to the Persons, and in another respect one, namely, according to Essence.

The principle adduced against the dogma of the Trinity: two things which are equal to a third are equal among themselves, is valid only when the two things are in every respect, *re et ratione*, equal to a third thing. The Divine Persons and the Divine Essence are indeed really identical, but virtually (*ratione*) different. Thus the Three Persons are indeed identical in Essence, but different from one another in their relation to one another. Cf. S. th. I 28, 3 ad 1.

Human reason cannot fathom the mystery of the Blessed Trinity even after the dogma has been revealed by God (*sent. fidei proxima*).

BOOK 'TWO

God the Creator

SECTION I

The Divine Act of Creation

CHAPTER I

The Beginning or the Creation of the World

§ 1. The Reality of the Divine Creation of the World

1. The Dogma and the Heretical Counter-Propositions

All that exists outside God was, in its whole substance, produced out of nothing by God. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declared against the ancient pagan and gnostic-manichæan dualism, as well as against modern monism (materialism, pantheism): Si quis non confiteatur mundum resque omnes, quæ in eo continentur, et spirituales et materiales, secundum totam suam substantiam a Deo ex nihilo esse productas anathema sit. D 1805. Cf. The Symbols of Faith and "Caput Firmiter" (D 428).

In philosophical and theological parlance, by Creation is understood: *The production of a thing out of nothing* (productio rei ex nihilo, i.e. non ex aliquo), and indeed, ex nihilo sui et subiecti (not ex nihilo causæ), that is, before the act of Creation, neither the thing as such, nor any material substratum, from which it was produced, existed. St. Thomas defines Creation as: Productio alicuius rei secundum suam totam substantiam nullo præsupposito, quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum (S. th. I 65, 3). From Creation in the proper and strict sense (creatio prima) is to be distinguished the so-called creatio secunda, by which is understood the modelling of formless material and the bestowal of life upon it.

2. Proof from Scripture and Tradition

a) The creation of the world out of nothing may be proved indirectly by the fact that the name Jahweh, and with it, necessary self-existence (Aseity), is attributed to God alone, while all other things in comparison with God are called *nothing*. From this follows the conclusion that everything outside God must attribute its existence to God. Cf. Is. 42, 8; 40, 17. The Divine name Adonai (κύριος) represents God as the Lord and Proprietor of Heaven and Earth by virtue of the Creation. Unlimited rights attributed to a lord and proprietor signify that the property has its origin solely in the proprietor himself. Cf. Ps. 88, 12; Est. 13, 10 et seq.; Mt. 11, 25.

The creation of the world out of nothing, according to general Jewish and Christian conviction, is directly expressed in Gn. 1, 1: "In the beginning God created Heaven and earth." It must be noted that in this basic text no substratum of creation (materia ex qua) is named. "In the beginning," without a more detailed definition, means the absolute beginning, that is, that point in time, before which there was nothing side by side with God, and in which the things external to God began to exist. "Heaven and Earth"

is the whole universe, that is, all extra-Divine things, the world. The verb *bara* (=create) can, indeed, also mean produce in the wider sense, but it is used almost exclusively of the Divine Activity; apart from Gn. 1, 27, it is never associated with the presence of a material, out of which God produces something. According to the usage of the biblical narrative in Gn. 1, 1, it expresses creation out of nothing only. Cf. Ps. 123, 8; 145, 6; 32, 9.

The belief of the Jewish people concerning the Creation which is found in Gn. 1, 1, is attested to also in 2 Macc. 7, 28, in which the Maccabean mother, "full of Wisdom" (V. 21) adjures her youngest son to accept martyrdom: "I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heavens and the earth, and see all that is in them: and consider that God made them out of nothing (οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων, *ex nihilo*)." Cf. Wis. 1, 14: "For He created all things that they might be." Rom. 4, 17: "Who calleth those things that are not, as those that are."

Wis. 11, 18: "For thy almighty hand which made the world of matter without form (ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης)" is, according to the context, to be understood as referring to the *creatio secunda*, as is also Hebr. 11, 3: "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God; that from invisible things, the visible things would be made." Cf. Gn. 1, 2, according to G: "And the earth was invisible (ἀόρατος) and unformed."

b) The Fathers regard the creation of the world out of nothing as a basic truth of Christian belief, and defend it against the false dualism of pagan philosophy and of gnostic-manichaeic error. About the middle of the 2nd century, Pastor Hermas writes: "For the very first thing believe that God is the only God, who has created and who prepared everything, and who has made everything, out of nothing" (Mand. I 1). Cf. Theophilus of Antioch (Ad Autol. II 4 10), St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer. I 22, 1; II 10, 4; Epideixis I 1, 4), Tertullian (Adv. Hermogenem I: De praescr. 13; Apolog. 17) and St. Augustine (De Genesi contra Manichaeos).

3. Creation and Reason

The creation of the world from nothing is not only a basic truth of Christian Revelation, but also a truth of reason, which is inherent in the cosmological proofs of God (except the teleological) and especially in the contingency proof. But since philosophy, including that of Aristotle, apart from Christianity, never achieved a pure concept of Creation, the revelation of this truth was morally necessary. (Cf. S. th. I 44, 1; I 61, 1; S.c.G. II 15-16.)

§ 2. The Divine World-Idea

The world is the work of the Divine Wisdom. (Sent. certa.)

In opposition to Christian doctrine, materialists propounded the "Accident Theory," according to which the present world has developed purely mechanically out of a material eternally existing.

Holy Writ teaches that God has made all in wisdom. Ps. 103, 24: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Wisdom stood at His side as a counsellor at the creation of the world. Pro. 8, 27 et seq. Cf. Pro. 3, 19 et seq.; Gn. 1, 26. Thus the created world is the realisation of Divine Ideas.

Since the Divine Ideas are thoughts of God they are Eternal and Unchangeable

because identical with the Divine Wisdom and with the Divine Essence. From the point of view of their realisation in Creation, they are temporal and mutable, because they have for their object merely finite replicas of Divine perfections. (N.B. : On account of the absolute simplicity of His Essence there is in God one single idea. In so far as this one Idea is reflected in many extra-Divine objects, one speaks of a multiplicity of Divine Ideas.)

St. Augustine adapted Plato's doctrine of "Ideas" to Christian doctrine by identifying the Eternal Idea with the Divinity Itself. (Cf. In Ioan. tr. I, 16 et seq.) See also The Doctrine of God, § 23.

§ 3. Motive and Purpose of the Creation of the World

1. Motive

**God was moved by His Goodness to create the world.
(De fide.)**

The motive which moved God to creation (*finis operantis*) is, as the Provincial Synod of Cologne declared in 1860, the love of His Absolute Goodness (*amor bonitatis suae absolutae*). This moved Him to reflect His Perfections in other beings by finite images. The Vatican Council declared : *Deus bonitate sua et omnipotentia virtute non ad augendam suam beatitudinem nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis impertitur, liberrimo consilio . . . utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam.* D 1783.

According to the testimony of Holy Writ the motive of the Divine Act of Creation lies in God Himself : "The Lord hath made all things for himself" (Prov. 16, 4).

The Fathers testify that God did not create the world because He needed it, but in order to "pour out His benefits" (Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* IV 14, 1). Origen teaches (*De princ.* II 9, 6) : "In the beginning when God created what He wanted to create, i.e., rational creatures, He had no other cause for it but Himself, i.e., His goodness". Augustine says (*De doct. christ.* I 32, 35) : "We are because He is good". Cf. Hilary, *In Ps.* 2, 15 ; Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XI 24 ; St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.* II 2.

God's necessary Self-Existence (*Aseity*) and the Infinite Bliss which it connotes (*in se et ex se beatissimus* : D 1782) excludes any extra-Divine motive for the Divine act of Creation. St. Thomas teaches : "God does not act for His own profit, but only for His own Goodness." *S. th.* I 44, 4 ad 1.

2. Purpose

**The world was created for the Glorification of God.
(De fide.)**

a) The objective purpose of creation (*finis operis*), i.e., the purpose intrinsic in the work of creation, is primarily the revelation of the Divine Perfections, and the glorification of God which flow from this. The Vatican Council thus defined : *Si quis . . . mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit,* A.S. D 1805.

The glorification of God which is made by creatures is called external glory (*gloria externa*). A distinction is made between objective glory (*gloria objectiva*) and formal glory (*gloria formalis*). The former is given to God by all creatures without exception, by their mere existence, in so far as they

mirror the Divine Perfections. Cf. Ps. 18, 2 : "The heavens show forth the glory of God." Dn. 3, 52 et seq. (Benedicite); Ps. 148. The latter is rendered to Him with knowledge and with will by rational creatures. Cf. Ps. 146150 (Laudat e Dominum).

According to the teaching of Holy Scripture, God is the Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the Final Purpose of all things. Apoc. 1, 8 : "I am the Alpha and the Omega (that is, the Beginning and the End) saith the Lord God." Cf. Rom. 11, 36 : "For of Him, and by Him, and in Him, are all things, to Him be glory for ever." Hebr. 2, 10 : "For Whom are all things and by Whom are all things." Cf. Pro. 16, 4. According to Tertullian, God produced the world out of nothing "as an adornment of His glory" (Apol. 17).

The objection raised by Descartes, Hermes and Günther, that it would be a reprehensible egoism if God had intended His Own Glory to be the ultimate purpose of the Creation, is unjustified, because the Perfection and the Beatitude of God cannot be increased by creatures, and because the Activity of God, being of the highest Goodness, must necessarily be co-ordinated with the highest end.

b) The secondary purpose of the creation of the world is the bestowal of good on creatures, especially creatures endowed with reason. The Vatican Council teaches that God created the world "for the Revelation of His Perfection" (primary purpose) "through the good things which He communicates to creatures" (secondary purpose).

Holy Writ stresses that the created world should serve mankind, but does not regard the happiness of mankind as an end in itself, but as an end subordinated to the glorification of God. Cf. Gn. 1, 28 et seq.; Ps. 8, 6 et seq.; Apoc. 4, 11. The two aims of creation are inseparably connected with each other, for the glory given to God by creatures who know and love Him, constitutes at the same time the bliss of the rational creature.

As a refutation of the objection that the external glory of God as something finite could not be the ultimate purpose of the Creation it is necessary to distinguish between the *finis qui* and the *finis quo* of the Creation. *Finis qui*, (objective purpose) is that which is aimed at; *finis quo* (formal purpose) is that through which the thing aimed at is achieved. The *finis qui* of the work of Creation is the intrinsic goodness of God and thus God Himself. The *finis quo* is the participation of creatures in the goodness of God, which contributes at the same time to the bliss of rational creatures. The definition of the Vatican (D 1805) according to which the world was created for the glory of God, has the *finis quo* in mind; for the participation of creatures in the goodness of God coincides with the external glory of God: The perfections of the creatures are images of the perfection of the Creator (*gloria obiectiva*); the consideration of the perfections of creatures leads rational creatures to the perception and acknowledgement of the perfections of the Creator (*gloria formulis*). While the *finis quo* is finite, the *finis qui* is infinite. This is what Holy Writ means when it names God as the ultimate purpose of every Creation.

§ 4. The Trinity and Creation

The Three Divine Persons are one single, common Principle of the Creation. (*De fide*.)

The Council of Florence declared in the "Decretum pro Jacobitis" (1441): *Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non tria principia creaturae, sed unum*

principium. D 704 ; cf. D 428. As the work of Creation, however, exhibits a certain similarity with the proprietates of the First Person, it is usually referred to the Father by "appropriation." (Cf. The Apostles' Creed.)

In contrast to the teaching of the Church there is the viewpoint of A. Günther, who, indeed, ascribed the idea of the world and the resolution to create to the Three Persons, but attributed the *execution* of the work of Creation to the Second Person exclusively, and the re-unification of creatures with God to the Third Person exclusively.

Holy Writ stresses the communal character of the operation of the Father and of the Son and founds this on their community of Nature. Cf. John 5, 19 ; 14, 10 (see Doctrine of the Trinity, § 20). In Holy Writ the work of Redemption is sometimes attributed to the Father, sometimes to the Son. Cf. Mt. 11, 25 ; John 1, 3 ; Col. 1, 15 et seq. ; 1 Cor. 8, 6 ; Hebr. 1, 2. Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. V 13, 14 : "In relation to the creation God is called a Single Principle, not two or three principles."

Since the time of St. Augustine the general teaching of theologians is that creatures unendowed with reason are a "Trace of the Trinity" (Vestigium Trinitatis), those gifted with reason are an "Image of the Trinity" (imago Trinitatis) and those endowed with saving grace a "Likeness (similitudo) of the Trinity." S. th. I 45, 7 ; I 93, 5-9.

§ 5. Freedom of the Divine Act of Creation

1. Libertas Contradictionis (Freedom of Contradiction)

God created the world free from exterior compulsion and inner necessity. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declared that God "with a will free from all necessity" (voluntate ab omni necessitate libera) executed the act of Creation (D 1783, 1805 ; cf. D 706). The Vatican definition refers primarily to "libertas contradictionis," which asserts that God had the choice of creating or of not creating. It is directed chiefly against Hermes, Günther, and Rosmini, who maintained that the goodness of God imposed on Him a necessity to create.

Holy Script and tradition place the origin of the Creation in the free will of the Creator. Ps. 134, 6 : "Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea and in all the deeps." Apoc. 4, 11 : "Because thou hast created all things, and for thy will they were and have been created." Cf. Ps. 32, 6 ; Wis. 9, 1 ; 11, 26 ; Eph. 1, 11.

St. Augustine comments on Ps. 134, 6 : "The cause of all that He has created is His will" (Enarr. in Ps. 134, 10). Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II 1, 1 ; III 8, 3. A pressure from without or an urgency from within is incompatible with God's absolute Being and with the independence and self-sufficiency which this implies. Again, no necessity to create derives from God's Goodness, because the desire for self-communication inherent in the nature of goodness (bonum est diffusivum sui) is satisfied in a perfect manner through the internal Divine Processions. God's infinite Goodness is indeed the reason for His communication of Being to creatures (communicatio ad extra), but He is not compelled to make this communication. Cf. S. th. I 19, 3.

2. *Libertas Specificationis*

"God was free to create this world or any other."
(*Sent. certa.*)

So declared the Provincial Synod of Cologne in 1860 against the absolute optimism expounded by Abelard, Malebranche and Leibniz, according to which God was obliged to create the best imaginable of all possible worlds. Cf. D 374. The world now existing does not possess the highest conceivable measure of perfections. Neither did God owe it to Himself to create the best world, because His perfections and happiness cannot be increased even by the best world. If one were to deny God's freedom in the choice between this or that world (*libertas specificationis*) one would limit His Omnipotence, which extends to all that is intrinsically possible.

3. *Lack of Libertas Contrarietatis*

God has created a good world. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Florence declared, in the *Decretum pro Jacobitis* (1441), against the Manichaean error: "there is no nature bad in itself, as all nature in so far as it is nature, is good: nullamque mali asserit esse naturam, quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bona est." D 706. Cf. D 428.

The biblical foundation is Gn. 1, 31: "And God saw all the things He had made and they were very good." Cf. Eccles. 39, 21: 1 Tim. 4, 4. God could not create a world that was morally bad, as by virtue of His absolute holiness He could not be the Originator of moral evil. Cf. D 816 (against Calvin). Thus God does not possess the *libertas contrarietatis*, that is, the freedom of choice between good and evil.

Against Pessimism (A. Schopenhauer, Ed. v. Hartmann), according to which the existing world is the worst imaginable, the Christian view of the world represents a relative optimism, which holds the present world to be relatively the best, since, being a work of the Divine Wisdom, it corresponds to the aim pre-determined for it by God, and unites in wonderful harmony in itself the various stages of the perfections of the natural and supernatural orders.

§ 6. The Temporal Character of the World

1. The Dogma

The world had a beginning in time. (*De fide.*)

While pagan philosophy and modern materialism assume the eternity of the world and also of the world-material, the Church teaches that the world has not existed from all eternity, but began to be. The 4th Lateran (1215) and the Vatican Councils declared: *simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam spiritualem et corporalem* (together, in the beginning of time (God) founded out of nothing the double order of creatures, spiritual and corporal). In this the eternity of the world is clearly rejected. D 428, 1783. Cf. D 301-303 (Meister Eckhart).

Holy Writ clearly testifies that the world once was not and that it began to be. John 17, 5: "And now glorify thou me, O Father, with thyself, with the glory which I had before the world was with thee." Eph. 1, 4: "He chose us

in Him (Christ) even before the foundation of the world." Ps. 101, 26 : "In the beginning, O Lord, thou foundest the earth." Cf. Gn. 1, 1 ; Pro. 8, 22 et seq. ; Ps. 89, 2 ; John 17, 24.

The Fathers reject the notion of the eternity of the world in the struggle against the dualistic error. (Cf. Tatian, *Or ad Graecos* 5 ; Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* II 34, 2 ; St. Basil, *In Hexaem. hom.* 1, 7.) Under the influence of Plato, Origen erroneously proposed the idea of series of worlds without a beginning, the first of which was created by God from all eternity.

The eternity of the world cannot be proved by philosophical arguments. As the existence of the world is due to a free act of God's will, God does not necessarily will that it should always exist. S. th. I 46, 1. The discoveries of modern atomic physics afford the possibility that in virtue of the disintegration process of the radio-active elements, the age of the earth, and thereby its temporal beginning, may positively be proved. Cf. the speech of Pius XII in 22.11.1951 : "The proof of God's existence in the light of modern Natural Science."

2. Controversy over the Possibility of an Eternal Creation of the World

Whether or not a created world without a beginning is possible is disputed.

a) St. Thomas and his School assert that there is no compelling proof from reason of the impossibility of an eternal creation of the world. Thus, that the world was created in time is, according to St. Thomas, purely a truth of Faith, and not a truth of reason. S. th. I 46, 2 : *mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur et demonstrative probari non potest.*

In support of this view, St. Thomas explains that the temporal nature of the world can be proved by reason neither from the nature of the world nor from its relation to God. The concept of the essence of a thing which is the starting-point of the proof prescind from space and time. Consequently it cannot be proved from the concept of the world that it did not always exist. It is true that the effective cause of the world is the Free Will of God. This, however, cannot be established through human reason, but can be known on the basis of Divine Revelation only. The temporal beginning of the world is therefore, not an object of natural knowledge, but an object of faith only.

b) St. Bonaventure and many other theologians are, however, of the opinion that the acceptance of an eternal world-creation involves an intrinsic contradiction ; for creation out of nothing means : to have being in succession to non-being (*habere esse post non esse*), i.e. first not to be and then to be. (*Sent.* II d. 1, p. 1 a. 1 q. 2.)

The Fathers also teach that a creature without beginning is not possible. They reject the teaching of Origen concerning the eternal creation of the first world (Methodius), and affirm against the Arians, the Eternal Godhead of the Logos. St. Athanasius says : "Even if God can always create, still the created things could not always be ; for they are out of non-being, and were not, before they became" (*Contra Arianos or.* I 29).

c) The eternal creation of a changeable world is not possible, because the succession involved in a change constitutes the essence of time. Only an unchangeable world could be eternal. An unchangeable creature is, however, hardly conceivable, as changeability necessarily exists with finity. In any case, the material of which the present world is constituted is mutable even in its very atomic nucleus.

§ 7. The Incommunicability of the Creative Power

1. The Creative Power as *Potentia Incommunicata*

God alone created the World. (*De fide*.)

The 4th Lateran Council teaches that the Triune God is "A Single Principle of all things" ("unum universorum principium; creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium") (D 428).

Holy Scripture rules out any other origin of the work of creation. A Demiurg (Demi-God) cannot exist conjointly with Him. Is. 44, 24: "I am the Lord that made all things, that alone stretch out heavens, that establish the earth" (according to another reading: "Who was with Me?"). Hebr. 3, 4: "He that created all things is God." Cf. Ps. 88, 12; 32, 6, 9; 94, 5; John 1, 3; Apoc. 4, 11.

The Fathers rejected both the Gnostic teaching, according to which the world was formed through an intermediary being (demiurg) from the eternal material, and the Arian doctrine which contended that the world was created out of nothing by a Logos who was a creature. (Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 20, 1; St. Augustine, De civ. Dei XII 24.)

2. The Creative Power as *Potentia Incommunicabilis*

a) No creature can, as Principal Cause (*causa principalis*) that is, from its own power, create something out of nothing. (*Sent. communis*.)

In contrast to this teaching, individual scholastic theologians, such as Durandus († 1334) and Gabriel Biel († 1495) expounded the viewpoint that God could equip a creature with the power to create so that it could, by its own power, produce things out of nothing. Jacob Frohschammer († 1893) held that parents, through a power of creation bestowed on them by God, produced the soul of the child out of nothing.

The Fathers, refuting the Arian thesis, took as their point of departure the fact that a creature can create nothing. From the fact then that everything was created through the Logos they established the Godhead of the Logos (John 1, 3). (Cf. St. Athanasius, Contra Arianos or. II 21: "If, according to your opinion the Son has become to be out of nothing, how is He capable of transforming non-being into being? . . . No emergent thing is a creative cause.")

The impossibility of a creature having the power of creation may be established speculatively by reason of the fact that the act of creation demands infinite power in order to overcome the infinite distance between non-being and being, while the power of every creature is finite (cf. S. th. I 45, 5).

b) Most theologians hold with St. Thomas, against Petrus Lombardus, that a creature cannot co-operate even as instrumental cause (*causa instrumentalis*) in the Creation: impossibile est, quod alicui creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria neque instrumentaliter sive per ministerium (S. th. I 45, 5). The intrinsic basis of the argument is the fact that every creative cause presupposes a substratum for its activity. Therefore it is impossible for a creature to co-operate as an instrumental cause in the production of a thing out of nothing.

CHAPTER 2

The Continuous Preservation and Governing of the World

§ 8. The Preservation of the World

1. Dogma

God keeps all created things in existence. (*De fide.*)

Against Deism, according to which God, the Creator, having created it, leaves the world to run itself, the Church declares that God continuously preserves in existence created things. The Vatican Council teaches: "God, by His Providence, protects all that He has created," that is, He preserves it from relapsing into nothingness. D 1784. Cf. Cat. Rom. I 2, 21: "If His Providence did not preserve all things with the same power with which they were created in the beginning they would fall back into nothingness immediately."

God's conserving activity is a constant causal intervention through which He preserves things in existence. This intervention acts not merely mediately through secondary causes, but it immediately secures the continuance of things. St. Thomas points out that the preservation of Creation is really a continuation of the creative activity of God; *conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse.* (S. th. I 104, 1 ad 4.)

2. Proof from the Sources of Faith

Holy Writ bears constant witness to God's Activity in conserving the world. Wis. 11, 26: "And how could anything endure if thou wouldst not, or be preserved, if not called by thee?" John 5, 17: "My Father worketh until now; and I work." The working of the Father refers to the preservation and governing of the world. St. Paul ascribes the preservation as well as the creation of the world, to Christ. Col. 1, 17: "And by Him all things consist." (Hebr. 1, 3): "He upholdeth all things by the word of His power." (Cf. Acts 17, 28.)

St. Augustine comments on John 5, 17: "Let us therefore believe that God works constantly, so that all created things would perish, if His working were withdrawn." (De Gen. ad Litt. V 20, 40.) (Cf. Theophilus, Ad Autol. 1 4: St. Irenaeus. Adv. haer. II 34, 2 et seq.)

St. Thomas speculatively establishes the Divine preservation of the world on the fact that God is not merely the cause of the becoming of things, but also the origin of their being. On this account, the creature depends on God, not merely in its becoming, that is at the point of time in which it is produced, but also in its existence and, indeed, in every moment of its existence. (S. th. I 104, 1.)

3. Freedom of Annihilation

As God has freely created creatures, He is free also to annihilate them through the withdrawing of His conserving influence, and so allow them to relapse into nothingness. (Cf. 2 Macc. 8, 18: "But we trust in the Almighty God, who, at a beck, can utterly destroy the whole world.") However, Revelation teaches that, in point of fact, God does not desire the complete annihilation of

His creatures. Cf. Wis. 1, 13 et seq. : "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of the living. For He created all things that they might be." Wis. 11, 27 ; Pro. 1, 4 ; 3, 14.

It is consonant with the Wisdom and the Goodness of God that He preserves in existence the creatures who are imitations of the Divine Perfections, and thus serve to give glory to God.

§ 9. The Divine Co-operation

1. The Fact of the Divine Co-operation

God co-operates immediately in every act of His creatures. (*Sent. communis.*)

There is no decision of the Church on this. However, theologians generally hold that God co-operates immediately in every act of His creatures. This is opposed by the theory of "Occasionalism" which denies that created things have a true cause, and to "Deism," which, admitting Creation, denies all subsequent intervention of God in created things. The Roman Catechism (I 2, 22) teaches that "God, by means of a most intrinsic power, impels everything that moves and acts to its movement and activity."

This co-operation of the Causa Prima (God) with the Causae Secundae (creatures) is known as "Concursus Divinus." The Divine co-operation in the Natural Order is called "Concursus Generalis or Naturalis," to distinguish it from the special supernatural intervention of God through grace in rational creatures ; it is known as "Concursus Physicus," to distinguish it from a merely moral intervention which derives from some external cause, e.g., a command, advice, a threat, etc. ; It is called "Concursus Immediatus" to distinguish it from a merely mediate intervention which is implied in the bestowal and conservation of self-sufficient natural powers (Durandus held this theory of mediate intervention) ; and finally it is called "Concursus Universalis," in so far as it affects all the activities of all creatures without exception.

The Holy Scriptures frequently ascribe to God the activity of created causes, for example, the formation of human life in the mother's womb, the dispensing of rain, nourishment and clothing (cf. Job. 10, 8 et seq. ; Ps. 146, 8 et seq. ; Mt. 5, 45 ; 6, 26, 30). However, these passages could be understood as referring to the mediate co-operation of God. Is. 26, 12, however, and especially Acts 17, 28, indicate an immediate co-operation. Is. 26, 12 : "Thou hast wrought all our works for us." Acts 17, 28 : "In Him we live, and move, and are."

St. Jerome, and St. Augustine defend the immediate Divine co-operation in all natural activities against the Pelagians, who limited the co-operation of God to the bestowal of the ability to be active. (St. Hieronymus. Dial. adv. Pelag. I 3 ; Ep. 133, 7 ; St. Augustine, Ep. 205, 3, 17.)

The intrinsic reason for the necessity of the Divine co-operation lies in the entire dependence of all created being on God. As the activity of the creature has a real being which is distinct from the power from which it flows, so this "being of activity" must be caused by God.

2. Divine Co-operation and Sin

God co-operates in the physical act of sin also (*actio peccati, entitas peccati*) ; since the activation of the sensual and spiritual powers of the creature, is a being, and therefore something good. The moral deficiency (i.e. the, *sin* as such),

which is associated with the physical act, derives from the free will of the creature who, therefore, alone is guilty. God, in consequence of His infinite perfection, cannot be the cause of a moral defect. (Cf. S. th. I 49, 2 ; de malo 3, 2.)

3. The Mode of the Co-operation between the Causa Prima (God) and of the Causae Secundae (Creatures)

The co-operation of the Causa Prima (God) and of the Causae Secundae (creatures) is not to be conceived as a mechanical working together, but as an organic activity in one another and with one another. Hence it is incorrect to ascribe part of the activity to the Divine Cause and part to the creature. The action as a whole belongs to the Divine as well as to the created cause. The created cause is subordinated to the Divine, in such a manner, however, that its own causality is not abrogated. (Cf. St. Thomas, De potentia, I, 4 ad 3 : licit causa prima maxime influat in effectum, tamen eius influentia per causam proximam determinatur et specificatur.)

In the more exact determination of the mode and manner of the co-operation of the Divine and the created cause in the free action of rational creatures, Thomists and Molinists diverge.

Thomists teach that God, through a "Concursus Praevius" or "Praemotio Physica" (physical pre-motion) brings the created power from potency to act, and through a "Concursus Simultaneus" accompanies the activity of the creature during its whole duration. The entire action therefore proceeds from God as the principal cause (causa principalis), and from the creature as the instrumental cause (causa instrumentalis). The physical preliminary movement (praemotio physica) is more closely defined as "prae-determinatio" (pre-determination), since it has as its aim not merely the activity of the creatures in general, but an exact definite activity (determinatio ad unam). By this means the operation desired by God is infallibly induced.

The Molinists teach that God's immediate physical co-operation depends on the free decision of the human will, but not as an effect depends on a cause, but as the conditioned depends on the condition. The Divine Co-operation begins in the instant in which the will goes over from potency to act. Prior to the free decision God works only morally and mediately on the will. Thus the Molinists refuse to accept a "Concursus Praevius" and accept a "Concursus Simultaneus" only. Many Molinists distinguish between "Concursus Oblatus" and "Concursus Collatus," that is, between the still undefined proffering of the Divine co-operation, which precedes the self-determination of the will, and the bestowal of the Divine co-operation for a quite definite action according to the free decision of the will.

The Thomist thesis emphasises God's omni-causality and the ubiquitous dependence of the creatures. Molinism emphasises the freedom of the will, but seems to weaken the essential dependence of the creatures upon God.

§ 10. Divine Providence and the Government of the World

1. Concept and Reality of the Divine Providence

By Divine Providence in the narrow sense (providentia) (πρόνοια) is understood the eternal Divine world-plan : ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praeexistens (S. th. I 22, 1). It involves an act of cognition and of willing. The Divine government of the world (gubernatio) (κυβερνήσις) is the execution of the eternal Divine world-plan in time. The eternal world-plan and its fulfilment in time are conjointly designated Divine Providence in the wider sense.

God, through His Providence, protects and guides all that He has created. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council teaches this doctrine against pagan fatalism, deism and materialism : Universa, quae condidit, Deus providentia sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter (Wis. 8, 1). (God, by His Providence protects and governs all that He established, reaching mightily from end to end and ordering all things sweetly.) D 1784, cf. D 239 et seq.

Holy Writ attests the operation of Divine Providence in numerous passages. The Old Testament specially stresses the Providence of God for the people of Israel and for individual figures of Israelite history (for example, Joseph, Moses, Tobias). The Psalms are permeated by a belief in Providence. Wis. 6, 8 affirms the universality of Providence : "He hath made the little and the great, and He hath equally care for all." Cf. Wis. 8, 1 ; 11, 21 ; 12, 13 ; 14, 3. Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount, teaches that the Providence of the Heavenly Father extends even to the most insignificant creatures, the birds of the air, the lilies and the grass of the field, and that it is vouchsafed in special measure to the creatures endowed with reason. In the same way, St. Paul also proclaims the universality of the Divine Providence : "It is He who giveth to all life and breath and all things." Acts 17, 25. The Apostle St. Peter warns people to have trust in the Divine Providence : "Casting all your care upon Him, for he hath care of yours" (Peter 5, 7).

The Fathers defend Divine Providence against pagan fatalism, pagan astrology, and the gnostic-manichæan dualism. Cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, "*Contra fatum.*" Monographs on the Divine providence were written in the times of the Fathers by St. John Chrysostom (*Ad Stagyrium*), Theodoret of Cyprus (10 Sermons *De providentia*), Salvianus of Massilia (*De gubernatione Dei*). St. Augustine glorified the wise and loving Providence of God in his "Confessions" and in his "*De civitate Dei.*"

St. Thomas establishes the Divine Providence speculatively on the existing co-ordination between the world and its end. Since everything is created according to the idea of God, then also the idea of the regulation of all things to an end (*ratio ordinis rerum in finem*) exists from all eternity in the Spirit of God. S. th. I 22, 1. St. Thomas bases the universality of the Divine Providence on the omni-causality of God : God's causality, as *Primum Agens*, extends to every individual being. As every active principle is active for the sake of an end, so everything that God operates, that is, every created being, is adapted to an end, and is therefore the object of the Divine Providence. S. th. I 22, 2.

2. Classification of the Divine Providence

According to the object and grade of the Divine Providence one distinguishes "*Providentia Generalis*," which extends to all creatures, including those not endowed with reason ; "*Providentia Specialis*," which refers to all rational creatures, including sinners, and "*Providentia Specialissima*," which is vouchsafed to the predestined.

According to the mode and manner of the fulfilment of the eternal plan of Providence, one distinguishes "*Providentia Mediata*" (Mediate Providence) and "*Providentia Immediata*" (Immediate Providence). In Mediate Providence God utilises created mediate causes (*causae secundae*). He Himself executes His Immediate Providence.

According to the nature and manner of the Divine operation one distinguishes *Providentia Ordinaria* and *Providentia Extraordinaria*. The former consists in the ordinary operation of God, the latter in an extraordinary intervention, for examples, in miracles, in inspiration, in infallible decisions of Faith.

3. Attributes of the Divine Providence

a) *Infallible certainty*. The Divine Plan of Providence is fulfilled with infallible certainty through the Divine government of the world, so that nothing happens without Providence or independent of it. As God is *Causa Universalis* (Universal Cause), to which all *causae particulares* (particular causes) are subordinate, it is impossible for any event to happen which is not foreseen and desired, or at least permitted in the Divine world-plan. For God, therefore, there can be neither an accident, nor any fate existing above Him or conjointly with Him. To Him all world events are necessarily and inevitably subject. Cf. S. th. I 22, 2 ad 1.

b) *Immutability*. By reason of God's absolute unchangeability, the Eternal Plan of Providence is immutable. But this does not make prayer of petition purposeless, nor does it interfere with the Eternal Plan of Divine Providence. On the contrary, prayer is from all eternity, foreseen and included as a "*causa secunda*" (secondary cause), in the Divine Providence.

4. The Divine Providence and Evil

See Doctrine of God § 25, 3.

SECTION 2

The Divine Work of Creation

CHAPTER I

Revealed Doctrine concerning Material Things, i.e., Christian Cosmology

§ 11. The Biblical Hexahemeron (The Six Days of Creation)

1. General Principles

In order to solve the difficulties deriving from the apparent contradiction between the results of natural science and the Biblical narrative of the Creation the following general principles are to be observed :

a) Even though all Holy Writ is inspired and is the Word of God, still, following St. Thomas (Sent. II d. 12 q. 1 a. 2), a distinction must be made between that which is inspired *per se*, and that which is inspired *per accidens*. As the truths of Revelation laid down in Holy Writ are designed to serve the end of religious and moral teaching, inspiration *per se* extends only to the religious and moral truths. The profane facts of natural science and history contained in Holy Writ are not inspired *per se*, but only *per accidens*, that is, by virtue of their relation to the religious-moral truths. The data inspired *per accidens* is also the Word of God, and consequently without error. However, as the hagiographers in profane things make use of a popular, that is, a non-scientific form of exposition suitable to the mental perception of their times, a more liberal interpretation, is possible here. The Church gives no positive decisions in regard to purely scientific questions, but limits itself to rejecting errors which endanger faith. Further, in these scientific matters there is no value in a consensus of the Fathers since they are not here acting as witnesses of the Faith, but merely as private scientists.

b) Since the findings of reason and the supernatural knowledge of Faith go back to the same source, namely to God, there can never be a real contradiction between the certain discoveries of the profane sciences and the Word of God properly understood. The Vatican Council declared: *Nulla unquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest.* D 1797.

2. Decisions of the Bible Commission (30/6/1909)

a) The first three Chapters of Genesis contain narratives of real events (*rerum vere gestarum narrationes quae scilicet obiectivae realitati et historicae veritati respondeant*), no myths, no mere allegories or symbols of religious truths, no legends. D 2122.

b) In regard to those facts, which touch the foundations of the Christian religion (*quae christianae religionis fundamenta attingunt*), the literal historical sense is to be adhered to. Such facts are, *inter alia*, the creation of all things by God in the beginning of time, and the special creation of humanity. D 2123.

c) It is not necessary to understand all individual words and sentences in the literal sense (*sensu proprio*). Passages which are variously interpreted by the Fathers and by theologians, may be interpreted according to one's own

judgment with the reservation, however, that one submits one's judgment to the decision of the Church, and to the dictates of the Faith. D 2124 et seq.

d) As the Sacred Writer had not the intention of representing with scientific accuracy the intrinsic constitution of things, and the sequence of the works of creation but of communicating knowledge in a popular way suitable to the idiom and to the pre-scientific development of his time, the account is not to be regarded or measured as if it were couched in language which is strictly scientific (*proprietas scientifici sermonis*). D 2127.

e) The word "day" need not be taken in the literal sense of a natural day of 24 hours, but can also be understood in the improper sense of a longer space of time. D 2128. Cf. the whole letter of the Secretary of the Bible Commission to Cardinal Suhard, dated 16th January, 1948 (D 3002).

3. Explanation of the Work of the Six Days

The Biblical account of the duration and order of Creation is merely a literary clothing of the religious truth that the whole world was called into existence by the creative word of God. The Sacred Writer utilised for this purpose the pre-scientific picture of the world existing at the time. The numeral six of the days of the Creation is to be understood as an anthropomorphism. God's work of creation represented in schematic form (*opus distinctionis—opus ornatus*) by the picture of a human working week, the termination of the work by the picture of the Sabbath rest. The purpose of this literary device is to manifest Divine approval of the working week and the Sabbath rest. Cf. Ex. 20, 8 et seq.

The many theories which have been evolved to explain the Biblical Hexahemeron (the six days of Creation), fall into two groups. The former regard Gn. 1, as giving a historical account of the duration and sequence of the works of creation (realistic theories). The second group sacrifices the historicity of the narrative concerning the duration and sequence of the works of the Creation, and in order to avoid conflict with natural science, assumes that the division of the six working days derives from the imagination of the Sacred Writers (idealistic theories). To the former group belong those who hold the "Verbal Theory," which is expounded by most of the Fathers and Schoolmen, the "Restitution Theory," the "Sin Flood Theory," and the various "Concordance Theories," which explain the six days of Creation as six periods of creation. To the second group belong the "Allegorism of St. Augustine," "The Vision Theory," "Poetism," "The Anthropomorphistic Explanation," mentioned above, and "Mythism," which has been rejected by the Church (D 2122).

§ 12. The Doctrine of Evolution in the Light of the Revelation

1. The materialist doctrine of evolution (E. Haeckel) which assumes the eternal existence of uncreated material, and which explains the emergence of all living creatures, of plants and animals and also of men, both body and soul, through purely mechanical evolution out of this material, is contrary to Revelation, which teaches the creation of the material and its formation by God in time.

2. The doctrine of evolution based on the *theistic* conception of the world, which traces matter and life to God's causality and assumes that organic being, developed from originally created seed-powers (St. Augustine) or from stem-

forms (doctrine of descent), according to God's plan, is compatible with the doctrine of Revelation. However, as regards MAN, a special creation by God is demanded, which must extend at least to the spiritual soul (*creatio hominis peculiaris* D 2123). Individual Fathers, especially St. Augustine, accepted a certain development of living creatures. Proceeding from the assumption that God created everything at the one time (cf. *Ecclus.* 18, 1), they taught that God brought a certain part of His creatures into existence in a finished state, while He created others in the form of primitive seeds (*rationes, seminales* or *causales*) from which they were gradually to develop. Those Fathers and Schoolmen who accepted a development, conceived a development of the individual species of living things each from a particular primitive form created by God; but modern theories of evolution (descendence theory) conceives the development as from one species to another. According as these give priority to evolution from a plurality of original forms or from one single stem-form (primitive form) one speaks of a many-stemmed (polyphyletic) or single-stemmed (monophyletic) development. From the standpoint of the doctrine of evolution, either form is possible. From the standpoint of natural science, F. Birkner says: "A single-stemmed monophyletic development of living beings is to be rejected, as the transitions from one group to the other are missing. Everything seems to favour a many-stemmed, polyphyletic development. Unfortunately, up to the present it has not been possible to determine how many primitive forms or basic organisations of living beings existed."

CHAPTER 2

The Doctrine of the Revelation regarding Man or "Christian Anthropology"

I. The Nature of Man

§ 13. The Origin of the First Human Pair and the Unity of the Human Race

1. Origin of the First Man

The First Man was created by God. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran and the Vatican Council declared: *utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem . . . ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam* (D 428, 1783). The creative deed, by which God called the first man into existence, is to be conceived in regard to the soul as *creatio prima*, in regard to the body as *creatio secunda*.

The materialistic theory of evolution, according to which man as to his whole being, both body and soul, developed mechanically from the animal kingdom, is to be rejected. The soul of the first man was created immediately by God out of nothing. As regards the body, its immediate formation from inorganic stuff

by God cannot be maintained with certainty. Fundamentally, the possibility exists that God breathed the spiritual soul into an organic stuff, that is, into an originally animal body. In fact, noteworthy, even if not absolutely decisive palaeontological and biological grounds seem to point to a genetic connection between the human body and the highest forms of the animal kingdom.

The Encyclical "Humani generis" of Pius XII (1950) lays down that the question of the origin of the human body is open to free research by natural scientists and theologians. He insists on the careful weighing of the pros and cons of the grounds for its origination from an already living material, and warns the faithful against the assumption that discoveries up to the present determine and prove the origin of the human body from an organic stuff, and points out that in this question, the need for the greatest reserve and care emerges from the sources of Revelation. D 3027. Cf. D 2286.

Holy Writ contains a double account of the creation of the first man. Gn. 1, 27: "God created man to His own image. To the image of God He created him. Male and female He created them." Gn. 2, 7: "And the Lord God formed man out of the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul."

According to the immediate, literal sense, God created the body of the first man immediately out of inorganic material ("from the slime of the earth") and vivified it by breathing into it a spiritual soul. The idea that the spiritual soul was created in an animal body is foreign to the letter of Holy Writ and to the Fathers. The question of the descent of the human body from the animal kingdom first appeared under the influence of the modern theory of evolution. The Biblical text does not exclude this theory. Just as in the account of the creation of the world, one can, in the account of the creation of man, distinguish between the *per se* inspired religious truth that man, both body and soul, was created by God, and the *per accidens* inspired, stark anthropomorphic representation of the mode and manner of the Creation. While the fact of the creation of man by God in the literal sense must be closely adhered to, in the question as to the mode and manner of the formation of the human body, an interpretation which diverges from the strict literal sense, is, on weighty grounds, permissible.

According to Gn. 2, 21 et seq., the body of the first woman was formed from the body of the first man. Gn. 2, 22: "And the Lord God built the rib which He took from Adam into a woman." This account, which is starkly anthropomorphic, was understood by the generality of the Fathers in the literal sense. By individual Fathers and theologians it was allegorically interpreted (The Alexandrians, Cajetan, Lagrange) or explained as a vision (Hummelauer, Hoberg). According to a decision of the Bible Commission the literal historical sense is to be adhered to in regard to the formation of the first woman out of the first man (D 2123). Cf. Eccles. 17, 5 (Vulg.): "Out of him He created a helper similar to him." 1 Cor. 11, 8: "The woman is of the man." However, the saying is and remains mysterious.

The Fathers concur in teaching that God immediately created the first man, both as to body and to soul. They see symbolised in the manner of Eve's creation the essential assimilation of the woman to the man, the Divine inauguration of marriage, and the origin of the Church and of the Sacraments from the wound in the side of Christ, the second Adam. Cf. St. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 9, 10.

2. Unity of the Human Race

The whole human race stems from one single human pair. (*Sent. certa.*)

Against the Pre-Adamite Theory (first expounded by the Calvinist Isaac de la Peyrère, 1655), and the view of certain modern scientists, according to which the various races are derived from several separated stems (polygenism), the Church teaches that the first human beings, Adam and Eve, are the progenitors of the whole human race (monogenism). The teaching of the unity of the human race is not, indeed, a dogma, but it is a necessary pre-supposition of the dogma of Original Sin and Redemption. According to a decision of the Bible Commission, the unity of the human race is to be reckoned among those facts which affect the foundations of the Christian religion, and which, on this account, are to be understood in their literal, historical sense (D 2123). The Encyclical "Humani Generis" of Pius XII (1950) rejects polygenism on account of its incompatibility with the revealed doctrine of original sin. (D 3028).

The biblical proof derives from the narration of the creation, which purports to relate the origin of all things, and therefore also the first emergence of man. Explicit testimonies are Gn. 2, 5 : "And there was not a man to till the earth." Gn. 3, 20 : "Adam called the name of his wife, Eve ; because she was the mother of all the living." Acts 17, 26 : "And hath made of one all mankind to dwell upon the whole face of the earth." Cf. Wis. 10, 1 ; Rom. 5, 12, et seq. ; 1 Cor. 15, 21 et seq. ; Hebr. 2, 11 ; St. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 9, 10. We may note that racial differences affect external characteristics only. The essential agreement of all races in physical structure and in mental endowment indicates a common origin.

§ 14. The Essential Constituent Parts of Human Nature

1. Two Essential Constituent Parts of Man

Man consists of two essential parts—a material body and a spiritual soul. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council teach this doctrine : *deinde (condidit creaturam) humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam.* D 428, 1783.

In opposition to the teaching of the Church is the exaggerated spiritualism of Plato and of the School of Origen, according to which the body is a burden and hindrance to the soul, its prison and grave. In Plato's view the soul alone makes the man, while the body is only a kind of shadow. The Church teaches on the contrary that the body essentially belongs to human nature.

When St. Paul speaks (Rom. 7, 14 et seq.) of a conflict between the body and the soul, and when he longs to be freed from the body of death (Rom. 7, 24) he is not thinking of the body in its physical construction, but in its condition of moral disorder occasioned by sin.

Again incompatible with Church dogma is the trichotomism taught by Plato, the gnostics, manichaeans, apollinarians, and in recent times also by Günther, according to which man is composed of three essential component parts, the body, an animal soul, and a spiritual soul (σάρξ, ψυχή, πνεῦμα).

The 8th General Council of Constantinople (869-870) rejected the doctrine of the two souls, and laid down the Catholic dogma that man possesses only one single spiritual soul: *unam animam rationabilem et intellectualem habere hominem*. D 338. The spiritual soul is the principle of the spiritual mental life, and at the same time, the principle of the corporeal (vegetative and sensitive) life. D 1655.

According to the teaching of Holy Scripture, man is composed of two essential component parts, and will again be resolved into two parts. Gn. 2, 7: "And the Lord God formed man out of the slime of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life (*spiraculum vitae*=life principle, soul), and man became a living soul." Pro. 12, 7: "Think of thy Creator . . ., before the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the Spirit of God who sent it." Cf. Mt. 10, 28; 1 Cor. 5, 3; 7, 34.

The Fathers defend dichotomism notably against the Christologically false teaching of Apollinaris of Laodicea founded on trichotomism. The locution "Spirit and Soul" serves on occasion as a designation of the higher and the lower soul-life, without involving the distinction between two principles. In Holy Writ the distinction between spirit and soul arises sometimes through the parallelism of Hebraic poetry, for example, Luke 1, 46, et seq.

Speculatively, the uniqueness of the soul-principle in man is shown especially by the testimony of the self-consciousness, according to which the same person is the principle of the rational as of the sensitive and vegetative activities.

2. Relation of Body and Soul

The rational soul is per se the essential form of the body. (*De fide*.)

Body and soul are connected with each other, not merely externally like a vessel and its contents, a ship and its pilot (Plato, Descartes, Leibniz), but as an intrinsic natural unit, so that the spiritual soul is of itself and essentially the form of the body. The Council of Vienne (1311-1312) condemned as heretical: *quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter*. D 481, cf. 738, 1655.

The decision was directed against the Franciscan theologian *Johannis Olivi* († 1298), who taught that the rational soul was not of itself (immediately) the essential form of the body, but only mediately through the *forma sensitiva et vegetiva*, which is really distinct from it. This would destroy the essential unity of human nature replacing it by a dynamic unity of operation. This decision of the Council of Vienne does not imply a dogmatic recognition of the Thomistic teaching of the uniqueness of the substantial form, or of the Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphism.

According to Gn. 2, 7, the slime, by virtue of the creation of the soul, becomes a living human body, and thus a component part of human nature. According to the vision of *Azechiel* 37, 1 et seq., the dead members of the body are awakened to life through the spiritual soul.

The Fathers conceive the attachment of body and soul as such an intrinsic one that they compare it to the Hypostatic Union. Cf. the Symbol *Quicumque* (D 40). St. Augustine teaches: "From the soul the body has feeling and life" (*De civ. Dei* XXI 3, 2. Cf. St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.* 11, 12.)

3. Individuality and Immortality of the Soul

Every human being possesses an individual soul. (*De fide.*)

The Fifth General Lateran Council (1512-17) denounced the humanistic neo-Platonists (Pietro Pomponazzi) who espoused Averroistic monopsychism declaring that the rational soul in all men is numerically one unique principle, and that only this general soul is immortal: *damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes animam intellectivam mortalem esse aut unicum in cunctis hominibus*. D 738 (we condemn and reprove all who maintain that the rational soul is mortal or one unique reality (shared) in (by) every man). The individuality of each soul is an essential presupposition of personal immortality.

The idea of retribution in this world appears strongly in the Old Testament, yet even the oldest of its books profess, as against the assertion of rationalistic criticism, a belief in immortality. According to the view of Holy Writ, life on earth is an exile in a foreign land (Gn. 47, 9). The deceased go to their fathers (Gn. 15, 15), are gathered to their people (Gn. 25, 8. 17 *passim*), sleep in their fathers (Dt. 31, 16; 3 Kings 2, 10 *passim*). After death the soul enters the Scheol, that is a place of collective detention of the departed souls (Gn. 37, 35). The newer books, especially the Book of Wisdom, are rich in testimonies of the belief in immortality held by the People of Israel. Cf. especially Wis. 2, 23: "For God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own eternity He made him." (According to another reading: "to the image of His own Being".)

The firm belief in the other world expressed in the New Testament rests on the conviction of personal immortality. Jesus teaches: "Fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul" (Mt. 10, 28). "These shall go into everlasting punishment; but the just into eternal life" (Mt. 25, 46). St. Paul believes that he will be united with Christ immediately after his death, and not only after the resurrection: "But I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ" (Phil. 1. 23). The doctrine of the death of the soul (thnetopsychism) is unknown in the New Testament.

The passage Eccles. 3, 21: "Who knoweth if the spirit of the children of Adam ascend upward, and if the spirit of the beasts descend downward?" appears to cast doubt on immortality. However, according to the context it refers only to the animal side of man, which is like the animal, mortal. The immortality of the soul is proved beyond all doubt by other passages of the Book. Cf. 12, 7; 9, 10.

The Fathers, not merely unanimously assert the doctrine of immortality, but also establish it philosophically. Origen defends it against Thnetopsychism which was widely current in Arabia. St. Gregory of Nyssa treats it from the philosophic standpoint in his "Dialogus de anima et resurrectione," as does St. Augustine in his monograph: *De immortalitate animae*.

Natural reason proves the immortality of the soul from its physical simplicity. As it is not composed of parts, it cannot be resolved into parts. God could, it is true, annihilate the soul, but His Wisdom and Goodness demand that He

should not frustrate the connatural desire of the soul for truth and bliss in the other world, just as His Justice demands that He reward the good and punish the wicked in the other world.

§ 15. The Origin of Individual Human Souls

In the posterity of Adam, the origin of the soul is associated with natural generation. As to the mode and manner of the origin of the soul different opinions have been advanced.

1. Pre-existentianism

Pre-existentianism, which was proposed by Plato, and which in the early Christian era was accepted by Origen and individual members of his disciples (Didymus of Alexandria, Evagrius Ponticus, Nemesius of Emesa), as well as by the Priscillianists, teaches that souls exist even before their connection with the bodies—according to Plato and Origen, from all eternity—and are exiled in bodies, as a punishment for moral defect. This doctrine was rejected by a Synod at Constantinople (543) against the Origenists, and by a Synod at Braga (561) against the Priscillianists. D 203, 236.

The idea of a pre-existence of the soul and of a pre-corporeal fall through sin is unknown to Holy Writ. Again, the passage, Wis. 8, 19 et seq.: "And I was a witty child and had received a good soul. And whereas I was more good I came into a body undefiled," is not to be understood in the sense of the Platonic doctrine of pre-existence, as the anthropological conceptions of the Book of Wisdom are entirely different from those of Plato. According to the testimony of Holy Writ, the first man created by God was good in soul and body (Gn. 1, 31). Sin entered the world through the fall by sin of our first parents (Gn. 3, 1 et seq.; Rom. 5, 12). St. Paul, in Rom. 9, 11, directly excluded a pre-corporeal fall through sin: "For when the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil." The Fathers, with very few exceptions, are opponents of the doctrine of pre-existence upheld by Origen. Cf. St. Gregory Nazianzus, Or. 37, 15; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De anima et resurr.* Par. 15, 3; St. Augustine, Ep. 217, 5, 16; Leo I, Ep. 15, 10. The testimony of self-consciousness testifies against the pre-existence of the soul. Cf. S. th. I 118, 3.

2. Emanationism

Emanatism, which was represented in antiquity by gnostic-manichaeism and which in modern times is taught by pantheism, teaches that individual souls proceed by emanation (outflowing) from the Divine Substance. The teaching contradicts the absolute simplicity of God. It was rejected by the Vatican Council, together with pantheism, as heretical. D 1804. Cf. D 348. St. Augustine says: "The soul is not a part of God; for if it were then it would be in every respect unchangeable and indestructible" (Ep. 166, 2, 3).

3. Generationism

Generationism traces the origin of the human soul, as well as the origin of the body, back to the act of generation performed by the parents. According to it, parents are the originators of both body and soul. The cruder form of generationism, i.e., the traducianism expounded by Tertullian, teaches that with the corporeal semen, a part of the soul-substance of the parents (*tradux*) is transmitted to the child. A less crude form of generationism, which was held

by St. Augustine to be possible, and in the past century by Klee, Rosmini and others to be probable, holds fast to the spirituality of the soul, and makes the soul of the child emerge from a semen spirituale of the parents.

Generationism is incompatible with the simplicity and spirituality of the soul. Pope Benedict XII demanded the condemnation of the doctrine of generationism as a pre-condition of the Union, from the Armenians (1341). D 533. Leo XIII condemned the teaching of Rosmini. D 1910.

4. Creationism

Every individual soul was immediately created out of nothing by God. (*Sent. certa.*)

Creationism, taught by the vast majority of the Fathers by the Schoolmen, and by modern theology, holds that each individual soul is created by God out of nothing at the moment of its unification with the body. This doctrine is not defined; it is, however, indirectly expressed in the decision of faith of the 5th General Lateran Council (pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine multiplicanda: D 738). Pope Alexander VII, in a doctrinal assertion on the Immaculate Conception of Mary, which formed the basis of the dogmatic definition of Pius IX, speaks of the "creation and infusion" of her soul into the body (in primo instanti creationis atque infusionis in corpus). D 1100, cf. D 1641. Pope Pius XII, in the Encyclical "Humani generis," teaches "The Catholic Faith obliges us to hold firmly that souls are immediately created by God" D 3027. Cf. D 348 (Leo IX).

A stringent scriptural proof of the doctrine of creationism is not possible. However, it is intimated in Ecc. 12, 7: "The Spirit returns to God Who gave it"; Wis. 15, 11 (inspiration of the soul through God), and Hebr. 12, 9 (distinction between the fathers of the flesh and the Father of the Spirits=God).

Most of the Fathers, especially the Greek, are adherents of creationism. While St. Jerome decisively advocates creationism, St. Augustine wavered all his life between generationism and creationism (Ep. 166). The difficulty of reconciling the immediate creation of the soul by God with the handing-on of original sin held him back from a decisive confession of creationism. In the following centuries, under the influence of St. Augustine, a certain indecision continued up to the period of the peak of scholasticism when creationism found a general recognition. St. Thomas went so far as to condemn generationism as heretical. S. th. I 118, 2.

The Time of the Creation and Infusion of the Soul.

According to the Aristotelian-scholastic viewpoint, in the human embryo three different forms of life follow one another in point of time, in such a manner that the following form at any time takes over the functions of the preceding, namely, the vegetative, the sensitive and finally (after 40 or, mutatis mutandis, 80 days), the spiritual. From this derives the distinction between foetus informis and foetus formatus. Confirmation of this was sought in Ex. 21, 22 et seq. (according to the Septuagint and the old-Latin translation). The foetus informis was regarded as being purely animal, the foetus formatus a human being, the destruction of which was regarded as murder. Modern Christian philosophy generally holds that the creation and infusion of the spiritual soul coincides with the moment of conception. Cf. D 1185.

II. The Elevation of Man to the Supernatural Order

§ 16. The concept of the supernatural

1. Determination of the Concept

Natural, in opposition to supernatural, is that which is either a part of nature, or that which proceeds out of nature as its effect, or to which nature has a claim: *Naturale est, quod vel constitutive vel consecutive vel exigitive ad naturam pertinet*, or more concisely: *Naturale est, quod naturae debetur*. The natural order is the ordination of all creatures to their ultimate end in accordance with their nature.

St. Augustine employs the word "natural" in accord with its etymology (*natura=nascitura*) frequently in the sense of "original" (*originalis*), and on occasion, in the sense of "according to nature" (*conveniens*). The "natural" endowment of man in the sense of St. Augustine includes also the supernatural gifts of the primitive state. (Cf. D 130: "*naturalis possibilitas*.")

Supernatural is that which is neither a part of nature, nor proceeds as effect from nature, nor can be claimed by nature, but which transcends the being, the powers and the claims of nature. The supernatural is super-added by God over the claims and endowments of nature to the natural gifts of the creature: *supernaturale est donum Dei naturae indebitum et superadditum*. The supernatural order is the ordination of rational creatures to a supernatural final goal.

2. Division

The supernatural is divided into:

- a) The supernatural in substance (*supernaturale secundum substantiam*) and the supernatural in mode (*supernaturale secundum modum*). The "supernatural in substance" is that which by its intrinsic character transcends the nature of the creature, for example, our knowledge of the triune personality of God, actual grace, sanctifying grace, the immediate vision of God. "Supernatural in mode" is an effect which as to its essence is indeed natural, but which in the mode and manner of its production transcends the natural powers of the creature, for example, a miraculous healing of a sick person.
- b) "The absolutely supernatural" or the supernatural pure and simple (*supernaturale simpliciter*) and "the relatively supernatural," or the supernatural in a definite respect (*supernaturale secundum quid*). "The absolutely supernatural" connotes goods of the Divine order, which transcend the nature of creatures; for example, sanctifying grace, or the immediate vision of God. The relatively supernatural connotes goods of the created order, which though supernatural for one creature, are not supernatural for another creature, for example, infused knowledge, which is natural for the angels, and supernatural for human beings. To the relatively supernatural belong the so-called preternatural gifts of man's primitive state.

§ 17. Relation between nature and supernature

1. Nature's capacity to receive a supernature

A creature has the capacity to receive supernatural gifts. (*Sent. communis*.)

Though the supernatural is beyond nature, still nature has a certain receptivity for the supernatural, the so-called *potentia oboedientialis*. This is the passive

potentiality proper to creatures, of being elevated by the Creator to a supernatural state of being and activity. Cf. S. th. III 11, 1.

According to the Schoolmen, the supernatural gift is educed through the power of the Creator from the *potentia oboedientialis*, in other words the passive potentiality which is present in the nature of the creature is actualised by the omnipotence of God. This doctrine is essentially different from the modernistic teaching of the "vital immanence," according to which everything religious develops out of the necessities of human nature in a purely natural fashion. St. Augustine teaches : *Posse habere fidem sicut posse habere caritatem naturae est hominum ; habere autem fidem quemadmodum habere caritatem gratia est fidelium* (De praedest. sanct. 5, 10).

2. Organic Connection of Nature and Supernature

a) The Supernatural presupposes Nature. (*Sent. communis.*)

The supernatural does not exist in itself, but in something else ; it is therefore not a substance, but an accident. Thus the supernatural presupposes a created nature, which receives it and in which it operates.

b) The Supernatural perfects Nature. (*Sent. communis.*)

The supernatural is not superadded merely externally to nature, but affects nature intrinsically. It permeates the being and the powers of nature, and perfects it either within the created order (e.g., the preternatural gifts) or through elevation into the divine order of being and activity (absolutely supernatural gifts). The Fathers and theologians compare the supernatural to fire which makes iron glow, or to a plant which is grafted on a tree.

3. The Natural and the Supernatural Aim of Man

God has conferred on man a supernatural Destiny. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council establishes the absolute necessity of Revelation by reason of man's ordination to a supernatural final end : *Deus ex infinita bonitate sua ordinavit hominem ad finem supernaturalem, ad participanda scilicet bona divina, quae humanae mentis intelligentiam omnino superant.* D 1786. Cf. D 1808. Man's final end consists in a participation by him in God's Vision of Himself. The attainment of this end by men gives glory to God and fills men with supernatural happiness. Cf. 1 Cor. 13, 12 ; 1 John 3, 2 (see Doctrine of God, Par. 6).

The natural end of man, which consists in man's natural knowledge and love of God, and in the natural glorification of God, is subordinated and adapted to his supernatural end. The natural order is thus used as a means for the attaining of the ultimate supernatural goal. Man, by reason of his whole dependence on God, is bound to strive after the supernatural destination determined for him by God. If he neglects this, then he cannot reach the natural goal either. Cf. Mk. 16, 16.

§ 18. The Supernatural Endowment of the First Man

1. Sanctifying Grace

Our first parents, before the Fall, were endowed with sanctifying grace. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent, in opposition to Pelagianism and to modern Rationalism, teaches : *primum hominem Adam . . . sanctitatem et iustitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse.* (If anyone will not confess that when the first man Adam had transgressed the mandate of God in paradise he did not immediately lose the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted A.S.) D 788 ; cf. D 192.

Against Baius and the Jansenist Quesnel, the Church asserted the supernatural character of the gifts given to man in the primitive state. D 1021 to 1026, 1385. Cf. D 1516.

The elevation to the state of grace is indicated by the intimacy between God and the progenitors of the human race in Paradise. A scriptural proof is provided by St. Paul's teaching on the Redemption. The Apostle teaches that Christ, the Second Adam, restored what the first Adam had lost, the state of holiness and justice. But if he had lost it, he must previously have received it. Cf. Rom. 5, 12 et seq. ; Eph. 1, 10 ; 4, 23 et seq. ; 1 Cor. 6, 11 ; 2 Cor. 5, 17 ; Gal. 6, 15 ; Rom. 5, 10 et seq. ; 8, 14 et seq.

The Fathers find the supernatural endowment with grace indicated in Gn. 1, 26 (*similitudo* = supernatural identity of image and likeness with God) ; in Gn. 2, 7 (*spiraculum vitae* = supernatural life-principle), and in Eccles. 7, 30 : "Only this have I found that God made man right."

St. Augustine declares that our renewal (Eph. 4, 23) consists in this that : "We have received justice from which man had fallen off through sin" (*De Gen. ad Litt.* VI 24, 35). St. John Damascene says : "The Creator has communicated His Divine Grace to man and thereby made him a participant in His community" (*De fide orth.* II 30).

As regards the time of man's elevation to the state of grace, most theologians, including St. Thomas and his school, are of the opinion that the first men were created in the state of sanctifying grace, Petrus Lombardus and the Franciscan school, on the other hand, teach that the first human beings on their creation received only the preternatural gifts of integrity, and were required to prepare themselves with the help of actual grace for the reception of sanctifying grace. The Council of Trent has deliberately left the question undecided (*whence constitutus, not creatus* : D 788). St. Thomas' teaching is that of the Fathers. Cf. D 192 : St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.* II 12. S. th. I 95, 1.

2. The Gifts of Integrity

The supernatural endowment of the first men (*iustitia originalis*) included, in addition to the absolute supernatural gift of Sanctifying Grace, certain preternatural gifts, the so-called "*dona integritatis*" :

a) The *donum rectitudinis* or *integritatis* in the narrower sense, i.e., the freedom from irregular desire. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Council of Trent explains that concupiscence was called a sin by St. Paul because it flows from sin and makes one inclined to sin (*quia ex peccato est et*

ad peccatum inclinatur : D 792). But if it does flow from sin, then it did not exist before sin. Cf. D 2123, 1026.

Holy Writ attests the perfect harmony between reason and sensuality. Gn. 2, 25 : "And they were both naked . . . and were not ashamed." It was only sin that gave rise to the feeling of shame (Gn. 3, 7. 10).

The Fathers defend the *donum integritatis* against the Pelagians, who regarded concupiscence, not as a defect of nature (*defectus naturae*), but as a power of nature (*vigor naturae*). St. Augustine teaches that the first man, by reason of the gift of integrity, had the possibility of easily avoiding sin (*posse non peccare* : *De correptione et gratia* 12, 33).

b) The donum immortalitatis, i.e., bodily immortality. (*De fide*.)

The Council of Trent teaches that Adam fell under the sentence of death as a punishment for sin : *Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem Adam . . . incurrisse per offensam praevaricationis huiusmodi iram et indignationem Dei atque mortem, quam antea illi comminatus fuerat Deus, . . . A.S. D 788 ; cf. D 101, 175, 1078, 2123.*

Holy Writ records that God threatened and imposed death as punishment for the transgression of His probationary commandment. Gn. 2, 17 ; 3, 19. Cf. Wis. 1, 13 : "For God made not death." Wis. 2, 24 : "But by the envy of the devil death came into the world." Rom. 5, 12 : "By one man sin entered into the world and by sin death."

The gift of immortality is, as St. Augustine teaches (*De Gen. ad Litt.* VI 25, 36), to be conceived as *posse non mori* (= the possibility of not dying) not as *posse mori* (= impossibility of dying). The Fathers regarded bodily immortality as being transmitted through the tree of life (Gn. 2, 9 ; 3, 22).

c) The donum impassibilitatis, i.e., the freedom from suffering. (*Sent. communis*.)

This gift is to be more closely defined as *posse non pati* (= the possibility of remaining free from suffering). It is associated with corporeal immortality.

Holy Writ represents suffering and sorrow as the consequences of sin. Gn. 3, 16 et seq. Before sin came into the world the progenitors of the human race lived in a condition of unalloyed happiness (cf. Gn. 2, 15 [Vulg.] : *in paradiso voluptatis*). But freedom from suffering in no wise means inactivity. Our first parents immediately after their creation by God received from Him the order to till the land (Gn. 2, 15), and thus, in a limited measure, to participate in the work of the Creator.

d) The donum scientiae, i.e., a knowledge of natural and supernatural truths infused by God. (*Sent. communis*.)

Since our first parents, according to Holy Writ, entered into existence in an adult state, and were the first teachers and educators of humanity, it was appropriate that they should be equipped by God with a natural knowledge suitable to their age and their tasks, and with that measure of supernatural knowledge which was necessary to enable them to achieve their supernatural

destiny. In Holy Writ the deep knowledge of Adam is indicated in his naming of the animals (Gn. 2, 20) and in his immediate knowledge of the status and tasks of the woman (Gn. 2, 23 et seq.). Cf. Ecclus. 17, 5 et seq.

In Gn. 2, 20 (naming of the animals), St. Augustine sees "a proof of the transcendental wisdom" (*indicium excellentissimae sapientiae*: *Op. imperf. contra Jul. V 1*). According to St. Cyril of Alexandria, "Adam, the head of the race, was perfect in knowledge immediately from the first moment of his emergence" (In Ioan. 1, 9). Cf. S. th. I 94, 3.

3. The Gifts of the Primitive State as Hereditary Gifts

Adam received sanctifying grace not merely for himself, but for all his posterity. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that Adam lost sanctity and justice (= sanctifying grace) not merely for himself, but also for us (D 789). It follows from this, that he received these not only for himself but also for us his descendants. This, according to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers and of the theologians, applies to the preternatural gifts of integrity (with the exception of the *donum scientiae*); for these were bestowed for the sake of sanctifying grace. Adam received the gifts of the original state, not as an individual person, but as head of the human race, and thus for the whole human race. They were a present to human nature (*donum naturae*) and, according to the positive ordinance of God, were to be transmitted with nature to all the heirs of that nature. Original justice was intended to be hereditary justice.

The Fathers declare that we, the posterity of Adam, received the grace of God gratuitously and lost it through sin. This manner of speaking presupposes that the original endowment with grace ought to pass from Adam to his posterity. Cf. St. Basil, *Sermo asc. 1*: "Let us return to the original grace, of which we were deprived by sin." St. Augustine, *De spir. et litt.* 27, 47. S. th. I 100, 1. Cf. *Comp. theol.* 187.

§ 19. The Various States of Human Nature

By the state of human nature (*status naturae humanae*) is understood the inner constitution of human nature in relation to the final goal set for it by God. One distinguishes between historical (or real), and merely possible states.

1. Real States

a) *The state of elevated nature* (*status naturae elevatae* or *status iustitiae originalis*), that is, the primitive state of the first human beings before the fall through sin in which they possessed both the absolute supernatural gift of sanctifying grace as well as the preternatural gifts of integrity.

b) *The state of fallen nature* (*status naturae lapsae*), that is, the state following immediately after the sin of Adam, in which man, as punishment for sin, possessed neither sanctifying grace nor the gifts of integrity.

c) *The state of restored nature* (*status naturae glorificatae*), that is, the condition of those who have achieved their supernatural destiny, i.e., the *Immediate Vision of God*. This state includes in its perfection sanctifying grace. After

their resurrection, the bodies of those in this state will also be endowed with the preternatural gifts of integrity (non posse peccare, mori, pati).

Common to all real states is the possession of the Beatific Vision of God.

2. Merely Possible States

a) *The state of pure nature* (status naturae purae), that is, a condition in which man would possess all that, and only that, which appertains to human nature, and in which he could attain to a *natural* final end only.

The possibility of a pure state of nature, which was denied by Luther, Baius and Jansenius, is certain Church doctrine. It springs as a necessary consequence from the doctrine of the supernatural character of the gifts of the primitive state. Pope Pius V rejected the assertion of Baius: Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur (D 1055). The Church teaches therefore that God could have created man without supernatural or praeter-natural gifts, but not in a condition of sin.

St. Augustine and the Schoolmen expressly teach the possibility of the pure state of nature. Cf. St. Augustine, *Retract.* I 8(9), 6. St. Thomas, *In Sent.* II d. 31 q. a. 2 ad 3.

b) *The state of unimpaired nature* (status naturae integrae), i.e., that is a condition in which man, in addition to his nature, would possess the preternatural gifts of integrity, in order to reach his *natural* final goal with ease and with certainty.

III. Man's Lapse from the Supernatural Order

§ 20. The Personal Sin of Our First Parents or Original Sin

1. The Act of Sin

Our First Parents in Paradise sinned grievously through transgression of the Divine probationary commandment. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that Adam lost sanctity and justice by transgressing the Divine commandment (D 788). Since the punishment is proportionate to the guilt, the sin of Adam was clearly a serious sin.

The biblical account of the fall through the sin of the First Parents is contained in Gn. 2, 17 and 3, 1 et seq. Since Adam's sin is the basis of the dogma of Original Sin and Redemption the historical accuracy of the account as regards the essential facts may not be impugned. According to a decision of the Bible Commission in 1909, the literal historical sense is not to be doubted in regard to the following facts: a) That the first man received a command from God to test his obedience; b) That through the temptation of the devil who took the form of a serpent he transgressed the Divine commandment;

- c) That our First Parents were deprived of their original condition of innocence. D 2123.

The later Books of Holy Writ confirm this literal, historical interpretation. Ecclus. 25, 33 : "From the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die." Wis. 2, 24 : "But by the envy of the devil death came into the world." 2 Cor. 11, 3 : "But I fear lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his subtlety, so your minds should be corrupted and fall away from the simplicity which is Christ." Cf. 1 Tim. 2, 14 ; Rom. 5, 12, et seq ; John 8, 44. The mythological explanation, and the purely allegorical explanation (of the Alexandrines) are therefore to be rejected.

The sin of our First Parents was a sin of disobedience. Cf. Rom. 5, 19 : "By the disobedience of one man many were made sinners." The root of the disobedience was pride. Tob. 4, 14 : "From it (pride) all perdition took its beginning." Ecclus. 10, 15 : "Pride is the beginning of all sin." The theory that Original Sin was a sexual sin (St. Clement of Alexandria, St. Ambrose) cannot be accepted. The gravity of the sin is clear when we regard its purpose and the circumstances of the Divine commandment. St. Augustine regards Adam's sin as an "inexpressibly great sin" (*ineffabiliter grande peccatum* : Op. Imperf. c. Jul. I 105).

2. The Consequences of Sin

- a) Through sin our First Parents lost sanctifying grace and provoked the anger and the indignation of God. (*De fide.*)

In Holy Writ the loss of Sanctifying Grace is indicated in the exclusion of Our First Parents from intercourse with God. (Gn. 3, 10. 23). God appears as a judge and announces the sentence of punishment (Gn. 3, 16 et seq.).

God's displeasure finally takes effect in the eternal rejection. Tatian believed that Adam lost eternal salvation but St. Irenaeus (*Adv. haer.* III 23, 8), Tertullian (*De poenit.* 12) and St. Hippolytus (*Philos.* 8, 16) rejected this view. In later times, the Fathers generally, supported by Wis. 10, 2 : ("She [Wisdom] brought him out of his sin"), teach that Our First Parents did atonement and "through the Blood of the Lord" were saved from eternal destruction (cf. St. Augustine, *De peccat. mer. et rem.* II 34, 55).

- b) Our First Parents became subject to death and to the dominion of the Devil. (*De fide.*) D 788.

Death and the evils associated with it follow from the loss of the gifts of integrity. According to Gn. 3, 16 et seq., God imposed suffering and death as a punishment for sin. The dominion of the devil is mentioned in Gn. 3, 15 and is explicitly taught in John 12, 31 ; 14, 30 ; 2 Cor. 4, 4 ; Hebr. 2, 14 ; 2 Peter 2, 19.

§ 21. The Existence of Original Sin

1. The Heretical Counter-propositions

The doctrine of Original Sin was rejected by the Gnostics and Manichaeans, who believed that the moral corruption of humanity comes from an eternal principle of evil and also by the Origenists and Priscillianists, who explained humanity's inclination to evil by a pre-corporeal fall through sin.

Original sin was directly denied by the Pelagians, who taught : a) The sin of Adam is transmitted to posterity not by inheritance but through imitation of a bad example (imitatione, non propagatione). b) Death, suffering and concupiscence are not punishment for sin, but a natural condition of man who was created in a pure state of nature. c) The baptism of children is administered, not for the remission of sins, but as a sign of acceptance by the Church, and to enable men to reach the Kingdom of Heaven, which is distinct from *vita aeterna* (a higher stage of blessedness).

The Pelagian error was combated chiefly by St. Augustine and was condemned by the Church at the Synods of Mileve 416, Carthage 418, Orange 529 and in later times by the Council of Trent (1546) D 102, 174 et seq., 787 et seq.

The Pelagian error lives on in modern rationalism (Socialism, Rationalism of the age of the Enlightenment, Liberal Protestant Theology, modern unbelief).

In medieval times the Synod of Sens (1141) rejected the following thesis of Peter Abelard : *Quod non contraximus culpam ex Adam, sed poenam tantum* D 376.

The Reformers, the Baians, and the Jansenists admitted the reality of original sin, but misunderstood its essence and its operation, since they regarded it as identical with concupiscence which corrupts completely human nature. Cf. Augustine Conf. Art. 2.

2. Teaching of the Church

Adam's sin is transmitted to his posterity, not by imitation, but by descent. (*De fide*.)

The dogmatic teaching on original sin is laid down in the Tridentine Decree "Super peccato originali" (Sess. V ; 1546), which in part follows word for word the decisions of the Synods of Carthage and of Orange. The Council of Trent rejects the doctrine that Adam's loss of the sanctity and justice received from God was merely for himself alone, and not for us also, and that he transmitted to his posterity death and suffering only, but not the guilt of sin. It positively teaches that sin, which is the death of the soul, is inherited by all his posterity by descent, not by imitation, and that it dwells in every single human being. It is removed by the merits of the Redemption of Jesus Christ, which as a rule are bestowed through the Sacrament of Baptism on adults as well as on children. Therefore children also are baptised for the forgiveness of sins (in remissionem peccatorum). D 789-791.

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

a) Scriptural proof

The Old Testament contains references to original sin. Cf. especially Ps. 50, 7 : "For behold I was conceived in iniquities : and in sins did my mother conceive me." Job 14, 4 (according to Vulg.) : "Who can make him clean that is conceived unclean ?" Both passages speak of an inborn sinfulness whether this be understood in the sense of habitual sin or merely of the inclination to sin, but do not bring this into causal connection with the sin of Adam. The causal connection between the death of all mankind and the

sin of our First Parents (original death) is, however, clearly stated in the Old Testament. Cf. Ecclus. 25, 33 ; Wis. 2, 24.

The passage which contains the classical proof is Rom. 5, 12-21, in which the Apostle draws a parallel between the first Adam, from whom sin and death are transmitted to all humanity, and Christ, the second Adam, from whom justice and life are transmitted to all men. V. 12 : "Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world and by sin death, and so sin passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned (in quo omnes peccaverunt—ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον) . . . 19. For as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners : so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just."

By sin (ἁμαρτία) is to be understood quite generally sin, which here appears personified. Original sin is therefore included. What is meant is the guilt of sin and not the consequences of sin. Death is expressly distinguished from sin and is represented as the consequence of sin. Concupiscence is not meant, because sin, according to V. 18 et seq., is removed by the grace of Christ's Redemption, while evil desire remains as experience shows.

β) The words in quo (ἐφ' ᾧ ; V. 12 d) were related relatively to unum hominem by St. Augustine and during the whole middle-ages : "By one man . . . in whom all have sinned." Since the time of Erasmus the better-founded conjunctive meaning already proposed by the Fathers, especially by the Greeks, came to the fore : ἐφ' ᾧ = ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὅτι = "on the ground that all have sinned" or "because all have sinned" ; cf. the linguistic parallels in 2 Cor. 5, 4 ; Phil. 3, 12 ; 4, 10 ; Rom. 8, 3. Since those also die who have committed no personal sin (young children), the origin of bodily death is not a personal guilt, but a guilt inherited from Adam. Cf. V. 13 et seq. and V. 19, in which the sin of Adam is given as the reason for the sinfulness of the many. The conjunctive interpretation, which is adopted generally to-day, conforms to the explanation of St. Augustine : all have sinned in Adam, therefore all die.

γ) The words : "Many (οἱ πολλοί) were made sinners" (V. 19a) do not limit the universality of original sin, since the expression "many" (in opposition to the one Adam, or Christ) is parallel to "all" (πάντες) in V. 12 d and 18 a.

b) Proof from Tradition

St. Augustine appeals to the Tradition of the Church against the Pelagian Bishop Julian of Eclanum : "It is not I who have invented original sin, which the Catholic Faith holds from of old, but thou, who deniest it, thou art without doubt a new heretic" (De nupt. et concup. II 12, 25). St. Augustine, in his Contra Julianum (L. I and II), adduces a formal proof from Tradition, in which he quotes St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, Reticius of Autun, Olympius, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, Innocent I, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil and St. Jerome as witnesses of the Catholic teaching. Many assertions of the Greek Fathers who insist on personal responsibility for sin and appear entirely to prescind from original sin, are to be understood as being in opposition to Gnostic-Manichaean dualism and to Origenistic pre-existentialism. St. Augustine defended the teaching of St. John Chrysostom against its misinterpretation by the Pelagians : vobis nondum litigantibus securius loquebatur (Contra Jul. 16, 22).

Irrefutable proof of the conviction of the primitive Church as to the reality of original sin is the old Christian practice of the baptism of children "for the remission of sin" (in remissionem peccatorum). Cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 64, 5.

4. Dogma and Reason

The doctrine of Original Sin cannot be proved by natural reason, nevertheless the fact of Original Sin is evidenced by many signs : *peccati originalis in humano genere probabiliter quaedam signa apparent* (S.c.G. IV 52). Such signs are the frightful moral aberrations of humanity, and the many lapses from belief in the True God (polytheism, atheism).

§ 22. The Nature of Original Sin

1. False Views

a) The view of Peter Abelard that Original Sin consists in eternal punishment (*"reatus poenae aeternae"*) is false. According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, Original Sin is a true and proper sin, that is, a guilt of sin. Cf. D 376, 789, 792. St. Paul speaks of a real sin. Rom. 5, 12 : "All have sinned." Cf. Rom. 5, 19.

b) Original Sin does not consist, as the Reformers, the Baians, and the Jansenists taught, in : "The habitual concupiscence, which remains, even in the baptised, a true and proper sin, but is no longer reckoned for punishment." The Council of Trent teaches that through Baptism everything is taken away which is a true and proper sin, and that the concupiscence which remains behind after Baptism for the moral proving is called sin in an improper sense only. D 792. That sin remains in man, even if it is not reckoned for punishment, is irreconcilable with the Pauline teaching of Justification as an inner transformation and renewal. The justified man is saved from the danger of rejection because the ground for the rejection, the sin, is removed. Rom. 8, 1 : "There is now, therefore, no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus." As concupiscence, in consequence of the composition of human nature out of body and spirit would be present, as natural evil, even in the pure state of nature, it cannot be sinful in itself, for God has created everything well. D 428.

c) Original Sin does not consist, as, among others, Albert Pighius († 1542) and Ambrosius Catharinus, O.P. († 1553), taught, in a mere external imputation of the sinful deed of Adam (imputation theory). According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, Adam's sin is transferred by inheritance to all the children of Adam, and exists as his own proper sin in every single one of them : *propagatione, non imitatione transfusum omnibus, inest unicuique proprium*. D 790. Cf. D 795. *Propriam iniustitiam contrahunt*. According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, the efficacy of baptism consists in a real eradication of sin, not in a mere non-imputation of an alien guilt. D 792. Cf. Rom. 5, 12, 19.

2. Positive Solution

Original sin consists in the deprivation of grace caused by the free act of sin committed by the head of the race. (*Sent. communis.*)

a) The Council of Trent defined Original Sin as the death of the soul (*mors animae* : D 789). The death of the soul is, however, the absence [not-being-present] of supernatural life, that is, of sanctifying grace. In Baptism Original Sin is eradicated through the infusion of sanctifying grace (D 792). It follows from this that Original Sin is a condition of being deprived of grace. This flows from the Pauline contrast between sin proceeding from Adam and justice proceeding from Christ (Rom. 5, 19). As the justice bestowed by

Christ consists formally in sanctifying grace (D 799) so the sin inherited from Adam consists formally in the lack of sanctifying grace. The lack of sanctifying grace, which, according to the will of God, should be present, establishes that the guilt of Original Sin signifies a turning away from God.

As the ratio voluntarii, that is the free incurring of guilt, belongs to the concept of formal sin, and as a young child cannot perform a personal voluntary act, in original sin, the factor of spontaneity must be explained from its connection with Adam's deed of sin. Adam was the representative of the whole human race. On his voluntary decision depended the preservation or the loss of the supernatural endowment, which was a gift, not to him personally but, to human nature as such. His transgression was, therefore, the transgression of the whole human race. Pope Pius V rejected the assertion of Baius, that Original Sin had the character of sin in itself without any reference to the will from which it sprung. D 1047. Cf. St. Augustine, *Retract.* I 12 (13), §. S. th. II 81, 1.

b) According to the teaching of St. Thomas, Original Sin consists formaliter in the lack of original justice, materialiter in the unregulated concupiscence. In every sin St. Thomas distinguishes between a formal and a material element, the turning away from God (*aversio a Deo*) and the turning towards the creature (*conversio ad creaturam*). As the turning towards the creature manifests itself above all in evil desire, St. Thomas with St. Augustine, sees in concupiscence, which itself is a consequence of original sin, the material element of original sin: *peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, formaliter vero est defectus originalis iustitiae* (S. th. I II 82, 3). The doctrine of St. Thomas was influenced partially by St. Anselm of Canterbury, who sees in the nature of original sin only the lack of original justice and partially by St. Augustine, who defines original sin as: an evil concupiscence with its state of guilt (*concupiscentia cum suo reatu*) and explains that the state of guilt (*reatus*) is removed by Baptism, while the concupiscence persists for a moral test (*ad agonem*), but not as a sin. (*Op. imperf. c. Jul.* I 71). Most of the post-Tridentine theologians do not regard concupiscence as an essential constituent part of original sin, but as its consequence.

§ 23. The Transmission of Original Sin

Original sin is transmitted by natural generation. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent says: *propagatione, non imitatione transfusum omnibus.* D 790. In the baptism of children that is expurgated which they have incurred through generation. D 791.

As original sin is a *peccatum naturae*, it is transmitted in the same way as human nature, through the natural act of generation. Although according to its origin, it is a single sin (D 790) that is the sin of the head of the race alone (the sin of Eve is not the cause of original sin) it is multiplied over and over again through natural generation whenever a child of Adam enters existence. In each act of generation human nature is communicated in a condition deprived of grace.

The chief cause (*causa efficiens principalis*) of original sin is the sin of Adam alone. The instrumental cause (*causa efficiens instrumentalis*) is the natural act of

generation, which gives rise to the connection of the individual human being with the head of the race. The actual concupiscence associated with the act of generation, the sexual pleasure (*libido*) is, contrary to the view of St. Augustine (*De nuptiis et concup.* I 23, 25 ; 24, 27), neither the cause nor the inescapable condition for the reproduction of original sin. It is only an accompanying phenomenon of the act of generation, which in itself alone is the instrumental cause of the transmission of original sin. Cf. S. th. I II 82, 4 ad 3.

Objections.

From the Christian doctrine of the reproduction of original sin, it does not follow, as the Pelagians maintained, that God is the Originator of sin. The soul created by God is, according to its natural constitution, good. The condition of original sin signifies the want of a supernatural advantage to which the creature has no claim. God is not obliged to create the soul with the adornment of sanctifying grace. God is not to be blamed for the fact that the newly-created soul is denied the supernatural endowment, but man is who misused his freedom. Again, it does not follow from this teaching that marriage is bad. The marital act of generation is good because, objectively, that is, according to its adaptation to its end, and subjectively, that is, according to the intention of the generators, it is aimed at good, namely, the reproduction of the human nature desired by God.

§ 24. The Consequences of Original Sin

The consequences of original sin are, following Luke 10, 30, summarised by the scholastic theologians, in the axiom : By Adam's sin man is deprived of the supernatural gifts and wounded in his nature (*spoliatus gratuitis, vulneratus in naturalibus*). The word *gratuita* usually means only the absolute supernatural gifts and *naturalia* the gifts of integrity, which were part of man's abilities and powers before the fall. Cf. S. th. I II 85, 1 ; Sent. II d. 29 q. 1a.2.

1. Loss of the Supernatural Endowment

In the state of original sin man is deprived of sanctifying grace and all that this implies, as well as of the preternatural gifts of integrity. (*De fide in regard to Sanctifying Grace and the Donum Immortalitatis. D 788 et seq.*)

The lack of the sanctifying grace has, as a turning away of man from God, the character of guilt and, as the turning of God away from man, the character of punishment. The lack of the gifts of integrity results in man's being subject to concupiscence, suffering and death. These results remain even after the extirpation of Original Sin, not as punishment, but as the so-called *poenalties*, that is, as the means given to man to achieve the practice of virtue and moral integrity. The person stained by Original Sin finds himself in the imprisonment and slavery of the devil whom Jesus calls "the prince," and St. Paul "the god of this world" (2 Cor. 4, 4). Cf. Hebr. 2, 14 ; Peter 2, 19.

2. Wounding of Nature

The wounding of nature must not be conceived, with the Reformers and the Jansenists, as the complete corruption of human nature. In the condition of Original Sin, man possesses the ability of knowing natural religious truths and of performing natural morally good actions. The Vatican Council

teaches that man, with his natural power of cognition, can with certainty know the existence of God. D 1785, 1806. The Council of Trent teaches that free will was not lost or extinguished by the fall of Adam. D 815.

The wounding of nature extends to the body as well as to the soul. The 2nd Council of Orange (529) explained: *totum, i.e., secundum corpus et animam, in deterius hominem commutatum (esse)* (the whole man both in body and in soul was changed for the worse). D 174. Cf. D 181, 199, 793. Side by side with the two wounds of the body, sensibility to suffering (*passibilitas*) and mortality (*mortalitas*), theologians, with St. Thomas (S. th. I II 85, 3) enumerate four wounds of the soul, which are opposed to the four cardinal virtues: a) ignorance (*ignorantia*), that is, difficulty of knowing the truth (opposite to prudence), b) malice (*malitia*), that is the weakening of the power of the will (opposite to justice), c) weakness (*infirmetas*), that is, the recoiling before difficulties in the struggle for the good (opposite to fortitude), d) desire (*concupiscentia*) in the narrower sense, that is, the desire for satisfaction of the senses against the judgment of reason (opposite to temperance). The wounds of the body are caused by the loss of the preternatural gifts of impossibility and immortality, the wounds of the soul by the loss of the preternatural gift of freedom from concupiscentia.

There is a controversy as to whether the wounding of nature consists exclusively in the loss of the preternatural gifts, or whether human nature in addition is intrinsically weakened in an accidental manner. The former view, which is that adopted by St. Thomas and by most theologians, conceives the wounding of nature as relative only, i.e., by comparison with its primitive condition, while the latter view conceives it as absolute and visualises it as a worsening in comparison with the pure state of nature. According to the former view, the person who is born in original sin is to the human being in the pure state of nature as one stripped of his clothes is to the unclothed (*nudatus ad undum*); according to the latter view, as the sick person is to the healthy (*aegrotus ad sanum*). The former view is to be preferred, as the sinful act of Adam, which occurred once only, could, neither in his own nature nor in the nature of his posterity, effect an evil habit and with it, a weakening of the natural powers. Cf. S. th. I II 85, 1. However, it must be admitted that fallen human nature, in consequence of individual and social aberrations, has declined below the state of pure nature.

§ 25. Souls who depart this life in the state of original sin are excluded from the Beatific Vision of God. (*De fide.*)

The 2nd General Council of Lyons (1274) and the Council of Florence (1438—45) declared: *illorum animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, poenis tamen disparibus puniendas* (the souls of those who die in original sin as well as those who die in actual mortal sin go immediately into hell, but their punishment is very different). D 464, 693.

The dogma is supported by the words of Our Lord: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God" (John 3, 5).

The spiritual re-birth of young infants can be achieved in an extra-sacramental manner through baptism by blood (cf. the baptism by blood of the children of Bethlehem). Other emergency means of baptism for children dying without sacramental baptism, such as prayer and desire of the parents or the Church (vicarious baptism of desire—Cajetan), or the attainment of the use of reason in the moment of death, so that the dying child can decide for or against God (baptism of desire—H. Klee), or suffering and death of the child as quasi-Sacrament (baptism of suffering—H. Schell), are indeed, possible, but their actuality cannot be proved from Revelation. Cf. D 712.

In the punishment of Hell theologians distinguish between the “*poena damni*,” which consists in the exclusion from the Beatific Vision of God, and the “*poena sensus*” which is caused by external means, and which will be felt by the senses even after the resurrection of the body. While St. Augustine and many Latin Fathers are of the opinion that children dying in original sin must suffer “*poena sensus*” also, even if only a very mild one (*mitissima omnium poena*: *Enchir.* 93), the Greek Fathers (for example, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or.* 40, 23), and the majority of the Schoolmen and more recent theologians, teach that they suffer “*poena damni*” only. The declaration of Pope Innocent III, is in favour of this teaching: *Poena originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei (= poena damni) actualis vero poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae cruciatus (= poena sensus)*. D 410. A condition of natural bliss is compatible with “*poena damni*.” Cf. St. Thomas, *De malo*, 5, 3; *Sent.* II d. 33 q. 2 a. 2.

Theologians usually assume that there is a special place or state for children dying without baptism which they call *limbus puerorum* (children's Limbo). Pope Pius VI adopted this view against the Synod of Pistoia. D 1526.

CHAPTER 3

Revelation Concerning the Angels or Christian Angelology

§ 26. Existence, Origin and Number of the Angels

1. Existence and Origin of the Angels

In the beginning of time God created spiritual essences (angels) out of nothing. (*De fide*.)

The existence of the angels was denied by the Sadducees (Acts 23, 8: “The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection neither angel nor spirit; but the Pharisees confess both.”), and by materialists and rationalists in all times. Modern rationalists explain the angels as personifications of Divine attributes and activities, or see in the Jewish-Christian doctrine of the angels traces of an original polytheism or a borrowing from Babylonian and Persian legends.

The 4th Lateran and the Vatican Councils declare: *simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem angelicam videlicet et mundanam* (simultaneously at the beginning of time He created from nothing both spiritual and corporal creation, i.e., angelic and mundane). D 428, 1783. It is not defined that the creation of the angel-world was contemporaneous with that of the material world (*simul* can also mean: in

total, together ; cf. *Ecclus.* 18, 1), but the *sententia communis* is that both were created at the same time.

Holy Writ, even in its oldest books, affirms the existence of the angels who glorify God, and as His messengers and servants, transmit His commands to mankind. Cf. *Gn.* 3, 24 ; 16, 7 et seq. ; 19, 1 et seq. ; 18, 2 et seq. ; 22, 11 et seq. ; 24, 7 ; 28, 12 ; 32, 1 et seq. The creation of the angels is indirectly attested in *Ex.* 20, 11 : "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them," and directly in *Col.* 1, 16 : "For in Him (= Christ) were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations or principalities, or powers."

Tradition affirming the existence of the angels is unanimous from the very beginning. The early Christian apologists, in refuting the reproach of atheism, also mention the existence of the angels (*St. Justin*, *Apol.* I 6 : *Athenagoras*, *Suppl.* 10). The first monograph on the angels was composed about 500 A.D. by Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita under the title : *De coelesti hierarchia*. Among the Latin Fathers, *St. Augustine* and *St. Gregory the Great* occupied themselves minutely with angelology. The Liturgy of the Church also offers many testimonies.

Natural reason cannot prove the existence of the angels, since their creation is a free deed of God. From the known sequence of stages of the perfections of the creatures, however, the existence of purely spiritual created essences can, with a high degree of probability, be inferred.

2. Number of the angels

The number of the angels is, according to Holy Writ, very great. The Scriptures speak of myriads (*Hebr.* 12, 22) of thousands and thousands (*Dn.* 7, 10. *Apoc.* 5, 11), of legions (*Mt.* 26, 53). The various biblical names indicate a gradation and order among the angels. Since the time of Pseudo-Dionysius, nine Choirs or Orders of angels are named of which each three form a hierarchy. In accordance with Holy Scripture these are called : Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones, Principalities, Powers, Strengths, Highnesses, Archangels, Angels. Cf. *Is.* 6, 2 et seq., *Gn.* 3, 24 ; *Col.* 1, 16 ; *Eph.* 1, 21 ; 3, 10 ; *Rom.* 8, 38 et seq. ; *Jud.* 9 ; 1 *Thess.* 4, 16.

The division of the angel-world into nine Orders and the illumination of the lower Orders through the Higher Orders—a teaching which stems from neo-Platonism—is not a truth of Faith, but a free theological opinion. The same applies to the grouping of the angels by the Schoolmen, which goes back to *Dn.* 7, 10, into *angeli assistentes* and *angeli ministrantes* (assistants at the Throne—messengers of God). To the former group are allocated the upper six choirs, to the latter group the lower three. Revelation testifies however that the functions of assisting and of serving are not mutually exclusive. Cf. *Tob.* 12, 15 ; *Luke* 1, 19, 26.

According to the teaching of *St. Thomas*, which is connected with the doctrine of the principle of individuation, the angels are specifically distinguished from one another ; thus each angel forms a separate species. Other theologians, as against this, teach either that all the angels together form one species only (*St. Albert the Great*) or that the individual hierarchies or choirs form particular species (the Franciscan school, *Suarez*).

§ 27. The Nature of the Angels

1. Immateriality of the angel nature

The nature of the angels is spiritual. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran and the Vatican Councils speak of a spiritual and a corporeal creation and refer the former to the angels. D 428, 1783: spiritualem et corporalem (creaturam), angelicam videlicet et mundanam.

As distinct from human nature, which is composed of spirit and body, the nature of the angels is purely spiritual, that is, free of all materiality.

Holy Writ explicitly calls the angels spirits (spiritus, πνεύματα). Cf. 3 Kings 22, 21; Dn. 3, 86; Wis. 7, 23; 2 Macc. 3, 24. Mt. 8, 16; Luke 6, 18; 10, 20; 11, 24. 26; Hebr. 1, 14; Apoc. 1, 4. St. Paul contrasts "the spirits of wickedness," that is, the fallen angels, with "flesh and blood," that is, mankind; Eph. 6, 12: "We must not wage battle against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of evil in the world of heaven." The act of contrasting shows that the fallen angels are visualised as immaterial essences.

Jud. 6-7 raises a difficulty concerning the immateriality of the angels if the words "in like manner having given themselves to fornication" (v. 7) be referred to the angels. If this interpretation be correct we have here a reference to the widespread belief of late Judaism, which was accepted also by many Christians in the primitive Church, that some of the angels had had marital relations with women (Gn. 6, 2) and were punished for it by God. The apostle then is not to be taken here as making a statement about the nature of the angels, he is simply using a traditional opinion to emphasise the judgments of God upon wickedness.

A great number of the Fathers, ascribed to the angels a fine ethereal or firelike corporeality. Amongst these was St. Augustine who was influenced in this matter not only by Stoic and Platonic views but also by a misinterpretation of certain passages in Sacred Scripture, e.g., Ps. 103, 4 and Gen. 6, 2. Others, such as Eusebius of Caesarea, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Pseudo-Dionysius and St. Gregory the Great, affirm the pure spirituality of the angels. St. Gregory the Great says: "The angel is only a spirit, man, on the other hand, flesh and spirit" (Moralia IV 3, 8). In the peak period of Scholasticism, the Franciscan School posited a composition of material and form (undefined and defining), in purely spiritual created substances, while St. Thomas and his School regarded purely spiritual substances as forms without matter (*formae subsistentes* or *substantiae separatae*). S. th. I 50, 1-2.

2. Natural immortality of the angels

The angels are by nature immortal. (*Sent. communis.*)

The natural immortality of the angels flows from the pure spirituality of their nature. Cf. Luke 20, 36: "Neither can they (the resurrected) die any more for they are equal to the angels." The blessedness of the good angels, and the rejection of the bad angels is, according to the testimony of the Revelation.

of eternal duration. Mt. 18, 10 : "I say to you that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father, who is in heaven." Mt. 25, 41 : "Depart from me ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels."

The view put forward by St. John Damascene (de fide orth. II 3) and by many Schoolmen (Scotus, Biel) that the immortality of the angels is a gift of grace, is unsound. In reality immortality is a necessary consequence of their spiritual nature. S. th. I 50, 5.

3. Understanding, will and power of the angels

As spiritual essences, the angels possess understanding and free will. The intellect and will of the angels is, on account of the pure spirituality of their nature, more perfect than those of men, but on account of the finiteness of their nature, infinitely more imperfect than the Knowledge and Will of God. The angels do not know the secrets of God (1 Cor. 2, 11), do not possess a knowledge of the heart (3 Kings 8, 39) and have no certain foreknowledge of the free actions of the future (Is. 46, 9 et seq.) : "But that day and hour (of the judgment) no one knoweth." (Mt. 24, 36 ; Mk. 13, 32). Also their wills are mutable.

The mode of cognition of the angels is, corresponding to their purely spiritual nature, purely spiritual. They gain spiritual concepts (*species intelligibiles*) not like man by abstractions from sensory perception, but receive them on their creation simultaneously with the natural power of cognition as a communication from God (*scientia infusa or indita*). Cf. S. th. I 55, 2. The natural cognition of God possessed by the angels is a mediately-won knowledge from the contemplation of the perfections of creatures, especially of their own perfections. Cf. S. th. I 56, 3.

Freedom of the will is a presupposition of the fall, through sin, of the bad angels and of their eternal rejection. 2 Peter 2, 4 : "God spared not the angels that sinned."

As the angels in their nature are superior to all other creatures, they also possess a higher perfection of power than other creatures. According to 2 Peter 2, 11, the angels are superior in strength and power to men. However, the angels do not possess the power of creation and the power of working miracles in the strict sense. These powers belong to God alone.

§ 28. The Supernatural Exaltation and Probation of the Angels

1. Elevation to the state of grace

God set a supernatural final end for the angels, the immediate vision of God, and endowed them with sanctifying grace in order that they might achieve this end. (*Sent. certa.*)

a) Pope Pius V. rejected the teaching of Baius that not grace but eternal bliss is the reward to the good angels for their naturally good works. D 1003 et seq. Jesus in the warning against scandal assures : "Their angels in heaven always

see the face of my Father, who is in heaven" (Mt. 18, 10). Cf. Tob. 12, 19. However, the indispensable precondition for the achievement of the immediate vision of God is the possession of sanctifying grace.

The Fathers attest the elevation of the angels to the state of grace. St. Augustine teaches that all angels without exception were endowed with habitual grace, in order to be good, and were constantly supported by co-operating grace in order to be able to remain good (De civ. Dei XII 9, 2; De corrept. et gratia c. 11 n. 32). St. John Damascene teaches: "All the angels were created by the Logos and perfected by the Holy Ghost through sanctification; corresponding to their dignity and to their order of rank they became participators in the illumination and the grace" (De fide orth. II 3).

b) As far as the time of the elevation into the state of grace is concerned, Petrus Lombardus (Sent. II d. 4-5), with the medieval Franciscan School, teaches that the angels were created without supernatural endowment, and that they were required to prepare themselves with the help of actual grace for the reception of sanctifying grace. This grace was received by the good angels only. St. Thomas, on the other hand (in his later writings), following St. Augustine, teaches that the angels were created in the state of sanctifying grace; *probabilis videtur tenendum et magis dictis sanctorum consonum est, quod fuerunt creati in gratia gratum faciente*. S. th. I 62, 3. Cf. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei XII 9, 2: *angelos creavit . . . simul eis et condens naturam et largiens gratiam*. The Roman Catechism (I 2, 17) follows the teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas in this matter.

2. Probation of the angels

The angels were subjected to a moral testing.
(*Sent. certa.* as regards the fallen angels, *Sent. communis* as regards the good.)

They were first in a state of pilgrimage (in statu viae), in which they, through their free co-operation, with grace were required to merit (in statu termini) the Beatific Vision of God. The good angels, who passed the test, entered as a reward therefor into the blessedness of heaven (Mt. 18, 10; Tob. 12, 15; Hebr. 12, 22; Apoc. 5, 11; 7, 11), while the bad angels, who did not pass the test, fell under the ban of eternal damnation (2 Peter 2, 4; Jud. 6).

As far as the fallen angels are concerned, the fact of their moral testing may be inferred from the fact of the fall (2 Peter 2, 4). As regards the good angels, it cannot with certainty be established from Scripture as their blessedness is not expressly represented as a reward for their loyalty. The opinion adopted by many of the Fathers, that the angels were created in a state of glory, is, as regards the bad angels, irreconcilable with the fact of the Fall. The view which was held for a long time by St. Augustine, but which was finally abandoned by him, that from the beginning there were two distinct realms of angels, the higher realm consisting of the angels created in the state of glory, and therefore incapable of sin, and the lower realm of the angels capable of sin, who had first to merit the perfect blessedness by loyal fulfilment of duties, is improbable, as it implies a completely unfounded difference in the original creation of the angels. S. th. I 62, 4-5.

§ 29. The fall through sin and the rejection of the bad angels

1. The fall through sin.

The evil spirits (demons) were created good by God; they became evil through their own fault.

The 4th Lateran Council (1215) declared against the Gnostic-Manichaean dualism: *Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali* (the Devil and the other demons were created by God good in their nature but they by themselves have made themselves evil). D 428; cf. D 427.

Holy Writ teaches that a section of the angels had not withstood the test, that they fell into grievous sin, and as punishment therefor were cast into hell. 2 Peter 2, 4: "God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them, drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower hell, unto torments, to be reserved unto judgment." Jud. 6: "The angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation, He hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains, unto the judgment of the great day." Cf. John 8, 44: "He (the devil) stood not in the truth."

The passages Luke 10, 18 ("I saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven") and Apoc. 12, 7 et seq. (battle between Michael and his angels on the one side, and the dragon and his angels on the other side, and the fall of the dragon and his angels to the earth) do not refer to the fall of angels but to the dethronement of Satan through the efficacy of Christ's redemption as is evident from the context. Cf. John 12, 31.

In any case the sin of angels is to be conceived as a sin of the spirit; indeed, following St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great, it is a sin of pride, not a sin of the flesh, as many of the older Fathers, St. Justin, Athenagoras, Tertullian, St. Clement of Alexandria, St. Ambrose thought in view of the Jewish tradition that the marital connections between the "sons of God" mentioned in Gn. 6, 2, referred to angels, and the daughters of man. Apart from the fact that the fall through sin of the angels was anterior in time to Gn. 6, 2, the purely spiritual nature of the angels negatives this interpretation. Cf. Eccles. 10, 15: "Pride is the beginning of all sin." The Fathers and theologians generally refer to the fall of the devil through sin the words of Jer. 2, 20, which the recusant Israel speaks to its God: "I will not serve," as well as the prophecy of the Prophet Is. 14, 12 et seq., on the king of Babylon: "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning (lucifer, qui mane oriebaris)! . . . 13. And they saidst in thy heart: I will ascend into heaven. I will exalt my throne above the stars of God . . . 14. . . . I will be like the most high." Cf. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia XXXIV* 21. S. th. I 63, 1: angelus absque omni dubio peccavit appetendo esse ut Deus.

2. Eternal rejection

As the blessedness of the good angels is of eternal duration (Mt. 18, 10) so the punishment of the bad angels is also without end. Mt. 25, 41: "Depart from me ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." Cf. Jud. 6: "in everlasting chains"; Apoc. 20, 10: "and the false prophet shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever."

The belief of Origen and of many of his followers (St. Gregory of Nyssa, Didymus of Alexandria, Evagrius Ponticus) concerning the restoration of all things (*ἀποκατάστασις πάντων*; cf. Act 3, 21), according to which the damned angels and men, after a long period of purification, will be re-established in grace and will return to God, was rejected at a Synod of Constantinople (543) as heretical. D 211; cf. D 429.

§ 30. The Efficacy of the Good Angels

1. Relation to God

The primary task of the good angels is the glorification and the service of God. (*Sent. certa.*)

Holy Writ adjures the angels to praise God and attests that they glorify God by their praise. Cf. Ps. 102, 20 et seq.: "Bless the Lord all ye his angels!" Cf. Ps. 148, 2; Dn. 3, 58; Is. 6, 3; Apoc. 4, 8; 5, 11 et seq.; Hebr. 1, 6. God is served as well as praised. As ambassadors of God the angels transmit revelations and directions to mankind. Cf. Luke 1, 11 et seq.; 1, 26 et seq.; Mt. 1, 20 et seq.; Luke 2, 9 et seq.; Mt. 2, 13, 19 et seq.; Acts 5, 19 et seq.; 8, 26; 10, 3 et seq.; 12, 7 et seq.

2. Relation to Man

a) The secondary task of the good angels is the protection of men and care for their salvation. (*De fide on the ground of general teaching.*)

Since the 16th century the Church celebrates a feast in honour of the guardian angels. The Roman Catechism (IV, 9, 4) teaches: "By God's Providence the task is given to the angels of protecting the human race and individual human beings, so that they may not suffer any serious harm whatever."

Holy Writ testifies that all the angels are in the service of mankind. Hebr. 1, 14: "Are they not all ministering angels, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?" Ps. 90, 11 et seq., describes the care of the angels for the just. Cf. Gn. 24, 7; Ex. 23, 20-23; Ps. 33, 8; Jdt. 13, 20; Tob. 5, 27; Dn. 3, 49; 6, 22.

According to Origen (*De princ. I Praed. 10*) it is "a constituent part of the doctrinal promulgation of the Church that there are angels of God and benevolent powers, which serve Him, in order to complete the salvation of mankind." Cf. Origen, *contra Celsum*, VIII 34.

b) Every one of the faithful has his own special guardian angel from baptism. (*Sent. certa.*)

According to the general teaching of the theologians, however, not only every baptised person, but every human being, including unbelievers, has his own special guardian angel from his birth. This view is biblically founded on the words of Our Lord. Mt. 18, 10: "See that you do not despise one of

these little ones. For I say to you that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven." Cf. Acts 12, 15: "It is his (=Peter's) angel."

St. Basil, with reference to Mt. 18, 10, teaches: "Every one of the faithful has an angel standing at his side as educator and guide, directing his life" (Adv. Eunomium III 1). According to the testimony of St. Gregory the Wonder-Worker and of St. Jerome, every person has from his birth his own special guardian angel. St. Jerome comments on Mt. 18, 10: "How great is the value of the (human) soul that every single person has from birth (ab ortu navitatis) received an angel for his protection." Cf. St. Gregory the Wonder-Worker's thanksgiving speech on Origen. c. 4. S. th. I 113, 1-8.

3. Veneration of Angels

The veneration by men of the good angels is justified both by their glorification by God and their relation to men. That which the Council of Trent teaches as to the invocation and veneration of the saints (D 984 et seq.), may also be applied to the angels. The rejection of the veneration of the angels by St. Paul (Col. 2, 18) refers to a false, exaggerated veneration of Gnostic false teachers. St. Justin the Martyr is an early witness to the Church's veneration of the angels.

§ 31. The Power of the Bad Angels

1. Dominion of the Devil over Mankind

The Devil possesses a certain dominion over mankind by reason of Adam's sin. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent names as a consequence of Adam's sin man's subjection to the power of the devil. D 788, 793. The Church's belief finds liturgical expression in the ceremonies of baptism.

Christ designates the Devil as "the prince of this world" (John 12, 31, 14, 30). St. Paul calls him "the god of this world" (2 Cor. 4, 4). By Christ's redemptive act the dominion of the Devil was in principle, conquered. John 12, 31: "Now shall the prince of this world be cast out." Hebr. 2, 14: He took flesh and blood, "that through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil." Cf. Col. 1, 13; 2, 15; 1 John 3, 8. In the General Judgment the dominion of the Devil will be completely and finally broken. Cf. 2 Peter 2, 4; Jud. 6.

2. Forms of the Activity of the Dominion of the Devil

a) The evil spirits seek to do moral injury to mankind through temptation to sin (tentatio seductionis). 1 Peter 5, 8: "Be sober and watch! because your adversary the devil as a roaring lion goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Cf. Mt. 13, 25, 39 (cockle in the wheat). Eph. 6, 12. Biblical examples are the fall through sin of the First Parents (Gn. 3, 1 et seq.; Wis. 2, 24; John 8, 44), Cain's fratricide (Gn. 4, 1 et seq.; John 3, 12), Judas' betrayal (John 13, 2, 27), Peter's denial (Lk. 22, 31). Ananias' lie (Acts 5, 3). Man's will is not forced to sin by the temptation of the devil, but retains its natural freedom. The evil enemy can tempt man only to that extent, which

God in His wisdom permits. Cf. 1 Cor. 10, 13 : "God will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able."

b) The bad spirits seek to harm mankind physically also, through the causing of physical evil (infestatio). Cf. Tob. 3, 8 ; Job. 1, 12 ; 2, 6 ; 1 Cor. 5, 5.

c) A particular kind of demoniac infestation is possession (obsessio, possessio), in which the evil spirit takes forceable possession of the human body, so that the bodily organs and the lower powers of the soul, but not the higher powers of the soul, are dominated by him. The possibility and reality of possession is firmly established by the express testimony of Christ, Who Himself drove out evil spirits (cf. Mk. 1, 23 et seq. ; Mt. 8, 16 ; 8, 28 et seq. ; 9, 32 ; 12, 22 ; 17, 18) and Who bestowed power over the evil spirits on His disciples (Mt. 10, 1, 8 ; Mk. 16, 17 ; Luke 10, 17 et seq.). Cf. the Church's exorcisms.

The rationalistic viewpoint that the possessed mentioned in Holy Writ, were merely ill in mind and body, and that Jesus accommodated Himself to the Jewish belief in demons, is incompatible with the dignity of the Divine Word and with the veracity and sanctity of the Son of God.

In the determination of demoniac influences credulity must be avoided as much as rationalistic unbelief. Since the causing of physical evils is an extraordinary form of diabolic intervention it must first be ascertained whether these ills can be explained by natural reasons.

Towards the end of the middle ages the tendency to ascribe any kind of remarkable phenomena to the work of the devil, led to the lamentable aberration of witch-hunts.

The opinion vouched for by most of the older Christian authors (Pastor Hermæ, Origen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Cassian), by the Schoolmen (Petrus Lombardus, Sent. II 11, 1), and by individual theologians of modern times (Suarez, Scheeben), that from birth every person has been allocated a bad angel, in order constantly to excite him to evil (opposite to angel guardian), lacks an adequate basis in the sources of Faith, and is also hardly compatible with the goodness and mercy of God. The passages in Holy Writ which are generally cited in this regard (John 13, 2 ; Ps. 108, 6 ; Zach. 3, 1 ; Job 1-2 ; 2 Cor. 12, 7) are not valid proofs.

BOOK THREE

The Doctrine of God the Redeemer

PART I

The Doctrine of the Person of the Redeemer

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

§ 1. The historical existence of Jesus Christ

The radical evangelical criticism of Liberal Protestant theology finally led to the denial of the historical existence of Jesus, by Bruno Bauer, Albert Kalthoff, Arthur Drews and others.

The historical existence of Jesus is definitely attested, not merely by Christian, but also by non-Christian authors, who in this matter, from the historical point of view are above suspicion.

1. Pagan Writers

a) Tacitus, in his *Annals* (about 116) relates the cruel persecution of the Christians in Rome by the Emperor Nero, and incidentally makes the following comment on the originator of the Christian religion. "The Author whose name was Christ was put to death by the Procurator Pontius Pilate during the reign of Tiberius" ("Auctor nominis eius Christus Tiberio imperante per procuratorem Pontium Pilatum supplicio adfectus erat." *Annales* XV 44).

b) Suetonius reports (about 120) that the Emperor Claudius expelled from Rome the Jews who were constantly causing tumults on the instigation of one Chrestus: "Judaeos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Roma expulit" (*Vita Claudii* 25, 4). This distorted report is based on the historic fact that there were intense disputes among the Roman Jews because of their different attitudes towards Christ. Cf. Acts 18, 2.

c) Pliny the Younger, Propraetor in Bithynia, writes (111-113) in a letter to the Emperor Trajan, that the Christians "on a settled day assembled before dawn and sing a hymn of praise to Christ as to a god"; *stato die ante lucem convenire carmenque christo quasi deo dicere* (Ep. X. 96).

d) The Syrian Mara Bar Serapion, an adherent of the Stoic Philosophy, writes in a letter to his son Serapion about Jesus: "Or (what had) the Jews from the execution of their wise King, who at that time was taken away from them in the kingdom? . . . The Jews were destroyed and undone, and driven out of their realm, and now live dispersed everywhere. . . . The wise King is not dead, by virtue of the new law he has given." The letter was written after the year 70, but the exact time is uncertain. (2nd-4th cent. A.D.).

2. Jewish Writers

a) The Jewish writer, Flavius Josephus, mentions in his "Antiquitates" (completed 93-94), that the High Priest Ananus "had the brother of Jesus who was called Christ, named Jacobus, and some others, accused of transgression of the laws, and stoned" (Ant. XX 9, 1). Clearer still, but of very doubtful genuineness, is another passage: "At this time Jesus, a wise man, appeared, if one may call him a man at all; for he was a worker of extraordinary deeds, a teacher of men who joyfully accept the truth; and he attracted to himself many Jews

as well as many of the Greek people. This was the Christ (ὁ Χριστός οὗτος ἦν). And when Pilate, on the accusation of the chief men among us, had punished him with the cross, still those who had first loved him did not desert him, for he re-appeared alive to them on the third day. Indeed the Prophets had foretold this and many other wonderful things about him. Up to to-day, the race of Christians, who derive their name from him, have not yet ceased to follow him" (Ant. XVIII 3, 3). It is probable that this passage is basically authentic, but it seems to have been embellished under Christian influence.

The ancient Slav version of the work "De Bello Judaico" (also by Flavius Josephus) contains a testimony concerning Christ which is in some respects similar to the foregoing. In the Greek and Latin versions, however, it is missing. Probably it is an interpolation. The theory built up on this by Robert Eisler, that Jesus was the leader of a revolutionary national movement, and as such had been executed by the Roman Civil Authorities, has not found favour.

b) Again the occasional mention of the Person of Jesus in the Talmud presupposes His historical existence. Judaism, indeed hatefully distorted the picture of Christ by representing Him as the son of an adulteress, a traitor, and the founder of a godless sect, but it has never doubted His historical existence. Cf. the Talmudic Tract Bab. Sanhedrin f. 43 a ; f. 67a. St. Justin, Dial. 17 : 108.

SECTION I

The Two Natures in Christ and the Mode and Manner of Their Unification

CHAPTER I

The True Divinity of Christ

§ 2. The Dogma of the True Divinity of Christ, and Its Opponents

1. Dogma

Jesus Christ is True God and True Son of God.
(*De fide.*)

The Church's belief in Jesus Christ's Divinity and Divine Sonship is expressed in all the Creeds. Cf. the Creed Quicumque : Est ergo fides recta, ut credamus et confiteamur, quia Dominus noster Jesus Christus Dei Filius, Deus et homo est. Deus est ex substantia Patris ante saecula genitus, et homo est ex substantia matris in saeculo natus, perfectus Deus, perfectus homo (we believe and confess that Our Lord Jesus Christ is the son of God. He is God and man. He is God begotten of the substance of the Father before all ages and man born in time of the substance of His Mother. He is perfect God and perfect man). D 40 ; cf. D 54, 86, 148, 214 et seq., 290. The dogma asserts that Jesus Christ possesses an Infinite Divine Nature with all its Infinite Perfections by virtue of His eternal generation from God the Father.

2. The Heretical Counter-propositions

Christ's true Divinity was denied in Christian antiquity by Cerinthus, the Ebionites, the Dynamic or Adoptian Monarchists, and the Arians and in modern times by the Socinians, by the rationalism of the Enlightenment and by modern liberal theology. (See the Doctrine of the Trinity. Par I.)

In opposition to the older rationalism, modern liberal theology gives to Christ the biblical names "God" and "Son of God," but it has changed their meaning in a rationalistic sense. According to it Christ is not the Son of God in a metaphysical, but only in an ethical sense, since the consciousness that God is our Father has developed in Him in a unique fashion. Christ is the Redeemer of the world, because He communicated to men the unique knowledge of God which He Himself experienced, and revealed God as the Good Father. As Christ is not true God, so He is not the object, but only the subject of religion. Harnack declared : "Not the Son, but the Father only should be spoken of in the Gospel, as Jesus has proclaimed it. The saying, 'I am the Son of God,' has not been put by Jesus Himself in His Gospel, and he who puts it into it as an assertion side by side with others, adds something to the Gospel" (*Wesen des Christentums*, p. 91 et seq.).

The religio-historical movement within liberal theology admits that the predicates God and Son of God in Holy Writ are intended to be understood in their

proper significance. The early Christians are regarded as having accepted this concept from the religious concepts of heathen religions (Apotheosis).

Through the influence of the liberal theology, Modernism (A. Loisy) also denies the Divinity of Christ. It distinguishes between the Jesus of history who is merely man, and the Christ of Faith, whom Christian piety has idealised and, under the influence of heathen ideas, exalted to the status of a Divine Being. Cf. D 2027-31.

§ 3. The Testimony of the Old Testament

The Old Testament contains mere indications of the True Godhead and Divine Sonship of the Messiah.

The Messianic prophecies describe the coming Redeemer as a prophet (Dt. 18, 15, 18), as a priest (Ps. 109, 4), as a shepherd (Ez. 34, 23 et seq.), as King and Lord (Ps. 2 ; 44 ; 109 ; Zach. 9, 9), as a suffering servant of God (Is. 53), and designate Him the Son of God : Dominus dixit ad me ; Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te. The Lord hath said to me : Thou art my son, this day I have begotten thee. (Ps. 2, 7 ; cf. 109, 3). Even if the title "Son of God" was, by reason of the rigid monotheism of the Old Covenant, understood only in a transferred ethical sense, still one is justified, in the light of the New Testament Revelation, in regarding the eternal generation of the Son from the Father as being expressed therein (cf. Hebr. 1, 5).

The Divine dignity of the Messiah is indicated by the appellations : Emmanuel = God with us (Is. 7, 14 ; 8, 8). Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace (Is. 9, 6). The attribute of Eternity is predicated of the coming Messiah, in which case, however, it must be noted, that the biblical expression "Eternity" may mean merely a long period of time. Cf. Mich. 5, 2 : "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (a diebus aeternitatis). Dan. 7, 14 : "His power is an everlasting power that shall not be taken away : and his kingdom that shall not be destroyed."

§ 4. The Testimony of the Synoptic Gospels

A. THE TESTIMONY OF THE HEAVENLY FATHER

At the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, a voice from Heaven said : "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased" (Mt. 3, 17 ; Mk. 1, 11 ; Luke 3, 22 ; cf. John 1, 34). At the transfiguration on Tabor a voice from out the clouds spoke : "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased ; hear ye Him" (Mt. 17, 5 ; Mk. 9, 7 ; Luke 9, 35 ; cf. 2 Peter 1, 17).

At His baptism Christ is inducted by His heavenly Father into His Messianic office, and His Divine Sonship is attested by means of a solemn Revelation to St. John. In the transfiguration on Tabor this Divine attestation is repeated before the chief Apostles. The appellation "Son of God" is used in the Old Testament for Christ only. The biblical expression, "Beloved Son" is synonymous with "Only Son" (cf. Gn. 22, 2. 12. 16 ; Mk. 12, 6). The testimony of the Heavenly Father was understood at the time by St. John and the disciples simply as a Divine assertion of the messianic mission of Christ, since their minds were not yet attuned to the concept of Jesus, consubstantial sonship with God. In

the early church, however, its true significance, as an affirmation of the real Divine sonship of Jesus, was recognised (cf. Jo. 1. 34).

B. THE TESTIMONY OF JESUS

1. Superiority over all creatures

Jesus knows Himself to be sublime over all creatures, men and angels.

He transcends the Prophets and the Kings of the Old Covenant, Jonas and Solomon (Mt. 12, 41 et seq.; Luke 11, 31 et seq.), Moses and Elias (Mt. 17, 3; Mk. 9, 4; Luke 9, 30), David who regards Him as his Lord (Mt. 22, 43 et seq.; Mk. 12, 36 et seq.; Luke 20, 42 et seq.). He is so great that the least in the Kingdom of God established by Him is greater than John the Baptist, who was the greatest of all those born up till then (Mt. 11, 11; Luke 7, 28).

The angels are His servants. Angels appear and minister to Him (Mt. 4, 11; Mk. 1, 13; Luke 4, 13); He has but to ask the Father and He will send Him more than twelve legions of angels (Mt. 26, 53). Angels will accompany Him at His second coming (Mt. 16, 27; Mk. 8, 38; Luke 9, 26; Mt. 25, 31). He will send them forth so that they may assemble the sinners and the just for judgment (Mt. 13, 41; 24, 31; Mk. 13, 27). As Son He stands above men and angels (Mt. 24, 36; Mk. 13, 32).

2. Assimilation to God

Jesus asserts of Himself that which in the Old Testament is said of Jahweh, and thereby makes Himself equal to God.

Like Jahweh He sends out prophets, seers and doctors of the Law (Mt. 23, 34; Luke 11, 49) and gives to them the promise of His assistance (Luke 21, 15; cf. Ex. 4, 15). Like Jahweh He is Lord of the Old Testament Law; in His own perfection of power He completes and changes certain precepts of the Old Testament Law (Mt. 5, 21 et seq.). He is also Lord of the Sabbath (Mt. 12, 8; Mk. 2, 28; Luke 6, 5). Like Jahweh, He makes a covenant with man (Mt. 26, 28; Mk. 14, 24; Luke 22, 20). As Israel is the community of Jahweh, so His disciples are His community (Mt. 16, 18).

3. Divine Demands

Jesus imposes obligations on His disciples, which none but God can impose on men; of belief in His Person and of a supreme degree of love directed to Him personally.

He blames the lack of faith in Israel and praises the readiness to believe of the pagan peoples (Mt. 8, 10-12; 15, 28); He rewards faith (Mt. 8, 13; 9, 2, 22, 29; 15, 28; Mk. 10, 52; Lk. 7, 50; 17, 19), and warns against faint-heartedness (Mt. 16, 8; 17, 20; 21, 21; Mk. 4, 40). The demands for belief made by Jesus refer to His own Person. He wishes to be Himself the content and the object of faith. Cf. Luke 9, 26: "He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of Man shall be ashamed when He shall come in His majesty and that of His Father and of the holy angels." Mt. 11, 6: "And blessed is he that shall not be scandalized in me."

Jesus demands of His disciples a love which surpasses all earthly love. Mt. 10, 37: "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me." He goes as far as to demand the surrender of life for His sake. Mt. 10, 39; Luke 17, 33 "Whosoever shall lose it [life] shall preserve it."

Jesus accepts religious veneration by allowing to Himself the veneration of the falling at the feet (*proskynesis*), which, according to both Jewish and Christian conceptions (cf. Est. 13, 12 et seq.; Acts 10, 26; Apoc. 19, 10; 22, 9) is due to the True God alone. Cf. Mt. 15, 25; 8, 2; 9, 18; 14, 33; 28, 9, 17.

4. Jesus' Consciousness of Power

Jesus is filled with a consciousness of superhuman power. Cf. Mt. 28, 18: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth."

He uses His power in numerous miracles, and gives to His disciples the power of working miracles in His name, that is, in virtue of His commission and His power (Mt. 10, 1, 8; Mk. 3, 15; 6, 7; Luke 9, 1, 10, 17). Jesus also claims the power of forgiving sins, which belongs to God alone (Mt. 9, 2; Mk. 2, 5; Luke 5, 20; 7, 48), and manifests by miracles His possession of this power (Mt. 9, 6). Again, He transfers to His apostles the full power to forgive sins (Mt. 16, 19; 18, 18; John 20, 23). In the giving up of His life He sees an adequate means of atonement by which He merits the forgiveness of the sins of all the human race (Mt. 20, 28; 26, 28).

Jesus also appropriates to Himself the office of Judge of the World, which, according to the teaching of the Old Testament, Jahweh would exercise in His Own Person (cf. Ps. 49, 1-6, 95, 12 et seq.; 97, 9. Zach. 14, 5). Mt. 16, 27: "The Son of Man shall come in the glory of His Father, with His angels: and then shall He render to every man according to his works." His judgment extends to every idle word (Mt. 12, 36). His judgment is final and will be executed immediately. Mt. 25, 46: "And these shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just into life everlasting." The exercise of the office of Judge of the World presupposes a being and a power above all nature.

5. Jesus' Consciousness of Being the Son of God

a) Jesus claims to be the Son of God.

Jesus clearly distinguishes His Divine Sonship from that of His disciples. When He speaks of His relation to His Heavenly Father, He says "My Father." When He speaks of the relation of His disciples to the Heavenly Father, He says: "Your Father" and when appropriate "Thy Father." Never does He unite Himself with them in the formula "Our Father," even in those assertions in which He speaks concurrently of Himself and of His disciples. Cf. Mt. 25, 34; 26, 29; Luke 2, 49; 24, 49; John 20, 17. The "Our Father" is not His own prayer, but the prayer for His disciples (Mt. 6, 9).

b) Jesus' first revelation of Himself as Son of God in the Temple.

The first Revelation known to us of Jesus' unique consciousness of being the Son of God was on the occasion of the finding of the 12-year-old Jesus in the Temple. To the reproachful question of His mother: "Child, why hast thou done this? Behold! thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing," Jesus answers: "How is it that ye sought me? Did ye not know that I must be about my Father's business?" (Luke 2, 49).

While His mother exercises her natural mother-rights, Jesus appeals to His child-relationship with the Heavenly Father, and to the higher duties arising from it. His human son-relationship must give place to His Divine

son-relationship. The antithesis demands that the latter, as well as the former, be conceived of in a literal sense.

c) The so-called Johannine passage in the Synoptic Gospels.

The clearest testimony in the Synoptic Gospels to Jesus' consciousness of being the Son of God, and of His relation to the Father, is given in the so-called, Johannine passage Mt. 11, 27 (Luke 10, 22): "All things are delivered to me by my Father; and no one knoweth who the Son is, but the Father; and who the Father is, but the Son, and to whom the Son will reveal Him." All attempts to explain the passage as being wholly or partly spurious, collapse in face of definite manuscript evidence and Patristic testimony (St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, Tertullian).

In this passage Jesus makes clear that He has received from the Father the fullness of the truth of Revelation and the fullness of the Divine Power for the fulfilment of His mission and thus shows Himself to be immensely exalted over all Prophets of the Old Testament. In the words: "No one knoweth who the Son is but the Father," Jesus asserts that His Essence is so perfect that it can be comprehended only by the Infinite Divine Knowledge of the Father. In the words: "And no one knoweth who the Father is but the Son," Jesus implies that His Knowledge is so perfect, that it alone is capable of knowing the Infinite Divine Essence of the Father. Jesus thereby makes His Knowledge equal to the Divine Knowledge. Only through the active Revelation by the Son can we know the Father. In this Revelation of the Father the Son is not bound as if He were an ordinary messenger, but communicates His Knowledge to whom He will. He promulgates the Divine Truth of Revelation side by side and conjointly with the Father. In fact the passage can be adequately understood only on the assumption that Jesus shares the Divine Essence with the Father.

d) Jesus' claim to be Messiah and Son of God in the presence of the Sanhedrin. Jesus solemnly testified to His Messiahship and Sonship of God before the Sanhedrin, the Supreme Jewish Court of Justice. To the question put by the presiding High Priest Caiphas: "I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us if thou be the Christ, the Son of God" (Mt. 26, 63), Jesus answered clearly and definitely: "Thou hast said it." (Mt. 26, 64). "I am He" (Mk. 14, 62).

That Jesus in these words wished to designate Himself, not as a purely human Messiah in the Jewish-theocratic sense, but as God and Consubstantial Son of God, is shown by the words, which He added: "Nevertheless I say to ye, hereafter you shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of the Power (= of God) and coming in the clouds of heaven." Cf. Ps. 109, 1; Dn. 7, 13. In Jesus' words, the Sanhedrists perceived a blasphemy against God deserving of death. But, having regard to Jewish ideas it is clear that this blasphemy was not committed because Jesus claimed to be the Messiah but because they perceived that Jesus, a man, claimed to be God.

e) The parable of the evil husbandmen.

Through the testimony of Jesus light is shed on the parable of the evil husbandmen, in which Jesus, in view of His impending death, and with obvious reference to Himself, says: "Now he (the Lord of the vineyard) having yet one son, most dear to him, he also sent him unto them last of all, saying: They will reverence my son. But the husbandmen said one to another:

This is the heir : Come! let us kill him and the inheritance shall be ours. And laying hold of him, they killed him, and cast him out of the vineyard."

In this Parable, the Old Testament prophets take the place of servants, and Jesus appears as the only-beloved Son of the Lord of the vineyard, and as the sole lawful heir. In this there lies a clear indication of Jesus' consubstantial sonship of God.

The testimony of Jesus to Himself is supported and strengthened by His miracles and prophecies, by the holiness of His life, and the sublimity of His teaching, and by the fact that He went to His death in vindication of His testimony.

§ 5. The Testimony of the Gospel of St. John

The Gospel of St. John is, as the Evangelist himself assures us, written with the aim of demonstrating the Messiahship of Jesus and His Sonship of God : "But these are written that you may believe, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God : and that believing you may have life in His name" (John 20, 31).

That St. John had the consubstantial Son of God in mind, flows indubitably from the Prologue, in which he deals with the importance of the Person and of the work of Jesus. The Prologue begins with the description of the pre-existing Logos, Who exists from all eternity, an Independent Person side by side with God, and Who is Himself God, through Whom all extra-Divine things have their being, Who is the Source of eternal life, and Who spiritually enlightens mankind through His Revelation. The Logos stands in the relation of Sonship to God. He is called "The Only Begotten of the Father" (*μονογενὴς παρὰ πατρός*; 1, 14), and as the "Only-Born God" (*μονο-γενὴς θεός*; 11, 18). In course of time the Logos existing from all eternity entered the world by becoming flesh (1, 14) in order to bring grace and truth to humanity. The Logos made flesh is identical with the historical Jesus Christ. In a later reference the Evangelist repeats the designation of Jesus as "Only-Begotten Son of God" (*ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*; 3, 16, 18).

THE TESTIMONY OF JESUS IN ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL

1. Jesus' Sonship of God

More often than in the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus, in the Gospel of St. John, calls God : "My Father" or "The Father" and Himself "The Son." He expressly distinguishes His own Sonship of God from that of His disciples. 20, 17 : "Go to my brethren and say to them : I ascend to my Father and to your Father, to my God and to your God."

2. Pre-existence with God

Jesus testifies that He was sent from the Father (5, 23, 37 ; 6, 38 et seq. 44 ; 7, 28 et seq., 33 passim), that He came "from heaven" (3, 13 ; 6, 38, 51) or "from above" (8, 23 ; cf. 3, 31), that He proceeds from God or from the Father (8, 42 ; 16, 27 et seq.). Jesus thereby asserts His pre-existence with God. By affirming His relation to God as Sonship, He asserts His pre-existence from all eternity.

3. The Son's Identity with God

a) On the occasion of the healing of the man who had been sick for 38 years (5, 1 et seq.), Jesus reveals in a specially insistent manner His Divinity and Sonship of God (5, 17-30). He rejects the reproach of His transgression of the Sabbath on the ground: "My Father worketh until now and I work" (17). Jesus claims therein for His work full equality with the work of the Father. As the Sabbath rest does not hinder God from practising His world-conserving and world-governing activity, neither does the commandment of the Sabbath hinder Him [Jesus Christ] from performing the miraculous cure. In the words of Jesus the Pharisees see expressed the identity of His substance with God and His substantial Sonship of God: "For this reason the Jews all the more sought after His life, because not only did He transgress the Sabbath, but also called God His own Father, and made Himself equal to God" (18).

In the following passages, Jesus more minutely details the thought that His actions are in all things identical with the works of the Father. He attributes to Himself the Divine activity of vivification ("vivificat," in the sense of the spiritual supernatural communication of life), and of judging (judicium, in the sense of the practice of the office of Judge at the General Judgment (21-22), and demands for Himself the same Divine Honour that is due to the Father, and absolute belief in His words (23-24). Faith is the subjective pre-condition for the communication of eternal life, and for the preservation from damnation at the judgment. Jesus, in the course of the speech, calls Himself, the "Son of God" (vocem filii Dei 25). Having regard to His claim that He is identical in substance with God, this title can designate nothing else than a true substantial Sonship of God.

b) Similarly Jesus reveals His unity of essence with God on the occasion of His controversy with the Jews on the Feast of the Consecration of the Temple (10, 22-39). Jesus says: "I and the Father are one" (30). The context makes it clear that He is not speaking here of a mere moral unity between Jesus and the Father nor of unity of Person (*ἐν* not *ἐς*) but of a physical or substantial unity. They accused Him of blasphemy of God: "For a good work we stone thee not, but for blasphemy; and because that thou being a man, makest thyself God" (33).

Jesus rejects the reproach of blasphemy of God and demands belief in Him in virtue of the testimony of the Father contained in the working of miracles: "Believe the works that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father" (38).

c) In His solemn departure speech at the Last Supper Jesus explains in more detail the concept of the mutual immanence and the mutual penetration of substance between the Father and Himself (*Perichoresis*, *Circumincessio*). Cf. 14, 9-11.

In His prayer as High Priest Jesus prays for the unity of the Apostles and of the Faithful the model of which is His unity of substance with the Father (17, 11, 21).

4. Divine Attributes and Demands

Jesus attributed Divine qualities and activities to Himself: "Eternity" (8, 58: "Before Abraham was, I am;" cf. 17, 5, 24); "The full knowledge

of the Father" (7, 29; 8, 55; 10, 14 et seq.). "Equal power and efficacy with the Father" (5, 17 et seq.), "The Power of the forgiveness of sins" (8, 11) which He also transfers to others (20, 23), "The Office of Judge of the world" (5, 22, 27), "The right to adoration" (5, 23). He calls Himself: "The Light of the World" (8, 12), and: "The Way, the Truth and the Life" (14, 6).

Jesus makes Divine demands by demanding faith in His Person (14, 1): "You believe in God, believe also in me" (cf. 5, 24; 6, 40, 47; 8, 51; 11, 25 et seq.) and a love for Himself which manifests itself by keeping His commandments (14, 15, 21, 23). As a reward He promises a reciprocal love by Himself and by the Father, His self-revelation and the indwelling of Both in the soul: "And we will come to him and We will make our abode with him" (14, 23). This indwelling is an exclusive privilege of God.

He adjures His disciples to pray in His name to Himself and to the Father and assures them of a hearing (14, 13 et seq.; 16, 23 et seq.).

The solemn confession of the Godhead by the Apostle Thomas: "My Lord and my God!" (20, 28) is accepted by the Risen Christ as an expression of the faith demanded by Him. Cf. D 224.

5. The Testimony of the Works of Jesus

The testimony of His works, that is, of His miracles, must be added to the verbal testimony of Jesus. The miracles, according to the conception of the Fourth Evangelist, are "tokens," by which the Divine "Lordship," dwelling in Christ, that is, the Divine power and majesty, and with it, His Divine Substance, are revealed. Cf. 2, 11; 11, 40. Jesus frequently appeals to the testimony of His works, and represents them as the motive for faith in Him. 10, 25: "The works, that I do in the name of the Father, they give testimony of me." Cf. 5, 36; 10, 37 et seq.; 14, 11; 15, 24.

Appendix: The testimony of the other Johannine writings

The testimony of the Gospel of St. John is reinforced by the testimony of the other Johannine writings. Of special importance is 1 John 5, 20: "And we know that the Son of God is come. And hath given us understanding that we may know the True God and may be in His True Son. This is the True God and life eternal." That the last words are to be understood as referring to Jesus Christ, may be seen from the following consideration: a) The demonstrative pronoun "this" points to the nearest concept, namely to Jesus Christ, b) If it referred to "the True God," that is, God the Father, it would be a tautology, c) The assertion that Jesus Christ is "Eternal Life" is genuinely Johannine, cf. John 1, 2; 5, 11 et seq.; John 1, 4; 11, 25; 14, 6. But if the second assertion is to be related to Jesus Christ, then also the former, d) The confession of the Divinity of Jesus Christ is in complete harmony with the Gospel. (Cf. John 1, 1, 18; 20, 28. Further important declarations concerning the Person and work of Christ are to be found in the following passages: 1 John 1, 1-3, 7b; 2, 1 et seq.; 4, 9 et seq. 14 et seq.; 5, 5 et seq. 10-13; 2 John 3, 7, 9; Apoc. 1, 5-7, 17 et seq.; 5, 12-14; 19, 13 (ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ); 22, 12 et seq.

§ 6. The Testimony of the Pauline Epistles

1. Phil. 2, 5-11

The clearest exposition of Pauline Christology is given in the dogmatically significant passage, Phil. 2, 5-11: "For let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus. 6. Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; 7. But emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. 8. He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the Cross. 9. For which cause, God also hath exalted Him and hath given Him a name which is above all names: 10. That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth; 11. and that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father."

In this text the Apostle distinguishes three different modes of existence of Christ; a) First He was in the form of God (*ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρ χων*); b) Then He adopted the form of a servant (*μορφὴν δούλου λαβών*); c) Finally, He was elevated by God, for His obedience in suffering, over all created things (*καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσεν*).

The expression *μορφή* was largely understood by the older commentators in the sense of the Aristotelian *μορφή*, synonymous with *οὐσία* (essentiality), but in the unphilosophical language of the Apostles it is more correctly to be taken as meaning external appearance, which permits the essence of a thing to be known. In the proper sense one cannot, of course, speak of a form of God, but the expression is made intelligible by the antithesis "form of a servant." The form of God coincides factually with the Divine Glory and Majesty (*δόξα*), which is predicable of the Divine Essence only and in which God reveals Himself to mankind. The mode of speech, therefore, "in the form of God" presupposes the possession of the Divine Essence. In the form of God, Jesus possessed equality of Being with God (*τό εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*), by which must be understood complete equality with God, which comprehends the Essence as well as the appearance (*οὐσία* and *μορφή*).

The difficult expression *ἀρπαγμός* (*rapina*), which in all Holy Writ occurs in this passage only, is frequently interpreted by the Fathers in the sense of the unlawful forcible taking to oneself, for example, of a thing which is appropriated, in an illegal and violent manner. Accordingly they explain: He did not regard the being equal to God as something which He had acquired or had to acquire in an unlawful, forcible manner, as He already possessed it connaturally. However, the antithesis: "but He humbled Himself," and the consideration that Christ's attitude should be a model of selflessness for the community, may demand the linguistically possible interpretation: "He regarded the being equal to God not as a thing which He should more or less selfishly retain" (*ἀρπαγμός* and *ἀρπαγμα*=a thing which one eagerly seizes and retains, an opportunity, which one does not miss, a find, something welcome: cf. Eusebius, Hist. eccl. VIII 12, 2: Vita Constantini II, 31; "Ir Lc. 6, 20 [Pg. 24, 537 c]; St. Cyril of Alexandria, De Adoratione I, 25).

The kenosis (debasement) consists in the renunciation (in His human nature) of the Form of God i.e., The Divine Dominion and Majesty, which like

the Divine Essence, belongs to the state of one who is completely equal to and identical with God. In no wise, however, does it signify the giving-up of the Divine Essence or Attributes. The exchange of the form of God for that of a servant followed Christ's Incarnation, for He who in His pre-mundane existence was "God in the form of God" became in His Incarnation "God in the form of a servant" also (F. Tillmann).

As a reward for His further self-abasement during His earthly life, through His obedience even unto the death of the Cross, God exalted Him in His human nature over all created things by bestowing on Him the Jahweh-name Kyrios (Lord) and Divine adoration from all creatures. Christ's human nature was assumed into the (manifest) Divine Glory (which the Logos enjoyed from Eternity) (cf. John 17, 5).

2. Christ is called God

The Apostle St. Paul gives further expression to his conviction of faith in the Godhead of Christ by directly calling Him God (*θεός*). a) Rom. 9, 5 : "Whose are the Father's and of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever." (*ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*).

Liberal Theology separates Verse 5b from 5a and construes it as an independent doxology to God the Father ; "The God (= the Father) who is over all things be praised in eternity." However, the evidence of the context is against this interpretation. (The expression "according to the flesh," that is, according to the human side, demands a completion ; compare the parallel assertion, Rom. 1, 3 et seq.) A comparison with the other Pauline doxologies, which are, as a rule, the solemn conclusion of a thought, and on that account also, linguistically closely associated with the foregoing, confirms this view (cf. Rom. 1, 25 ; Gal. 1, 5 ; 2 Cor. 11, 31 ; Rom. 11, 36 ; Phil. 4, 20). If this were a doxology to the Father it would be (in St. Paul's writings) factually and linguistically unique. The unanimous interpretation of the Fathers refers the whole passage to Christ.

b) Tit. 2, 13 : "Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ" (*ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*).

That the designation "God" is to be understood as referring to Christ, not to God the Father, is indicated both by the linguistic form (composition of the substantive *θεός* and *σωτήρ* under one single article), and especially by the fact that the Epiphany or Parousie is always asserted of Christ, not of the Father. Cf. 1 Tim. 6, 14 ; 2 Tim. 4, 1.

c) Hebr. 1, 8 : "But to the Son (God saith) : Thy throne, O God (*ὁ θεός*), is for ever and ever." That which is asserted of God in Ps. 44, 7, is transferred together with the address "O God" to Christ, the Son of God. The nominative *ὁ θεός* instead of the vocative is a Hebrewism.

According to the literal sense, the words of the Psalm refer to the Israelite King. The salutation "O God" may have occurred through a corruption of the text (*jhlje*="he will be"—Jahweh—Elohim ; or *kelohim*="like God's [throne]"). The author of the Letter to the Hebrews, however, understands the words to refer to God and applies them to Christ.

In consonance with these assertions the Apostle ascribes to Jesus Christ the entire fullness of the Godhead (Col. 2, 9: "For in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead corporeally"). Against gnostic Ennoia doctrine (which makes of Christ an "eon" emanating from a inferior to the Father) the Apostle stresses that in Christ the Divine Essence is continuously present with all Its perfections. Cf. Col. 1, 19.

3. Christ is called Lord

Hellenic speech-usage applied to heathen gods, who were the object of special veneration, the religious title *Kyrios*. The Roman Emperors also adopted the title of *Kyrios* and caused themselves to be shown divine honours. Among the Jews, *Kyrios*, as a rendering of the Hebrew God-names *Adoni* and *Jahweh*, was applied to the One True God.

In the primitive Christian community of Jerusalem the glorified Christ was, according to the testimony of the Acts of the Apostles (1, 21: 2, 36), called *Kyrios* in the religious sense. The invocation of the name of the Lord (or of Jesus) was looked upon as the characteristic identifying mark of the Christians (Acts 9, 14, 21; 22, 16). The dying St. Stephen prays: "Lord Jesus, receive my soul . . . lay not this sin to their charge" (Acts 7, 59 et seq.).

To the Apostle St. Paul the designation *Kyrios* was tantamount to a confession of Christ's Godhead. This is made particularly evident in that he transfers Old Testament *Kyrios*-passages which refer to *Jehovah*, to the *Kyrios* Jesus Christus (cf. 1 Cor. 1, 31: "He that glorieth may glory in the Lord"; Rom. 10, 13 et seq.: "For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." 2 Thess. 1, 9 et seq.; Hebr. 1, 10 et seq.; 1 Cor. 2, 16). According to Phil. 2, 9 et seq., the name *Kyrios* is the name which is exalted over every other name that is, the name of God. The *Kyrios* Jesus Christ is, therefore, for St. Paul, the object of religious veneration the same as God. Cf. Phil. 2, 10: "In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth and under the earth." 1 Cor. 8, 5 et seq.: "For although there be that are called gods either in heaven or on earth (for there be gods many and lords many), Yet to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto Him." Just as in the pagan notion, the gods are lords and the lords are gods, so in Christian teaching the one God is Lord and the one Lord is God (Cf. Origen, In Rom. VII 13). The invocation of the name: "The Lord Jesus Christ" is for St. Paul the great bond of all Christians (1 Cor. 1, 2). St. Paul beseeches of the Lord Jesus Christ, in the same manner as of God the Father: grace, peace and mercy for the faithful (compare the opening passages of the Epistles).

The Aramaic prayer-appeal: *Marana tha*—"Our Lord, come!" points to the Palestinian, Jewish-Christian origin of the title of *Kyrios* (1 Cor. 16, 22: *Didache* 10, 6; cf. *Apoc.* 22, 20).

4. Ascription to Jesus of Divine Qualities

The Apostle St. Paul further attests his belief in Christ's Divinity by ascribing to Him divine attributes:

a) Omnipotence, which is manifested in the creation of the world and the conservation of the world (Col. 1, 15-17: "All things were created by Him and

in Him . . . and by Him all things consist"; 1 Cor. 8, 6: "of whom are all things"; Hebr. 1, 2 et seq.: "by who, also He made the world" . . . "upholding all things by the word of His power"; cf. Hebr. 1, 10); b) Omniscience (Col. 2, 3: "in whom are hid all treasures of wisdom and knowledge"); c) Eternity (Col. 1, 15: "The firstborn of every creature"); d) Immutability (Hebr. 1, 12: "But thou are the self-same": Hebr. 13, 8: "Jesus Christ yesterday and today; the same for ever"); d) Adorability (Phil. 2, 10: "That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow"; Hebr. 1, 6: "And let all the angels of God adore Him").

5. Christ's Divine Sonship

The Apostle St. Paul defines the relationship of Christ to God more closely as one of Sonship. In view of his other Christological teaching, this Sonship must be conceived as a true and consubstantial Sonship of God. In many passages it is clearly indicated as such, for example, Rom. 8, 3: "God sent His Own Son (*τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν πέμψας*); Rom. 8, 32: "He that spared not His Own Son" (*τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο*); Col. 1, 13: "He hath translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love" (*τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ*). Cf. Rom. 1, 3 et seq. (Son of David and Son of God); Gal. 4, 4 et seq. (where St. Paul contrasts Christ's natural Sonship of God with the Sonship-of-God through grace which Christ gives to redeemed humanity). Rom. 8, 29 (Christ the First-Born among many brethren); Hebr. 1, 6 (First-Born of God).

The expression "God" and "The Father" of "Our Lord Jesus Christ" is to be understood as corresponding to the concept of "The Son" in the sense of a true fatherhood established by natural generation. Cf. Rom. 15, 6; 2 Cor. 1, 3; Eph. 1, 3.

In the introduction to the Epistle to the Hebrews the exaltation of Christ over the angels is founded on the fact that He is the Son of God. 1, 4: "Being made so much better than the angels as He had inherited a more excellent name than they" (namely, the name Son). As the Son of God He is "the brightness of His glory and the figure of His Substance" (1, 3).

§ 7. The Testimony from Tradition

The oldest Church Tradition clearly attests its faith in Jesus Christ's Godhead and in His Sonship of God, founded on Holy Writ. Since the times of the Apostles, numerous martyrs have sealed with their blood their belief in Jesus Christ, the True Son of God. The Apostles' Creed designates Jesus Christ as the Only Son of God (*filius unicus, unus, unigenitus*).

1. The Apostolic Fathers

a) The Didache acknowledges Christ to be the Lord (10, 6; *marana tha*), the God of David (10, 6), the Son of God (16, 4), and in relation to the prophecy of Isais concerning the Passion, the Servant of God (9, 2, 3; 10, 2).

b) St. Clement of Rome (about 96) constantly designates Christ as the Lord and in connection with the Epistle to the Hebrews, calls Him "mirror of the majesty of God, by so much greater than the angels as the name which He has received surpasses them," and stresses His filiation with the Father (Cor. 36. 2-4). He says

of Him : "The sceptre of the majesty of God, Our Lord Jesus Christ, did not appear in pomp and state, although He might have, but in humility" (16, 2)—an indication of His pre-existence with God, and of His self-abasement in the Incarnation. Christ is for him the object of religious veneration as the repeated doxology attests : "Through our Lord Jesus Christ to whom be honour and glory from eternity to eternity. Amen" (20, 11 et seq. ; 50, 7), cf. 59, 2-4.

c) Among the Apostolic Fathers, St. Ignatius of Antioch most clearly teaches (about 107) Jesus Christ's Godhead and Sonship of God. He frequently calls Christ, God (Eph. 1, 1 ; 7, 2 ; 15, 3 ; 18, 2 ; Rom. 6, 3 ; Smyrn. 1, 1) ; he regards Him as the Creator of the world by referring to Him the words : "He spoke and it is become" (Eph. 15, 1 ; cf. Ps. 32, 9 ; Gn. 1, 3). In addition to the power of creation he ascribes to Christ the Divine Attribute of Omniscience (Eph. 15, 3), Pre-existence from all eternity (Magn. 6, 1 : "He who was with the Father before time, and who finally appeared"), the quality of not being generated in time (Eph. 7, 2), of timelessness and dominion over time (Pol. 3, 2). He designates Christ's relationship to God as a true and unique Sonship (Rom., inscr. : *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ μόνου υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*). The principal thoughts of the Ignatian Christology are summarised in Eph. 7, 2 : "The Physician is one, in flesh and spirit, generated and ungenerated, God appearing in flesh, true life in flesh, from Mary as well as from God, first capable of suffering and then incapable of suffering, Jesus Christ our Lord."

d) Compare also the Barnabas Letter 5, 5-11 ; 12, 10. St. Polycarp, Phil. 2, 1 ; 12, 2. Martyrium Polycarpi 14, 3 ; 17, 3 : "This One we adore because He is the Son of God."

2. The Early Christian Apologists

The Christian Apologists of the second and third centuries (St. Justin, Theophilus of Antioch, St. Hippolytus, Origen), teach the pre-existence and the Godhead of Christ mainly by the application of the Johannine concept of the Logos, but in the determination of the internal Divine relation of the Son to the Father, do not always keep themselves free from subordinationist tendencies.

Aristides of Athens (about 140) thus expresses himself concerning the Christian belief : "The Christians derive their origin from Jesus Christ. The latter is called the son of the Supreme God, and it is said of him that he as God descended from heaven and took flesh of a Hebrew virgin, and adopted it to himself and so the Son of God took up dwelling in a daughter of men" (Apol. 2, 6).

St. Justin Martyr (about 150) in his dialogue with the Jew Tryphon (c. 48-108) supplies a detailed proof of the Godhead and Sonship of God of Jesus Christ from the writings of the Old Testament. He says of Christ, that He, the Son of the Creator of the world, pre-existed as God and that He was born as a man of the maiden (Dial. 48). Cf. Apol. 1, 63.

The universality of the belief in the Godhead of Christ in the later years of the Early Christian Church is manifest in the Creeds. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I 10, 1 ; Tertullian, De virg. vel. 1 ; Adv. Prax. 2 ; Origen, De princ. I praef. 4.

A testimony from Monumental Theology is the fish-symbol used since the 2nd century (*Ἰθὺς* = *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός θεοῦ υἱὸς σωτήρ*). Cf. the Aberkios and the Pectorius inscription.

CHAPTER 2

*Christ's True Humanity***§ 8. The Reality of Christ's Human Nature****1. Heretical Teaching**

About the end of the 1st and the beginning of the 2nd century heresies emerged which denied the reality of Christ's human Body and stigmatised as fantasy the facts of Christ's earthly life, especially His suffering and death (St. Ignatius, Trall. 10. Smyrn. 2, 1 : Christ, it was claimed, "had only apparently suffered"). The point of departure of this "Docetism" was, according to the letters of St. Ignatius, the "scandal of the Cross" (Eph. 18, 1 ; cf. Gal. 5, 11 ; 1 Cor. 1, 23).

The later gnostic sects, which either attributed to Christ an apparent body without any reality (Basilides, Marcion) or a heavenly astral body (Apelles, Valentin), proceeded from Gnostic Dualism, according to which a union of the Divine Logos with a human body is not possible, since all material things were regarded not as creatures of God but as proceeding from a primeval principle of evil. This Gnostic Dualism was also the source of the Docetic errors of the Manichaeans and of the Priscillianists.

2. The Teaching of the Church

**Christ assumed a real body, not an apparent body.
(*De fide.*)**

The oldest symbols of Faith mention the most important facts of the earthly life of Jesus, i.e., conception, birth, suffering, dying and resurrection, using the words in their natural sense and thereby exclude the Docetic denial of the reality of Christ's human nature. Cf. the Apostles' Creed and the later Symbols which depend on it. The Council of Chalcedon (451) calls Christ "truly God and truly man" (D 148).

Docetism, which continued in Manichaeism, was condemned in mediaeval times in the "Profession of Faith of Michael Palaeologus" of the 2nd General Council of Lyons (1274), and in the "Decretum pro Jacobitis" of the General Council of Florence (1441). D 462, 710.

3. Proof from the New Testament and Tradition

The Evangelists describe the facts of the earthly life of Jesus in such a fashion that one cannot doubt the reality of His Body and of His Soul and of their specific similarity to the body and to the soul of other men. After the Resurrection, Jesus assures the doubting disciples of the reality of His human body with the words, "Handle and see" (Luke 24, 39). The Apostle St. John designates the act of becoming man as becoming flesh (John 1, 14), and combats false teachers, who deny the coming of Christ in the flesh (1 John 4, 2 ; 2 John 7 ; cf. 1 John 1, 1). St. Paul, speaking of Christ as the Mediator calls

Him the "man Jesus Christ" (Rom. 5, 15; 1 Cor. 15, 21; 1 Tim. 2, 5) and points to the human origin of Christ (Rom. 1, 3; 9, 5; 2 Tim. 2, 8; Gal. 3, 16; 4, 4) as well as to His suffering and death on the Cross (1 Cor. 1, 23: "We preach Christ Crucified").

Docetism was refuted first by St. Ignatius of Antioch († c. 107) and later by St. Irenaeus († c. 202) and Tertullian († 220) especially in their arguments against the Gnostics. In the refutation of Docetism St. Ignatius takes his stand on the authority of the Gospel (Philad. 5, 1); he cites the therein reported facts of Jesus' human life and emphasises them with a forceful ἀληθῶς (= truly, really).

As the Fathers stress, Docetism is particularly baneful for the Christian striving after virtue, since it leads to the devaluation of the Suffering and Death of Christ and His Redemption; it leads to the undermining of the credibility of Holy Writ, and consequently of the whole Christian Faith, and it nullifies the doctrine of the Eucharist.

§ 9. The Integrity of Christ's Human Nature

1. Heretical Teaching; Arianism and Apollinarianism

Arius († 336) taught that the Logos (the Word) had no human soul but only a soulless body united with Himself. He held that the Logos substituted for Christ's soul. He believed that in this way he could prove that the Logos was a Creature.

Apollinaris of Laodicea († about 390), a zealous defender of the Nicene Creed, under the influence of the Platonic Trichotomism (synthesis of the human being out of flesh, soul and spirit), taught that the Divine Logos had assumed a human body and an animal soul. The Divine Logos had, he asserted, taken the place of the missing spiritual soul. He erroneously believed that only in this manner could the unity of person and the sinlessness of Christ be preserved. He sought a positive foundation for his theory in John 1, 14 (σάρξ body) and in Phil. 2, 7 (ὁμοίωμα=similarity).

2. The Teaching of the Church

**Christ assumed not only a body but also a rational soul.
(De fide.)**

Apollinarianism, which was condemned at a particular Synod at Alexandria under the presidency of St. Athanasius (362), was rejected as heretical at the 2nd General Council at Constantinople (381), and at a Roman Synod under Pope Damasus (382). (D 85, 65). The Council of Chalcedon (451) teaches concerning Christ's humanity: "He is perfect . . . according to humanity . . . a true man, consisting of a rational soul and a body. . . . He is identical in substance with us according to His humanity" (D 148). In conformity with the decision of Chalcedon, the Creed "Quicumque" confesses: perfectus homo ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens (D 40). Cf. D 216. The General Council of Vienne (1311-12) declared against Petrus Johannis Olivi († 1298) that as in all other men so also in Christ the rational soul is in itself and essentially (per se et essentialiter) the form of the body (D 480). Cf. D 710.

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

Jesus Himself speaks of His human soul. Cf. Mt. 26, 38 : "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Luke 23, 46 : "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." Holy Writ designates Jesus' death as the "giving up of the ghost" (Mt. 27, 50 ; John 19, 30 ; Mk. 15, 37 ; Luke 23, 46). The spirituality of Christ's soul is especially manifested in His prayer of appeal and thanksgiving, as well as in the subordination of His human will to the Divine Will : "Not my will but Thine" (Luke 22, 42).

St. Clement of Rome refers to both constituent parts of Christ's human nature when he says that Jesus Christ "has given His flesh for our flesh and His soul for our soul" (Cor. 49, 6). St. Ignatius of Antioch calls Christ a "perfect man" (τέλειος ἄνθρωπος; Smyrn. 4, 2). The most important of the early opponents of Apollinaris of Laodicea was St. Gregory of Nyssa.

The Fathers and theologians establish the necessity of the assumption of a rational soul by Christ on the two axioms : Quod assumptum non est, non est sanatum : "That which is not assumed has not been saved" (St. Gregory of Nazianzus. Ep. 101 ad Cledonium), and Verbum assumpsit carnem mediante anima (cf. S. th. III 6, 1 : "The Word assumed flesh through the medium of the soul"). In connection with the defence against Apollinarianism the formula developed : In Christ there are two natures (divinity and humanity) and three Substances (Logos, rational soul, and body). However this formula was later reprobated by the Provincial Council of Frankfurt (794), on account of the factual identity of nature and substance. Cf. D 284, 295, 312. In spite of this, however, it gained an entry into scholastic theology. Cf. Hugo of St. Victor, *De sapientia animae Christi*. "Christus unus (est) in una persona, duabus naturis, tribus essentiis . . . divinitate, carne et anima" (Christ is one with one personality, two natures, and three constituents—divinity, flesh, and soul). PL 176, 847. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. III 6, 3.

§ 10. The Adamite Origin of Christ's Human Nature

Christ was truly generated and born of a daughter of Adam, the Virgin Mary. (*De fide*.)

The reality and integrity of Christ's human nature is especially guaranteed by the fact that Christ was truly generated and born of a human mother. Through His descent from a daughter of Adam, He was, as to His humanity, incorporated into the posterity of Adam. He had identity of essence with man and community of race ; Christ became our Brother.

While individual Gnostics, such as Valentin and Apelles, relying upon 1 Cor. 15, 47 and Mt. 1, 20, asserted that Christ had descended from heaven to earth in a spirit-form body and had gone through the Virgin without appropriating anything from her "just as the water flows through a canal" (Epiphanius, Haer. 31, 4), the Church in her Symbols of Faith teaches that Christ was generated and born of the Virgin Mary, that is, out of the substance of the Virgin Mary. Cf. The Apostles' Creed : natus ex Maria Virgine ; the Creed "Quicumque" : ex substantia matris in saeculo natus (D 40). In both the Old and the New Testaments the Messiah is designated as of the posterity of Abraham and of David. Cf. Gn. 22, 18 ; Mt. 1, 1 ; 9, 27 ; 12, 23 ; 22, 42 ; Rom. 1, 3 ; 2 Tim. 2, 8. The New Testament explicitly stresses the true

motherhood of Mary. Cf. Mt. 1, 16; Mary, "of whom was born Jesus"; Luke 1, 31: "Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb and shalt bring forth a son"; Gal. 4, 4: "made of a woman."

Among the Fathers, St. Ignatius of Antioch in particular emphasises that Christ "is truly of the race of David according to the flesh . . . that he was truly born of a virgin (Smyrn. 1, 1; cf. Eph. 18, 2).

Against the Gnostics the Fathers use the proposition *ex* (not *per*) in Mt. 1, 16; Gal. 4, 4 and Luke 1, 35 (in the last passage an addition). Cf. Tertullian, *De carne Christi* 20. S. th. III 4, 6.

The importance, as regards salvation, of the true and complete humanity of Christ, and of His community of race with us lies, on the one hand, in the deed of atonement on the Cross, which He, as our Brother, has performed on our behalf, and on the other hand, in the ideal picture of noble humanity which He afforded us in His moral life. (See the Doctrine of the Redemption.)

CHAPTER 3

The Union of His Two Natures in the one Person, Christ

§ 11. Christ is one Person

1. The heresy of Nestorianism

The false teaching of Nestorius (428 Patriarch of Constantinople; † about 451 in exile) to which the two Heads of the Antioch School of Exegetics, Diodorus of Tarsus († before 394) and his pupil Theodore of Mopsuestia († 428) had subscribed, may, from its refutation (St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. John Cassian), be summarised under the following principal heads:

a) The Son of the Virgin Mary is not the same person as the Son of God (*ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλος*). In Christ there are, corresponding to the two natures, also two subjects or persons.

b) The two persons are connected with each other by a mere accidental or moral unity (*ένωσις σχετιχή, συνάφεια*). The man Christ is not God, but a bearer of God (*θεοφόρος*). The Incarnation does not mean that God the Son became man, but merely that the Divine Logos resided in the man in the same manner as God dwells in the just.

c) The human activities (birth, suffering, death) may be asserted of the Man-Christ only; the Divine activities (creation, omnipotence, eternity) of the God-Logos only (i.e. denial of the *communicatio idiomatum*).

d) Consequently Mary cannot in the proper sense be designated by the title, customary since the time of Origen, of "Mother of God" (*θεοτόκος*). She is merely a bearer of man (*άνθρωποτόκος*) or Mother of Christ (*χριστοτόκος*).

e) The conviction that in Christ there are two persons appears also in the doctrine of authentication peculiar to the Antiochians, according to which the Man-Christ was obliged to merit divine dignity and adoration by his obedience in suffering.

Nestorianising tendencies appear in the Christology of early scholasticism also,

above all in the "habitus" theory, which goes back to Peter Abelard, and which was favoured by Petrus Lombardus (Sent. III 6, 4-6) which compares the assumption of human nature by the Divine Logos to the putting on of a garment. St. Thomas condemns this as heresy, since it implies a mere accidental unification. S. th. III 2, 6.

The teaching of Anton Günther († 1863) also merges into Nestorianism. From his philosophic concept that the essence of personality lies in self-consciousness, there results in the field of Christology the conclusion that in Christ, who has a truly Divine and truly human self-consciousness, there are two different persons, a Divine and a human. In order to evade this conclusion, Günther assumed a "formal unity" between the eternal Son of God and the Son of the Virgin, which consists in the mutual penetration of the self-consciousness. However, the dogma teaches that there is only one Person.

2. The Teaching of the Church

The Divine and the human natures are united hypostatically in Christ, that is, joined to each other in one Person. (*De fide.*)

The dogma asserts that there is in Christ a person, who is the Divine Person of the Logos, and two natures, which belong to the One Divine Person. The human nature is assumed into the unity and dominion of the Divine Person, so that the Divine Person operates in the human nature and through the human nature, as its organ.

The 3rd General Council of Ephesus (431) confirmed the Twelve Anathematisms of St. Cyril of Alexandria, but did not formally define them. D 113-124. They were later recognised by Popes and Councils as an authentic expression of Catholic doctrine. (Cf. D 226 et seq., 269). Their main content may be summarised as follows :

a) Christ Incarnate is a single, that is, a sole Person. He is God and man at the same time (An. 2 and 6).

b) The God-Logos is connected with the flesh by an inner, physical or substantial unification (*ἔνωσις φυσική* or *ἔνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν*) (An. 2 and 3). Christ is not the bearer of God, but is God really. (An. 5.)

c) The human and the divine activities predicated of Christ in Holy Writ and in the Fathers may not be divided between two persons or hypostases, the Man-Christ and the God-Logos, but must be attributed to the one Christ, the Logos become Flesh (An. 4). It is the Divine Logos, who suffered in the flesh, was crucified, died, and rose again (An. 12).

d) The Holy Virgin is the Mother of God (*θεοτόκος*) since she truly bore the God-Logos become Flesh (An. 1).

The Council of Chalcedon (451) declared that the two natures of Christ are joined "in one Person and one Hypostasis" (*εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν* D 148).

St. Cyril uses the expression *ἔνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν* (An. 2) but still understands *ὑπόστασις* in the sense of *οὐσία* = essentiality, substance. With this he designates the unification as a substantial one in opposition to the accidental unification of the Nestorians. The Council of Chalcedon does not use the term "hypostatic

union" (*ἑνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν*). This phrase (the hypostatic union) was only adopted by the Fifth General Council of Constantinople (553), against the Nestorian heresy of two persons in Christ and against the monophysite heresy of one nature, as an adequate expression of Catholic doctrine of the union of the two natures in the one Divine personality of Christ. D 217: "If anyone does not confess that the Word of God was united with the flesh in the hypostasis (*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*) and that for this reason there is only one Person and one Hypostasis let him be anathema." ("Si quis . . . non confitetur Dei Verbum carni secundum, subsistentiam unitum esse, et propter hoc unam eius subsistentiam, seu unam personam" a.s.)

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

a) Teaching of Holy Scripture

The Catholic doctrine is contained in Holy Writ, though it does not contain the term Hypostatic Union. Scripture attests that Christ is true God and true man. To the one Christ are attributed two series of predicates—one Divine and one human. Since the attributes of both natures (omnipotence, eternity, nascence, crucifixion, death) are attributed to Him, it follows that the two natures must belong to one and the same subject. The oneness of Christ's personality is particularly clear in those passages where His human characteristics are predicated of His Person under the title of God, and His Divine characteristics predicated of His Person designated according to His human nature (*communicatio idiomatum*). Cf. John 8, 57 et seq.; Rom. 9, 5; 1 Cor. 2, 8; Gal. 4, 4; Acts 3, 15; 20, 28.

Since God's immutability excludes the possibility of a transformation of His Divine Nature into His human nature, the Incarnation of the Logos in John 1, 14 can be understood only as signifying that the Divine Logos became man, without ceasing to be God. The Logos, therefore, after the Incarnation possesses not only the Divine but also a human nature, that is, He is a God-Man.

According to Phil. 2, 6 et seq., the same Christ, who was in the figure of God and was equal to God took the form of a servant and became like unto man. This Kenosis, on account of the absolute immutability of God, cannot be understood as a renunciation of the Divine Nature, but only as a renunciation (in His human nature) of the Divine Glory (*δόξα*). To the Divine nature which He retained, He added the human nature; *μένων, δ' ἦν, ἔλαβεν, δ' οὐκ ἦν*. (St. John Chrysostom, In ep. ad Phil. hom. 7, 2.) The Christ who appeared in the form of a servant is therefore a Divine Person, who possesses the Divine as well as a human nature.

b) The Testimony of Tradition

The Fathers appealed to the Church symbols of Faith in which it is said of the same Jesus Christ that He is the Son of God and that He was born of the Virgin Mary. The Symbols of the Oriental Church specially stress the unity of Christ (*πιστεύομεν . . . εἰς ἓνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν*) cf. D 13, 54, 86.

The Fathers before the Council of Ephesus attest their faith in the Hypostatic Union by predicating of Christ divine and human characteristics and activities, frequently interchanging the predicates and thus combating the attempt to divide Christ into two subjects (*ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*) or into two sons (Son of

God—Son of Man). Cf. St. Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 1, 1; 7, 2; 18, 2; Rom. 6, 3; Pol. 3, 2. St. Gregory of Nazianzus (423-430) points out that the relationship of nature and person in Christ is to be conceived conversely from that which obtains in the Trinity: "To put it briefly, the Saviour unites in Himself two different things (*ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*) but not two different persons far from it (*οὐκ ἄλλος δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, μγένοιτο*). . . . I say different things, the opposite to the Case of the Trinity; for in that case we have distinct persons, since we may not mix the hypostases, but not distinct things, for the Three are one and the same in the Godhead" (Ep. 101, 4).

The Latin Fathers, principally under the influence of Tertullian, came earlier than the Greek to a clear Trinitarian and Christological terminology. Cf. Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 26: *Videmus duplicem statum (=naturam), non confusum, sed conjunctum in una persona, Deum et hominem Jesum* (we behold a double state (nature), not mixed with one another but joined in the one person, Jesus God and man). St. Augustine, Ep. 137, 39: in unitate personae copulans, utramque naturam (in unity of person joining both natures). Enchir. 35: in unitatem personae accessit Verbo anima rationalis et caro (in the unity of His person there accrued to the Word a rational soul and a body).

In their speculative refutation of the Nestorian heresy the Fathers point out the fatal consequences of the fundamental Nestorian errors, especially in the doctrine of the Redemption and in the doctrine of the Eucharist: Thus Christ's Passion, as the work of a mere man, would be deprived of its infinite value, and this infinite value is a necessary presupposition of the Redemption (cf. D 124) and again the flesh of Christ in the Eucharist is not "life-giving," if it be not "the very flesh of the God-Logos" (D 123).

In the conflict with the Nestorians St. Cyril of Alexandria makes frequent use of the easily misunderstood formula: "An incarnate nature of the God-Logos" (*μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*). In this context he understood by nature, just as did his opponents, the nature existing in itself=hypostasis. St. Cyril erroneously thought that the formula had the authority of St. Athanasius. In reality it goes back to the confession of Faith made by Apollinaris of Laodicea to the Emperor Jovian "On the incarnation of the God-Logos," which was publicised under the name of St. Athanasius. The Fourth General Council of Constantinople adopted the formula (D 220). Cf. D 238.

§ 12. The Duality of the Natures

1. The heresy of Monophysitism

In the struggle against Nestorianism, Eutyches, Archmandrite of Constantinople, and his adherents, principally Alexandrians (Patriarch Dioscur) went to the other extreme, misinterpreting some phrases of St. Cyril (*ἑνωσις φυσική, μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*) and also some older phrases (*κράσις, μίξις* mixtio, mixtura) they posited in Christ not only One Person but also only one single nature (*μόνη φύσις*). They taught that Christ is indeed "out of" two natures, but not "in" two natures. In their explanation of the mode and manner of the unification of the Godhead and the humanity, they diverged. Some assumed a transformation of the human nature into the Divine Nature, or an absorption of the human nature in the Divine Nature (*ἑνωσις κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν, conversio*), others a confusion or mixture of the two natures into one new third nature (*ἑνωσις κατὰ σύγχυσιν, confusio*), others a composition of the two natures after the fashion of the unification of the body and soul in man (*ἑνωσις κατὰ σύνθεσιν compositio*). This last was the view of Severus of Antioch.

2. The Teaching of the Church

In the Hypostatic Union each of the two natures of Christ continues unimpaired, untransformed and unmixed with the other. (*De fide.*)

The Catholic doctrine of Faith found its classical expression in the famous *Epistola Dogmatica* of Pope Leo I to the Patriarch Flavian of Constantinople (449) which was solemnly confirmed (D 143 et seq.) by the Fourth General Council of Chalcedon (451).

This Council, in agreement with the *Epistola Dogmatica* of Leo I, and the formulations of St. Cyril defined: "We teach that one and the same Christ, the Son, the Lord, the Only-Begotten is to be recognised in two natures δύο (*ἐν φύσει*) unmixed, untransformed (*ἀσυνγχύτως ἀτρέπτως*—against Monophysitism), undivided, unseparated (*ἀδιαίρετως ἀχωρίστως*—against Nestorianism) the difference of the natures in consequence of the unification being in no way abrogated, and the properties (*proprietos*) of each of the two natures remaining completely undisturbed ("unum eundemque Christum Filium Dominum unigenitum, in duabus naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter agnoscendum, nusquam sublata differentia naturarum propter unionem magisque salva proprietate utriusque naturae.") (D 148). The last words are taken over from the *Epistola Dogmatica* of Pope Leo (D 143: *Salva proprietate utriusque naturae*).

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

According to the testimony of Holy Writ, Christ is true God and true Man that is, possessor of the unimpaired Divine Nature and an unimpaired human nature. Cf. John I, 14; Phil. 2, 6 et seq.

Specially deserving of mention among the traditional witnesses is Tertullian who long before the Council of Chalcedon attested the unimpaired continuance of the two natures in classical words. *Adv. Prax.* 27: "The identity of each of the two substances remained intact (*salva est utriusque proprietate substantiae*), so that the spirit (=the Divine Spirit) performed His works in Him, that is miracles and signs, as also the flesh underwent sufferings. As both substances, each in its own condition of being, acted in distinct ways (*quia substantiae ambae in statu suo quaeque distincte agebant*), each performed the feats and achieved the successes peculiar to it" (namely, on the one hand, miracles, on the other hand, sufferings). Pope Leo I, had recourse to the formulations of Tertullian. Cf. St. Ambrose. *De fide*, II 9, 77.

The Fathers also point out the intrinsic impossibility of the monophysite doctrine of unification. It contradicts the absolute Immutability and the infinite Perfection of God, and by abrogating the true humanity of Christ, leads to the destruction of the work of redemption.

§ 13. The Duality of Wills and Modes of Operation in Christ

1. The Heresy of Monothelitism

Monothelitism is an offshoot of Monophysitism. In order to win back the Monophysites, the Patriarch Sergius of Constantinople (610–638) suggested the unifying formula. In Christ there are indeed two natures, but only one will, namely the Divine Will, and one mode of activity (*ἐν θέλημα καὶ μία ἐνέργεια*).

In this view the human nature of Christ becomes an instrument without a will of its own in the hand of the Divine Logos. The most prominent opponents of this error and protagonists in defence of the true doctrine of the Church were St. Sophronius, from 634 Patriarch of Jerusalem, and St. Maximus Confessor († 662).

2. The Teaching of the Church

Each of the two natures in Christ possesses its own natural will and its own natural mode of operation.
(*De fide.*)

In spite of the real duality of the wills a moral unity subsisted and subsists, because Christ's human will is, in the most perfect fashion, in harmony with, and in free subordination to, the Divine Will.

Monothelitism was rejected by the Church at the Lateran Synod of the year 649 under Pope Martin I (D 263 et seq.), in the *Epistola Dogmatica ad Imperatores* of Pope Agatho (678-681) (D 288), and at the Sixth General Council of Constantinople (680-681). The last-named completed the Chalcedon decision of Faith by the addition: "Similarly we promulgate, according to the teaching of the Holy Fathers, that in Him are also two natural wills and two natural modes of working, unseparated, untransformed, undivided, unmixed; and these two natural wills are not opposed to each other, as the impious heretics maintained (D 291).

From the dogma that Christ possesses a true human will there emerges as a theological conclusion, that Christ's human will is free. The *libertas contrarietatis*, that is, a freedom to choose between good and evil must however, be denied, because He, as a Divine Person, cannot be the subject of sin.

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

a) According to the testimony of Holy Writ Christ expressly distinguishes His human will from the Divine will, which He possesses in common with the Father; but at the same time Christ stresses the complete subordination of His human will to His Divine will. Mt. 26, 39; "Not as I will but as thou wilt." Luke 22, 42: "Not my will but thine be done." John 6, 38: "I came down from heaven, not to do my will but the will of Him that sent me." Christ's relationship of obedience with the Heavenly Father, often stressed in Holy Writ, presupposes a human will. Cf. John 4, 34; 5, 30; 8, 29; 14, 31; Phil. 2, 8; Rom. 5, 19; Hebr. 10, 9. The freedom of choice possessed by Christ's human will is expressed in John 10, 18: "I lay down my life of myself (=freely, voluntarily), and I have the power to lay it down and I have the power to take it up again." Cf. Is. 53, 7: "He was offered because it was His own will."

The Fathers' conception is already expressed in the rejection of Apollinarianism and of Monophysitism. In regard to Mt. 26, 39, St. Athanasius expressly teaches the natural duality of the wills of Christ. "He announces two wills here, the human, which is an affair of the flesh, and the Divine which is the affair of God. The human will, on account of the weakness of the flesh, prays for the aversion of suffering, but the Divine Will welcomes it" (*De incarn. Dei Verbi et c. Arianos* 21). Pope Leo the Great stresses the two different modes of operation

in his *Epistola Dogmatica*: "Each of the two forms (=nature) operates, in communion with the other, that which is peculiar to it" (D 144).

The scholastic theologians distinguish in Christ's human will the *voluntas rationis* or *spiritus*, that is, the spiritual will which subordinates itself to the Divine will, and the *voluntas carnis* or sensual will, that is, the sensual desire, which strove against suffering; accordingly they speak of Christ's two human wills. Many, with Hugo of St. Victor, add to this the *voluntas pietatis*, that is, the will of compassion, which feels for the suffering of others, and speak of four wills in Christ. Cf. Hugo's treatise, *De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo*.

The Fathers speculatively derive the doctrine of the two wills and modes of activity in Christ from the integrity of the two natures (cf. D 288), and base it on the principle that no nature is without activity (cf. St. John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* III 15). They recall the axiom which is valid for the doctrine of the Trinity and for Christology, that the number of the wills and modes of activity follow the number of the natures, not of the hypostases.

Appendix :

The God-human (Theandric) activities

The expression "God-human activity" (*ἐνέργεια θεανδρική*), *operatio dei-virile*, goes back to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (about 500) (Eph. 4). The Severianians, moderate Monophysites, taught a single God-human mode of operation, corresponding to Christ's nature compounded of the Godhead and a human nature. The Monoenergetics also, spoke of a single mode of activity of Christ, which they conceived as being achieved by the Divine nature by the utilisation of a purely passive human nature possessed of no human will.

The orthodox theologians of the 7th century took over the expression and purified it. St. Maximus the Confessor and the Lateran Synod of the year 649 expressly clarified it in view of the heretical misinterpretation (D 268). According to St. Maximus (in Ep. I. Dionysii) three distinct kinds of activity can be distinguished in Christ :

a) The Divine or the purely Divine activities, which the Logos, as *principium quod*, in common with the Father and with the Holy Ghost, operates through the Divine nature as *principium quo*, for example, the Creation, Preservation and Government of the world.

b) The human activities, which the Logos operates as *principium quod* through the human nature as *principium quo*, for example, seeing, hearing, eating, drinking, suffering, dying. In so far as these activities are human acts of a Divine Person, they can, in the wider sense, be designated God-human. (Theandric)

c) The mixed activities, which the Logos, as *principium quod* operates through the Divine nature, in such a fashion, however, that at the same time, He uses the human nature as instrument (*instrumentum coniunctum*), for example, the miraculous healing of the sick by physical touch, or by a mere word. Closely considered, the mixed activities emerge as two distinct activities, one Divine and one human, through which a joint operation is effected. Activities of this kind are designated God-human activities in the proper and narrower sense. The expressions *caro deificata* (σὰρξ θεωθεῖσα) *voluntas deificata* (θέλημα θεωθέν), do not assert a transformation of the human nature into the Divine nature or of the human will into the Divine will, nor a conmixture of both, but simply the assumption of the human nature and of the human will by the hypostasis of the God-Logos. Cf. D 291.

The Question of Honorius

There is no doubt but that Pope Honorius I (625-638) was personally orthodox. However, through his prohibition against speaking of two modes of operation he unwittingly favoured the Monothelite error. The Sixth General Council wrongly condemned him as a heretic. Pope Leo II (682-683) confirmed his anathematisation but not for the reason given by the Council. He did not reproach him with heresy, but with negligence in the suppression of the error.

§ 14. The Beginning and Duration of the Hypostatic Union

1. Beginning of the Hypostatic Union

The Hypostatic Union of Christ's human nature with the Divine Logos took place at the moment of conception. (*De fide*.)

In opposition to the Catholic dogma is the Origenistic doctrine, according to which Christ's human soul pre-existed, and already before the Incarnation was united with the Divine Logos (D 204). Another erroneous view, the Gnostic, held that it was only on the occasion of His Baptism that the Logos first descended on the Man-Jesus.

The Symbols of Faith assert the passive conception of the Son of God, not of the Man-Jesus, as would be correct if the Hypostatic Union of the two natures had occurred at a later point in time. The Apostles' Creed confesses : *Filium eius unicum Dominum nostrum, qui conceptus est de Spiritu Sancto* (His only son, Our Lord, who was conceived of the Holy Ghost).

The Scriptures corroborate that the Son of God became man in that He was "made," that is, was conceived and born out of the race of David or out of a woman. Rom. 1, 3 (The Gospel) "concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh": Gal. 4, 4: "But when the fullness of time had come, God sent His Son made of a woman."

St. Augustine says: "From the moment in which He began to be man, He is also God" (De Trin. XIII 17, 22). St. Cyril of Alexandria teaches: "The God-Logos from the moment of conception united with Himself the temple assumed of the Holy Virgin (the human nature)" (Ep. 39), "there never was a mere Man Jesus before the connection and unification of God with Him" (Adv. nolentes confiteri s. Virginem esse deiparam 4). Cf. St. Augustinus, Contra serm. Arian. 8; Leo I, Ep. 35, 3.

Mary's true Divine Motherhood demands that the conception of Jesus and the beginning of the Hypostatic Union should coincide in time.

2. Duration of the Hypostatic Union

a) The Hypostatic Union was never interrupted. (*Sent. certa*.)

The Apostles' Creed asserts of the Son of God that He suffered, was crucified, died, was buried (according to the body) and descended into Hell (according to the soul). Christ's death dissolved the connection between body and soul—Christ was therefore during the three days not "man" that is, a compositum

of body and soul (S. th. III 50, 4)—but His death did not dissolve the attachment of Godhead and humanity, or of their parts. Even after their separation the body and the soul separately remained hypostatically united with the Divine Logos.

The teaching of the Church is opposed by the Gnostic-Manichaean teaching, according to which the Logos left the man before the Passion.

The continuance of the Hypostatic Union during the Passion also, is proved by 1 Cor. 2, 8. "If they had known the concealed wisdom of God they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory (= God)."

The passage relied on by the Gnostics is Mt. 27, 46. "My God My God why hast thou forsaken me" is acutely explained by Hugo of St. Victor († 1141): Subtraxit protectionem sed non separavit unionem (He withdrew His protection but He did not separate the union) (De sacr. christ. fidei II 1, 10); similarly by St. Thomas (S. th. III 50, 2). Because of Mt. 27, 46, some Fathers, like St. Ambrose and St. Hilary, wrongly thought that at Christ's death the Godhead left the body.

The conception of the Fathers is expressed in the axiom: Quod verbum semel assumpsit, nunquam dimisit (what the Word once assumed, He never dismissed). In regard to the soul, this had an absolute validity, in regard to the body, only a relative one.

b) The Hypostatic Union will never cease. (*De fide.*)

The doctrine of Marcellus of Ancyra († about 374), according to which the Incarnate Logos will, at the end of time, put off the human nature and revert to God, from whom He proceeded for the purpose of creating the world, was rejected as heresy (D 85) by the Second General Council of Constantinople (381). In opposition to it an addition to the Symbol of Faith was accepted; cuius regni non erit finis (of whose kingdom there shall be no end) (Luke 1, 33) D 86; cf. D 283.

Luke 1, 33, bears witness to the uninterrupted continuance of the Hypostatic Union in the future "And He shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever and ever and of His kingdom there shall be no end." But Christ is King of the Messianic Realm as God-Man. The Letter to the Hebrews corroborates the eternal duration of Christ's priesthood "But this (Christ) for that He continueth for ever, hath an everlasting priesthood" (7, 24). But Christ is a priest as God-Man.

The Fathers reject the doctrine of Marcellus of Ancyra. St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: "If thou shouldst hear that Christ's empire has an end, then hate this heresy" (Cat. 15, 27).

Appendix :

The Precious Blood of Jesus Christ

The Blood in the Living Body of Jesus Christ is an integral constituent part of human nature, immediately, not merely mediately, united with the Person of the Divine Logos. (*Sent. certa.*)

The 5th Anathema of St. Cyril speaks of the unification of the Logos with flesh and blood; Verbum factum est caro et communicavit similiter ut nos

carni et sanguini (the Word was made flesh and like us had flesh and blood). D 117. According to the Jubilee Bull "Unigenitus Dei Filius" of Pope Clement VI (1343), the value of the blood of Christ on account of its union with the Logos (propter unionem ad Verbum) is so great that one little drop would have sufficed for the redemption of the whole human race. As blood of the Divine Logos the blood of Jesus Christ is "the Precious Blood" (1 Petr. 1, 19), "The great price" of our Redemption (1 Cor. 6, 20), and in the same manner as the Body of Christ, nourishment for the supernatural life of the soul (John 6, 53 et seq.).

In regard to the Blood shed on the Cross the *sententia communis* now teaches that the Blood, when and in so far as it was reassumed into the Body on the Resurrection, remained hypostatically united with the Logos even during the separation from the body. Cf. D 718.

CHAPTER 4

Theological-speculative Discussion on the Hypostatic Union

§ 15. The Supernatural and Mysterious Character of the Hypostatic Union

1. The Hypostatic Union as Grace

The assumption of a created nature into the unity of a Divine Person is absolutely supernatural. It is a *grace* in the most complete sense of the word, that is, an unmerited and unmeritable supernatural gift of God (*gratia unionis*). Cf. S. th. III 2, 11.

St. Ignatius of Antioch designated Christ simply as *χάρισμα* = the Gift of Grace (Eph. 17, 2). Cf. Did. 10, 6.

2. The Hypostatic Union as a Mystery

The Hypostatic Union is a *mysterium stricte dictum*, that is, a mystery of Faith, the reality of which could not be known before its revelation, and the inner possibility of which cannot positively be proved even after its revelation. It is a unique union, for which there are no analogues, of a creature with God. St. Augustine speaks of a "uniquely wonderful or wonderfully unique assumption" (*susceptio singulariter mirabilis vel mirabiliter singularis*: De corrept. et gratia 11, 30). Cf. D 1655, 1669. St. Paul calls the Incarnation and the work of Redemption of Christ: "A mystery hidden from eternity in God" (*sacramentum absconditum a saeculis in Deo*; Eph. 3, 9) and "a great mystery of piety" (*magnum pietatis sacramentum*; 1 Tim. 3, 16).

Pope Leo the Great says: "That both substances unite themselves in one Person no speech can explain if Faith does not hold fast to it" (*Sermo* 29, 1).

The Hypostatic Union is the central mystery of the Christian faith, to which all other mysteries are co-ordinated. Cf. S. c. G. IV 27.

§ 16. Objections against the Dogma of the Hypostatic Union

As a *mysterium stricte dictum* the Hypostatic Union is indeed elevated beyond human reason (*supra rationem*) but on account of the harmony of faith and knowledge, it is not contrary to reason (*contra rationem*). Accordingly, human reason can deal with the objections raised against the dogma

1. From the side of the assuming

In regard to the unique quality of the assuming Divine Person (*ex parte assumentis*) it is objected that the Hypostatic Union contradicts the immutability of God (Celsus : cf. Origen, C. Celsus IV 14). The rejoinder to this is that the act of becoming man, as an operation of God *ad extra*, has no more induced a change in the Divine Essence than did the creation of the world, as it is only the execution in time of an eternal unchangeable resolve of will. Neither did the event of the Incarnation result in a change of the Divine Essence ; for, after the assumption of a body the Logos was no more perfect and no less perfect than before. No change for the worse took place, because the Logos remains what It was ; and no change for the better, because It already possessed in sublime manner all perfections of the human nature from all eternity. The Word becoming man means no more an intensification of the Divine perfection than does God's Creation of the world. The change lay on the side of the human nature only, which was elevated to participation in the Personal Subsistence of the Logos. Cf. St. Thomas Sent. III. d. 6. q. 2. a 3 ad 1 : *in persona composita quamvis sint plura bona quam in persona simplici . . . tamen persona composita non est maius bonum quam simplex.*

2. From the side of the assumed

In regard to the unique character of the assumed human nature (*ex parte assumpti*) it is objected that each individual complete human nature is a hypostasis or person, and that in consequence Christ's human nature is a human person.

The answer to this depends on the relationship of nature and person. In the sphere of natural things each individual complete substance or nature subsists for itself and is thus a hypostasis. The Revelation of the mystery of the Trinity and of the Incarnation however, leads us to the knowledge that some kind of distinction must exist between the individual complete nature and the hypostasis. A distinction in thought only (*distinctio pure mentalis*) does not suffice for the explanation of the two dogmas ; a real or a virtual distinction is necessary.

a) Against the hypothesis of a real distinction (*distinctio realis*) it is objected that Christ would lack the reality which every other human being possesses. According to the teaching of the Church, however, Christ is a perfect man (*perfectus homo* ; D 40). The advocates of a real distinction (Thomists, Suarez) reply that the lack of created subsistence in Christ signified no real want, because in the place of the lacking human subsistence there is an infinitely higher perfection, namely, the Divine Subsistence of the Logos. The Church's insistence on the integrity of Christ's human nature and His consubstantiality with us according to our humanity does not contradict this position since the integrity and consubstantiality refer to the human nature or essentiality as such, while a subsistence accrues to a nature as a new reality. It is claimed that Christ's human nature has indeed a natural potency of being a hypostasis in itself. In the concrete, however, on account of its assumption into the subsistence of the Logos, this potency is not reduced to act.

According to Suarez, the individual complete nature becomes a hypostasis by a mode of subsistence proceeding from the nature, but really distinct from it. This was lacking in the human nature of Christ. In its place another created substantial mode appeared, called *modus unionis*, which united the two natures with each other.

The Thomists posit a real difference, not merely between nature and hypostasis, but also between nature (essence) and existence, and teach that the nature becomes an hypostasis by reason of the fact that it receives existence. Christ's human nature possesses no created existence of its own, but the uncreated existence, the subsistence of the Logos. The Thomists base their argument on the teaching of St. Thomas concerning the unicity of being in Christ (S. th. III 17, 2). However, it appears questionable whether St. Thomas by the Unique Being of Christ understands the existence (*esse existentiae*) or, as is more probable, the being of the suppositum. Cf. *De unione Verbi incarnati* a. 4 : *Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente ("esse" truly and properly is predicated of a subsisting suppositum)* In the same Article (ad I) St. Thomas expressly speaks of a dual being of Christ *Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen simpliciter dicendum est, quod Christus sit duo secundum esse, quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum.*

b) The Scotists posit a virtual difference only (*distinctio virtualis* or *distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*) between nature and hypostasis. In their opinion nature becomes an hypostasis by the fact that it remains by itself and is not taken up by a higher hypostasis. The hypostasis adds no new reality to the nature. Christ's human nature, according to them, is not a human hypostasis or person because it is taken up into the divine hypostasis of the Logos. If the human nature of Christ were ever released from the Hypostatic Union, then it would of itself, without the addition of any other reality, be a human person. In this view that which distinguishes the hypostasis from the nature and which makes an individual being an hypostasis is something purely negative. But that which gives a nature its supreme perfection must surely be something positive.

Christ's human nature is, as the Greek Fathers (Leontius of Byzantium, † 543) emphasise, in spite of its lack of its own proper human hypostasis, not without an hypostasis (*ἀνθρώπωτατος*). If it is not immediately hypostatic (*ἐννθρώπωτατος*), that is, subsisting by itself, still it is "in-hypostatic" (*ὑπώστατος*) that is, assumed into the hypostasis of another.

3. From Both Sides

In connection with the relationship of the two natures united with each other (*ex parte unitorum*) it is objected, that the finite human nature cannot be united with the infinite Divine nature on account of their infinite distance apart. However, the objection merely proves the impossibility of the unification of the two natures in one single nature, which is also rejected by Catholic dogma. The distinction between Creator and creature remains, since both natures remain preserved in their full integrity. It is due to God's Infinity that the hypostasis of the Logos side by side with the Divine nature can also possess a human nature. The appropriateness of the Incarnation may be demonstrated by God's Infinity. As it belongs to the essence of the good to communicate itself to others according to the principle *bonum est diffusivum sui*, so it is appropriate to the Infinite Goodness of God, to communicate Himself in the most perfect fashion to creatures Cf. S. th. III 1. 1.

Human nature on the ground of its spiritual nature possesses a potentia obediencialis for its elevation into the subsistence of a Divine Person. Cf. S. th. III 4, 1.

§ 17. The Relationship of the Hypostatic Union to the Trinity

1. The Act of the Hypostatic Union

The Hypostatic Union was effected by the Three Divine Persons acting in common. (*De fide.*)

The Creed of the Eleventh Synod of Toledo (675) states: "It is to be believed that the Whole Trinity effected the Incarnation of the Son of God, because the works of the Trinity are indivisible" D 284. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) explains: Unigenitus Dei Filius Jesus Christus a tota Trinitate communiter incarnatus. D 429. As a work of God's love (John 3, 16; 1 John 4, 9) the active Incarnation, that is, the effecting of the same, is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, to the subsistent Love of God: "conceived by the Holy Ghost" (Apost. Creed).

In Holy Writ the unity of the operation of the Three Persons is indicated by the fact that the effecting of the Incarnation is attributed to the Father (Hebr. 10, 5) to the Son (Phil. 2, 7) and to the Holy Ghost (Mt. 1, 18. 20; Luke 1, 35).

St. Augustine witnesses: "Mary's conceiving and bringing forth is the work of the Trinity, through Whose creative activity all creation is made" (De Trin. II 5, 9).

The intrinsic reason is the fact that the Divine nature common to the Three Persons is the principium quo of all extra-Divine operation. (See the Doctrine of the Trinity, Par, 20.)

2. The Terminus of the Hypostatic Union

Only the Second Divine Person became Man. (*De fide.*)

Against the teaching of the Sabellians (Patripassians) the Symbols of Faith assert the passive Incarnation exclusively of the Only begotten Son of God. Holy Writ also refers to the Logos or of the Son of God only when it says that He became flesh and came into the world (John 1, 14; 3, 16 et seq. passim).

Contrary to the view of Roscelin the union of human nature with a Divine person does not imply the union of human nature with the other Persons, since the union occurs not in the nature, but in the person, and the persons are really distinct one from another. The Divine nature is only indirectly connected with human nature through the Person of the Logos. Consequently it is in regard to the person of the Logos only (ratione personae Verbi) that the Divinity can be regarded as terminus of the Hypostatic Union. The Synod of Rheims (1148) declared against Gilbert of Poitiers (who rejected the identity of God and His Divinity and therefore rejected as unorthodox the phrase: Divinitas est incarnata) "Credimus ipsam divinitatem . . . incarnatam esse, sed in Filio." D 392. Cf. S. th. III 3, 1-4.

CHAPTER 5

*Inferences from the Hypostatic Union***§ 18. The Natural Sonship of God of the Man Jesus Christ****1. The Heresy of Adoptianism**

Towards the end of the 8th century, Archbishop Elipandus of Toledo († 802) and Bishop Felix of Urgel († 816) taught a double sonship of Christ: They said that as God He was the natural Son of God, as man, the adopted son of God. In the baptism in the Jordan He was adopted by God through grace. This theory of a double sonship in Jesus Christ logically demands two persons, which is the error of Nestorianism. This erroneous teaching was combated by the Abbot Beatus of Libana, Bishop Etherius of Osma, and the Frankish theologians, especially Alcuin.

2. The Teaching of the Church

Not only as God but also as man Jesus Christ is the natural Son of God. (*De fide.*)

The condemnation of Nestorianism indirectly involves the condemnation of Adoptianism. Pope Hadrian I (772-795), in two doctrinal writings (D 299, 309 et seq.) rejected it as a renewal of the Nestorian error, and confirmed the decisions of the Plenary Council of Frankfurt (794) which rejected Adoptianism as a heresy on the ground that He who was born of the Virgin, was true God, and could, therefore, not be adopted. (D 311 et seq.)

We may thus summarise the dogma: The person subsisting in the human nature is the natural son of God. The expression "Christ as man" (*Christus ut homo*) is not to be conceived in the reduplicative sense (= *Christus secundum humanitatem*) as if the ground for his natural sonship of God lay in the human nature. Rather it is to be conceived in the specificative sense, that is, *Christus ut hic homo* or *Christus ut hypostasis subsistens in humana natura (est Filius Naturalis Dei)*. Cf. S. th. III 16, 11.

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

Holy Writ never calls the Man Christ the adopted Son of God, but the proper and Only-begotten Son of God. Rom. 8, 32: "He (God) has not spared even His own son, but delivered Him up for us all." John, 3, 16: "For God so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son." Cf. John 1, 14, 18; Mt. 3, 17.

In the struggle against Nestorianism the Fathers rejected the doctrine of a double sonship in Christ, and stressed that the Son of Man is the same as the Son of God. They also expressly excluded an adoptive sonship of Christ. St. Augustine points to Holy Writ: "Read the Scriptures; you will never find it said of Christ that He is, through adoption, the Son of God (C. Secundinum Manich. 5). Many traditional texts, for example, those of St. Hilary (*De Trin.* II 27) and the Mozarabic liturgy, employ the expressions *adoptare* and *adoptio* in the wider sense of *assumere* and *assumptio*.

4. Argument from reason

Sonship belongs to the hypostasis or the person, not the nature: *Filiatio proprie convenit hypostasi vel personae, non autem naturae* (S. th. III 23, 4). As there is in Christ only one single hypostasis or person, which proceeds through eternal generation from God the Father, so also only one single sonship of God may be predicated of Christ, the natural sonship of God. The view of medieval theologians (Durandus, † 1334, many Scotists), that the man Jesus Christ is at the same time the natural Son of God and by reason of the endowment of grace the adopted son of God, is to be rejected, as one and the same person cannot be both the natural son and an adopted son of the same father.

Appendix :

Christ as "Servant of God" and "Predestined" Son of God

The Adoptianists referred the appellation "servant of God" (*servus Dei*) to the person and presupposed thereby a human person in Christ side by side with the Divine Person, to whom this appellation cannot be applied. Pope Hadrian I, and the Council of Frankfurt (794) reprobated it (the term *Servant of God*) in this sense (*ratione personae*). With regard to His assumed human nature, which is subject to the dominion of God (*ratione humanae naturae*), Christ can, however, in a true sense, be called servant of God. Cf. Is. 42, 1; Mt. 12, 17 et seq.; Phil. 2, 7. S. th. III 20, 1 ad 2.

The passage Rom. 1, 4 : *qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute* (Who was predestined to be the Son of God in power), cannot, as the Adoptianists would suggest, be understood of the predestination of Christ to the adopted sonship of God. The Vulgate renders the original text wrongly (*praedestinatus* instead of *destinatus* = *ὁρισθείς*). The Apostle expresses the thought that Christ manifested Himself in power after the Resurrection in consonance with the Divine Pneuma dwelling in Him (according to another explanation : was installed as "the Son of God in might," that is, in the condition of exaltation). Having regard to the general teaching of the Vulgate, the passage must be interpreted in an orthodox way : God predetermined from all eternity that the bearer of Christ's human nature is the natural son of God. Cf. S. th. III 24, 1 ad 2.

§ 19. Christ's Right to Adoration

1. The Teaching of the Church

The God-Man Jesus Christ is to be venerated with one single mode of Worship, the absolute Worship of Latria which is due to God alone. (*De fide*.)

In St. Cyril's eight Anathemas the Council of Ephesus (431) rejected the Nestorian "co-veneration" (*συμπροσκύνησις*) of the Man Jesus Christ with the Word (*Logos*), and laid down as Catholic teaching that the Incarnate Word (by virtue of His unity of person) is to be adored with one single adoration (*μὴ προσκυνῆσαι*). D 120.

In opposition to the double veneration proposed by the Nestorians, and the single veneration of the Monophysites, directed to the Divine nature alone, or to an ostensible mixed nature, the Fifth General Council of Constantinople (553), declared that the Incarnate Logos with His own flesh (*μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας αὐτοῦ σαρκός*) is the object of the one adoration.

Christ's humanity is, through the hypostatic union, a constituent part (quasi pars) of the Incarnate Logos, and is adored, therefore, in and with the Logos. It is indeed in itself the object of the adoration, but not for its own sake (in se, sed non propter se), but on account of its hypostatic union with the Logos. Against the false teaching of the Synod of Pistoia (1786): Pope Pius VI declared: "*humanitas ipsaque caro vivifica Christi adoratur, non quidem propter se et tanquam nuda caro, sed prout unita divinitati*" (The Humanity and the vivifying flesh of Christ Itself is adored not because of itself and as mere flesh but inasmuch as it is united with the Divinity). D 1561.

2. Proof from the Sources of Faith

Christ accepted worship by genuflection (*προσκύνησις*) which after the Resurrection becomes latriatic veneration (cf. Mt. 28, 9. 17). According to John 5, 23, He claims for Himself the same veneration which is due to the Father: "That all men may honour the Son, as they honour the Father." The Apostle St. Paul witnessed to the divine adoration due to Christ in His humanity in Phil. 2, 10: "That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow," and in Hebr. 1, 6: "and let all the angels of God adore Him." Cf. Apoc 5, 12.

"The Martyrdom of Polycarp" (156) distinguishes clearly between the adoration due to Christ and the veneration due to the martyrs: "This One (Christ) we adore because He is the Son of God; but the martyrs we duly love as disciples and imitators of the Lord on account of their unsurpassable affection toward their King and Teacher" (17, 3). The Fathers reject the reproach made by the Apollinarists that we adore the flesh of Christ (*σαρκολατρεία*), the man Christ (*ἀνθρωπολατρεία*) on the ground that Divine veneration is shown to Christ's humanity, not on its own account and separately from the Word, but on account of its hypostatic union with the Word. The veneration is intended for the Incarnate Word. Cf. St. Athanasius, Ep. ad Adelphium 3; St. John Damascene, De fide orth. III 8; IV 3; Ambrose, De Spiritu S. III 11, 79; Augustine, Ennarr. in Ps. 98, 9.

3. Speculative Foundation

The veneration is, in the proper sense, shown to the person only. In Christ there is only the one Divine Person of the Logos, thus there belongs to Him one veneration only. The human nature, however, cannot be excluded from it, as it is inseparably united with the Divine Person. Cf. S. th. III 25, 2: "The honour of the adoration belongs in the proper sense to the subsisting hypostasis. . . . The adoration of Christ's flesh means nothing else than the adoration of the Word become Flesh, as the veneration of the King's garment signifies nothing else than the veneration of the clothed King."

The whole object (*obiectum materiale totale*) of the adoration offered to Christ is the Incarnate Word. The human nature hypostatically united to the Word is the partial object (*obiectum partiale*). The ground (*obiectum formale*) for the adoration is the infinite perfection of the Divine Person.

§ 20. Adoration of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus

Just as Latria is due to the whole Human Nature of Christ, so is it due to the individual parts of His nature. (Sent. certa.)

Although in and for themselves all parts of Christ's human nature are in equal manner worthy of veneration, still, since the times of the Crusades, a special veneration has developed for individual parts of His human nature, for the Five Holy Wounds and the members associated with them, the Most Precious Blood, the Holy Face, the Head of the Suffering Redeemer, and the Most Sacred Heart. Again, the mysteries of His life, His suffering, His death, His conception, birth, etc., are analogically objects of the worship of Latria. The reason why these parts of the human nature, or these facts of Christ's life are specially venerated, lies in the fact that in them the redeeming love of Christ is especially clearly revealed (obiectum manifestationis).

1. Dogmatic Basis of the Veneration

The cult of the Heart of Jesus, which was bitterly assailed by the Jansenists, and which originated in the German mysticism of the Middle Ages, has its dogmatic basis in the dogma of the Hypostatic Union. Against the slanders of the Jansenists, Pope Pius VI declared that the Heart of Jesus is not separated or dissolved from the Godhead (cum separatione vel praecisione a divinitate), but rather adored as "the heart of the Person of the Word, with which it is inseparably united" (cor personae Verbi, cui inseparabiliter unitum est). D 1563.

2. Object of the Veneration

a) The immediate object (obiectum proximum, ob. materiale partiale) of the cult of the Heart of Jesus is the corporeal Heart of Jesus as an essential constituent part of the human nature of Christ, hypostatically united with the Logos, and not merely the heart in the metaphorical sense (=love). This is clear from the controversy with the Jansenists and from the liturgical Texts.

b) The whole object (ob. materiale totale) is the Word Incarnate, the God-Man Jesus Christ.

c) The formal object is the infinite perfection of the Divine Person.

d) The reason why, of all the parts of Christ's humanity, the heart is specially venerated is that the heart is the most perfect symbol of Christ's redeeming love for mankind. Cf. the appeal in the Litany of the Heart of Jesus: "Heart of Jesus, burning furnace of love!"

According to the customary language of Holy Writ (cf. Dt. 6, 5; 10, 12; 13, 3; Prov. 2, 2; 23, 26; Mt. 22, 37; John 16, 6, 22; Rom. 5, 5), and in the popular view, the heart is the seat of the affections, especially the affection of love. As love is the motive of the Redemption (cf. John 3, 16; I John 4, 9 et seq.), special love and veneration is shown to the organ of the Redeemer which is regarded as the symbol of love. The Heart of Jesus as a symbol of His redeeming love is the adequate object of the official Church veneration of the Heart of Jesus. As Christ's redeeming love is particularly manifested in His bitter suffering and death and in the Holy Eucharist, so the veneration of the Passion of Christ and the veneration of the Eucharist stand in close association with the veneration of the Heart of Jesus.

3. Purpose of the Veneration

The purpose of the veneration of the Heart of Jesus is that firstly, men may be stirred up to return love for love to Christ and to imitate the virtues of the human heart of the Incarnate God (Mt. 11, 29) and secondly, to promote a desire to atone for the insults offered to the Heart of Jesus. Cf. the Encyclical "Misericordissimus Redemptor" (1928) and "Caritate Christi compulsi" (1932) of Pope Pius XI.

Appendix: Veneration of pictures and relics of Christ. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, a relative Latria is due to pictures and relics of Christ, for example to the Holy Cross. As the ground (ob. formale) of the veneration does not lie in these things themselves, but in the Person of Christ which they represent or to which they refer, the veneration shown to them is not absolute but relative. However, it is a true Latria since it refers in the last resort to the Divine Person of Christ. S. th. III 25, 3 and 4.

§ 21. The Communication of Idioms

The ontological basis of the communication of idioms is the community and mutual communication of the Divine and human properties and activities in Christ. This derives from the unity of the Person in such fashion that the human properties are predicated of the Word and the Divine properties of the Man-Christ. The communicatio idiomatum in the logical sense (predication of idioms) obviously derives from the ontological reality.

Christ's Divine and Human characteristics and activities are to be predicated of the one Word Incarnate. (*De fide*.)

The Apostles' Creed attributes to the Son of God the human properties of conception and birth, of suffering and crucifixion, of dying and of being buried. The Council of Ephesus (431) teaches with St. Cyril of Alexandria against Nestorius, that the assertions concerning Christ contained in Holy Writ may not be divided between two Persons, the God-Logos and the human Christ, but must be referred to the one Word made flesh (D 116). As Christ's Divine Person subsists in two natures, and may be referred to either of these two natures, so human things can be asserted of the Son of God and Divine things of the Son of Man.

The old Lutheran Doctrinal Theology inclines to the monophysitic error which posits a real transference of Divine attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence, ubiquity, by reason of the Hypostatic Union, to the human nature of Christ, and teaches that "Christ, not only as God, but also as man knows all, can do all, and is present to all created things" (formula concordiae I 8, 11).

1. The Communication of Idioms and the Sources of Faith

Holy Writ makes an extensive use of the communication of idioms, for example, John 8, 58: "Before Abraham was, I am" (the Man-Christ). Acts 3, 15: "The Author of life ye have killed." Acts 20, 28; "to rule the Church of God which He (God) hath purchased with His own blood"; Rom. 8, 32: "He (God) hath spared not even His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all": 1 Cor. 2, 8 "For if they had known (the wisdom of God) they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory" (God).

In consonance with the language of Holy Scripture, St. Ignatius of Antioch speaks of the blood of God (Eph. 1, 1), of the sufferings of God (Rom. 6, 3), and of the birth of God ex Maria (Eph. 18, 2). It was Origen who first expressly adverted to the exchange of predication (De princ. II 6, 3).

2. Rules Concerning the Predication of Idioms

The nature of the Hypostatic Union is such that while on the one hand things pertaining to both the Divine and the human nature can be attributed to the person of Christ, on the other hand things specifically belonging to one nature cannot be predicated of the other nature. Since concrete terms (God, Son of God, Man, Son of Man, Christ the Almighty) designate the Hypostasis and abstract terms (Godhead, humanity, omnipotence) the nature, the following rule may be laid down: communicatio idiomatum fit in concreto, non in abstracto. The communication of idioms is valid for concrete terms not for abstract ones. So, for example: The Son of Man died on the Cross; Jesus created the world. The rule is not valid if there be reduplication, by reduplication the concrete term is limited to one nature. Thus it is false to say "Christ has suffered as God." "Christ created the world as a human being." It must also be observed that the essential parts of the human nature, body and soul are referred to the nature, whose parts they are. Thus it is false to say: "Christ's soul is omniscient," "Christ's body is ubiquitous."

Further, predication of idioms is valid in positive statements not in negative ones, as nothing may be denied to Christ which belongs to Him according to either nature. One, therefore, may not say: "The Son of God has not suffered," "Jesus is not almighty." Assertions liable to be misunderstood should be protected by clarifying additions like "as God," "as man," for example. "Christ, as man, is a creature."

§ 22. The Christological Perichoresis

The Two Natures of Christ exist in the closest union (*Sent. communis.*)

The two natures, despite the real distinction between them, do not exist side by side, as the Nestorians taught, but in a most close and intimate union. From the Hypostatic Union there derives a mutual intimate union and penetration of one nature by the other. This penetration of one nature by the other is designated by a term which goes back to St. Gregory Nazianzus (Ep. 101, 6) "Christological Perichoresis" (περιχώρησις, circumincesso, called by the later Schoolmen: circuminssio). The power which unites the two natures and holds them together, proceeds exclusively from the Divine nature. The penetration, therefore, having regard to its active component, is not a mutual but a one-sided penetration. It results, however, in the mutual intimate union of the two natures. The Godhead, which itself is impenetrable, penetrates and inhabits humanity, which is thereby deified without suffering any change (D 291 *σὰρξ θεωθεῖσα, θέλημα θεωθέν*).

The older Fathers teach the doctrine of the perichoresis when they inaccurately designate the union of the two natures as a fusion (*μίξις, σύμμιξις, κράσις, σύγκρασις*). Since the Nestorian controversies, the question has been minutely discussed. It was treated in detail by St. John Damascene (De fide orth. III 3 and 7) and later by the Scholastics.

SECTION 2

The Attributes of Christ's Human Nature

CHAPTER I

The Prerogatives of Christ's Human Nature

Preliminary

Christ is a true man (consubstantialis nobis secundum humanitatem : D 148) but, by virtue of the Hypostatic Union, no mere and ordinary man. The hypostatic union of the humanity of Christ with the Divine Logos effected in a unique perfect way a supernatural endowment and enriching of Christ's human nature. The limits of this perfection arise from the finiteness of the created nature and the special needs of the redemptive vocation of Christ. In the light of this we shall consider in Christ's human nature the prerogatives of human knowledge, human will and human power.

I. The Prerogative of Christ in the Domain of Human Knowledge.

§ 23. The Immediate Vision of God

1. Actuality of the Immediate Vision of God

a) Teaching of the Church

Christ's soul possessed the immediate vision of God from the first moment of its existence. (*Sent. certa.*)

While the immediate knowledge of God, which is absolutely supernatural, is vouchsafed to other men only in the next world (in statu termini), Christ's soul possessed it in this world (in statu viae), and indeed, from the very moment of its union with the Divine Person of the Word, that is, from the Conception. Christ was therefore, as the Schoolmen say, viator simul et comprehensor, that is, at the same time a pilgrim on earth and at the destination of His earthly pilgrimage. It follows from this that He could not possess the theological virtues of faith and hope.

Some of the newer Theologians, such as H. Klee, A. Günther, J. Th. Laurent and H. Schell, denied that Christ possessed the Immediate Vision of God while on earth because they considered it to be contradictory to individual assertions of Holy Writ, and to the fact of the Passion of Christ. The Modernists (A. Loisy) denied it also and maintained that the natural sense of Scriptural texts cannot be reconciled with the teaching of theologians concerning the consciousness and infallible knowledge of Christ (D 2032).

In 1918, in answer to an inquiry, the Holy Office decided that the following statement could not be taught with certainty, that is, without danger to the Faith: *non constat, fuisse in anima Christi inter homines degentis scientiam, quam habent beati seu comprehensores* (D 2183).

Pope Pius XII, in the Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*" (1943) declared: "Also that knowledge which is called vision, He possesses in such fullness that in breadth and clarity it far exceeds the Beatific Vision of all the saints in Heaven" . . . "in virtue of the Beatific Vision which He enjoyed from the time when He was received into the womb of the mother of God, He has forever and continuously had present to Him all the members of His mystical Body and embraced them with His saving love" (D 2289).

b) Proof from the Sources of Faith

A stringent scriptural proof is not possible as for the most part the assertions of Holy Scripture regarding the perfection of Christ's knowledge cannot be taken with certainty as referring to Christ's human or Divine knowledge. A certain measure of support is offered by those assertions in which the clear knowledge of the Father is attributed to Christ as well as the Divine truth which He proclaims to mankind. Cf. John 8, 55: "And you have not known Him (the Father) but I know Him. And if I shall say that I know Him not I shall be like unto you, a liar. But I do know Him and do keep His word." As Christ can keep the word of God only as man, so also the clear knowledge of the Father and consequently of the whole Trinity appears to be due to Him, not merely in so far as He is God, but also in so far as He is man. Cf. John 1, 17 et seq.; 3, 11.

The Fathers implicitly teach the doctrine that Christ's soul always enjoyed the Beatific Vision by reason of the fact that they teach that Christ as man had fullness of knowledge as a consequence of the Hypostatic Union. The doctrine was expressly attested to by St. Fulgentius, who, on an inquiry made by his disciple Ferrandus, replied: "It is very difficult and quite irreconcilable with the integrity of the Faith to assume that Christ's soul did not possess a full knowledge of its divinity, with which, according to the Faith, it physically possesses one person" (Ep. 14, 3, 26). However, St. Fulgentius goes too far when he ascribes a "full," that is, a comprehensive knowledge of God to Christ's soul. The main proof derives from the Schoolmen, who unanimously accepted the thesis that Christ while here on earth possessed the Beatific Vision.

a) The Beatific Vision, according to its nature, is simply the consummation of sanctifying grace, which in turn is a participation in the Divine Nature (*consortium divinae naturae*; 2 Peter 1, 4): *Gloria est gratia consummata* (Glory is grace consummated). The attachment of the soul to God through grace and glory is an accidental union. The attachment of Christ's soul to God, is, however, a substantial union and therefore much more intimate. If, then, Christ's soul on earth was already much more intimately joined to God than the Blessed are in Heaven, it seems impossible that the immediate knowledge of God, which is vouchsafed to them should be denied to It. St. Thomas adduces the principle: "The nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence" (S. th. III 7, 1).

β) Christ, through the acts of His humanity, through His life and especially through His Passion and Death for humanity, is the source of salvation (Hebr. 2, 10), that is, of the immediate vision of God. According to the principle:

"The original cause must always be superior to the instrumental." Christ Himself must possess in outstanding fashion that which He is to communicate to others. Cf. S. th. III 9, 2.

7) Christ is the Head of the angels and of mankind. The angels, who according to Mt. 4, 11, appeared and ministered to Him, were at the time of the earthly life of Jesus already in possession of the Beatific Vision (Mt. 18, 10). It is incompatible with the status of the Head that he should lack any prerogative that was vouchsafed to a section of the members.

8) Christ as the Originator and Completer of faith (Hebr. 12, 2), could not Himself walk in the darkness of faith. The perfection of the self-consciousness of the man Jesus can be explained only on the understanding that He possessed immediate knowledge of the Godhead with which He was united.

2. Compatibility of the Passion with the Scientia Beata

The Immediate Vision of God effects supreme happiness in creatures endowed with reason. From this the question arises: How can the profound sorrow and sadness which Christ felt in the Garden of Olives during His Agony, and in His Descent by God on the Cross be reconciled with the perfect happiness which flows from the Beatific Vision?

a) The fact of Christ's bodily suffering is easily reconciled with His scientia beata, as bodily sorrow is felt with the lower sensitive powers of the soul, while spiritual sorrow is felt with the higher spiritual power of the soul. By Divine ordinance the joy deriving from the Beatific Vision was in Christ limited to His spiritual soul. The overflow of the bliss into the body does not belong to the nature of the glory, but is merely an accidental consequence of it, which in this case was suspended. Cf. S. th. III, 15, 5 ad 3.

b) The main difficulty lies in the compatibility of spiritual joy and spiritual sorrow. Melchior Cano, O.P. († 1560) sought to solve the difficulty by assuming in the act of the immediate vision of God a real distinction between the confirmation of the reason (visio) and the activity of the will (gaudium, delectatio), and by teaching that the vision of God possessed by Christ's soul continued on the Cross, while the happiness naturally proceeding from the vision of God was interrupted by a miracle of the Divine Omnipotence. (De locis theol. XII 12.) Against this suspension theory it is objected that heavenly bliss necessarily proceeds from the vision of God.

According to the teaching of St. Thomas, the miraculous intervention of God consisted only in that the bliss proceeding from the immediate vision of God did not overflow from the ratio superior (=the higher spiritual knowledge and will directed to the bonum increatum) to the ratio inferior (=human knowledge and will directed to the bonum creatum) nor from the soul to the body: dum Christus erat viator, non fiebat redundantia gloriae superiori parte in inferiorem nam ab anima in corpus (S. th. III 46, 8). Christ's soul, therefore, remained sensitive to sorrow and sadness.

3. Object and Scope of Christ's Scientia Beata

a) The primary object of the immediate vision of God is the Divine Essence (Deus sicuti est: I John 3, 2). As Christ's soul, by reason of the Hypostatic Union, is more closely connected with God than the angels and the blessed in heaven, it beholds God more perfectly than any other creature. Cf. S. th. III 10, 4. On account, however, of the finiteness of human nature the Beatific Vision of Christ as man is not comprehensive knowledge of God. S. th. III 10, 1: infinitum

non comprehenditur a finito, et ideo dicendum, quod anima Christi nullo modo comprehendit divinam essentiam.

b) The secondary object of the Beatific Vision lies in things external to God, which are beheld in God as the Origin of all things. The scope of this knowledge is proportioned to the perfection with which God is known. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, it includes at any rate all that knowledge that pertains to the individual who is blessed (quae ad ipsum spectant). When one applies this principle to Christ, it follows that even on earth Christ's soul knew all extra-Divine things in the Divine Essence, to the extent that such knowledge was necessary or useful for His vocation as Redeemer. Since Christ is the Head and the Lord of the whole Creation, and the Judge of all mankind, St. Thomas concluded that Christ's soul already on earth knew in the Divine Essence, all real things of the past, the present and the future, including, of course, the thoughts of mankind. Christ's human knowledge, however, did not extend to all possible things which God in His Omnipotence could effect, but never has effected or will effect; for such knowledge of all possible things is synonymous with the comprehensive knowledge of the Divine Power and of the Divine Essence which is identical with it. Thus, according to St. Thomas, Christ's soul possessed, not an absolute, but a relative omniscience. S. th. III 10, 2. In 1918, in reply to an inquiry, the Holy Office reprobated the opinion of some modern Theologians, which was opposed to the teaching of the Schoolmen, by declaring that the following statement could not with certainty be taught: "The opinion cannot be designated as certain which states that Christ's soul was ignorant of nothing, but from the beginning knew all in the Divine Word, the past, the present and the future, that is, all which God knows with the knowledge of vision." D 2184; cf. 2185.

4. Freedom of Christ's Human Knowledge from Ignorance and Error

Christ's human knowledge was free from positive ignorance and from error. (*Sent. certa.*) Cf. D 2184 et seq.

a) Christ's freedom from ignorance was denied by the Arians, the Nestorians, and especially by the Agnoetes, a monophysitic sect of the 6th century. The last-mentioned, appealing to Mk. 13, 32; Mt. 24, 36: "But of that day and hour no one knoweth; no, not the angels in Heaven, but the Father alone," attributed to Christ ignorance, notably in regard to the day and the hour of the General Judgment. The leading exponent of this error was the Deacon Themistios of Alexandria.

Christ calls Himself the Word become Man, the Light of the World (John 8, 12), which is come into the world, in order to bring the true knowledge to mankind (John 12, 46); He calls Himself the Truth (John 14, 6), and gives as the purpose of His coming into the world the giving of testimony to the truth (John 18, 37); He permits Himself to be called Teacher (John 13, 13). He is, as Holy Writ witnesses, full of grace and truth (John 1, 14), full of wisdom (Luke 2, 40); in Him are all treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden (Col. 2, 3). He knows about happenings which occur far away (John 1, 48; 4, 50; 11, 14), and sees through the heart of man (John 1, 47; 2, 24 et seq.; 4, 16 et seq.; 6, 71). With this is irreconcilable the notion that Christ's human knowledge is defective or erroneous.

In the struggle against the Arians who held that the Logos did not know the day of the General Judgment in order to show that He was a creature, individual Fathers (St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St. Cyril of Alexandria) ascribed ignorance to Christ's soul. In the defence against Agnoetism, however, the Fathers generally acquitted Christ's human soul of ignorance and error, and condemned as heresy the doctrine of the Agnoetes. The Patriarch Euologius of Alexandria, the chief opponent of the Agnoetes, teaches: "Christ's humanity which was taken up in the hypostasis of the inaccessible and substantial wisdom of Christ cannot be ignorant of anything of the past or of the future" (Photius, *Bibl. Cod.* 230 n. 10). Pope Gregory the Great approved the teaching of Eulogius, basing it upon the Hypostatic Union, from which Christ derives a communication of the knowledge from His Divine to His human nature. Only if one accepts Nestorianism can ignorance on the part of Christ be maintained: "He who is not a Nestorian cannot possibly be an Agnoet." He expressly calls the Agnoetes heretics (Ex. X 39; D 248). Cf. *The Libellus emendationis* (N 10) of the Gallic Monk Leporius.

In explanation of the scriptural passage Mk. 13, 32, apart from the inadmissible mystic interpretation (the Son=the Body of Christ) the Fathers submit the following two interpretations:

a) The ignorance of the day of the General Judgment (Acts 1, 7): "It is not for you to know the times or the moments, which the Father hath put in His own power," is a so-called economic ignorance that is *οικονομία θεοῦ* founded on God's decree, or a *scientia noncommunicanda*, that is, Christ should not, in accordance with the will of the Father, reveal the moment of the General Judgment to mankind: "It was no part of His teaching duty to make it (the day of the General Judgment) known to us" (St. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* 36, *Sermo* 1, 1).

b) In consequence of His innermost connection with the Logos, Christ as man knew the day of the General Judgment indeed, but He did not have this knowledge from his human nature (Pope Gregory the Great); D 248.

Modernism, with liberal Protestant Theology, teaches that Christ erred in believing that the end of the world and His coming-again (Parousia) was immediately imminent. D 2033.

In fact, however, Christ left the time of His Second Coming undetermined. The assertion in the great Parousia Discourse: "This generation shall not pass till all these things be done" (Mt. 24, 34; Mk. 13, 30; Luke 21, 32) does not refer to the end of the world itself nor to the Parousia, but to the portents of the Parousia among which is reckoned the destruction of Jerusalem. Christ presupposes that the Gospel will be preached to the whole world before the onset of the end of the world (Mt. 24, 14; Mk. 13, 10; cf. Mt. 28, 19 et seq.; Mk. 16, 15), that the elect from all the ends of the earth will be assembled for judgment (Mt. 24, 31; Mk. 13, 27), that after the destruction of Jerusalem the world will continue on its course (Mt. 24, 21; Mk. 13, 19) and that the "times of the nations" will follow (Luke 21, 24). In other passages Christ even expressly guarantees that the Disciples will not experience the day of the Parousia (Luke 17, 22; Mt. 12, 41). (Compare Eschatology, Par. 6, 3.)

The intrinsic reason for the impossibility of error in Christ lies in the Hypostatic Union. In consequence of the finiteness of human nature, the human actions of Christ are indeed subject to the general human imperfections. It is, however, irreconcilable with the dignity of the Divine Person in act, to ascribe to Him special imperfections such as error or moral deficiency.

§ 24. Christ's Infused Knowledge

From the beginning of Christ's life, His soul possessed infused knowledge (*scientia infusa*). (*Sent. communis.*)

Scientia infusa is knowledge by means of spiritual concepts which are immediately and habitually communicated to a Spirit by God. It is distinguished from *scientia beata* in that through it things are known in their proper nature through infused concepts (*per species proprias*), and from acquired knowledge in that its concepts are not acquired by a process of abstraction from objects known in the first instance by sense perception, but are communicated by God in a finished way to the Spirit.

No definite scriptural proof can be adduced of the existence in Christ of *scientia infusa*. Speculatively, it may be demonstrated not as necessary but as very appropriate. The dignity of the human nature assumed by the Word demands that It should lack no perfection, of which human nature is capable. *Scientia infusa* is such a perfection. Again Christ's position as head of angels and men makes it appear appropriate that He should possess the mode of cognition which is natural for the angels, and which was bestowed as a preternatural gift on the progenitors of the race. Cf. S. th. III 9, 3.

According to the teaching of St. Thomas, Christ's *scientia infusa* extends, on the one hand to all which can be the natural object of human cognition and, on the other hand, to all which is communicated through supernatural Revelation from God to man. It does not include, however, the Divine Essence itself, which is the object of *scientia beata*. Cf. S. th. III 11, 1.

§ 25. Christ's Acquired Knowledge and the Progress of His Human Knowledge

1. Christ's Acquired Knowledge

Christ's soul possessed also an acquired knowledge or experimental knowledge (*scientia acquisita, sc. experimentalis*). (*Sent. communis.*)

Acquired knowledge is the natural human knowledge which proceeds from sense perception, and which is achieved through the abstracting activity of the intellect.

That Christ possessed this kind of knowledge follows as a necessary consequence from the reality and the completeness of His human nature since the specific human capacity to know and the natural human activity of cognition which comes from it belong to complete human nature. The denial of experimental knowledge in Christ leads finally to Docetism. Cf. S. th. III 9, 4 (otherwise in the Commentary on the Sentences).

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2. The Progress in Christ's Human Knowledge

According to Luke 2, 52, there was a progress in the human knowledge of Christ. In His *scientia beata* and in His *scientia infusa*, according to St. Thomas, a real progress of knowledge (*profectus secundum essentiam*) was not possible, as both modes of cognition, from the very beginning, encompassed all real things of the past, the present and the future. In regard to these two modes of cognition, a progress can be spoken of only in the sense of a successive manifestation corresponding to His different age-stages of the knowledge which He had from the beginning (*profectus secundum effectum*).

In His *scientia acquisita* a real progress was possible in so far as the habit of knowledge acquired in the natural way could be increased step by step by the abstracting activity of His intellect. As the knowledge which Christ acquired through His experimental knowledge was already contained in His *scientia beata* and in His *scientia infusa*, it was new, not in its content, but only in the mode by which Christ attained it. Cf. S. th. III 12, 2.

II. Christ's Holiness

§ 26. Christ's Sinlessness and Impeccability

1. Sinlessness (*impeccantia*)

Christ was free from all sin, from original sin as well as from all personal sin. (*De fide*.)

a) Christ's freedom from original sin is expressed in the *Decretum pro Jacobitis* of the Council of Florence (1441); *sine peccato conceptus*. D 711. According to Luke 1, 35, Christ entered into His earthly existence in a state of holiness: "The Holy which shall be born of thee." As original sin is propagated by natural generation, and since Christ entered life in a supernatural manner through conception by the Holy Ghost (Mt. 1, 18 et seq.; Luke 1, 26 et seq.) it follows that He was not subject to the general law of original sin.

The Fathers and the theologians infer Christ's freedom from original sin from the Hypostatic Union, which being a most intimate connection with God, excludes the condition of separation from God implied by original sin. They also point to the supernatural manner of His entry into the world. Cf. Tertullian, *De carne Christi* 16; St. Augustine, *Enchir.* 13, 41: "Christ was generated or conceived without any concupiscence of the flesh, and thus remained free from every stain of original sin."

From the freedom from original sin there flows the freedom from concupiscence. As Christ was not subject to original sin, there was no need for Him to take on Himself this consequence of original sin, nor was it demanded by His redemptive task. Christ's sensual nature was, therefore, completely subordinate to the direction of reason. The Fifth General Council of Constantinople (553) rejected the teaching of Theodor of Mopsuestia, that Christ

"was burdened with the passions of the soul and with the desires of the flesh" (D 224).

St. Augustine declared: "Let everyone that believes that the flesh of Christ revolted against His spirit, be excluded" (Opus imperfectum c. Iul, IV 47).

b) Christ's freedom from all personal sin (and at the same time from original sin) is expressed in the 10th Anathema of St. Cyril: "for He did not need oblation who was entirely free from sin" (D 122), and in the decision of faith of the Council of Chalcedon: "similar to us in all things, except sin" (D 148).

Jesus was conscious of His freedom from all personal sin. Cf. John 8, 46: "Which of you shall convince me of sin?" John 8, 29: "For I do always the things that please Him (the Father)." John 14, 30: "For the prince of this world (Satan) cometh, and in me he hath not anything." The Apostles also attest Jesus' complete impeccancy. Cf. John 3, 5: "And in Him there is no sin." 1 Peter 2, 22: "*Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth.*" 2 Cor. 5, 21: "Him who knew no sin He hath made sin (that is, a bearer of sin) for us." Hebr. 4, 15: "Tempted in all things like as we are, without sin." Hebr. 7, 26: "It was fitting that we should have such a high priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens."

In Christ's perfect impeccancy the Fathers see a pre-condition of His universal atonement. Origen remarks: "He was capable of taking all the sins of the world on Himself, of redeeming, of eradicating, of removing them because He did no sin, and no deceit was found in His mouth, and because He knew not sin" (Comment. in Ioan. 28, 18, 160).

2. Impeccability (*impeccabilitas*)

Christ has not merely not actually sinned, but also could not sin. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Fifth General Council of Constantinople (553) condemned the teaching of Theodor of Mopsuestia, which asserted that Christ only became completely impeccable after the Resurrection. D 224. It follows from this that He was already impeccable.

The intrinsic reason of Christ's impeccability lies, as the Fathers stress, in the Hypostatic Union. Since the Word is the principium quod of His human activity, it follows that His human actions are actions of a Divine Person. Obviously it is incompatible with God's absolute sanctity that a Divine Person should be the responsible subject of a sinful deed. Further, the Hypostatic Union effected an intrinsic penetration and control of Christ's human will by the Divine Will. (Cf. D 291: *θέλημα θεωθέν.*)

From the Hypostatic Union there arises a physical impossibility of sinning and from the Beatific Vision a moral impossibility that is, it involves such a close connection with God in knowledge and love that a turning away from God is actually excluded.

§ 27. Christ's Sanctity and Fullness of Grace

1. Christ's Substantial Sanctity Derives from the Gratia Unionis

By reason of the Hypostatic Union, Christ's human nature, through the Uncreated Holiness of the Word, is substantially Holy. (*Sent. communis.*) Cf. Luke 1, 35.

The Fathers derive the doctrine of the substantial sanctification of Christ's humanity from the anointing and the sanctifying of Christ's human nature by the Godhead which was signified by the name of Christ. St. Gregory Nazianzus says: "He is called Christ on account of the Godhead; for this is the anointing of humanity; it sanctifies not through an alienation of power, as in the case of other anointed, but through the presence of the totality of Him who anoints." (*Orat.* 30, 21). St. Augustine says: "Then (when the Word became flesh) He sanctified Himself in Himself, that is, Himself the man in Himself the Word, because the Word and the man is one Christ, who there and thus sanctifies the man in the Word" (*In Ioan.* tr. 108, 5).

The Hypostatic Union sanctifies the human nature of Christ directly and therefore formally (i.e., not merely causally and radically, by promoting and effecting sanctifying grace, as the Scotists teach). Independently then of His created sanctifying grace, Christ's humanity is holy through uncreated Divine holiness. As the Divine attributes cannot belong to a created nature, so the substantial holiness of Christ is not to be conceived as a form inhering in Christ's humanity. It derives exclusively from the personal union of Christ's humanity with the Logos.

2. Christ's accidental holiness by reason of sanctifying grace

By reason of His endowment with the fullness of created habitual grace, Christ's soul is also accidentally holy. (*Sent. certa.*)

Pope Pius XII, in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943) declares: "In Him (Christ) dwells the Holy Ghost with such a fullness of grace that greater cannot be conceived."

Sacred Scripture bears witness to the sanctification of Christ's humanity through created grace. Jn. 1, 14: "Full of grace and truth"; Acts 10, 38, "How God anointed Him with the Holy Ghost"; Is. 11, 2: "And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest on Him"; Is. 61, 1 (= Luke 4, 18): "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me."

St. Augustine, referring to many of the quoted passages, teaches: "The Lord Jesus has not alone as God given the Holy Ghost, but as man has also received Him; therefore He was called 'full of grace' (John 1, 14) and 'full of the Holy Ghost' (Luke 4, 1). Again, the Acts of the Apostles still more distinctly witness of Him: 'God anointed Him with the Holy Ghost' (10, 38) not with visible oil, but with the gift of grace, which is symbolised in the visible unction with which the Church anoints the baptised" (*De Trin.* XV 26, 46).

St. Thomas (S. th. III 7, 1) speculatively establishes the sanctification of Christ's

humanity through Sanctifying Grace : a) Upon the Hypostatic Union, which, being the closest possible union with God, the Prime Source of all grace, demands as a consequence the perfection of Sanctifying Grace in Christ's soul, according to the principle : " The nearer an effect is to its cause, the more does it partake of its influence." b) Upon the incomparable nobility of Christ's soul, its activities (knowledge and love) reaching out to most perfect union with God. For this however, the elevation of His human nature into the supernatural order through grace was necessary. c) Upon the relationship of Christ to men, on whom His fullness of grace is to pour.

3. The Grace of the Head (*gratia capitis*)

Sanctifying Grace overflows from Christ, the Head, to the Members of His Mystical Body. (*Sent. communis.*)

Pope Pius XII declared in the Encyclical " *Mystici Corporis* " (1943): " From Him there flows out into the body of the Church all light through which the faithful receive supernatural enlightenment, and every grace, through which they become holy, as He Himself is holy. . . . Christ is the founder and the originator of holiness. . . . Grace and glory well up from His inexhaustible fullness."

Christ's fullness of Grace, which derives from the Hypostatic Union, is the reason why the Grace of Christ, the Head, overflows to the members of His Mystical Body. Christ's *gratia singularis* or *personalis* is therefore also *gratia capitis*.

Concerning the Word Incarnate, who is full of Grace and Truth, St. John says : " And of His fullness we have all received : and grace for grace " (John 1, 16). St. Paul teaches that Christ as man is the head of the Church, which is His Mystical Body. Eph. 1, 22 et seq. : " and He hath subjected all things under His feet and hath made Him Head over all the Church, which is His body." Cf. Eph. 4, 15 et seq. ; Col. 1, 18 ; Rom. 12, 4 et seq. ; Cor. 12, 12 et seq. Just as a person's life is regarded as being sited principally in his head, so the supernatural life-power of grace flows from Christ, the Head, to the members of His Mystical Body. Cf. S. th. III 8, 1.

In regard to the mode and manner of the bestowal of grace by the Head to the members of the Mystical Body, it must be observed that Christ as God, bestows grace *authoritative*, that is, of His own power ; as man, on the other hand, instrumentally only, that is, as instrument of the Godhead. By reason of His Divine Dignity He merited grace (*causa meritoria*) through His human activities, especially through His Passion and death. As *causa instrumentalis* (*instrumentum coniunctum*) He confers grace, which proceeds from God as *Causa Principalis*, upon individual souls through the ordinary channels and by means of the Sacraments (*instrumenta separata*). Cf. S. th. III 8, 1 ad 1.

The activity of Christ, the Head, in bestowing grace, extends to all the members of the Mystical Body; to the actual members who are associated with Him through sanctifying grace, or at least through faith, and also to the potential members, who are connected with Him neither by sanctifying grace nor faith, but who have the potentiality of becoming actual members of His Mystical Body. The damned alone are excluded from His beneficent influence. Cf. S. th. III 8, 3.

III. The Perfection of Christ's Human Power

§ 28. Christ's Power

Christ's Humanity, as instrument of the Logos, possesses the power of producing supernatural effects. (Sent. certa.)

Side by side with its own proper power (*virtus propria*), which it has either from nature or from grace, Christ's Humanity, as instrument of the Word, possesses instrumental power (*virtus instrumentalis*) of producing all supernatural works in the physical order (miracles) and in the moral order (forgiveness of sins, sanctification) which serve the purpose of Redemption (*habuit instrumentalem virtutem ad omnes immutationes miraculosas faciendas ordinabiles ad incarnationis finem, qui est instaurare omnia*). In all these operations Christ's Godhead is the *causa principalis* (principal cause), His humanity is the *causa instrumentalis*, seu *ministerialis* (instrumental cause) but in a unique fashion as it is an instrument which is continuously hypostatically united with the Word (*instrumentum coniunctum Verbo*). Cf. S. th. III 13, 2.

The Sacred Scriptures manifest the power of Christ's humanity in His many miracles, for example, in His healing of a sick person, and the pouring-out of His power on the sick. Luke 6, 19: "And the multitude sought to touch Him; for a virtue went out of Him and healed all." Cf. Luke 8, 46: "Somebody hath touched me, for I know that virtue is gone out of me." Christ attributed to Himself, as the Son of Man, that is, as Man, the power of the forgiveness of sins. Mt. 9, 6: "The Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins." He attributes to His flesh and blood in the Eucharist the supernatural communication of life. "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath everlasting life." (John 6, 55). In His prayer as High Priest He confesses that the Father has given Him power over "all flesh," that is, over all mankind; "As thou hast given Him (the Son) power over all flesh, that He may give eternal life to all whom thou hast given Him" (John 17, 2).

The Fathers regarded Christ's humanity as an instrument of the Godhead (*ὄργανον τῆς θεότητος*; Cf. St. Athanasius, Adv. Arianos or. 3, 31) and for this reason ascribed to the flesh of Christ the power of giving life (*ὁὰρ ἐξ ζωοποιός*). St. Cyril of Alexandria says of the Eucharistic flesh of Christ: "As the flesh of the Redeemer, through His union with substantial life, that is, with the Word stemming from God, is become life-giving, we, when we enjoy it, have life in us" (In Ioan. 6, 55) cf. D 123. The efficacy of Christ's humanity, according to the teaching of St. Thomas (cf. S. th. III 8, 1 ad 1) and of his school, is not merely a moral, but also a physical efficacy. The moral efficacy consists in this that the Divine Will produces a definite supernatural effect in virtue of its eternal foreknowledge of Christ's human activity. The physical efficacy consists in this, that Christ's humanity, as instrument of the Divine Word, produces by itself a definite supernatural effect through the power received from God. The Scotists teach a moral efficacy only. Tradition is more in favour of the Thomistic teaching.

CHAPTER 2

The Defects or the Passibility of Christ's Human Nature

§ 29. Christ's Capacity for Suffering

1. The Corporeal Defects of Christ (*defectus corporis*)**Christ's human nature was passible. (*De fide*.)**

The monophysite sect of the Aphthartodocetae founded by Bishop Halicarnassus at the beginning of the 6th century, taught that Christ's body was incorruptible ("ἀφθαρτος") from the beginning of the Incarnation, that is, that He was not subject to dissolution and decay. This view necessarily leads to the denial of the reality of the Passion and death of Christ.

As against this view, the Church, in its symbols of faith, teaches that Christ (really) suffered and died. The Fourth Lateran council, and the Union Council of Florence expressly stress, not merely the fact of the Passion, but also the passibility of Christ. D 429: *secundum humanitatem factus est passibilis et mortalis* (in [His] humanity He was made capable of suffering and mortal) D 708: *passibilis ex conditione assumptae humanitatis* (passible [i.e., capable of suffering] by reason of the humanity [He] assumed).

The Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament foretell the grievous suffering of the coming Redeemer. Is. 53, 4: "Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows." Cf. Ps. 21 and 68. According to the testimony of the Evangelists, Christ was subject to the general defects of the body, such as hunger (Mt. 4, 2), thirst (John 19, 28), weariness (John 4, 6), sleep (Mt. 8, 24), suffering and death. Christ's Passion was intended to be a model to the faithful (cf. 1 Petr. 2, 21).

The Fathers' general conviction of Christ's passibility finds expression in the unanimous rejection of Docetism. The chief opponents of Aphthartodocetism were the Monophysite Patriarch Severus of Antioch, and on the Catholic side Leontius of Byzantium († about 543). Individual Fathers, like St. Hilary of Poitiers († 367), and Hesychius of Jerusalem († after 451) believed that impassibility was Christ's normal condition, and that He produced the capacity for suffering only through a special effort of will or through a miracle. The view of St. Hilary was a subject of keen discussion in the rheology of early Scholasticism. Some of the Schoolmen, e.g., Abelard's pupil, Hermann, rejected it as an error; others, e.g., Petrus Lombardus, interpreted it in a favourable fashion; others, e.g., Philip of Harvengst, adopted it; others, e.g., Stephen Langton, maintained that St. Hilary had himself recanted his error.

In Christ, by virtue of His freedom from original sin, bodily defects were not as in other men, consequences of original sin, but He voluntarily adopted them, in order a) to make vicarious atonement for the sins of mankind, b) to demonstrate the reality of His human nature, and c) to afford mankind a model of patience in the bearing of suffering. Cf. S. th. III 14, 1. These defects were, however, natural to Christ, because they belong to human nature as such. Cf. S. th. III 14, 2.

Christ's work of redemption required only that He assume the general human defects of human nature as such (*defectus* or *passiones universales* sive *irreprehensibiles*, e.g., hunger, thirst, weariness, feeling of pain, mortality, which do not contradict His intellectual and moral perfections). He did not assume particular defects, e.g., illness of His body or soul. Cf. S. th. III 14, 4.

2. The Emotions of Christ's Soul (*passiones animae*)

By the *passiones animae* are understood the emotions of the sensual appetite : *proprissime dicuntur passiones animae affectiones appetitus sensitivi* (S. th. III 15, 4).

Christ's soul was subject to sensual emotions. (*Sent. certa.*)

According to the testimony of Holy Writ, Christ possessed a truly human soul with the corresponding emotions, for example, sadness (Mt. 26, 37 : "He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad"), fear (Mk. 14, 33 : "He began to fear and to be heavy"), anger (Mk. 3, 5 : "He looked round about on them with anger"), love (Mk. 10, 21 : "He (Jesus) loved Him"; John 11, 36 ; 19, 26), Joy (John 11, 15 : "And I am glad for your sakes"). He wept with emotion at the sight of the City of Jerusalem doomed to destruction because of its unbelief (Luke 19, 41), and at the grave of His friend Lazarus (John 11, 35) and rejoiced in the Holy Ghost at the thought of the efficacy of the grace of God (Luke 10, 21). Cf. Hebr. 2, 17 ; 4, 15 ; 5, 2.

The sensual emotions appertain to the nature of mankind, and are therefore also natural to Christ. In consequence of His freedom from concupiscence, however, in Christ they could not be directed towards an unlawful object, could not arise in Him without His consent or against His Will, and could not achieve dominion over His Reason. Theologians therefore following St. Jerome (In Mt. 26, 37) call them *propassiones* (=initiatory excitations and not passions properly so-called). On account of their being free from moral disorder the Greek Fathers call them *πάθη ἀνθρώπινα* or *ἀναμάρτητα*. Cf. St. John Damascene, De fide orth. III 20 ; S. th. III 15, 4.

PART 2

The Work of the Redeemer

CHAPTER I

The Redemption in General

§ 1. The Purpose of the Incarnation

The Son of God became man in order to redeem men. (*De fide.*)

The Nicene Creed confesses : Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de coelis et incarnatus est. D 86. (Who for us men and for our salvation descended from heaven and was made flesh.)

Holy Writ testifies that Christ came into the world to save all men, to redeem them from their sins. The Prophet Isaias prophesied in the Old Covenant : "God Himself will come and save you" (35, 4). The name Jesus indicates His redemptive task. Cf. Mt. 1, 21 : "Thou shalt call His name Jesus for He shall save His people from their sins." The Angel proclaimed the birth of Christ to the shepherds of Bethlehem with the words : "For this day is born to you a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord, in the City of David." Luke 2, 11. The Prophet Simeon praised God for the grace of being permitted to see the salvation of all peoples. "Because my eyes have seen thy salvation, which thou hast prepared before the face of peoples" (Luke 2, 30 et seq.). Jesus Himself designated it as His task "to seek and to save that which was lost" (Luke 19, 10 ; cf. Mt. 9, 13). The Apostle St. Paul summarises Christ's life work in the words : "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners (1 Tim. 1, 15). Similarly John 3, 17 : "God sent not His son into the world to judge the world ; but that the world may be saved by Him."

Holy Scripture suggests another purpose of the Incarnation, that is the Glory of God, which is the supreme and ultimate purpose of all God's works. Cf. Luke 2, 14 : "Glory be to God in the highest !" In His prayer as High Priest Jesus says : "I have glorified thee on earth ; I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do" (John 17, 4).

§ 2. Controversy as to the Conditioned or Unconditioned Predestination of the Incarnation

There is a controversy between the Thomists and the Scotists as to whether the prime motive of the Incarnation of the Son of God was the redemption of mankind, so that without the Fall of the first parents the Incarnation would

not have taken place (conditioned predestination of the Incarnation) or whether it was the glory of God. In the Scotist view the Son of God, in order to crown the work of the Creation, would have become man even without the Fall, but in an impassible body (unconditioned or absolute predestination of the Incarnation). The conditioned predestination of the Incarnation is taught by the Thomists, the unconditioned by the Scotists (and even before Scotus by Isaac of Ninive [7th cent.], Rupert of Deutz, St. Albert the Great) and by many modern theologians.

1. Conditioned Predestination

The testimony of Holy Writ favours the Thomistic view (cf. S. th. III 1, 3). In numerous passages (see Par. 1) it names the Redemption of mankind from sin as the motive of the Incarnation, while it never mentions that the Incarnation would have occurred even without the Fall.

The Fathers are unanimous in teaching that the Incarnation of the Son of God was solely to redeem mankind. St. Augustine says: "If mankind had not fallen, the Son of Man would not have come. . . . Why did He come into the world? To save sinners (1 Tim. 1, 15). There was no other reason for His coming into the world" (Sermo 174, 2, 2, 7, 8).

2. Unconditioned Predestination

The Scotists seek a biblical basis for their view in the teaching of St. Paul that the whole Creation is co-ordinated to Christ as its destination and head. Cf. Col. 1, 15-19. However, it must be observed that in the Verses 15-17, in which Christ is represented as the "First-born of every creature," as the Creator of the universe, including the angel-world, as the goal of Creation ("In Him were all things created in heaven and on earth") and as conservator of the world, the fact of the Incarnation is entirely prescinded from, so that He appears as the goal of the Creation not as man but as God. Since it is as God that He is the Creator, so it is also as God that He is the goal of the Creation. The position of Head which is attributed to Him in V. 18 in regard to the Church, has its foundation in the fact of the Redemption. That in God's plan, Christ, independent of sin and redemption, should take the position of Head is not thereby asserted. In Hebr. 2, 10, the relative words: "for whom are all things and by whom are all things," is to be understood as referring not to Christ, but to God the Father. Those assertions of Holy Writ which make the Redemption of mankind the purpose of the Incarnation, are regarded by the Scotists as referring solely to the factual order of Salvation initiated by sin, in which the Son of God came into the world with a passible body. However, it is remarkable that Holy Writ should be silent concerning the possibility of His coming in an impassible condition.

The speculative foundation of the Scotist thesis is that the end cannot be of less importance than the means to the end. Therefore the Incarnation, as the most sublime of all God's works, could not have been effected primarily for the purpose of saving creatures. The Thomists reply that the Redemption is indeed the proximate purpose of the Incarnation but its ultimate purpose is, of course, God's glory.

Again the Scotists find it inappropriate that sin, which God hates, should be the occasion for the most glorious Revelation of God. The Thomists see therein all the greater proof of God's love and mercy: cf. *O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!* (Exultet of the Vigil of Easter).

According to the Scotist view, all grace, not only the grace of fallen mankind, but also the grace of man in Paradise, and the grace of the angels, derives from the merits of the God-Man. Thus Christ assumes a central all-transcending position in the Divine world-plan.

The Thomist view is less ambitious than that of the Scotists, but appears to be better supported in the sources of the Faith.

§ 3. Concept and Possibility of the Redemption

1. Concept of the Redemption

We may regard the Redemption objectively or subjectively. Objectively the Redemption is the work of the Redeemer, subjectively the Redemption is the realisation of the Redemption in individual men, or the application of the fruits of the Redemption to individual men (Justification). Christ's work of Redemption effected the salvation of humanity from the burden of sin. But sin, by its very nature, is a turning away from God (*aversio a Deo*) and a turning towards the creature (*conversio ad creaturam*). Accordingly, the work of the Redemption must consist in the turning away from the creature, and the turning towards God (cf. Col. 1, 13).

Redemption signifies the freeing of men from the tyranny of sin and its attendant evils (servitude to the devil and death). As such it is called, *απολύτωσις*, *redemptio* (= ransoming in the narrower sense). Cf. Rom. 3, 24; 1 Cor. 1, 30; Eph. 1, 7; Col. 1, 14; Hebr. 9, 15. It also signifies the restoration of man's supernatural union with God, which was destroyed by sin. As such it is called *παραλαβή* = atonement. Cf. Rom. 5, 10 et seq.; 2 Cor. 5, 18 et seq.; Col. 1, 20. The Redemption objectively considered, was fulfilled through the teaching and directing activity of Christ. In a supreme degree, however, it was effected by the vicarious atonement and the merits of Christ in His sacrificial death on the Cross. Through the Atonement, the insult offered to God by sin was counterbalanced, and the injury to the honour of God repaired. Through the merits of Christ the supernatural riches of salvation were acquired which are to be dispensed in the subjective Redemption.

2. Possibility of Redemption

The possibility of the Redemption through Christ's atonement and through His merits derives from His Divine-human constitution, in virtue of which He is the mediator between God and mankind. 1 Tim. 2, 5: "There is one God; and but one mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ, 6, who gave Himself a Redemption for all." Hebr. 9, 15: "He is the mediator of the New Testament." Cf. D 143, 711, 790.

In the ontological and ethical order, that is, in the order of being and activity, the God-Man Jesus Christ is the natural and, as such, the sole mediator between God and man. The supernatural mediation deriving from grace in all other than Christ (Moses, according to Dt. 5, 5, the Prophets and the Apostles, the priests of the Old and New Covenants, the angels and the saints) is imperfect and subordinated to the one natural mediation of Christ. Christ exercised and exercises the activity of mediation through the actions of His human nature (*homo Christus Jesus*). In consequence of the real distinction between the two natures, it was possible that He could perform mediatory acts as man and receive them as God. This solves the objection that Christ could not act as mediator between Himself and mankind. Cf. S. th. III 26 1-2.

§ 4. Necessity for and Freedom of the Redemption

1. Necessity from the Side of Man

Fallen man cannot redeem himself. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches: "cum omnes homines in praevaricatione Adae innocentiam perdidissent facti immundi et . . . natura filii irae . . . usque adeo servi erant peccati et sub potestate diaboli et mortis ut non modo gentes per vim naturae sed ne Judaei quidem per ipsam etiam literam Legis Moysi inde liberari aut surgere possent" (since all men had lost their innocence in Adam's sin, being made unclean and by nature children of wrath, they were servants of sin and under the power of the devil and death to such an extent that neither the Gentiles by the power of nature nor the Jews through the letter of the Mosaic Law could liberate themselves or rise from it) D. 793. This Dogma is contradicted by Pelagianism, which attributed the power of self-redemption to free will; and by Modern Rationalism with its various theories of self-redemption.

In his Epistle to the Romans, the Apostle St. Paul teaches that all men, Jews and heathens, stand under the curse of sin, and that they are justified by a free gift of the Divine love in virtue of the Redemption. Rom. 3, 23, et seq.: "For all have sinned and need the glory of God (= grace of Redemption), being justified freely by His grace through the Redemption that is in Christ Jesus."

The Patristic teaching is expressed in the words of St. Augustine: "They can sell themselves but cannot redeem themselves" (*Vendere se potuerunt, sed redimere non potuerunt*: Enarr. In Ps. 95, 5).

The intrinsic reason for the absolute necessity of Redemption for fallen man lies, on the one hand, in the infinity of man's guilt, and on the other hand, in the absolute supernaturalness of the state of grace. As a deed of a creature (*offensa Dei activa*) sin is indeed finite, but as insult to the Infinite God (*offensa Dei passiva*) it is infinite, and accordingly demands an atonement of infinite value. But a mere man cannot supply such an atonement. Cf. S. th. III 1, 2 ad 2.

2. Freedom from the Side of God

a) God was not compelled to redeem mankind by either an internal or an external compulsion. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Redemption is an entirely free deed of Divine Love and Divine Mercy (*libertas contradictionis*). Since even the elevation of man into the supernatural state is a free gift of Divine Love, then all the more free is the restoration of the supernatural unity with God which was destroyed by grievous sin. The Apostle St. Paul begins the Epistle to the Ephesians with a eulogy on the grace of God which so magnificently manifests itself in the Redemption through Jesus Christ. He designates the Redemption as a "Mystery of the Divine will, which He has made known to us according to His good pleasure" (Eph. 1, 9), cf. Eph. 2, 4 et seq.

The view of St. Athanasius (Or. de incarn Verbi 6) that God's honour demanded the Redemption, is to be understood as a high appropriateness, since elsewhere he decisively stresses the gratuitous nature of the Redemption. St. Anselm of Canterbury (Cur Deus homo II, 4) teaches that God was constrained to

redeem us by reason of the immutability of His Decree of blessedness for man. He held that when God, in spite of His fore-knowledge of sin, resolved from all eternity to create man and to bless him, there followed from this free Divine resolve a necessity to redeem mankind (*necessitas consequens*).

b) Even on the presupposition of the Divine Resolve of Redemption, the Incarnation was not absolutely necessary. (*Sent. communis.*)

St. Thomas, like St. Augustine (*De agone Christ.* 11, 12), teaches against St. Anselm of Canterbury (*Cur Deus homo* II 6 et seq.) that God through His Omnipotence, could have redeemed mankind in many other ways (*libertas specificationis*). S. th. III, 2.

It would be undue limitation of the Divine Omnipotence, Wisdom and Mercy, if the Incarnation were to be represented as the sole means of Redemption. God can, without injury to His justice, bestow forgiveness and grace on the repentant sinner even without a condign (adequate) atonement, or any atonement.

c) If God demanded a full atonement the Incarnation of a Divine Person was necessary. (*Sent. communis.*)

The infinite insult to God inherent in grievous sin can be fully counterbalanced by an infinite act of atonement only. None but a Divine Person can perform such an atonement. To this extent a hypothetical (conditioned) necessity of the Incarnation can be maintained.

In a wider sense one can also speak of a *necessitas congruentiae*, in so far as the Incarnation of a Divine Person was the most appropriate means of Redemption, because it most gloriously reveals the perfections of God and gives the strongest motives to the striving of mankind for religious and moral perfection. S. John Damascene, *De Fid. Orth.* I. B. I. ; S. th. III 1, 1-2.

CHAPTER 2

The Realisation of the Redemption through the Three Offices of Christ

By Christ's offices are understood the functions through which the purpose of the Redemption was realised. Christ fulfilled the work of Redemption through his threefold office : the teaching office, the pastoral office and the sacerdotal office. The three offices are indicated in John 14, 6 : "I am the way (pastoral office), the truth (teaching office), and the life (sacerdotal office)."

I. The Teaching Office

§ 5. Christ's Teaching or Prophetical Office

1. The Soteriological Significance of Christ's Teaching Office

The soteriological significance of Christ's teaching office flows from this that religious ignorance is a consequence of sin, which came into the world through the seduction of the devil, the father of lies (John 8, 44). Cf. Rom. 1, 18 et seq. ;

John 1, 5 ; 3, 19. The Redeemer who came "to destroy the works of the devil" (1 John 3, 8) and to free mankind from his slavery, had first to take away from humanity the spiritual darkness stemming from sin, and to bring the light of true knowledge. Christ bears witness to the redeeming power of truth in the words : "The truth shall make you free" (John 8, 32).

2. Christ as Teacher and Prophet according to the Testimony of the Sources of Faith

Christ is the Supreme Prophet promised in the Old Covenant and the absolute teacher of humanity. (Sent. certa.)

The prophecy of Moses in Dt. 18, 15 : "The Lord thy God will raise up to thee a PROPHET of thy nation and of thy brethren like unto me. Him shalt thou hear," is, in the New Testament, referred to Christ. Cf. Acts 3, 22 ; John 1, 45 ; 6, 14.

Christ designates Himself as the Light of the World (John 8, 12 ; 12, 46), calls Himself the Truth (John 14, 6), and regards the announcing of the truth as one of His essential tasks (John 18, 37 ; 8, 40), approves of the salutation, "Master and Lord" (John 13, 13) and claims to be the "sole teacher" of men : "Neither be ye called masters : for One is your Master, Christ" (Mt. 23, 10). In the consciousness of His unique teaching authority, Christ transfers His right to teach all men to others (Mt. 28, 19 ; Mk. 16, 15 et seq.). His hearers speak of the powerful impression made by His teaching : "Never did man speak like this man." (John 7, 46 ; cf. Mk. 1, 22).

St. Paul sees in Christ the ultimate and the supreme bearer of God's Revelation (Hebr. 1, 1 et seq.) : "At sundry times and in divers manners God spake in times past to the Fathers and by the Prophets, last of all in these days to us by His Son."

The Fathers extol Christ as the teacher of the truth. St. Ignatius of Antioch († about 107) calls Him "the candid mouth through which the Father has spoken the truth" (Rom. 8, 2), "our only teacher" (Magn. 9, 1). The early Christian apologists in particular stress the sublimity of the Christian teaching above all human wisdom, as it was revealed and guaranteed by the Incarnate Word, the Divine Wisdom which appeared in human form. Cf. St. Justin, Apol. 11, 10.

The ultimate basis of the unique authority of Christ's Teaching lies in the Hypostatic Union.

II. The Pastoral Office

§ 6. Christ's Pastoral or Kingly Office

1. The Soteriological Significance of Christ's Pastoral Office

The purpose of Christ's pastoral office was to show fallen mankind the right way to its supernatural final end. While the teaching office is directed to the understanding, by the preaching of Divine Truth, the pastoral office is concerned with

man's will, the inculcating the demands in it of the Divine Law and of a spirit of obedience to God's commands.

2. The Functions of Christ's Pastoral Office

The pastoral office includes legislative, judicial and punitive power. Accordingly Christ's pastoral office manifests itself in legislation, in judicial functions, and in the execution of His judgments.

3. Christ as the Lawgiver and Judge of Mankind

The Council of Trent declared against the teaching of Luther (according to which Christ had given not commands, but merely promises), that Christ is not only our Redeemer, but also our Lawgiver: *Si quis dixerit, Jesum Christum a Deo hominibus datum fuisse ut redemptorem, cui fidant, non etiam ut legislatorem, cui oboediant, A.S. D 831.*

The Creeds attest the Kingship of the Risen Christ and His second coming at the General Judgment. The Apostles' Creed confesses: *sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris omnipotentis, inde venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos.* The Nicene Creed proclaims the eternal duration of the Kingdom of Christ: *cuius regni non erit finis* (D 86). Pope Pius XI, in 1925, established a special feast by the Encyclical, "Quas primas," in honour of the Kingship of Christ. D 2194 et seq.

The New Testament confirms the Old Testament prophecies of the Messianic Kingship (cf. Ps. 2; 44; 71; Is. 9, 6 et seq.; Dn. 7, 13 et seq.). The Angel Gabriel announces: "The Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His Father; and He shall reign in the House of Jacob for ever. And of His Kingdom there shall be no end." (Luke 1, 32). Christ, before Pilate, confesses Himself to be a king. In reply to Pilate's question: "Art thou a King?" He gives the affirmative answer: "Thou sayest that I am a king" (John 18, 37), but at the same time stresses the celestial character of His Kingdom: "My kingdom is not of this world" (John 18, 36; cf. John 6, 15; Mt. 22, 21). His royal power encompasses heaven and earth. "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth" (Mt. 28, 18). In the Apocalypse, St. John calls Christ: "the Prince of the Kings of the earth" (1, 5). "King of Kings, and Lord of Lords" (19, 16).

Christ has particularly confirmed His lawgiving power in the promulgation of the basic law of His kingdom (Sermon on the Mount), and in the organisation of the Kingdom of God on earth, i.e., of the Church. He authoritatively decides concerning the obligation of the Mosaic Law, gives the new law of love (John 13, 34; 15, 12) and demands strict observance of His commandments (John 14, 15; 15, 10; Mt. 28, 20).

To His supreme lawgiving power there corresponds His supreme judicial power. Jesus bears witness: "For neither doth the Father judge any man, but hath given all judgment to the Son." (John 5, 22). The judgment that the Son shall pass will be immediately executed: "And these (the evil ones) shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just into life everlasting" (Mt. 25, 46).

The Fathers, relying on the Old Testament prophecies and on His own claim, attribute to Christ the title of King. Cf. *Martyrium Polycarpi*, 9, 3 ; 17, 3 ; *St. Irenaeus, Ad. haer.* I 10, 1. As early as the beginning of the second century we have a Christian interpolation to Ps. 95, 10 : *Dominus regnavit a ligno.* Cf. *Barnabas Letter* 8, 5 : *St. Justin, Apol.* I 41 ; *Dial.* 73. The King ruling from the wood (of the Cross) is Christ, the King.

Pope Pius XI teaches in the Encyclical, "*Quas primas*," that Christ, by reason of the Hypostatic Union, possesses not merely an indirect, but also a direct power over temporal things, even though He made no use of this during His earthly life. D 2196.

III. The Priestly Office

According to the teaching of modern Rationalists, Christ's redemptive activity had a pedagogic significance only. It is limited to His teaching and His example, by which man is to be moved to his personal sanctifying activity. Accordingly Christ's efforts offer simply a support to our self-redemption.

According to the teaching of Revelation, not only did Christ bring to mankind new knowledge of God and of His demands, but He also removed the abyss between God and mankind which had been made by sin. Christ effected this reconciliation of fallen mankind with God through His priestly office.

§ 7. Reality of Christ's Priestly Office

The God-Man Jesus Christ is a High Priest. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Ephesus (431) teaches with St. Cyril of Alexandria, that the Word Himself stemming from God became our High Priest, when He became man and flesh like us "*Si quis ergo Pontificem et Apostolum nostrum dicit factum non ipsum Dei Verbum, quando caro factum est . . . A.S.*" (D 122). Thus as man He is a priest. The Council of Trent declared : *oportuit . . . sacerdotem alium secundum ordinem Melchisedech surgere, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum.* D 938.

In the Old Covenant Christ's priesthood is foretold in Ps. 109, 4 : "The Lord hath sworn and he will not repent : Thou art a priest for ever according to the Order of Melchisedech." The Messianic character of these words is confirmed by Mt. 22, 42 et seq. ; *Hebr.* 5, 6, 10 ; 7, 17, 21.

The Epistle to the Hebrews contains a formal treatise on Christ's priesthood (3, 1 ; 4, 14 et seq. ; 7, 1 et seq.). The author points out that Christ personally fulfilled all demands of the priesthood. "For every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins" (5, 1) ; Christ had human nature in common with us men so that he might have sympathy with our

weaknesses (4, 15); He was called by God to the priesthood (5, 5 et seq.); for all those who obey Him He is the author of eternal salvation (5, 9); by offering Himself on the Cross as a sacrifice of expiation (7, 27; 9, 28).

Christ's priesthood is exalted over the Levitic priesthood of the Old Covenant. Compare the relation of Melchisedech who was a model of Christ, to Abraham (7, 1 et seq.). According to Ps. 109, 4, Christ was installed in the priestly office through an oath of God (7, 20 et seq.); He possesses a priesthood which does not pass (7, 23 et seq.); He is holy, innocent, immaculate, separated from all sinners (7, 26 et seq.); He is the Son of God consummated in eternity (7, 28); through His unique act of self-sacrifice He washed away the sins of men (7, 27).

The Fathers, from the very beginning, reiterate the thoughts of the Epistle to the Hebrews. St. Clement of Rome calls Christ: "the High Priest of our sacrificial gifts" (Cor. 36, 1). St. Ignatius of Antioch says in regard to Christ's priesthood: "Good are the priests (of the Old Covenant), but better is the High Priest to Whom the All-Highest is entrusted" (= Jesus Christ; Philad. 9, 1). St. Polycarp calls Jesus Christ, "The Eternal High Priest" (Phil. 12, 2).

Christ's priesthood begins with the Hypostatic Union. The proper task of the priest consists in being a mediator between God and men (S. th. III 22, 1). The ontological middle position which is a presupposition for the exercise of the mediating activity, belongs to Christ by reason of the Hypostatic Union.

Christ's priesthood is of eternal duration, as the sacerdotal dignity of Christ founded in the Hypostatic Union remains for ever, and also because the operation of His priesthood endures eternally in those redeemed who enjoy for ever the Beatific Vision. Again, Christ's sacrificial disposition, as far as it consists in praise and thanksgiving, endures for eternity. Cf. S. th. III 22, 5.

§ 8. The Exercise of the Sacerdotal Office or Christ's Sacrifice

1. Concept of Sacrifice

The most essential function of the sacerdotal office is sacrifice. Hebr. 8, 3: "For every high priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices." The Council of Trent declares: "Sacrifice and priesthood are, through God's ordinance, so connected with each other that both existed in every order of salvation (in omni lege)" D 957.

By sacrifice is understood in the widest sense, the surrender of some good for the sake of a good aim. The religious meaning attaching to sacrifice in the wider sense is every inner act of self-surrender to God, and every outer manifestation of the inner sacrificial disposition, e.g., prayer, alms-giving, mortification. Cf. Ps. 50, 19; 140, 2; Os. 14, 3; Eccles. 35, 4; Rom. 12, 1. In the narrower liturgical sense one takes sacrifice to mean an external religious act, in which a gift perceptible to the senses is offered by an ordained servant of God in recognition of the absolute sovereignty and majesty of God, and, since the Fall, in atonement to God. In a sacrifice we distinguish: a) A visible sacrificial gift (*res oblata*) which represents the thing being sacrificed, b) A sacrificing priest (*minister sacrificii*) who is authorised to appear before God as the representative of the community, c) The purpose of the sacrifice (*finis sacrificii*), which primarily consists in the recognition of the absolute majesty of God through adoration, thanksgiving,

entreaties, and secondarily in the reconciliation with God through atonement, d) An act of sacrifice (*actio sacrificia, sacrificium visibile*), which represents in a way apparent to the senses the inner sacrificial disposition (*sacrificium invisibile*) through the offering of the sacrificial gift.

2. Christ's Sacrifice on the Cross

Christ offered Himself on the Cross as a true and proper sacrifice. (*De fide*.)

The Council of Ephesus (431) teaches with St. Cyril of Alexandria: "He (Christ) offered Himself for us as a sweet odour (that is, as a pleasing sacrifice) to the God and Father" (*obtulit autem semetipsum pro nobis in odorem suavitatis Deo et Patri*) (D 122). The doctrinal decisions of the Council of Trent on the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass presuppose the sacrificial character of Christ's death on the Cross. D 940: *qui in ara crucis semel se ipsum cruento obtulit*. Cf. D 938, 951. Rationalism is opposed to this dogma. Cf. D 2038. According to Hebr. 8-10, the sacrifices of the Old Covenant were models of the death of Christ on the Cross. The Prophet Isaias foretells not only the Passion and Death of the future Messiah, but also that He would voluntarily accept it as a "guilt-sacrifice" for the sins of mankind. Cf. Is. 53, 7-12. St. John the Baptist, the last of the Prophets, following Isaias, sees in Christ the Lamb of Sacrifice, who took on Himself the sins of all mankind, in order to atone for them. John 1, 29: "Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world!"

St. Paul, most clearly of all, bears witness to the sacrificial character of Christ's death on the Cross. Eph. 5, 2: "Christ also hath loved us and hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice (*προσφορὰν καὶ θυσίαν*), to God as a sweet odour (as a pleasing sacrifice)." 1 Cor. 5, 7: "For Christ our Pasch is sacrificed." Rom. 3, 25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation (*ἱλαστήριον*) through faith in His blood." The atoning blood is, however, according to Holy Scripture (cf. Lv. 17, 11) sacrificial blood. Hebr. 9, 1-10, 18 describes the superiority of the sacrifice offered by Christ on the Cross over the Old Testament sacrifices, 9, 28: "So also Christ was offered to exhaust the sins of many." Cf. 1 John 2, 2.

Christ Himself indirectly designated His death on the Cross as a sacrifice for the sins of men, by using the biblical sacrificial terms "giving up of life" and "shedding of blood." Mt. 20, 28 (Mk. 10, 45): "For the Son of Man also is not come to be administered unto; but to minister and to give His life a Redemption for many." In the inauguration of the Holy Eucharist He indicates the sacrificial character of His death. Luke 22, 19: "This is my body which is given for you." Mt. 26, 28: "This is my blood of the New Testament which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins."

The Fathers, from the very beginning, regarded Christ's death on the Cross as a sacrifice for the sins of mankind. The author of the Barnabas Letter, 7, 3, says: "He Himself wished to offer the vessel of life (= His Body) as a sacrifice for our sins, so that the model would be fulfilled, which was given in Isaac, which was offered on the altar of sacrifice." Cf. St. Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus*, 5, 23, 1; St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* X 20; *De Trin.* IV 14, 19.

The sacrificial character of Christ's death on the Cross may be established, speculatively, in that all the demands of a sacrificial act were fulfilled. Christ as man was at the same time sacrificing priest and sacrificial gift. As God together with the Father and with the Holy Ghost, He was also the receiver of the sacrifice. The act of sacrifice consisted in the fact that Christ, in a disposition of the most perfect self-surrender, voluntarily gave up His life to God by permitting His enemies to kill Him, although He had the power of preventing it. Cf. John 10, 18.

§ 9. The Soteriological Importance of Christ's Sacrifice

Even though all Christ's individual activities have redemptive value for us, and as a whole compose the work of the Redemption, still His redemptive activity finds its apogee in the death of sacrifice on the Cross. On this account it is, by excellence but not exclusively, the efficient cause of our redemption.

1. Teaching of the Church

Christ by His Sacrifice on the Cross has ransomed us and reconciled us with God. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that Our Lord offered His life on the Cross for our eternal redemption: "Is igitur Deus et Dominus noster (etsi) semel se ipsum in ara crucis, morte intercedente, Deo Patri oblaturus erat, ut aeternam illis redemptionem operaretur," D 938. The same Council refers to the one mediator Jesus Christ: "who in His blood has reconciled us with God made unto us justice and sanctification and redemption" (1 Cor. 1, 30). D 790.

2. Testimony of the Sources of Faith

a) Christ regards the giving of His life as "a redemption for many" (λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν; Mt. 20, 28; Mk. 10, 45). In agreement with this St. Paul teaches that Christ gave Himself up as ransom for mankind and that the effect of His death of sacrifice was our ransom. 1 Tim. 2, 6: "Who gave Himself a redemption (ἀντὶ λύτρου) for all." Rom. 3, 24: "Being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ (διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως)." Cf. Eph. 1, 7; Col. 1, 14; 1 Cor. 6, 20; 1 Peter 1, 18; Apoc. 5, 9. The slavery from which Christ purchased mankind through His sacrificial death is the slavery of sin (Tit. 2, 14: "Who gave Himself for us that He might redeem us from all iniquity"; cf. Eph. 1, 7; Col. 1, 14; Hebr. 9, 12 et seq.), the slavery of the Mosaic Law (Gal. 3, 13: "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law"; cf. Gal. 4, 5; Rom. 7, 1 et seq.) the slavery of the Devil (Col. 1, 13: "Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness"; cf. 2, 15; Hebr. 2, 14) and the slavery of death (2 Tim. 1, 10: "He hath destroyed death"; cf. Hebr. 2, 14, et seq.).

b) Christ indicates the atoning power of His death in the inauguration of the Eucharist: "This is my blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sin" (Mt. 26, 28). St. Paul ascribes the reconciliation of sinners with God, that is, the restoration of the original relationship of child to parent and friendship with God, to Christ's death. Rom. 5, 10: "When we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son." Col. 1, 20: "It hath well pleased the Father through Him

(Christ) to reconcile all things unto Himself, making peace through the blood of His Cross," cf. 2 Cor. 5, 19; Eph. 2, 13 et seq.; 1 Peter 3, 18; 1 John 1, 7; 2, 2; 4, 10.

From the beginning the Fathers insist on the scriptural ideas of ransom and atonement. St. Irenaeus, appealing to the passages in the Epistle to the Ephesians (1, 7; 2, 13 et seq.), says: "Since between Him (Christ) and us there exists a community (namely the community of the flesh and blood), the Lord reconciled mankind with God, by reconciling us through the body of His flesh and ransomed us through His blood." (Adv. haer. V 14, 3).

3. Inadequate Patristic Theories of the Redemption

From the efforts to explain the dogma of the Redemption speculatively, various theories of the Redemption developed in Patristic times.

a) St. Irenaeus of Lyons († about 202) initiated the so-called recapitulation theory or mystic theory of Redemption, which, starting from Eph. 1, 10 (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι* = recapitulare: Vulg.: instaurare) teaches that Christ as the second Adam, saved and united with God the whole human race. In this view salvation of man had already taken place in principle through the Incarnation of the Son of God. Side by side with this theory which gave to the Passion and Death of Christ a subordinate significance only, St. Irenaeus also expounds the Pauline teaching of the ransoming and reconciling through Christ's death on the Cross. Cf. Adv. haer. III 16, 9; IV 5, 4; V 1, 1 et seq.; 14, 2-5; 16, 3; 17, 1.

b) Origen († 254) changed the Pauline teaching of man's ransom from the dominion of the devil to an unbiblical ransom-theory. He held that the devil by Adam's sin, had acquired a formal dominion over mankind. In order to liberate mankind from this tyranny Christ gave his life to the devil as ransom price. But the devil was deceived, as he was not able to maintain for long his dominion of death over Christ. Others explained that the devil lost his dominion over mankind by unjustly trying to extend this right to Christ also. Despite the fact that this error was widespread, Patristic teaching held firmly to the biblical teaching of man's reconciliation with God through Christ's death on the Cross. The notion of a dominion of the devil over fallen mankind was energetically refuted by St. Anselm of Canterbury.

§ 10. Christ's Vicarious Atonement

1. The Notion of Atonement

By atonement in general is understood the satisfaction of a demand. In the narrower sense it is taken to mean the reparation of an insult: *satisfactio nihil aliud est quam injuriae alteri illatae compensatio* (Cat. Rom. II 5, 59). This occurs through a voluntary performance which outweighs the injustice done. If such a performance through its intrinsic value completely counterbalances the grievousness of the guilt according to the demands of justice, the atonement is adequate or of full value (*satisfactio condigna, aequivalens sive ad aequalitatem iustitiae*); if it is not commensurate with the grievousness of the offence and is accepted as sufficient purely out of gracious consideration, it is inadequate or not of complete value (*satisfactio congruo sive ad benignitatem condonantis*). If the atonement is not performed by the offender himself, but by another in his stead, it is vicarious atonement (*satisfactio vicaria*).

2. Reality of Christ's Vicarious Atonement

Christ, through His Suffering and Death rendered vicarious atonement to God for the sins of man. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Council of Ephesus teaches with St. Cyril of Alexandria: "If any one says that He (Christ) offered the oblation for Himself, and not rather solely for us, let him be excluded." D 122. The Council of Trent says of Jesus Christus: Qui sua sanctissima passione in ligno crucis . . . pro nobis Deo Patri satisfacit. D 799 (who by His most holy Passion on the Cross offered satisfaction for us to God the Father). The Vatican Council intended to raise the teaching of Christ's vicarious satisfaction to the status of a formal dogma (Coll. Lac. VII 566). Holy Writ contains the teaching of the vicarious atonement, not indeed explicitly but by implication. Isaias (53, 4 et seq.) foretells of the Servant of God, that is, of the Messiah, that He, the Sinless One, for our sins and in our stead, would suffer and die like an innocent lamb of sacrifice, to obtain for us peace and justification. Christ expressed the idea of the vicarious atonement in the words: "The Son of Man is come . . . to give His life a redemption for many" (Mt. 20, 28). "I lay down my life for my sheep" (John 10, 15). The notion of the vicarious atonement appears distinctly in St. Paul also 2 Cor. 5, 21: "Him who knew no sin He hath made sin for us: that we might be made the justice of God in Him ($\epsilon\upsilon\eta\epsilon\rho\eta\mu\omega\nu=\alpha\nu\tau\iota\eta\mu\omega\nu$)"; Gal. 3, 13: "Christ hath redeemed us free from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." According to Rom. 3, 25 et seq., God's justice is revealed in the demand for and the acceptance of Christ's vicarious atonement-sacrifice, "to the shewing of His justice." Cf. 1 Peter 2, 24; 3, 18.

From the very beginning the Fathers were familiar with the idea of Christ's vicarious atonement. The Apostles' disciple, St. Clement of Rome, comments: "For the sake of the love which He had for us Our Lord Jesus Christ, according to the will of the Father has given His blood for us, His flesh for our flesh, and His soul for our souls" (Cor. 49, 6). Cf. The Letter to Diognetus, 9, 2.

St. Anselm of Canterbury († 1199) in his dialogue: "Cur Deus Homo" has speculatively penetrated and built up to a systematic theory of Redemption the idea of the vicarious atonement of Christ which is based in Scripture and tradition. While the Fathers, in the explanation of Christ's work of sanctification, proceed more from the contemplation of the consequences of the Redemption, and therefore stress the negative side of the Redemption, namely, the ransoming from the slavery of sin and of the devil, St. Anselm proceeds from the contemplation of the guilt of sin. This, as an insult offered to God, is infinite, and therefore demands an infinite expiation. Such expiation, however, can be achieved by a Divine Person only. To be capable of thus representing mankind, this person must be, at the same time, man and God.

3. The Intrinsic Perfection of Christ's Atonement

a) Christ's Vicarious Atonement is adequate or of full value, by reason of its intrinsic merit. (*Sent. communior.*)

When Holy Scripture designates Christ's precious blood, or the giving up of His life, as a ransom-price for our sins, the basic thought is that the atonement

offered is of equal value to the guilt of the sins. Cf. 1 Peter 1, 19; 1 Cor. 6, 20; 1 Tim. 2, 6.

The intrinsic reason of the adequacy of Christ's atonement lies in the Hypostatic Union. Christ's actions possess an intrinsic infinite value, because the principium quod is the Divine Person of the Logos. Thus Christ's atonement was, through its intrinsic value, sufficient to counterbalance the infinite insult offered to God, which is inherent in sin. According to the teaching of the Scotists and the Nominalists, it was adequate only by virtue of God's external acceptance.

b) Christ's Vicarious Atonement is superabundant, that is, the positive value of the expiation is greater than the negative value of the sin. (Sent. communis.)

Pope Clement VI declared in the Jubilee Bull "Unigenitus Dei filius" of the year 1343, that Christ had shed His blood copiously, as it were, in streams, even though one little drop of the blood, on account of the Hypostatic union with the Logos, would have sufficed for the Redemption of the whole human race. D 550.

In the parallel between Adam and Christ (Rom. 5, 12 et seq.) St. Paul teaches that the measure of the blessing going forth from Christ far surpasses the measure of the curse going forth from Adam. V. 20: "Wherever sins increase there grace has become superabundantly copious."

St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: "The injustice of sinners was not so great as the justice of Him who died for us; we have not sinned to the extent that He transcends through righteousness, who gave up His life for us" (Cat. 13, 33). Cf. St. J. Chryst. In ep. ad Rom. 10, 2.

4. The External Perfection of Christ's Atonement

a) (i) Christ did not die for the predestined only. (De fide.)

(ii) Christ died not for the Faithful only, but for all mankind without exception. (Sent. fidei proxima.)

In the year 1653, Pope Innocent X condemned as heretical the proposition that Christ died for the salvation of the predestined exclusively. D 1096. In the year 1690, Pope Alexander VIII rejected the assertion that Christ offered Himself to God for the Faithful only (pro omnibus et solis fidelibus). D 1294. The Council of Trent laid down: "Hence it was that the Heavenly Father sent His Son to men that He might redeem the Jews who were under the Law and that the gentiles who followed not after justice might receive justice and that all might receive the adoption of sons. Him God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in his blood for our sins and not alone for ours but for those of the whole world." D 794. Cf. D 319, 795.

Holy Scripture clearly teaches the universality of the deed of Redemption, and with it indirectly the atonement of Christ. 1 John 2, 2: "He (Christ) is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world." Cf. John 3, 16 et seq.; 11, 51 et seq.; 2 Cor. 5, 15: "He died for us all." 1 Tim. 2, 6: "He gave Himself a Redemption for all." Cf. Rom. 8, 18.

The Fathers living before the outbreak of the Pelagian controversy unanimously teach both the generality of God's will of sanctification and the generality of Christ's vicarious atonement. St. Clement of Rome writes: "Let us behold the blood of Christ and let us realise how precious it is to God His Father because it, shed for our salvation, has brought the grace of repentance to the whole world" (Cor. 7, 4). Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. III 22, 4. On Good Friday, the commemorative day of Christ's death of redemption, the Church prays for the salvation of all mankind.

The universality of Christ's vicarious atonement refers to the objective Redemption only. Christ made sufficient atonement for all men without exception. The subjective appropriation of the fruits of Redemption is, however dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions, on faith (Mk. 16, 16), and on the observation of the Commandments (Hebr. 5, 9; 2 Peter 1, 10). Accordingly the Schoolmen distinguish between *sufficientia* (adequacy) and *efficacia* (efficacy, success) of the atonement, and teach that Christ offered atonement for all mankind, *secundum sufficientiam*, but not *secundum efficaciam*. In other words: in *actu primo* Christ's atonement is universal; in *actu secundo*, it is particular. Cf. S.c.G. IV 55.

b) Christ's Atonement does not extend to the fallen angels.

The teaching of Origen, according to which the restoration of all things (*apokatastasis*; cf. Acts, 3, 21) by virtue of Christ's Atonement will also liberate the fallen angels out of hell, was rejected as heresy by a Synod at Constantinople (543). D 211. It contradicts the eternal nature of the pains of hell which is clearly attested in Holy Writ. Cf. Mt. 25, 46; 18, 8; 3, 12; 2 Thess. 1, 9.

§ 11. Christ's Merits

1. The Notion of Merit

By merit is understood a work completed for the benefit of another on whom it establishes a claim for reward, or the claim for rewards founded on the work. According as the reward is due in justice or merely out of graciousness, the merit is a *meritum de condigno* or a *meritum de congruo*. Christ's work of Redemption is at one and the same time satisfactory and meritorious, inasmuch as, on the one hand, it removes the relationship of guilt between humanity and God, and on the other hand, establishes a claim to recompense on the part of God.

2. Meritoriousness of Christ's Passion and Death

Christ, through His Passion and Death, merited reward from God. (*De fide*.)

The Council of Trent teaches that the origin of the merit of Jesus Christ's justification is that He, through His most holy Passion, has merited justification for us (*qui sua sanctissima passione . . . nobis justificationem meruit*). D 799. The same Council lays down that original sin is removed by the merits of Jesus Christ only, and that through Baptism the merits of Christ are applied to adults and children. D 790. Holy Writ does not use the word "merit," but it explicitly teaches the doctrine of Christ's merit. Cf. Phil. 2, 9: "for which

cause (becoming obedient unto death) God hath exalted Him." Hebr. 2, 9 : "We see Jesus . . . for the suffering of death crowned with glory and honour." Exaltation is the reward for His obedience in suffering.

The meritoriousness of Christ's actions may be speculatively established by reason of the fact that all the conditions of a true and proper merit were fulfilled. They were free, morally good, supernatural, performed in the state of earthly pilgrimage and in the state of grace, and had the Divine promise of reward (Is. 53, 10). As actions of a Divine Person they possessed an infinite meritorious value. Cf. D 552 : *infinita Christi merita*. As the whole life-work of Christ, not merely His Passion and Death, has an atoning value, it is meritorious also.

3. Object of Christ's Merit

a) Christ merited for Himself the condition of exaltation (Resurrection, Transfiguration of the body, Ascension into Heaven). (*Sent. certa.*)

Cf. Phil. 2, 8 et seq.; Hebr. 2, 9; John 17, 4; Luke 24, 26; Apoc. 5, 12. The Latin Fathers, relying on Phil. 2, 8 et seq., speak of the merits of humility and of obedience, and designate the glorification of Christ as His reward and remuneration (*retributio, praeium, merces*). St. Hilary of Poitiers says : "On account of the merit of humility (*ob humilitatis meritum*) He recovers the form of God in the lowliness which He assumed" (In Ps. 53, 5). St. Augustine comments : "Through humiliation He merited the transfiguration. Transfiguration is the reward for humiliation" (*humilitas claritatis est meritum, claritas humilitatis est praeium* : In Ioan. tr. 104, 3). Cf. S. th. III 19, 3.

b) Christ merited all supernatural graces received by fallen mankind. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Decretum pro Jacobitis declares that "nobody has been freed from the power of the Devil except through the merits of the mediator Jesus Christ." D 711. According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, "no one can be just to whom the merits of Christ's Passion have not been communicated." D 800. Cf. D 790, 795, 797, 799.

It is a fundamental doctrine of St. Paul that salvation can be acquired only by the grace merited by Christ. Rom. 3, 24 et seq.; 5, 15 et seq.; 7, 24 et seq.; Eph. 2, 4 et seq. The Apostle St. Peter testified before the High Council : "Neither is there salvation in any other." Acts 4, 12.

The Fathers designate supernatural grace as *gratia Dei per Jesus Christum* or *gratia Christi*. Cf. D 103 et seq. The word *meritum* is applied in Patristic literature to the merit which Christ acquired for Himself only.

CHAPTER 3

The Glorious Conclusion of Christ's Work of Redemption

Christ's Exaltation

§ 12. Christ's Descent into Hell

After His Death, Christ's soul, which was separated from His body, descended into the underworld. (*De fide.*)

The underworld is the place of detention for the souls of the just of the pre-Christian era, the so-called vestibule of hell (limbus Patrum).

The later version of the Apostles' Creed (5th century) contains the article : descendit ad inferos ; similarly the Creed Quicumque (D 40). The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) more explicitly declares : descendit ad inferos, . . . sed descendit in anima. D 429. Cf. D 385.

The doctrine of Christ's descent into hell does not, as rationalism maintains, draw its inspiration from heathen myths, but from the Old Testament Revelation of the intermediate condition between death and resurrection, in which the departed souls sojourn in the underworld (Scheol). In regard to His stay in the underworld during the period between death and resurrection, Jesus says : "For as Jonas was in the whale's belly three days and three nights ; so shall the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights." (Mt. 12, 40). The expression "heart of the earth" (κατὰ διὰ τῆς γῆς) does not signify the grave, but the underworld, which was visualised as being localised in the interior of the earth, as it were in its heart. This interpretation is supported by the parallel to Jon. 2, 3 ("belly of hell") (κοιλία ᾧδου) as well as by the Old Testament visualisation that the point of departure of the resurrection is the underworld, the place of detention of the departed souls. St. Peter, speaking of Christ's Resurrection, says : "God hath raised Him up having loosed the sorrows of hell (of the empire of death) as it was impossible that He should be holden by it death." Acts. 2, 24. The dissolution of the "blasts of death" (according to another way of reading : "of the winds of Hades") is a symbol of the freeing of the dead from the underworld (cf. 4 Esr. 4, 41 ; Col. 1, 18 : "The firstborn from the dead"). Referring to the Psalm passage 15, 10 : "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell ; nor wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption," we read : "Foreseeing this He (David) spoke of the Resurrection of Christ, for neither was He left in hell : neither did His flesh see corruption" (Acts 2, 31).

St. Paul in Rom. 10, 6 et seq., bears witness to Christ's stay in the underworld : "But the justice which is of Faith speaketh thus : Say not in thy heart : Who shall ascend into heaven ? That is to bring Christ down ; or who shall descend

into the deep? That is to bring up Christ again from the dead." Of note also is the formula which was in frequent use: "to raise up or to awake from the dead" (*ἐκ νεκρῶν*), and which in its application to Christ asserts that His soul before the Resurrection was in the Empire of the Dead, that is, in the underworld.

The passage Eph. 4, 9: "'He ascended,' what is it but because He also descended into the lower parts of the earth?" is, according to the context, to be understood, not of Christ's descent into the underworld, but of His descent in the Incarnation from heaven "into the lower parts of the earth." The interpretation of the passage 1 Peter 3, 19 et seq.: "In which (=in the spirit) also coming He preached to these spirits that were in prison which had been some time (in the days of Noah) incredulous," is uncertain; however, the uncertainty refers not so much to the fact as to the purpose of Christ's descent to the underworld.

Tradition unanimously bears witness to the fact of Christ's descent into the underworld. St. Ignatius of Antioch writes that Christ had "awakened the Prophets from the dead, who were His disciples in spirit, and who awaited Him as their teacher on His arrival" (Magn. 9, 2). St. Justin and St. Irenaeus quote an apocryphal passage in Jeremias, in which they see Christ's descent into hell clearly foretold: "The Lord, the Holy God of Israel, bethought Him of His dead who slept in the earth of the grave, and He went down to them in order to announce to them the salvation" (St. Irenaeus Adv. haer. IV 33, 1, 12 and V 31, 1: "in order to release them and to save them"). Cf. St. Justin, Dial. 72; 99; St. Irenaeus Adv. haer. III 20, 4; IV 22, 1; IV 33, 1, 12; V 31, 1 (with Scriptural proof); Epist. 78. Tertullian, De anima 7; 55. St. Hippolyt, De antichristo 26; 45. St. Augustine attests the general belief of the Church when he says: "Who other than an unbeliever can deny that Christ was in the underworld?" (Ep. 164, 2, 3). Further, the apocryphal literature witnesses to the Church belief in Christ's descent into Hell. Compare the Odes of Solomon (a Christian composition of the 2nd century) Nos. 17 and 42.

The purpose of the descent into Hell was, according to the general teaching of theologians, the freeing of the just in Limbo by the application of the fruits of the Redemption, that is, by the communication of the Beatific Vision. Cf. S. th. III 52, 5. Cat. Rom. I 6, 6.

§ 13. Christ's Resurrection

1. Dogma

On the third day after His Death Christ rose gloriously from the dead. (*De fide.*)

The Resurrection of Christ is a basic truth of Christianity, which is expressed in all the symbols of Faith and in all rules of Faith of the ancient Church.

Christ, as the Eleventh Synod of Toledo (675) emphasizes, rose through His own power (*virtute propria sua*) (D 286). The source of His Resurrection is the Hypostatic Union. The Principal Cause of the Resurrection was the Word, together with the Father and the Holy Ghost; the Instrumental Cause was the parts of the humanity of Christ, soul and body which were hypostatically united with the Godhead. When Holy Writ (for example Acts 2, 24; Gal. 1, 1) asserts that Christ was awakened by God or by the Father,

these assertions are to be taken as referring to His humanity. Cf. Cat. Rom. I 6. 8.

All forms of rationalism in ancient and modern times (deceit hypothesis, apparent death hypothesis, vision hypothesis), deny Christ's Resurrection. Compare the condemnation of Modernism by Pope Pius X. D 2036 et seq.

2. Foundation

In the Old Testament, Christ's Resurrection is, according to the exposition of St. Peter and St. Paul (Acts 2, 24 et seq. ; 13, 35 et seq.), announced in Ps. 15, 10 : " Because thou wilt not leave my soul in hell nor wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption." Cf. D 2272. The Resurrection of the Messias is presupposed also in Is. 53, 10 : The servant of God who has given Himself as a sacrifice for guilt " shall see a long-lived seed " and execute the plan of the Lord.

Christ definitely prophesied that He would rise from the dead on the third day after His death. Cf. Mt. 12, 40 ; 16, 21 ; 17, 22 ; 20, 19 ; 27, 63, 28, 6 ; John 2, 19. The reality of the Resurrection is proved by the fact of the empty tomb—a furtive removal of the corpse was, in the circumstances, out of the question—and of the many appearances during which Jesus spoke with His disciples, allowed Himself to be touched by them, and ate with them. Cf. Mt. 28 ; Mk. 16 ; Luke 24 ; John 20–21 ; 1 Cor. 15, 3 et seq. ; Christ's Resurrection is the centre of the Apostolic doctrinal teaching. The Apostles give forceful testimony of the Resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ ; cf. Acts 1, 22 ; 2, 24, 32 ; 3, 15 ; 13, 30 et seq. ; 17, 3, 18 ; 26, 23.

The Body of the Risen Christ was in a state of glory as is apparent from a study of the circumstances of the appearances, and from the Risen Christ's supremacy over the bonds of space and time. The Risen Christ retained the wounds in His transfigured body as tokens of His triumph over death. John 20, 27 : " Put thy finger hither and see my hands. And bring hither thy hand and put it into my side and be not faithless but believing."

The Fathers attest the Resurrection of the Lord with great emphasis and with a complete unanimity against heathen materialism and against the Jewish unbelief.

3. Significance

For Christ Himself the Resurrection was the entry into the condition of Glory which was the reward for His self-abasement in suffering.

From the soteriological point of view the Resurrection, unlike Christ's Death, is not the meritorious cause of our Redemption, but it is the victorious completion of the work of Redemption. It belongs however to the completeness of the Redemption, and is therefore associated in the Holy Scriptures, with the death on the Cross, as one complete whole. Cf. Rom. 4, 25. It is the model of our spiritual Resurrection from sin (Rom. 6, 3 et seq.) and the model and pledge of the resurrection of our bodies (1 Cor. 15, 20 et seq. ; Phil. 3, 21).

From the apologetic point of view, the Resurrection is the greatest of all Christ's miracles, and as the fulfilment of prophecy, the strongest proof of the truth of His teaching. Cf. 1 Cor. 15, 14 et seq.

§ 14. Christ's Ascension into Heaven

1. Dogma

Christ ascended body and soul into Heaven and sits at the right hand of the Father. (*De fide*.)

All Creeds in agreement with that of the Apostles confess: *ascendit ad coelos, sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris omnipotentis*. The *Caput Firmiter* says more exactly: *ascendit pariter in utroque* (sc. in anima et in carne). D 429.

Christ ascended into Heaven of His own power and indeed as God in Divine Power and as man in the power of His transfigured soul which moves His transfigured body, as it will. In regard to the human nature of Christ, one can also, following the Scriptures, assert that it was taken up or elevated into Heaven (by God) (Mark 16, 19; Luke 24, 51; Acts 1, 9, 11). Cf. S. th. III 57, 3; Cat. Rom. I 7, 2.

Rationalism is opposed to this dogma, and seeks to explain the origin of the belief in the Ascension by a borrowing from the Old Testament (Gn. 5. 24; carrying off of Enoch; 4 Kings 2, 11; ascension of Elias) or from pagan mythology, but in doing so omits to see the basic differences. Similarity, if there be such, by no means signifies dependence. The definite testimony of the Apostolic era leaves no room for the formation of legends.

2. Foundation

Christ foretold His Ascension (cf. John 6, 63; 14, 2, 16, 28; 20, 17) and accomplished this on the fortieth day after His Resurrection in the presence of many witnesses. Mark 16, 19: "And the Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken up into Heaven and sitteth on the right hand of God."

f. Luke 24, 51; 1 Peter 3, 22.

The Fathers give unanimous testimony of Christ's Ascension. All the ancient rules of Faith mention it together with the Death and the Resurrection. Cf. St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* I 10, 1; III 4, 2; Tertullian, *De praescr.* 13; *De virg. vel.* 1; *Adv. Prax.* 2; Origen, *De princ.* I praef. 4.

The biblical expression "to sit at the right hand of God," which goes back to Ps. 109, 1 and which is frequently used in the Epistles of the Apostles (Rom. 8, 34; Eph. 1, 20. Col. 3, 1; Hebr. 1, 3; 8, 1; 10, 12; 12, 2; 1 Peter 3, 22) asserts that Christ, elevated in His humanity over all the angels and saints, takes up a place of honour and participates in the honour and glory, and in the jurisdiction and judicial power of God. Cf. St. John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* IV 2.

3. Significance

From the christological angle the Ascension means the final elevation of Christ's human nature into the condition of Divine glory.

From the soteriological angle it is the crowning conclusion of the work of the Redemption. According to the general teaching of the Church, the souls of the just of the pre-Christian era also moved with the Saviour into the glory of Heaven. Cf. Eph. 4, 8 (after Ps. 67, 19) "He ascended on high; He led captivity captive" (*Ascendens in altum captivam duxit captivitatem*). In Heaven He prepares a place for His own (John 14, 2 et seq.), intercedes for them (Hebr. 7, 25);

" always living to make intercession for them " (Vulg. : for us) (Hebr. 9, 24 , Romans 8, 34 ; 1 John 2, 1) and sends them His gifts of grace, especially the Holy Ghost (John 14, 16 ; 16, 7). At the end of the world He is to come again with great power and glory to judge the world (Mt. 24, 30). Christ's Ascension is the archetype and the pledge of our own ascension into Heaven. Eph. 2, 6 : ' Through Jesus Christ " (that is on account of our mystic unity with Christ, the Head) " He hath raised us up together and hath made us sit together in the Heavenly places."

PART 3

The Mother of the Redeemer

CHAPTER I

Mary's Motherhood of God

§ 1. Reality of Mary's Motherhood of God

1. The Nestorian Heresy.

The denial of the true humanity of Christ involves the denial of the true motherhood of Mary and the denial of the Divinity of Christ logically also leads to the denial of Mary's motherhood of God. Thus the Nestorians refused to recognise Mary's title *θεοτόκος* (= Mother of God), and designated her by the names *ἀνθρωποτόκος* (= Mother of Man) or *χριστοτόκος* (= Mother of Christ).

2. The Dogma.

Mary is truly the Mother of God. (*De fide.*)

In the Apostles' Creed the Church professes her belief in the Son of God, "born of the Virgin Mary." As the Mother of the Son of God, Mary is the Mother of God. The Council of Ephesus (431) with St. Cyril of Alexandria declared against Nestorius: "If any one does not confess that the Emmanuel (Christ) in truth is God and that on this account the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God (*θεοτόκος*)—since according to the flesh she brought forth the Word of God made flesh—let him be anathema." D 113. The subsequent General Councils repeated and confirmed this doctrine. Cf. D 148, 218, 290.

The dogma of Mary's motherhood of God contains two truths—

- a) Mary is truly a mother, that is, she contributed everything to the formation of the human nature of Christ, that every other mother contributes to the formation of the fruit of her body;
- b) Mary is truly the Mother of God, that is, she conceived and bore the Second Person of the Divinity, not indeed according to the Divine Nature, but according to the assumed human nature.

3. Proof from Scripture and Tradition.

Scripture implicitly affirms Mary's Divine motherhood by attesting, on the one hand, the true Divinity of Christ (see Christology), and on the other hand, Mary's true motherhood. Thus Mary is called: "Mother of Jesus" (John 2, 1); "His Mother" (Mt. 1, 18; 2, 11. 13. 20; 12, 46; 13, 55); "Mother of the Lord" (Luke 1, 43). Mary's true motherhood is clearly foretold by the Prophet Isaias: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a Son and his name shall be called Emmanuel" (7, 14). In similar words the angel transmits to Mary the message: "Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a Son and thou shalt call his name Jesus" (Luke 1, 31). The motherhood of God is included in the words of St. Luke 1, 35:

"The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God," and in the words of Gal. 4, 4: "God sent His Son made of a woman." The woman who bore the Son of God is the Progenitress of God, or the Mother of God.

The Fathers also teach Mary's true motherhood of God, not explicitly, but implicitly. St. Ignatius of Antioch says: "For our God Jesus Christ was carried in Mary's womb according to God's resolve of salvation"; From the seed of David, it is true but by the Holy Ghost (Eph. 18, 2). St. Irenaeus says: "This Christ, who as Logos of the Father was with the Father . . . was born of a virgin" (Epid. 53). The title "*θεοτόκος*" became current after the third century. It is attested to by Origen (an ostensibly earlier testimony of St. Hippolytus of Rome is probably an interpolation), St. Alexander of Alexandria, Eusebius of Caesarea, St. Athanasius, St. Epiphanius, by the Cappadocians and others, as well as by Arius and Apollinaris of Laodicea. St. Gregory Nazianzus (about the year 382) writes: "If anyone does not recognise the Holy Mary as the Mother of God, he is separated from the Divinity" (Ep. 101, 4). The principal defender against Nestorius of the Marian title of honour is St. Cyril of Alexandria.

To the objection made by Nestorius that Mary is not the Mother of God because from her was taken the human nature only, but not the Divine Nature, it is replied that not the nature as such, but the person was conceived and born. As Mary conceived and bore the Person of the God-Logos subsisting in human nature, she is truly the Mother of God. Thus the title of Theotokos includes a confession of the Divinity.

§ 2. Mary's Fullness of Grace and Her Dignity Deriving from Her Motherhood of God

1. Mary's Objective Dignity

As the mother of God, Mary transcends in dignity all created persons, angels and men, because the dignity of a creature is the greater the nearer it is to God. And of all created things after the human nature of Christ, which is hypostatically united with the Person of the Logos, Mary is nearest to the Triune God. As a true mother she is related by blood to the Son of God according to His human nature. Through the Son she is associated intimately also with the Father and the Holy Ghost. The Church honours her on account of her position as Mother of God, and on account of her high endowment with grace deriving from her position as daughter of the Heavenly Father and Spouse of the Holy Ghost. In a certain sense (*secundum quid*) Mary's dignity is infinite, since she is the mother of an Infinite Divine Person. Cf. S. th. I 25, 6 ad 4.

In order to express the sublime dignity of the Mother of God, the Church, following the Fathers, applies many Old Testament literary passages in an accommodated sense for Mary: a) passages from the Psalms, which depict the glory of the magnificence of the tent of the Covenant, of the Temple and of the City of Sion (86, 3; 45, 5; 131, 13); b) passages from the Sapiential Books which refer to the Divine Wisdom and transferred to Mary "*Sedes Sapientiae*" (Prov. 8, 22 et seq.; Ecclus 11, 23 et seq.); c) passages from the Song of Songs, in which the bride is glorified (for example, 4, 7), and transferred to Mary the "Bride of the Holy Ghost."

The Fathers call Mary, on account of her sublime dignity, Lady and Queen. St. John Damascene says: "Verily she is in the proper and true sense the Mother of God and The Lady; she rules over all Creation as she is both maid and the Mother of the Creator" (De fide orth. IV 14).

2. Mary's Plenitude of Grace

a) Mary is full of Grace.

Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical *Mystici Corporis* (1943) says of the Virgin Mother of God: "Her most holy soul, more than the souls of all others of God's creatures, was filled with the Divine Spirit of Jesus Christ."

Mary's plenitude of grace is declared in the greeting of the angel (Luke 1, 28): "Hail, full of grace (κεχαριτωμένη) the Lord is with thee." According to the context, Mary's special endowment with grace is an accompaniment of her vocation to be the Mother of the Messiah or the Mother of God. This vocation demands a specially rich measure of Sanctifying Grace.

The Fathers stress the connection between Mary's fullness of grace and her dignity as Mother of God. St. Augustine, having based her sinlessness on her dignity as Mother of God, says: "Whence, then, do we know with what excess of grace she was endowed, in order to conquer sin in every regard, who merited to conceive and to bear Him of whom it is certain that He had no sin?" (De natura et gratia, 36, 42).

St. Thomas sees in Mary's fullness of grace a verification of the axiom: The nearer a thing is to a principle, the more it receives from the operation of that principle. But of all creatures Mary His Mother stands nearest to Christ, who is the source of Grace, as God auctoritative, as man instrumentaliter. Consequently she duly received from Him a supreme measure of Grace. But above all Mary's vocation to be the Mother of God demands for her the richest endowment with Grace. S. th. III 27, 5.

b) Limits to Mary's fullness of grace.

The measure of grace of the Mother of God falls as much short of Christ's fullness of grace as the dignity of the Mother of God falls short of the Hypostatic Union. On the other hand the fullness of grace of the Mother of God as much transcends the fullness of grace of even the highest angels and saints as the dignity of the Mother of God surpasses the supernatural excellences of the angels and the saints. But all possible supernatural excellences cannot be summarily derived from Mary's fullness of grace. There are no grounds for ascribing to the Mother of God all the gifts of grace possessed by Adam and Eve in the state of primitive innocence or the possession of the Beatific Vision during her earthly life, or the gifts of self-consciousness and the use of reason from the first moment of her creation or a unique knowledge of the mysteries of Faith or an extraordinary knowledge of profane things or even the infused knowledge of the angels. That she did not possess the Beatific Vision is proved by Luke 1, 45: "Blessed art thou who has believed." On the other hand, it is consonant with the dignity of the Mother of God that to her are attributed a high degree of supernatural knowledge of Faith, and, after her conception of Christ, a special grace of mystical contemplation. Cf. S. th. III 27, 5 ad 3.

While Christ's fullness of grace was perfect from the beginning, the Mother of God increased in grace and holiness up to her death. Cf. S. th. III 27, 5 ad 2.

CHAPTER 2

The Privileges of the Mother of God

§ 3. Mary's Immaculate Conception

1. Dogma

**Mary was conceived without stain of original sin.
(*De fide.*)**

On the 8th December, 1854, Pope Pius IX, in the Bull "*Ineffabilis*" promulgated the following doctrine as revealed by God, and therefore to be believed firmly and constantly by all the faithful: "The Most Holy Virgin Mary was, in the first moment of her conception, by a unique gift of grace and privilege of Almighty God, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of mankind, preserved free from all stain of original sin." D 1641.

Explanation of the dogma :

a) By conception is to be understood the passive conception. The first moment of the conception is that moment of time in which the soul was created by God and infused into the bodily matter prepared by her parents. b) The essence of original sin consists (formaliter) in the lack of sanctifying grace, in consequence of the fall of Adam. Mary was preserved from this defect, so that she entered existence in the state of sanctifying grace.

c) Mary's freedom from original sin was an unmerited gift of God (*gratia*), and an exception from the law (*privilegium*) which was vouchsafed to her only (*singulare*).

d) The efficient cause (*causa efficiens*) of the Immaculate Conception of Mary was Almighty God.

e) The meritorious cause (*causa meritoria*) was the Redemption by Jesus Christ. It follows from this that even Mary was in need of redemption, and was in fact redeemed. By reason of her natural origin, she, like all other children of Adam, was subject to the necessity of contracting original sin (*debitum contrahendi peccatum originale*), but by a special intervention of God, she was preserved from stain of original sin; *debutit contrahere peccatum, sed non contraxit*. Thus Mary also was redeemed "by the grace of Christ" but in a more perfect manner than other human beings. While these are freed from original sin present in their souls (*redemptio reparativa*), Mary the Mother of the Redeemer, was preserved from the contagion of original sin (*redemptio præservativa* or *præ-redemptio*). Thus the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary in no way contradicts the dogma that all children of Adam are subject to Original Sin and need redemption.

f) The final cause (*causa finalis proxima*) of the Immaculate Conception of Mary is her Motherhood of God: *dignum Filio tuo habitaculum praeprasti* (Prayer of the Feast).

2. Proof from Holy Writ and Tradition

a) The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of Mary is not explicitly revealed in Scripture. According to many theologians it is contained implicitly (implicite) in the following passages :

α) Gn. 3, 15 (Protoevangelium) : *Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem et semen tuum et semen illius ; ipsa conteret caput tuum, et tu insidiaberis calcaneo eius.* The translation of these words, according to the original text, is : "I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed. He (the seed of the woman) shall crush thy head, and thou shalt crush his heel."

The *literal sense* of the passage is possibly the following : Between Satan and his followers on the one hand, and Eve and her posterity on the other hand, there is to be constant moral warfare. The posterity of Eve will achieve a complete and final victory over Satan and his followers, even if it is wounded in the struggle. The posterity of Eve includes the Messiah, in whose power humanity will win a victory over Satan. Thus the passage is indirectly messianic. Cf. D 2123.

The seed of the woman was understood as referring to the Redeemer (the *αὐτός* of the Septuagint), and thus the Mother of the Redeemer came to be seen in the woman. Since the second century this direct messianic-marian interpretation has been expounded by individual Fathers, for example, St. Irenaeus, St. Epiphanius, Isidor of Pelusium, St. Cyprian, the author of the *Epistola ad amicum aegrotum*, St. Leo the Great. However, it is not found in the writings of the majority of the Fathers, among them the great teachers of the East and West. According to this interpretation, Mary stands with Christ in a perfect and victorious enmity towards Satan and his following. Many of the later scholastics and a great many modern theologians argue, in the light of this interpretation of the Proloevangelium that : Mary's victory over Satan would not have been perfect, if she had ever been under his dominion. Consequently she must have entered this world without the stain of original sin.

The Bull "Ineffabilis" approves of this messianic-marianic interpretation. It draws from it the inference that Mary, in consequence of her intimate association with Christ, "with Him and through Him had eternal enmity towards the poisonous serpent, triumphed in the most complete fashion over him, and crushed its head with her immaculate foot." The Bull does not give any authentic explanation of the passage. It must also be observed that the infallibility of the Papal doctrinal decision extends only to the dogma as such and not to the reasons given as leading up to the dogma.

β) Luke 1, 28 : "Hail, full of grace !" The expression "full of grace" (*κεχαριτωμένη*) in the angel's salutation, represents the proper name, and must on this account express a characteristic quality of Mary. The principal reason why the pleasure of God rests in special fashion on her, is her election to the dignity of the Mother of God. Accordingly, Mary's endowment with grace proceeding from God's pleasure must also be of unique perfection. However, it is perfect only if it be perfect not only intensively but also extensively, that is, if it extends over her whole life, beginning with her entry into the world.

γ) Luke 1, 41 : Elizabeth, filled with the Holy Ghost, speaks to Mary : "Blessed art thou (*εὐλογημένη*) among women, and blessed is the fruit

of thy womb." The blessing of God which rests upon Mary is made parallel to the blessing of God which rests upon Christ in His humanity. This parallelism suggests that Mary, just like Christ, was from the beginning of her existence, free from all sin.

b) Neither the Greek nor the Latin Fathers explicitly (explicite) teach the Immaculate Conception of Mary. Still, they teach it implicitly (implicite), in two fundamental notions :

a) *Mary's most perfect purity and holiness.* St. Ephrem says : "Thou and thy mother are the only ones who are totally beautiful in every respect ; for in thee, O Lord, there is no spot, and in thy Mother no stain" (Carm. Nisib. 27). St. Augustine says that all men must confess themselves sinners, "except the Holy Virgin Mary, whom I desire, for the sake of the honour of the Lord, to leave entirely out of the question, when the talk is of sin" (excepta sancta virgine Maria, de qua propter honorem Domini nullam prorsus, cum de peccatis agitur, haberi volo questionem : De natura et gratia 36, 42). According to the context, however, this must be taken as referring to freedom from personal sins

β) *The similarity and contrast between Mary and Eve.* Mary, is on the one hand, a replica of Eve in her purity and integrity before the Fall, on the other hand, the antitype of Eve, in so far as Eve is the cause of corruption, and Mary the cause of salvation. St. Ephrem teaches : "Mary and Eve, two people without guilt, two simple people, were identical. Later, however, one became the cause of our death, the other the cause of our life" (Op. syr. II 327). Cf. St. Justin, Dial. 100, St. Irenaeus Adv. haer. III 22, 4 ; Tertullian, de carne Christi, 17.

3. Historical Development of Dogmas

Since the seventh century a Feast of the Conception of St. Anne (Conceptio S. Annae), that is, of the passive conception of Mary, was celebrated in the Greek Eastern Church. The celebration and the Feast spread later to the West, first to southern Italy, then to Ireland and England, under the title, Conceptio Beatae Mariae Virginis. The object of the celebration of the feast was initially the active conception of St. Anne, which, according to the Proto-Gospel of St. James, occurred after a long period of childlessness, and was foretold by an angel, as an extraordinary manifestation of God's grace.

At the beginning of the twelfth century, the British monk Eadmer, a pupil of St. Anselm of Canterbury, and Osbert of Clare, advocated the Immaculate (passive) Conception of Mary, that is, her conception free from original sin. Eadmer wrote the first monograph on this subject. On the other hand, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, on the occasion of the institution of the Feast in Lyons (about 1140), warned the faithful that this was an unfounded innovation, and taught that Mary was sanctified after conception only, that is, when she was already in the womb (Ep. 174). Under the influence of St. Bernard, the leading theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Petrus Lombardus, St. Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas ; cf. S. th. III 27, 2), rejected the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. Their difficulty was that they had not yet found the way to bring Mary's freedom from original sin into consonance with the universality of original sin, and with the necessity of all men for redemption.

The correct approach to the final solution of the problem was first achieved by the Franciscan theologian, William of Ware, and this was perfected by his great

pupil John Duns Scotus († 1308). The latter taught that the animation (*animatio*) need not precede the sanctification in order of time (*ordo temporis*) but only in order of concept (*ordo naturae*). Through the introduction of the concept of *praeremptio* (preremption), he succeeded in reconciling Mary's freedom from original sin with her necessity for redemption. The preservation from original sin, is, according to Scotus, the most perfect kind of redemption. Thus, it was fitting that Christ should redeem His mother in this manner. The Franciscan Order allied itself with Scotus, and in contrast to the Dominican Order, decisively advocated the doctrine and the Feast of the Immaculate Conception of Mary.

In the year 1439, the Council of Basle, in its Thirty-sixth Session, which, however, had no ecumenical validity, declared in favour of the Immaculate Conception. Pope Sixtus IV (1471-1484) endowed the celebration of the Feast with indulgences, and forbade the mutual censuring of the disputing factions (D 734 et seq.). The Council of Trent, in its Decree on original sin, makes the significant declaration "that it was not its intention to involve Mary, the Blessed and Immaculate Virgin and Mother of God in this Decree" (D 792). In 1567, Pope Pius V condemned the proposition advanced by Baius, that nobody but Christ had been free from original sin, and that Mary's sorrows and her death were a punishment for actual sins or for original sin (D 1073). Popes Paul V (1616), Gregory XV (1622) and Alexander VII (1661), advocated the doctrine. Cf. D 1100. On the eighth day of December, 1854, Pope Pius IX, having consulted the entire episcopate, and speaking *Ex Cathedra*, declared the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception to be a Dogma of the Faith.

4. Argument from Reason

Reason bases the dogma on the Scholastic axiom, which is already found in the writings of Eadmer; *Potuit, deuit, ergo fecit* (God could do it, He ought to do it, therefore He did it). This, it is true, gives no certainty, but still, it rationally establishes for the dogma a high degree of probability.

§ 4. Mary's Freedom from Evil Concupiscence and from Every Personal Sin

1. Freedom from Concupiscence

From her conception Mary was free from all motions of concupiscence. (*Sent. communis.*)

Freedom from original sin does not necessarily involve freedom from all defects which came into the world as a punishment for sin. Mary, like Christ Himself, was subject to the general human defects, in so far as these involve no moral imperfection. Concupiscence cannot be reckoned among these since it excites a person to commit acts which are materially contrary to God's Law, even where, through lack of assent, they are not formal sins. It would be incompatible with Mary's fullness of grace and her perfect purity and immaculate state to be subject to motions of inordinate desire.

Mary's merits are no more prejudiced by her freedom from concupiscence than are the merits of Christ, since concupiscence is indeed an occasion, but not an indispensable pre-condition of merit. Mary acquired rich merits,

not by any struggle against sensual desire, but by her love of God, and by other virtues (faith, humility, obedience). Cf. S. th. III 27, 3 ad 2.

Many of the older theologians, with St. Thomas, distinguish between the binding (ligatio) and the complete removal or extinction (sublatio, extinctio) of the fomes peccati, that is, of concupiscence. In the sanctification of Mary in the mother's womb, concupiscence was so bound that every inordinate motion of the senses was excluded. In Christ's conception, concupiscence was completely removed, so that the powers of the senses were completely subject to the direction of reason (S. th. III 27, 3). The distinction made by St. Thomas rests on the assumption that Mary was cleansed from original sin. Since she was preserved from original sin, it is logical to assume that she was, from the very beginning, entirely free from concupiscence.

2. Freedom from Actual Sin

In consequence of a Special Privilege of Grace from God, Mary was free from every personal sin during her whole life. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Council of Trent declared: "No justified person can for his whole life avoid all sins, even venial sins, except on the ground of a special privilege from God such as the Church holds was given to the Blessed Virgin" (*nisi ex speciali Dei privilegio, quemadmodum de beata Virgine tenet Ecclesia*). D 833. Pope Pius XII says in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" of the Virgin Mother of God, that: "she was immune from all sin, personal or inherited."

Mary's sinlessness may be deduced from the text: Luke I, 28: "Hail, full of grace!", since personal moral defects are irreconcilable with fullness of grace.

While individual Greek Fathers (Origen, St. Basil, St. John Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexandria) taught that Mary suffered from venial personal faults, such as ambition and vanity, doubt about the message of the Angel, and lack of faith under the Cross, the Latin Patristic authors unanimously teach the doctrine of the sinlessness of Mary. St. Augustine teaches that every personal sin must be excluded from the Blessed Virgin Mary for the sake of the honour of God (*propter honorem Domini*). (*De natura et gratia*, 36, 42.) St. Ephrem the Syrian puts Mary, in her immaculateness, on the same plane as Christ (see Par. 3). According to the teaching of St. Thomas, the fullness of grace which Mary received in the active conception (according to modern theology, in the passive conception) implied confirmation in grace and therefore sinlessness. S. th. III 27, 5 ad 2.

§ 5. Mary's Perpetual Virginity

Mary was a Virgin before, during and after the Birth of Jesus Christ.

The Lateran Synod of the year 649, under Pope Martin I, stressed the threefold character of Mary's virginity teaching of the "blessed ever-virginal and immaculate Mary" that: "she conceived without seed, of the Holy Ghost, generated without injury (to her virginity), and her virginity continued un-

impaired after the birth" (D 256). Pope Paul IV declared (1555): *Beatissimam Virginem Mariam . . . perstitisse semper in virginitatis integritate, ante partum scilicet, in partu et perpetuo post partum.* D 993

Mary's virginity includes *virginitas mentis*, that is, a constant virginal disposition, *virginitas sensus*, that is, freedom from inordinate motions of sexual desire, and *virginitas corporis*, that is, physical integrity. The Church doctrine refers primarily to Her bodily integrity.

1. Virginity Before the Birth

Mary conceived by the Holy Ghost without the co-operation of man. (*De fide.*)

Early opponents of the virginal conception of Mary were the Jews and the pagans (Celsus, Julian the Apostate, Cerinth and the Ebionites). In modern times, the Rationalists seek to derive the belief in the Immaculate Conception either from Is. 7, 14 or from pagan mythology.

The Church's faith in Mary's (active) virginal conception is expressed in all the symbols of Faith. The Apostles' Creed declares: "Qui conceptus est de Spiritu Sancto." Cf. D 86, 256, 993. That Mary led a virginal life up to the moment of her active conception is attested by Luke 1, 26 et seq.: "The angel Gabriel was sent from God . . . to a virgin . . . and the virgin's name was Mary."

Mary's virginal conception was already foretold in the Old Covenant by the Prophet Isaias in the famous Emmanuel prophecy. Is. 7, 14: "Therefore the Lord Himself shall give a sign: Behold a virgin (ha 'alma; G, ἡ παρθένος) shall conceive and bear a son and his name shall be called Emmanuel (= God with us)."

The Jews did not recognise this passage as Messianic. From the beginning however Christians took it as referring to the Messiah, since the sign had been fulfilled. Cf. Mt. 1, 22 et seq. The Jewish objection that the Septuagint wrongly rendered the Hebrew word ha 'alma by ἡ παρθένος=the virgin, instead of by ἡ νεάνις=the young woman (thus Aquilas, Theodotion, Symmachus), is unfounded, as the word ha 'alma in biblical language means an untouched marriageable maiden. Compare Gn. 24, 43 with Gn. 24, 16; Ex. 2, 8. Ps. 67, 26; Hl. 1, 2 (M 1, 3); 6, 7 (M 6, 8). The context demands the interpretation "virgin"; for an extraordinary sign would exist only if a virgin, as a virgin, conceives and gives birth.

The fulfilment of the Isaianic prophecy is narrated by Mt. 1, 18 et seq., and Luke 1, 26 et seq. Mt. 1, 18: "When Mary His mother was espoused to Joseph before they came together, she was found with child by the Holy Ghost." Luke 1, 34: "And Mary said to the angel: How shall this be done, because I know not man? And the angel answering, said to her: The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee." As Mary was living in lawful wedlock with Joseph, the latter was the legal father of Jesus. Luke 3, 23: "The son of Joseph, as it was supposed." Cf. Luke 2, 23. 48.

The scruples of rationalist critics (A. Harnack) against the genuineness of Luke 1, 34-35 derive simply from presuppositions inherent in their philosophy of

life. The unorthodox interpretation of the text of Mt. 1, 16 which is found in Syrus Sinaiticus: "But James begot Joseph, and Joseph, who was espoused to the Virgin Mary, begot Jesus," cannot be accepted as correct. The ancient Syrian translator apparently referred to the fatherhood of Joseph in a purely legal sense since in the subsequent passages (1, 18 et seq.) in agreement with all the other texts, he speaks of the conception of Jesus by the Holy Ghost. The unorthodox interpretation arose from an improper reading of the text. The proper reading as may be seen by a comparison with the Western text, is as follows: "And James begat Joseph, who (was) espoused to the Virgin Mary (who) begat (= bore) Jesus, who is called Christ."

The Fathers affirm the virginal conception of Mary with complete unanimity. The Fathers attest the virginal conception of Mary with complete unanimity. Cf. St. Ignatius of Antioch, Smyrn. 1, 1: "truly born of a virgin"; Trall 9, 1; Eph. 7, 2; 18, 2; 19, 1. Starting with St. Justin, the Fathers defend the Messianic interpretation of Is. 7, 14, and stress that the words are to be understood in such a manner, that the Mother of the Emmanuel conceived and brought forth while still remaining a virgin (in sensu composito, not in sensu diviso). Cf. St. Justin, Dial. 43; 66-68; 77; Apol. 1 33; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. III 21; Origen, Contra Celsum I 34 et seq. S. th. III 28, 1.

2. Virginity During the Birth of Jesus

Mary bore her Son without any violation of her virginal integrity. (*De fide on the ground of the general promulgation of doctrine.*)

The dogma merely asserts the *fact* of the continuance of Mary's physical virginity without determining more closely how this is to be physiologically explained. In general the Fathers and the Schoolmen conceived it as non-injury to the hymen, and accordingly taught that Mary gave birth in miraculous fashion without opening of the womb and injury to the hymen, and consequently also without pains (cf. S. th. III 28, 2).

However, according to modern natural scientific knowledge, the purely physical side of virginity consists in the non-fulfilment of the sex act ("sex-act virginity") and in the non-contact of the female egg by the male seed ("seed-act virginity") (A. Mitterer). Thus, injury to the hymen in birth does not destroy virginity, while, on the other hand, its rupture seems to belong to complete natural motherhood. It follows from this that from the concept of virginity alone the miraculous character of the process of birth cannot be inferred, if it cannot be, and must not be derived from other facts of Revelation. Holy Writ attests Mary's active rôle in the act of birth (Mt. 1, 25; Luke 2, 7: "She brought forth") which does not seem to indicate a miraculous process.

But the Fathers, with few exceptions, vouch for the miraculous character of the birth. However, the question is whether in so doing they attest a truth of Revelation or whether they wrongly interpret a truth of Revelation, that is, Mary's virginity, from an inadequate natural scientific point of view. It seems hardly possible to demonstrate that the dignity of the Son of God or the dignity of the Mother of God demands a miraculous birth.

Mary's virginity during the birth of Jesus was contested in the Early Church by Tertullian (De carne Christi 23) and especially by Jovinian, an opponent of the Church ideal of virginal purity; and in modern times by Rationalists (Harnack calls it: "a Gnostic invention").

Jovinian's teaching (virgo concepit, sed non virgo generavit) was rejected

at a Synod at Milan (390) under the presidency of St. Ambrose (cf. Ep. 42), which recalled the invocation of the Apostles' Creed : *Natus ex Maria virgine*. Her virginity during the birth of Jesus is included in the title of honour "perpetual virgin" (*ἀειπαρθένος*), which was given to Mary by the Fifth General Council at Constantinople (553) (D 214, 218, 227). The doctrine is expressly taught by Pope St. Leo I in the *Epistola Dogmatica ad Flavianum* (Ep. 28, 2) which was approved by the Council of Chalcedon ; it was taught also by the Lateran Synod (649) and by Pope Paul IV (1555) (D 256, 993). Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*" says : "It was she who gave miraculous birth to Christ our Lord (*mirando partu edidit*)."¹ The Church's general teaching is expressed in her Liturgy also. Cf. the *Responsorium* to the fifth Lesson of the Feast of Christmas, and to the eighth Lesson of the Feast of the Circumcision of Our Lord.

Is. 7. 14 announces that the maiden (as a virgin) would give birth. The Fathers also, in a typical sense, refer to the virgin birth of Our Lord the words of the Prophet Ezechiel on the closed gates (Ez. 44, 2 ; cf. St. Ambrose Ep. 42, 6 ; St. Jerome, Ep. 49, 21) ; the words of the Prophet Isaias on the painless birth (Is. 66, 7 ; cf. St. Irenaeus, Epis. 54 ; St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.* IV 14 : and the words of the Song of Songs on the closed garden and the sealed well (Hl. 4, 12 ; cf. St. Jerome, *Adv. Jov.* I 31, Ep. 49, 21).

St. Ignatius of Antioch characterises, not merely Mary's virginity, but also the bringing forth of her Son as a "mystery which must be proclaimed aloud" (Eph. 19, 1). Christ's virginal birth is accepted without question in the apocryphal writings of the second century (*Odes of Solomon*, 19, 7 et seq. ; *Proto-Gospel of St. James* 19 et seq. ; ascension into heaven of Isaias 11, 7 et seq.), and also by Church authors such as St. Irenaeus (*Epid.* 54 ; *adv. haer.* III 21, 4-6) ; St. Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* VII 16, 93) ; Origen (*In. Lev. hom.* 8, 2 ; otherwise in *Luc. hom.* 14). St. Ambrose (*Ep.* 42, 4-7), St. Jerome (*Adv. Jov.* I 31 ; *Ep.* 49, 21) and St. Augustine (*Enchir.* 34) defend the traditional Church doctrine against Jovinian. For the illustration of the mystery the Fathers and Theologians employ various analogues—the emergence of Christ from the sealed tomb, His going through closed doors, the penetration of the ray of sun through glass, the birth of the Logos from the bosom of the Father, the going out of human thought from the human spirit.

Christ's miraculous emergence from the unimpaired womb of the Virgin Mother finds its ultimate explanation in the Omnipotence of God. St. Augustine says : "in such things the whole ground of the mystery is the might of Him who permits it to happen" (*Ep.* 137, 2, 8). Cf. *S. th.* III 28, 2.

3. Virginity After the Birth of Jesus

Also after the Birth of Jesus Mary remained a Virgin. (*De fide.*)

Mary's virginity after the birth of Jesus was denied in the Early Church by Tertullian (*De monog.* 8), Eunomius, Jovinian, Helvidius, Bonosus of Sardica and the Antidicomarianites. At the present day it is contested by the majority of Protestants, as well as by both the Liberal and the Conservative schools of thought.

Pope St. Siricius (392) rejected the teaching of Bonosus. D 91. The Fifth General Council (553) gives Mary the title of honour "perpetual virgin

(ἀειπαρθένος). D 214, 218, 227. Cf. the declarations of the Lateran Synod 649 and of Pope Paul IV (1555). D. 256, 993. The Liturgy also honours Mary as the "perpetual Virgin." Cf. the Prayer *Communicantes* in the Canon of the Mass. The Church prays: post partum, Virgo inviolata permansisti. Holy Writ only indirectly attests the continuance of Mary's virginity after the birth. From the question which Mary puts to the Angel, Luke, 1, 34: "How shall this be done, because I know not man?" it is inferred that she had taken the resolve of constant virginity on the ground of a special Divine enlightenment. In the light of this text St. Augustine and many Fathers and theologians believed that Mary made a formal vow of virginity. However, the subsequent espousals can hardly be reconciled with this. We note that the fact that the dying Redeemer entrusted His Mother to the protection of the Disciple John (John 19, 26: "Woman, behold thy Son"), presupposes that Mary had no other children but Jesus. Cf. Origen, *In Ioan*, 1, 4 (6) 23.

By the "brethren of Jesus," often named in the Holy Scriptures, and who are characteristically never called "Sons of Mary" are to be understood near-relatives of Jesus. Compare Mt. 13, 55 with Mt. 27, 56, John 19, 25 and Gal. 1, 19. From the passage Luke 2, 7: "and she brought forth her first-born son" (cf. Mt. 1, 25 according to the Vulgate) it cannot be inferred that Mary had more children after Jesus, as among the Jews an only son was also known as "first-born son" since the "first-born" had special privileges and duties. The passages Mt. 1, 18: "Before they came together," and Mt. 1, 25: "he knew her not till she brought forth her first-born son," assert that up to a definite point in time the marriage was not consummated, but not by any means that it was consummated after this. Cf. Gn. 8, 7; 2 Sm. 6, 23; Mt. 28, 20.

Among the Fathers many upheld the teaching of Mary's virginity after the birth of Jesus: Origen (*In Luc. hom. 7.*), St. Ambrose (*De inst. virg. et S. Mariae virginitate perpetua*), St. Jerome (*De perpetua virginitate B. Mariae adv. Helvidium*), St. Augustine (*De haeresibus* 56, 84), St. Epiphanius (*Haer.* 78; against the Antidicomarianites), St. Basil remarks: "The friends of Christ do not tolerate hearing that the Mother of God ever ceased to be a virgin" (*Hom. in S. Christi generationem n. 5.*). Cf. St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.* IV. 14. S. th. III 28, 3.

From the fourth century onwards the Fathers, for example Zeno of Verona (*Tract.* I 5, 3; II 8, 2), St. Augustine (*Sermo* 196, 1, 1; *De cat. rud.* 22, 40), St. Peter Chrysologus (*Sermo* 117) affirm the virginity of Mary in formulas, such as: *Virgo concepit, virgo peperit, virgo permansit* (St. Augustine, *Sermos* 51, 11, 18).

§ 6. The Bodily Assumption of Mary into Heaven

1. Mary's Death

Mary suffered a temporal death. (*Sent. communior.*)

Even if reliable historical reports as to the place (Ephesus, Jerusalem), the time, and the circumstances of Mary's death are lacking, still the fact of her death is almost generally accepted by the Fathers and Theologians, and is expressly affirmed in the Liturgy of the Church. The *Sacramentarium Gregorianum*, which Pope Hadrian I transmitted to Charles the Great (784/91), contains the

prayer : *Veneranda nobis, Domine, huius est diei festivitas, in qua sancta Dei Genitrix mortem subiit temporalem, nec tamen mortis nexibus deprimi potuit quae Filium tuum Dominum nostrum de se genuit incarnatum.* The "Oratio super oblata" of the same Sacramentary reads : *Subveniat, Domine, plebi tuae Dei Genitricis oratio, quam etsi pro condicione carnis migrasse cognoscimus. in caelesti gloria apud te pro nobis intercedere sentiamus.*

Origen (In Ioan 2, 12 ; fragm. 31), St. Ephrem (Hymnus 15. 2), Severian of Gabala (De mundi creatione or. 6, 10), St. Jerome (Adv. Ruf. 11, 5), St. Augustine (In Ioan tr. 8, 9) mention the fact of her death incidentally. St. Epiphanius, who had already instituted researches into the close of Mary's life says : "Nobody knows how she departed this world." He leaves undecided whether she died a natural death, or whether (according to Luke 2, 35) she died by violence, or whether she (cf. Apoc. 12, 14) still lives on immortal in some place unknown to us (Haer 78, 11. 24). The unknown author of a sermon which has come down to us under the name of the Presbyter Timotheus of Jerusalem (6th-8th cent.) is of the opinion that "the virgin is up to now immortal (that is, did not die), as He who (in her) lived, translated her into the place of reception (that is, into the Heavenly Paradise)" (Or. in Symeonem). For Mary, death, in consequence of her freedom from original sin and from personal sin, was not a consequence of punishment of sin (cf. D 1073). However, it seems fitting that Mary's body, which was by nature mortal, should be, in conformity with that of her Divine Son, subject to the general law of death.

2. The Bodily Assumption of Mary into Heaven

a) Dogma

Mary was assumed body and soul into Heaven. (*De fide.*)

After Pope Pius XII, on 1st May, 1946, had addressed to all bishops in the world the official query whether the bodily assumption of Mary into Heaven could be defined as a proposition of faith, and whether they with their clergy and people desired the definition, and when almost all the bishops had replied in the affirmative, on 1st November, 1950, he promulgated by the Apostolic Constitution "*Munificentissimus Deus*" as a dogma revealed by God that : "Mary, the immaculate perpetually Virgin Mother of God, after the completion of her earthly life, was assumed body and soul into the glory of Heaven" (*pronuntiamus, declaramus et definimus divinitus revelatum dogma esse : Immaculatam Deiparam semper Virginem Mariam, expleto terrestris vitae cursu, fuisse corpore et anima ad caelestem gloriam assumptam*).

In the Marian Epilogue to the Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*" (1943) Pope Pius XII had already taught that Mary "resplendent in glory in body and soul reigns in heaven with her Son" (D 2291).

b) Proof from Scripture and Tradition

Direct and express scriptural proofs are not to be had. The possibility of the bodily assumption before the second coming of Christ is not excluded by 1 Cor. 15, 23, as the objective Redemption was completed with the sacrificial death of Christ, and the beginning of the final era foretold by the prophets commenced. Its probability is suggested by Mt. 27, 52-53 : "And the graves were opened : and many bodies of the saints that had slept arose, and coming

out of the tombs after His Resurrection came into the holy city and appeared to many." According to the more probable explanation, which was already expounded by the Fathers, the awakening of the "saints" was a final resurrection and transfiguration. If, however, the justified of the Old Covenant were called to the perfection of salvation immediately after the conclusion of the redemptive work of Christ, then it is possible and probable that the Mother of the Lord was called to it also.

From her fullness of grace spoken of in Luke 1, 28, Scholastic theology derives the doctrine of the bodily assumption and glorification of Mary. Since she was full of grace she remained preserved from the three-fold curse of sin (Gn. 3, 16-19), as well as from her return to dust (cf. S. Thomas, *Expos. salut. ang.*). In the woman of the Apocalypse clothed with the sun (12, 1), which in its literal sense, must be taken to mean the Church, Scholastic theology sees also the transfigured mother of Christ. The Fathers too refer passages such as Ps. 131, 8 in a typical sense to the mystery of the bodily assumption: "Arise, O Lord, into thy resting place; thou and the ark which thou hast sanctified, the ark of the Covenant made from incorruptible wood (a type of the incorruptible body of Mary)." Apoc. 11, 19: "And the temple of God was opened in Heaven and the ark of His Covenant was seen in His temple." Cant. of Cant. 8, 5: "Who is this that cometh up from the desert, flowing with delights, leaning upon her beloved?" Modern theology usually cites Gn. 3, 15 in support of the doctrine. Since by the seed of the woman it understands Christ, and by the woman, Mary, it is argued that as Mary had an intimate share in Christ's battle against Satan and in His victory over Satan and sin, she must also have participated intimately in His victory over death. It is true that the literal reference of the text is to Eve and not Mary, but already since the end of the second century (St. Justin) Tradition has seen in Mary the new Eve.

The speculative grounds on which the Fathers of the closing Patristic era, and the theologians of the scholastic movement, led by Ps.-Augustine (ninth century) base the incorruptibility and transfiguration of the body of Mary, are also based upon Revelation: These are:

a) Freedom from sin. As the dissolution of the body is a punishment consequent on sin, and as Mary, the immaculately conceived and sinless one, was exempt from the general curse of sin, it was fitting that her body should be excepted from the general law of dissolution and immediately assumed into the glory of Heaven, in accordance with God's original plan for mankind.

β) Motherhood of God. As the body of Christ originated from the body of Mary (*caro Jesu caro est Mariae*: Ps.-Augustine) it was fitting that Mary's body, should share the lot of the body of Christ. As a physico-spiritual relationship the Motherhood of Mary demands a likeness to her Divine Son in body and soul.

γ) Perpetual virginity. As Mary's body was preserved unimpaired in virginal integrity, it was fitting that it should not be subject to destruction after death.

δ) Participation in the work of Christ. As Mary, in her capacity of Mother of the Redeemer, took a most intimate share in the redemptive work of her Son it was fitting that, on the completion of her earthly life, she should attain to the full fruit of the Redemption, which consists in the glorification of soul and body. The idea of the bodily assumption of Mary is first expressed in certain *transitus*-narratives of the fifth and sixth centuries. Even though these are

apocryphal they bear witness to the faith of the generation in which they were written despite their legendary clothing. The first Church author to speak of the bodily ascension of Mary, in association with an apocryphal transitus B.M.V., is St. Gregory of Tours († 594). Early sermons on the Feast of Mary's entry into heaven are those of Ps.-Modestus of Jerusalem (about 700), Germanus of Constantinople († 733), Andrew of Crete († 740), St. John Damascene († 749) and Theodore of Studion († 826).

In the East, at least since the sixth century, and at Rome, at any rate, since the end of the seventh century (Sergius I, 687-701) the Church celebrated the Feast of the Sleeping of Mary (Dormitio, *κοιμησις*). The object of the Feast was originally the death of Mary, but very soon the thought appeared of the incorruptibility of her body and of its assumption into Heaven. The original title Dormitio (Sleeping) was changed into assumptio (Sacramentarium Gregorianum). In the Liturgical and Patristic texts of the eighth and ninth centuries, the idea of the bodily assumption is clearly attested. Under the influence of Ps.-Hieronimus, there was uncertainty for a long time as to whether or not the assumption of the body was signified by the Feast. Since the peak period of the Middle Ages, the affirmative view has gained precedence, and has now been dominant for a long time.

c) Historical Development of the Dogma.

A hindrance to the development of the dogma of the Assumption in the West was a pseudo-Augustinian sermon (Sermo 208: "Adest nobis"); a letter forged under the name of Jerome (Ep. 9: "Cogitis me"); and the Martyrology of the Monk, Usuard. Ps.-Augustine (probably Ambrosius Autpertus, † 784) takes up the stand that we know nothing of the fate of Mary's body. Ps.-Hieronimus (Paschasius Radbertus, † 865) leaves the question open, whether Mary was assumed into heaven with or without her body, but maintains the incorruptibility of her body. Usuard († about 875) praises the reticence of the Church which prefers not to know the spot "in which that venerable Temple of the Holy Ghost was hidden from view by Divine command," than to maintain it as something legendary. Usuard's Martyrology was extensively used in many monasteries and chapters during choir prayers; Part of the letter of Ps.-Hieronimus found its way into the breviary. This delayed the acceptance of the dogma into the theological thought of the Middle Ages.

In favour of the dogma, an anonymous tract appeared ("Ad interrogata") in the twelfth century, which has been attributed to St. Augustine but the origin of which is not yet certain (9th-11th centuries), decisively advocating, on rational grounds, the bodily assumption of Mary. Since the thirteenth century, the view represented by Ps.-Augustine has gained the upper hand. The great theologians of the scholastic era declared for it. St. Thomas teaches: Ab hac (maledictione, sc. ut in pulverem revertetur) . . . immunis fuit Beata Virgo, quia cum corpore ascendit in coelum (Epos. salut. ang). On the reform of the Breviary under Pope Pius V (1568) the Ps.-Hieronimian lessons were expunged and replaced by others which advocated the bodily assumption. In the year 1668 a violent dispute flamed up in France on the doctrine of the Assumption, when part of the Chapter of Notre-Dame in Paris wished to revert to the Martyrologium of Usuard, which was abolished in 1540 (or 1549). Jean Launoy († 1678) energetically defended Usuard's standpoint. Pope Benedict XIV (1740-58) declared the doctrine of the Assumption to be a pious and probable opinion, but in so doing, did not declare that it belonged to the depositum fidei. In the year 1849 the first petitions for dogmatisation were addressed

to the Apostolic See. At the Vatican Council nearly 200 Bishops signed a motion for dogmatisation. Since the beginning of this century, the movement grew apace. After the whole Episcopate, following an official inquiry of the Pope (1946) almost unanimously affirmed the possibility of and the desire for the definition, Pope Pius XII confirmed: "the unanimous doctrine of the ordinary Church Teaching Office, and the unanimous belief of the Christian people" in a solemn definition on November 1st, 1950.

3. The Queenship of Mary.

After being assumed into Heaven and being raised above all angels and saints, Mary reigns with Christ, her Divine Son. The Fathers from ancient times honoured her as the Patroness, Lady, Queen, Queen of the creation (John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* IV 14), Queen of Men (Andrew of Crete, *Hom.* 2 in *Dormit. ss. Deiparae*). The Liturgy honours her as the Queen of Heaven and Earth, and so do the Popes in their Encyclicals (Pius IX, Leo XIII, Pius XII).

Mary's right to reign as Queen of Heaven is a consequence of her Divine Motherhood. Since Christ, because of the hypostatic union, is as man the Lord and King above all creation (cf. *Lk.* 1, 32 f.; *Apc.* 19, 16), so Mary as "the Mother of the Lord" (*Lk.* 1, 43) shares in the royal dignity of her Son, even if only in an analogical way. Furthermore, Mary's royal merit is based on her intrinsic connection with Christ in His work of Redemption. Just as Christ is also our Lord and King because He has redeemed us with His precious Blood (*1 Cor.* 6, 20; *1 Petr.* 1, 18 f.), so, in an analogical way, Mary is our Lady and Queen because she the new Eve has shared intimately in the redemptive work of Christ, the new Adam, by suffering with Him and offering Him up to the Eternal Father. Mary's sublime dignity as the Queen of Heaven and Earth make her supremely powerful in her maternal intercession for her children on earth. Cf. *Enc.* "Ad coeli reginam" Pius XII (1954).

CHAPTER 3

Mary's Co-operation in the Work of Redemption

§ 7. The Mediatorship of Mary

Although Christ is the Sole Mediator between God and man (*1 Tim.* 2, 5), since He alone, by His death on the Cross, fully reconciled mankind with God, this does not exclude a secondary mediatorship, subordinated to Christ (cf. *S. th.* III 26, 1). "To unite men to God perfectly (perfective) appertains to Christ according to *2 Cor.* V. 19. Therefore Christ alone is the perfect mediator between God and man, inasmuch as He reconciled mankind with God by His death. . . . But there is nothing to prevent others in a certain way (*secundum quid*) from being called mediators between God and man, in so far as they, by preparing or serving (*dispositive vel ministerialiter*), co-operate in uniting men to God."

The Fathers called Mary the "Go-between" (*μεσίτης*, *mediatrix*). A prayer ascribed to St. Ephrem says of her: "After the Mediator thou art the mediatrix of the whole world" (*post mediatorem mediatrix totius mundi: Oratio IV ad Deiparam.* 4th Lesson of the Office of the Feast). The title *Mediatrix* is

attached to Mary in official Church documents also, for example, in the Bull "Ineffabilis" of Pope Pius IX (1854); in the Rosary Encyclicals "Adiutricem" and "Fidentem" (D 1940 a) of Pope Leo XIII. (1895 and 1896); in the Encyclical "Ad diem illum" of Pope Pius X (1904). It has also been received into the Liturgy of the Church through the introduction of the Feast of M. *Mariae Virginis omnium gratiarum Mediatrix* (1921).

Mary is designated mediatrix of all graces in a double sense :

1. Mary gave the Redeemer, the Source of all graces, to the world, and in this way she is the channel of all graces. (*Sent. certa.*)
2. Since Mary's Assumption into Heaven no grace is conferred on man without her actual intercessory co-operation. (*Sent. pia et probabilis.*)

1. Mary is the Mediatrix of all graces by her co-operation in the Incarnation. (*Mediatio in universali.*)

Mary freely and deliberately co-operated in giving the Redeemer to the world. Instructed by the angel as to the person and the task of Her Son she freely assented to be Mother of God. Luke 1, 38 : "Behold the handmaid of the Lord : be it done unto me according to thy word." The Incarnation of the Son of God, and the Redemption of mankind by the vicarious atonement of Christ were dependent on her assent. In this significant moment in the history of Salvation Mary represented humanity. St. Thomas says : "At the Annunciation the concurrence of the maiden was awaited as a representative of all human nature (*loco totius humanae naturae*)" (S. th. III 30, 1). In regard to these words, Pope Leo XIII remarks : "To a certain extent she (Mary) represented the whole human race" (*quae ipsius generis humani personam quodammodo agebat*). D 1940 a.

The Fathers contrast Mary's obedience at the Annunciation with Eve's disobedience. Mary by her obedience became the cause of the Salvation, while Eve by her disobedience became the cause of death. St. Irenaeus teaches : "As she (Eve) who had Adam as her husband, but was nevertheless a virgin, was disobedient, and thereby became the cause of death to herself and to the whole of mankind, so also Mary, who had a pre-ordained husband, and was still a virgin, by her obedience became a cause of her own salvation and the salvation of the whole human race" (*et sibi et universo generi humano causa facta est salutis* : Adv. haer. III 22, 4 ; cf. V 19, 1). St. Jerome says : "By a woman the whole world was saved" (*per mulierem totus mundus salvatus est* ; Tract. de Ps. 96). Cf. Tertullian, De carne Christi 17.

Mary's co-operation in the Redemption.

The title *Corredemptrix*=*Coredempstress*, which has been current since the fifteenth century, and which also appears in some official Church documents under Pius X (cf. D 1978 a), must not be conceived in the sense of an equation of the efficacy of Mary with the redemptive activity of Christ, the sole Redeemer of humanity (1 Tim. 2, 5). As she herself required redemption and in fact was redeemed by Christ, she could not of herself merit the grace of the redemption of humanity in accordance with the principle : *Principium meriti non cadit sub eodem merito*. (The author of an act of merit cannot be a recipient of the same

act of merit.) Her co-operation in the objective redemption is an indirect, remote co-operation, and derives from this that she voluntarily devoted her whole life to the service of the Redeemer, and, under the Cross, suffered and sacrificed with Him. As Pope Pius XII says in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943), she "offered Him on Golgotha to the Eternal Father together with the holocaust of her maternal rights and her motherly love like a new Eve for all children of Adam" (D 2291). As "The New Eve" she is, as the same Pope declares, in the Apostolic Constitution "Munificentissimus Deus" (1950) "the sublime associate of our Redeemer" (*alma Redemptoris nostri socia* [cf. Gn. 3, 12]). Cf. D. 3031 : *generoso Divini Redemptoris socia*.

Christ alone truly offered the sacrifice of atonement on the Cross ; Mary merely gave Him moral support in this action. Thus Mary is not entitled to the title "Priest" (*sacerdos*). Indeed this is expressly laid down by the Holy Office (1916, 1927). Christ, as the Church teaches, "conquered the enemy of the human race alone (*solus*)" (D 711) ; in the same way, He alone acquired the grace of Redemption for the whole human race, including Mary. The words of Luke 1, 38 : "Behold the handmaid of the Lord," imply Mary's mediate, remote co-operation in the Redemption. St. Ambrose expressly teaches : "Christ's Passion did not require any support" (*De inst. virg.* 7). In the power of the grace of Redemption merited by Christ, Mary, by her spiritual entering into the sacrifice of her Divine Son for men, made atonement for the sins of men, and (*de congruo*) merited the application of the redemptive grace of Christ. In this manner she co-operates in the subjective redemption of mankind.

The statement of Pope Pius X in the Encyclical "Ad diem illum" (1904) : (*Beata Virgo de congruo, ut aiunt, promeretur nobis, quae Christus de condigno promeruit* (D 1978 a) (The Blessed Virgin merits for us *de congruo* what Christ merited *de condigno*) is, as the present tense "*promeretur*" shows, not indeed to be taken as referring to the historical objective Redemption, which occurred once and for all, but to her ever-present, intercessory co-operation in the subjective redemption.

2. Mary is the Mediatrix of all graces by her intercession in Heaven. (*Mediatio in speciali.*)

Since her assumption into Heaven, Mary co-operates in the application of the grace of Redemption to man. She participates in the distribution of grace by her maternal intercession which is far inferior in efficacy to that of the intercessory prayer of Christ, the High Priest, but surpasses far the intercessory prayer of all the other saints.

According to the view of the older, and of many of the modern, theologians Mary's intercessory co-operation extends to all graces, which are conferred on mankind, so that no grace accrues to men, without the intercession of Mary. The implication of this is not that we are obliged to beg for all graces through Mary, nor that Mary's intercession is intrinsically necessary for the application of the grace, but that, according to God's positive ordinance, the redemptive grace of Christ is conferred on nobody without the actual intercessory co-operation of Mary.

Recent Popes have declared in favour of this doctrine. Leo XIII says in the Rosary Encyclical "Octobri mense" (1891) : "From that great treasure of

all graces, which the Lord has brought, nothing, according to the will of God, comes to us except through Mary, so that, as nobody can approach the Supreme Father except through the Son, similarly nobody can approach Christ except through the Mother" (1940 a). Pope Pius X calls Mary "the dispenser of all gifts, which Jesus has acquired for us by His death and His blood" (D 1978 a). Pope Benedict XV declared: "All gifts which the Author of all good has deigned to communicate to the unhappy posterity of Adam, are, according to the loving resolve of His Divine Providence, dispensed by the hands of the Most Holy Virgin" (AAS 9, 1917, 266). The same Pope calls Mary: "the mediatrix with God of all graces" (*gratiarum omnium apud Deum sequestra*: AAS 11 1919, 227).

Pope Pius XI in the Encyclical "*Ingravescentibus malis*" (1937) quotes with approval the words of Saint Bernard: "Thus it is His (God's) will that we should have everything through Mary" (AAS 29, 1937, 373). Similarly Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*" (1947).

Express scriptural proofs are lacking. Theologians seek a biblical foundation in the words of Christ, John 19, 26 et seq.: "Woman behold thy son, son behold thy mother." According to the literal sense these words refer only to the persons addressed, Mary and John. The mystical interpretation, which became dominant in the West in the late Middle Ages (Dionysius the Carthusian), sees in John the representative of the whole human race. In him Mary was given as a mother to all the redeemed. Moreover, it corresponds to the position of Mary as the spiritual mother of the whole of redeemed humanity that she, by her powerful intercession, should procure for her children in need of help all graces by which they can attain eternal salvation.

The idea of the spiritual Motherhood of Mary is part of the Ancient Christian tradition, independently of the interpretation of John 19, 26 et seq. According to Origen the perfect Christ had Mary as mother: "Every perfect person no longer lives (of himself) but Christ lives in him; and because Christ lives in him, it is said of him to Mary: Behold thy son Christ" (Com. in Ioan. 14, 23). St. Epiphanius derives Mary's spiritual Motherhood from the Eve-Mary parallel: "She (Mary) is she of whom Eve is the prototype, who, as such received the appellation 'mother of the living' . . . as to externals the whole human race on earth stemmed from that Eve. Thus in truth, through Mary, the very life of the world was borne, so that she bore the Living One, and became the Mother of the Living. Thus in prototype Mary was called 'Mother of the living'" (Haer. 78, 18). St. Augustine bases Mary's spiritual Motherhood on the mystical unity of the faithful with Christ. As the bodily Mother of God, she is, in a spiritual fashion, also the mother of those who are articulated with Christ. Cf. *De s. virginitate* 6, 6.

Express testimonies, though few in number, to Mary's position as mediatrix of grace are found since the eighth century. They became more numerous during the peak period of the Middle Ages. St. Germanus of Constantinople († 733) says: "Nobody can achieve salvation except through thee . . . O Most Holy One . . . nobody can receive a gift of grace except through thee . . . O Most Chaste One" (Or. 9, 5. Lesson of the Office of the Feast). St. Bernard of Clairvaux († 1153) says of Mary: "God wished that we have nothing, except by the hands of Mary" (In Vig. Nativit. Domini serm. 3, 10). Ps.-Albert the Great calls Mary: "The universal dispenser of all riches" (*omnium bonitatum universaliter distributiva*; *Super Missus est* q. 29). In modern times the doctrine

that Mary is the Universal Mediatrix of Grace was advocated by St. Peter Canisius, Suarez, St. Alphonsus Liguori, Scheeben, and it is supported by the opinion of numerous theologians at the present day.

Speculatively the doctrine of Mary's Universal Mediation is based on her co-operation in the Incarnation and the Redemption, as well as on her relationship to the Church :

- a) Since Mary gave the source of all grace to men, it is to be expected that she would also co-operate in the distribution of all grace.
- b) As Mary became the spiritual Mother of all the redeemed, it is fitting that she, by her constant motherly intercession should care for the supernatural life of all her children.
- c) As Mary is " the prototype of the Church (St. Ambrose, Expos. ev. sec. Luc. II 7), and as all grace of redemption is obtained by the Church, it is to be assumed that Mary, by her heavenly intercession, is the universal mediatrix of grace.

Definability

The doctrine of Mary's Universal Mediation of Grace based on her co-operation in the Incarnation is so definitely manifest in the sources of the Faith, that nothing stands in the way of a dogmatic definition. Her position as Mediatrix of Grace in virtue of her intercession in Heaven is less definitely attested. Since however it is organically associated with Mary's Spiritual Motherhood which in turn is based on Scripture and with her intimate participation in the work of her Divine Son, its definition does not seem impossible.

8. The Veneration of Mary

Mary, the Mother of God, is entitled to the Cult of Hyperdulia. (*Sent certa.*)

1. Theological Proof

In view of her dignity as the Mother of God and her fullness of grace, a special veneration is due to Mary. This is substantially less than the cultus latriæ (=adoration) which is due to God alone, but it is higher than the cultus Duliae (=veneration) due to the angels and to the other saints. The special veneration thus given to Mary is called cultus hyperduliae.

The Scriptural source of the special veneration due to the Mother of God is to be found in Luke 1, 28 : " Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee," in the praise of Elizabeth, filled with the Holy Ghost, Luke 1, 42 : " Blessed art thou amongst women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb," in the prophetic words of the Mother of God, Luke 1, 48 : " For behold, from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed," in the words of the woman in the multitude, Luke 11, 27 : " Blessed is the womb that bore thee, and the paps that gave thee suck."

2. Historical Development

During the first three centuries, the veneration of Mary was intimately connected with the veneration of Christ. From the fourth century onwards we find a formal veneration of Mary herself. The hymns of St. Ephrem the Syrian († 373) on the birth of the Lord " are almost equally songs of praise for the Virgin Mother " (Bardenheuer, Sermons on Mary II). St. Gregory Nazianzus

(† about 390) refers to the invocation of Mary's intercession by saying of the Christian maiden Justina, that she had "besought the Virgin Mary to assist a maiden in danger," when her virginity was threatened (Or. 24, 11). St. Epiphanius († 403) teaches in opposition to the sect of the Collyridians whose members paid an idolatrous veneration to Mary: "Mary should be honoured, but the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost should be adored. Nobody should adore Mary" (Haer. 79, 7). Saints Ambrose and Jerome depict Mary as the prototype of virginity, and demand that she should be imitated (St. Ambrose, *De virginibus*, II 2, 6-17; St. Jerome, Ep. 22, 38; 107, 7).

The veneration of Mary was greatly promoted by the definition of her dignity as Mother of God, advocated by St. Cyril of Alexandria, at the Council of Ephesus (431). In the years following Mary was glorified in numerous sermons and hymns; in her honour Churches were built and feasts instituted. Side by side with the Candlemas of Mary (*Hypapante* = meeting), and the Annunciation, which were originally feasts of the Lord, there emerged, even in Patristic times, the Feast of the Home-Going (Assumption) of Mary, and of the Birth of Mary. The veneration of Mary achieved its richest development in the Middle Ages.

Luther, fearing that Divine honour would be paid to a creature, and that the unique mediatorship of Christ would be prejudiced, sharply criticised many forms of the veneration paid to Mary, but held fast to the traditional belief in Mary's Motherhood of God, her perpetual virginity, her Immaculate Conception, and her intercession. He paid homage to her as the model of humility and faith, and recommended that appeal be made to her intercession. (Interpretation of the Magnificat 1521). Zwingli also acknowledged the Church's belief in Mary, and held to the veneration of Mary, but rejected the practice of making petition to her. The same attitude was adopted by most of the Old Lutheran Theologians, although it must be remarked that they often confounded petition with adoration. A resolute opponent of the veneration paid to Mary was Calvin, who rejected it as adoration of idols. Even within the framework of Lutheranism the three biblically founded Feasts of Mary, the Annunciation, the Purification, and the Visitation were solemnised up to the time of the Enlightenment, while the Feasts of the Birth of Mary and Her Assumption, after they had been maintained for some time, as Luther wished, were abandoned in the sixteenth century. Under the influence of rationalism the religious veneration of Mary deteriorated and sank to the level of regarding her as a sublimely moral model but a merely natural person. Wherever in Protestantism belief in the Incarnation is still living, veneration of the Mother of God is not entirely extinguished.

BOOK FOUR

The Doctrine of God the Sanctifier

PART I

The Doctrine of Grace

INTRODUCTION

Of grace in general

§ 1. The Subjective Redemption in General

The God-Man Jesus Christ, by His vicarious atonement and His merit in the Redemption, achieved the reconciliation of humanity with God in principle and objectively. The Objective Redemption must be accepted by each man so that thereby he may bring to fruition in himself the subjective Redemption. The act of the application of the fruits of the Redemption to the individual man is called Justification (*δικαίωσις*, iustificatio) or Sanctification (*ἀγιασμός*, sanctificatio). The fruit of the Redemption itself is called grace.

The source of the Subjective Redemption is the Triune God. Since however, the communication of grace is a work of the Divine Love, it is "appropriated" to the Holy Ghost, i.e., to the Personal Divine Love. Nevertheless it is effected by the Three Persons in common. The Subjective Redemption, however, is not the work of God alone. By reason of the fact that God has endowed human nature with reason and free will, Justification requires the free co-operation of men (D 799). The unfathomable mystery of the doctrine of grace lies in this intimate mutual co-operation of Divine power and human freedom. All the controversies and the heresies that have arisen concerning Justification derive from the difficulties posed by this mystery of co-operation. In the working-out of man's Subjective Redemption, God supports man, not merely by an inner principle, grace, but also by an outward principle, the efficacy of the Church in its doctrine, its guidance of men and its work of dispensing the grace of Christ through the Sacraments. The final object of the Subjective Redemption is the Beatific Vision.

§ 2. The Concept of Grace

1. The Notion of Grace in S. Scripture

a) In scriptural terminology, grace (*χάρις*=gratia) in its subjective sense, signifies a disposition of condescension or benevolence shown by a highly-placed person to one in a lower place, and especially of God towards mankind (gratia=benevolence). Cf. Gn. 30, 27 ; Luke 1, 30.

b) In the objective sense grace signifies an unmerited gift (gratia=beneficium or donum gratis datum) proceeding from this benevolent disposition.

The gift, as such, is the material element; the lack of any claims, i.e., the gratuitous nature of the gift, is the formal element. Cf. Rom. II, 6.

c) Grace may also mean pleasing charm. Cf. Ps. 44, 3 ; Prov. 31, 30.

d) Grace again signifies thanks for favours received. Cf. Luke 17, 9 ; 1 Cor. 10, 30.

2. The Language of theology

Theology takes the word Grace in the objective sense and understands by it a gift from God to man, not due from God, and not merited by man. In this wider sense one can also speak of a natural grace (for example, the Creation and gifts of the natural order, such as bodily health and mental soundness).

In the narrower and proper sense one understands by grace a supernatural gift, which God of His free benevolence, bestows on rational creatures for their eternal salvation ; *donum supernaturale gratis a Deo creaturae rationali concessum in ordine ad vitam aeternam*. To this belong above all, the *donata supernaturalia quoad substantiam*, which in their inner nature transcend the being, the powers and the claims of created nature (sanctifying grace, the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, actual grace, the Beatific Vision). To this belong also in a secondary sense the *donata supernaturalia quoad modum* which in the manner and degree of their production surpass the natural capability of the recipient (miraculous healing, the gift of tongues, gift of prophecy). In a more remote sense it refers to the *donata praeternaturalia*, which perfect human nature within its own order (freedom from concupiscence, from suffering and death).

3. Causes of Grace

Causa Efficiens Principalis (Principal Efficient Cause) of grace is the Triune God ; *Causa Efficiens Instrumentalis* (Efficient Instrumental Cause) is Christ's Humanity and the sacraments ; *Causa Meritoria* (Meritorius Cause) of the grace conferred on fallen mankind is the God-Man Jesus Christ, by reason of the Redemption ; *Causa Finalis Primaria* (the Primary Final Cause) is the glorification of God ; *Causa Finalis Secundaria* (the Secondary Final Cause) is the eternal salvation of man.

§ 3. Classification of Grace

The First Division :

1. *Gratia Increata—Gratia Creata*

The Uncreated Grace is God Himself in so far as He, in His love, from all eternity has pre-determined the gifts of grace, in so far as He has communicated Himself in the Incarnation of Christ's Humanity (*gratia unionis*), in so far as He indwells in the souls of the justified, and in so far as He gives Himself to the blessed for possession and enjoyment in the Beatific Vision. The Hypostatic Union, The Indwelling and The Beatific Vision, considered as acts, are indeed created graces, for they had a beginning in time. But the gift which is conferred on a creature in these acts is uncreated.

Created Grace is a supernatural gift or operation really distinct from God

The Second Division :

2. Gratia Dei (Creatoris)—Gratia Christi (Redemptoris)

The Grace of God or of the Creator is the grace which God, from the sole motive of love, bestowed on the angels and on our First Parents in Paradise, who, in consequence of their sinlessness, were only negatively unworthy of the reception of grace (non digni) leaving aside the question of the merits of Christ.

The Grace of Christ or of the Redeemer is the grace, which God (from the double motive of love and mercy for men, who, in consequence of the Fall, were positively unworthy (indigni) of the reception of grace), has bestowed and continues to bestow, in view of the merits of Christ's Redemption. Both the Grace of God and the Grace of Christ elevate the receiver into the supernatural order of being and activity (gratia elevans). In addition the Grace of Christ has the task of curing the wounds inflicted by sin (gratia elevans et sanans or medicinalis).

In virtue of their theory that the Incarnation would have taken place apart from the Fall, the Scotists include the grace of the angels and of the First Parents in Paradise in the Grace of Christ, not, however, in so far as He is the Redeemer (gratia Christi tamquam Redemptoris), but in so far as He is the Head of all Creation (gratia Christi tamquam capitis omnis creaturae). (See Doctrine of Redemption, Par. 2.)

3. The Third Division :

3. Gratia Externa—Gratia Interna

External Grace is any benevolent deed of God for the salvation of men, which is external to man and which affects man in a moral way only, for example : Revelation ; Christ's teaching and example ; sermons ; the Liturgy ; the Sacraments ; the example of the saints.

Internal Grace affects the soul and its powers intrinsically, and operates physically on it, for example : sanctifying grace ; the infused virtues ; actual grace. Outward graces dispose men for the reception of inner graces. Cf. 1 Cor. 3, 6.

4. The Fourth Division :

4. Gratia Gratis Data—Gratia Gratum Faciens

Although every grace is *gratis data*, i.e., a free gift of the Divine Goodness the term *Gratia Gratis Data* is given specifically to every grace which is conferred on particular persons for the salvation of others. To this class belong such extraordinary gifts of grace as charismata (prophecy, gift of miracles, gift of tongues ; cf. 1 Cor. 12, 8 et seq.), the priestly power of consecration, the hierarchical power of jurisdiction. The possession of these gifts is independent of the personal moral composition of their possessor (cf. Mt. 7, 22 et seq. ; John 11, 49-52).

Gratia Gratum Faciens or the grace of sanctification is for all men, and its purpose is the personal sanctification of him who receives it. It makes the receiver pleasing to God (gratum) either by formally sanctifying him (sanctifying

grace) or by preparing him for sanctification, or by preserving and increasing his sanctification (actual grace). *Gratia gratis data* is given to secure for men *gratia gratum faciens*. This latter then is more sublime and more valuable than the former. Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 31 et seq.

The Fifth Division :

5. *Gratia Habitualis* (sanctificans)—*Gratia Actualis*

Gratia gratum faciens embraces both *gratia habitualis* and *gratia actualis*. *Habitual grace* is a constant supernatural quality of the soul which sanctifies man intrinsically and makes him just and pleasing to God (sanctifying grace or justifying grace).

Actual grace or assisting grace or helping grace is a temporary supernatural intervention by God by which the powers of the soul are stirred up to perform a salutary act which is directed to the attaining or preservation or increase of sanctifying grace.

The Sixth Division :

6. *Gratia Actualis* is distinguished into :

- a) *Gratia illuminationis*, i.e., the enlightenment of the intellect and *gratia inspirationis*, i.e., the strengthening of the will.
- b) *Gratia Praeveniens* (antecedens, excitans, vocans, operans) which precedes and affects a deliberate act of will, and *Gratia subsequens* (adjuvans, concomitans, co-operans) which accompanies and supports the deliberate act.
- c) *Sufficient Grace* (*gratia sufficiens*) and *efficacious grace* (*gratia efficax*). The former gives a person the power to accomplish the salutary act, the latter de facto secures that the salutary act is accomplished.

§ 4. The Principal Errors concerning Grace

Pelagianism

The founder of Pelagianism was a lay-monk named Pelagius, of very austere life and probably a native of Ireland. He was the author of a commentary on St. Paul, and of various ascetical writings († after 418). The outstanding exponents of the error concerning grace which he originated were the Presbyter Caelestius and Bishop Julian of Eclanum. The defender of the Church doctrine, who towers in this matter above all the others is St. Augustine, called "Doctor Gratiae," who devoted the last two decades of his life to contesting the Pelagian error. Cf. *De natura et gratia*, 62, 73 ; *pro gratia Christi clamo, sine qua nemo iustificatur*. Side by side with him other defenders of the Christian teaching appeared. Chief amongst these are : St. Jerome, the Presbyter Orosius, and the layman Marius Mercator. The Pelagian error was scientifically refuted by St. Augustine, and condemned by the Church at numerous particular synods (Carthage 411, 416, 418, Milevis 416), and finally at the Third General Council of Ephesus, 431. Cf. D 101-108, 126 et seq.

Pelagianism denies the elevation of man into the supernatural state, and denies

original sin. According to the Pelagians the sin of Adam affected his descendants by way of bad example only. Thus, Christ's deed of Redemption consists above all in His teaching and in His example of virtue. Pelagianism regarded grace as within the natural capacity of man. Man in this view has a natural capacity to live a sinless and holy life and merit eternal bliss by exercising his free will (*gratia possibilitatis*=*liberum arbitrium*); this natural moral striving is facilitated by outward grace, the Mosaic Law, the Gospel, and the example of virtue set by Christ (*adiutorium possibilitatis*); man thus achieves the remission of sins by his own power, by the act of the turning away of his will from sin. Pelagianism is, of course, pure naturalism, influenced by Stoic ethics.

2. Semi-Pelagianism

This developed by way of reaction against the Augustinian doctrine of grace. It was expounded principally in the monasteries of Southern Gaul, especially in Marseilles and Lerins (John Cassian, St. Vincent of Lerins, Bishop Faustus of Riez). It was combated by St. Augustine, Prosper of Aquitania, and Bishop St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, and condemned by the Church at the Second Synod of Orange in the year 529, under the presidency of Archbishop Caesarius of Arles. The resolutions of the Synod were confirmed by Pope Boniface II. Cf. D 174 et seq. : 200 a et seq.

Semi-Pelagianism recognises the supernatural elevation of man, original sin, and the necessity of inner supernatural grace for preparation for justification and for the achievement of salvation, but limits the necessity and gratuitous nature of grace. Striving to preserve the freedom of the will and the personal co-operation of man in the process of sanctification, the originators of the error came to the following conclusions : a) The primary desire for salvation proceeds from the natural powers of man (*initium fidei*, *pia credulitatis affectus*, *pia studia*). b) Man does not require supernatural help to persevere in virtue to the end. c) Man can merit *de congruo* the first grace by his own natural endeavours.

3. The Reformers

While Pelagius denied the supernatural endowment of man, Luther, who strained the doctrine of St. Augustine beyond its proper limits, made grace an essential constituent part of human nature. By its loss human nature was entirely corrupted, as its essential constituent parts were taken away and concupiscence, in which, according to Luther, original sin consists, has ever since ruled man. In Luther's view, therefore : fallen man is, of his own proper power, incapable of achieving knowledge of religious truth, or of performing morally good actions ; Man's will is no longer free, and of itself can do nothing but sin ; Grace is not capable of saving or intrinsically renewing and sanctifying human nature, since this is fully and entirely vitiated ; What justification effects is merely an external covering of man's sinful state but man himself remains unchanged intrinsically. Man's will is purely passive and does not co-operate with grace, grace alone performing the work of justification. Cf. Luther, In Genesis., c. 19.

Historically, the Rationalism of the 17th and 18th centuries is a reaction against Luther's doctrine of the irreformable corruption of human nature. With an unbounded confidence in man's capacity to think, will and act in virtue of his own inner power, Rationalism rejected the doctrines of Revelation and Grace.

Baius, Jansenius, Quesnel

a) Michael Baius († 1589), appealing to St. Augustine like Luther denied the supernatural nature of the gifts of man in the state of innocence, holding them to be things pertaining to the perfection of human nature. Like Luther, he equated original sin and habitual concupiscence. According to him, the will has become intrinsically unfree. All actions of men proceed either from cupiditas, i.e., evil concupiscence, or from the charity infused by God. The former actions are morally bad, the latter morally good. In the year 1567, Pope Pius V condemned 79 propositions from the writings of Baius (D 1001-1080).

b) The error of Cornelius Jansenius († 1638) is a logical extension of Baianism. According to Jansenius, man's will, in consequence of the Fall, is not free and is incapable of any goodness. All man's actions proceed either from earthly desires which stem from concupiscence (*delectatio terrena sive carnalis*) or from heavenly desires, which are produced by grace (*delectatio coelestis*). Each exercises an urgent influence on the human will, which in consequence of its lack of freedom always follows the pressure of the stronger desire (*delectatio victrix*). According therefore as the earthly or the heavenly desire preponderates in a man so his actions are sinful or morally good. If the *delectatio coelestis* is victorious, it is called *gratia efficax* or *irresistibilis*; if it be overcome by earthly desire it is *gratia parva* or mere *sufficiens*. In the year 1653, Pope Innocent X condemned five propositions of Jansenius, taken from the latter's work "Augustinus." D 1092-96.

c) Paschasius Quesnel († 1719) popularised the views of Baius and Jansenius and specially stressed the irresistibility of the Grace of Christ. In the year 1713, Pope Clement XI in the Bull "Unigenitus" condemned 101 propositions from Quesnel's writings. D 1351-1451.

Modern Rationalism

Modern rationalism, which denies everything supernatural and also original sin, in effect accepts the doctrine of Pelagianism.

SECTION I

Actual Grace

CHAPTER I

The Nature of Actual Grace

§ 5. Enlightening and Strengthening Grace

1. Concept of Actual Grace

Actual grace is a temporary supernatural act of God directed towards the spiritual power of man for the purpose of moving him to a salutary act. By reason of its temporary character actual grace is distinguished from habitual grace, and from the infused virtues, which inhere as permanent qualities in the soul. By reason of its supernatural character and its ordination to salutary acts (i.e., to activities, which are intimately associated with the supernatural final objective), actual grace is distinguished from God's natural co-operation in the activities of His creatures (*concursus Dei naturalis*). The expression "*gratia actualis*" emerged in the later scholastic period (Capeolus) and gained general currency only after the Council of Trent, which did not use the term.

2. The Nature of Actual Grace

1) Teaching of the Church.

Actual Grace internally and directly enlightens the understanding and strengthens the will. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Second Council of Orange (529) declared the following proposition to be heretical: Man, by the power of nature alone and without the enlightenment and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, can think and act as he ought to, and be saved, that is assent to the preaching of the Gospel "*Si quis per naturae vigorem bonum aliquid quod ad salutem pertinet vitae aeternae, cogitare ut expedit, aut eligere sive salvari id est evangelicae praedicationi consentire posse confirmat absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus Sancti*" (D 180). Cf. D 1791 104, 797. The teaching of the Church therefore is that man needs a power exceeding his natural capacity (i.e., a supernatural power), for the performance of salutary acts. The supernatural help of God in salutary activities extends to the two faculties of the soul, the reason and the will. Actual grace consists in a direct external enlightenment of the understanding and a direct internal strengthening of the will.

From the direct internal enlightenment of the understanding and the strengthening of the will must be distinguished the indirect enlightenment of the understanding, which occurs naturally by outward means (*gratiae externae*), e.g., the teaching of Revelation, sermons, readings, and the consequent indirect strengthening of the will, which in the course of nature, follows from the enlightenment of the understanding. A salutary act exists only when the faculties of the soul are immediately and intrinsically moved by grace.

b) Proof from Scripture and Tradition.

The existence of an immediate intrinsic Divine enlightenment of the understanding and its necessity for the performance of salutary acts is testified to in Sacred Scripture: 2 Cor. 3, 5: "Not as if we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God." In these words St. Paul teaches that we are by nature incapable of salutary acts which lead to our eternal salvation. To perform supernatural acts we need supernatural light from God. 1 Cor. 3, 6 et seq.: "I have planted, Apollo watered, but God gave the increase. Therefore, neither he that planteth is anything, nor he that watereth: but God that giveth the increase." Here the Apostle expresses the thought that the Apostolic preaching is unfruitful if our inner enlightenment by God is not added to the outward enlightenment by the preacher. Cf. Eph. 1, 17 et seq.; Acts 16, 14; 1 John 2, 27.

The need for a supernatural strengthening of the will to move a person to salutary acts emerges also from Sacred Scripture. Thus in Phil. 2, 13 we read: "For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will"; and in John 6, 44: "No man can come to me (that is, believe in me) except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him."

Among the Fathers, St. Augustine, especially in the struggle against the Pelagians who denied inner grace, emphasised the necessity of inner grace of understanding and inner grace of will. Cf. In Ep. I. Ioan. tr. 3, 13: *De gratia Christi* 26, 27.

c) Proof from Reason.

The direct intrinsic enlightenment of the understanding and strengthening of the will is demanded by the intimate connection between man's supernatural final destination and his salutary acts. The means must be of the same order of Being as the end. The end is entitatively supernatural, consequently the means, the salutary acts proceeding by way of knowledge from the will, must also be entitatively supernatural.

§ 6. Antecedent and Consequent Grace

1. Antecedent Grace

There is a supernatural intervention of God in the faculties of the soul, which precedes the free act of the will. (*De fide*.)

In this case God works alone "in us, without us" (in nobis sine nobis, sc. libere cooperantibus), and produces spontaneous indeliberate acts of knowledge and

will (*actus indeliberati*). This grace is called *gratia praeveniens* (also *antecedens*, *excitans*, *vocans*, *operans*).

The Church's teaching of the existence of antecedent grace and its necessity for the achieving of justification was defined at the Council of Trent. D 797: "In adults the beginning of justification must proceed from the antecedent grace of God acquired by Jesus Christ (*a Dei per Christum Jesum praeveniente gratia*)." Cf. D. 813.

Holy Scripture indicates the working of antecedent grace in the metaphors of standing and knocking at the door (Apoc. 3, 20), of the drawing by the Father (John 6, 44), of the invocation of God (Jer. 17, 23; Ps. 94, 8).

2. Consequent Grace

There is a supernatural influence of God in the faculties of the soul which coincides in time with man's free act of will. (*De fide*.)

In salutary acts God and man work together. God works "in us, with us" (in *nobis nobiscum*; cf. D 182), so that they are a conjoint work of God's grace and of man's activity under the control of his will. The grace which supports and accompanies the salutary act (having regard to the operation of grace which preceded the act of the will), is called *adiuvans*, *concomitans*, *cooperans*.

The Church's teaching regarding the reality and necessity of consequent grace is expressed in the Decree of the Council of Trent. D 797. The sinner returns to justification: "by freely assenting to and co-operating with grace (*gratiae libere assentiendo et cooperando*)." D 810: "God's Goodness towards all men is so great that He wishes them to merit what are His gifts. . . . Who renders to everyone according to his works." Cf. D 141.

St. Paul emphasises the all-importance of grace in salutary human acts: 1 Cor. 15, 10: "But by the grace of God I am what I am. And his grace in me hath not been void: but I have laboured more abundantly than all they. Yet not I, but the grace of God with me (*gratia Dei mecum*)."

St. Augustine thus describes the operation of antecedent and subsequent grace: "God works in man many good things to which man does not contribute; but man does not work any good things apart from God since it is from God man receives the power to do the good things which he does" (*Contra. duas Ep. Pel. II 9, 21=D 193*). "The Lord prepares the will, and perfects by His co-operation that which He begins by His working. For the same God works in the beginning so that we may will to do good . . . He willingly co-operates with the willing one and perfects him. . . . In order that we may will (to do good), He works without (= before) us; but if we will (to do good), and so will that in fact we do it, He works with us. But without Him Who so works that we may will (to do good) and co-operates with us when we will, we can do nothing in regard to the good works of piety" (*De gratia et lib. arb. 17, 33*). Cf. St. Gregory the Great, *Moral*, XVI 25, 30, and the *Prayer Actioes nostras*.

§ 7. Controversy as to the Nature of Actual Grace

1. The doctrine preached by Paschasius Quesnel, according to which actual grace is identical with the Omnipotent Will of God, must be rejected. Cf. the *propositio damnata* 19 : *Dei gratia nihil aliud est quam eius omnipotens voluntas* (D 1369 ; cf. 1360 et seq.). God's Will being identical with the Divine Essence cannot be actual grace is a finite implementing of God's desire for salvation distinct from God (*gratia creata*). Quesnel's purpose was, in accord with his theory of pre-destination, to establish the irresistible efficacy of grace.

2. According to the Molinists actual grace does not add any real entity to our faculties but it consists formally in a vital (indeliberate) act of the soul (i.e. an act of understanding or willing) which God (constituting with our faculties one adequate principle of operation) produces by His Divine Power. In support of their view they appeal to the names given to actual grace in Tradition and in doctrinal utterances of the Church : *cogitatio pia* (pious thought), *cognitio* (knowledge), *scientia* (knowledge) or *bona voluntas* (good will), *sanctum desiderium* (a holy desire or wish), *cupiditas boni* (desire for good), *voluptas* (pleasure), *delectatio* (delectation), etc., all which expressions signify acts of the soul.

3. The Thomists define actual grace as a supernatural (entitative) gift or power which precedes the vital act of the soul (not in time but by nature) and by which our faculties are intrinsically excited, moved and elevated into action. This supernatural power (actual grace) communicated by God, unites itself with the faculties of intellect and will, effecting with them one united principle from which the supernatural act proceeds.

The Thomists seek to establish this thesis from the teaching of Holy Writ, the Fathers and the Synods, in which antecedent grace is represented as a calling, enlightening, knocking, awakening, drawing, a touching by God. All these expressions designate an activity of God, which precedes the vital acts of the soul and which enables them to be.

The supernatural power, which illuminates the intellect and strengthens the will temporarily so that they perform supernatural acts, is called by the Thomists a transient or "flowing" quality (*qualitas fluens*), in contradistinction to sanctifying grace, which is a permanent quality. The teaching of St. Thomas (S. th. I II 110, 2) does not contradict this, although he expressly says of actual grace that : "it is not a quality, but a motion of the soul" (*non est qualitas sed motus quidam animae*) ; for by "quality" he understands a permanent disposition, and by "motion of the soul" he understands, not a vital act of the soul, but a movement which consists in the acceptance of the grace proceeding from God (*anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel volendum vel agendum*).

Against the Molinistic conception there is the consideration that the supernatural vital acts of the soul are conjointly produced by God and the powers of the soul, while grace is caused by God alone. Hence the notion that the vital acts themselves are actual grace seems to be unacceptable.

CHAPTER 2

*The Necessity of Actual Grace***§ 8. The Necessity of Grace for the Acts of the Supernatural Order.****1. Necessity of Grace for Every Salutary Act**

For every salutary act internal supernatural grace of God (*gratia elevans*) is absolutely necessary. (*De fide*.)

The Second Council of Orange (529) teaches in Can. 9 : *quoties bona agimus, Deus in nobis atque nobiscum, ut operemur, operatur* ("as often as we do good God operates in us and with us, so that we may operate") (D 182), in Can. 20 : *nulla facit homo bona, quae non Deus praestat, ut faciat homo* (man does no good except that which God brings about that man performs) (D 193 : cf. 180). The Council of Trent confirmed this doctrine in its Justification Decree, Can. 1-3 (D 811-813). The Church's teaching is opposed to Pelagianism and modern Rationalism.

In John 15, 1 et seq., in the parable of the vine and the grapes, Christ vividly represents the influence of grace going out from Him to souls, which brings forth fruits of eternal life, i.e., salutary acts. V. 5 : "I am the vine : you the branches. He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit : for without me you can do nothing" (*sine me nihil potestis facere*). St. Paul expresses the same idea by the notion of the connection between the head and the limbs (Eph. 4, 15 et seq. : Col. 2, 19). For every salutary thought (2 Cor. 3, 5) ; for every good resolve of the will (Rom. 9, 16), and for every good work (Phil. 2, 13 ; 1 Cor. 12, 3), the Apostle demands the assistance of the Divine grace. 1 Cor. 12, 3 : "No man can say 'the Lord Jesus' but by the Holy Ghost."

The Fathers stigmatised the teaching of Pelagius as an innovation which contradicted the tradition of Faith. St. Augustine thus comments on John 15, 5 : "Lest any one think that the vine could of itself produce fruit, He does not say 'Without me ye can do little,' but 'without me you can do nothing.' Be it then little or much, nothing can happen without Him, without Whom nothing can happen" (In Ioan tr. 81, 3).

The absolute necessity of grace for every salutary act may be shown by considering the entitative supernatural nature of man's final end. From this it follows that the salutary act, which is the means to end, must also be supernatural. Cf. S. th. 1 II 109, 5.

2. Necessity of Grace for the Beginning of Faith and of Salvation

Internal supernatural grace is absolutely necessary for the beginning of faith and of salvation. (*De fide*.)

The Second Council of Orange (529) declares in Can. 5, in opposition to the teaching of the Semi-Pelagians : *Si quis . . . initium fidei ipsumque credulitatis affectum . . . non per gratiae donum, id est per inspirationem Spiritus*

sancti . . . sed naturaliter nobis inesse dicit, Apostolicis dogmatibus adversarius approbatur (If anybody says that the . . . beginning of Faith and the Act of Faith itself . . . is in us naturally and not by a gift of grace that is by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, he is opposed to Apostolic teaching) (D 178). The Council of Trent similarly teaches that the starting-point of justification is the antecedent grace of God. Cf. D 797 et seq., 813.

Holy Writ teaches that Faith, which is the subjective condition of justification, is a gift of God. Eph. 2, 8 et seq.: "For by grace you are saved through faith: and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God: not of works, that no man may glory." John 6, 66: "No man can come to me (i.e., believe in me) unless it be given him by my Father." According to Hebr. 12, 2, Christ is "the finisher of faith." Cf. Phil. 1, 6; 1, 29, 1 Cor. 4, 7.

The scriptural passage invoked by the Semi-Pelagians: Zach. 1, 3: "Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you"; Prov. 8, 17: "I love them that love me"; Mt. 7, 7: "Ask, and it shall be given you"; Acts 16, 31: "Believe in the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved"; Eph. 5, 14: "Rise, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead: and Christ shall enlighten thee", are, to be explained in consonance with other scriptural teaching, and therefore in such a manner that the turning of man to God has already commenced under the influence of actual grace, which does not exclude the free activity of the will. The turning of God to man referred to in these texts is not to be understood of the conferring of the first grace, but of the communication of further graces.

In the work, *De dono perseverantiae* (19, 48-50), St. Augustine adduces the testimonies of St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, and St. Gregory Nazianzus as a proof from tradition of the doctrine. He cites the prayer of the Church for the conversion of infidels: "If faith is simply a matter of free will and is not given by God, why then do we pray for those who do not wish to believe, that they might believe?" (*De gratia et lib. arb.* 14, 29). In earlier writings, dating from the time previous to his appointment as Bishop of Hippo (395) St. Augustine himself had expounded the false opinion that faith is not a gift of God, but the exclusive work of man. What brought him to the knowledge that faith also is a gift of God was the words of St. Paul: 1 Cor. 4, 7: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" Cf. *De praedest. sanct.* 3, 7.

Many assertions of the pre-Augustinian Fathers which seem to savour of semi-Pelagianism are to be explained by the struggle against pagan fatalism and Manichaeism, which denied freedom of the will. St. John Chrysostom, to whom the Semi-Pelagians mainly appealed, comments on Hebr. 12, 2: "He Himself implanted the Faith in us, He Himself made the start" (*In ep. ad Hebr. hom.* 28, 2).

The gratuity of grace demands that the beginning of faith and of salvation be the work of God. In the completion of the act of faith the first grasp of the credibility of Revelation (*iudicium credibilitatis*) and the readiness to believe (*pius credulitatis affectus*) are to be ascribed to the influence of immediate enlightening and strengthening grace.

3. Necessity of Actual Grace for the Salutary Acts of the Justified

The justified also require actual grace for the performance of salutary acts. (*Sent. communis.*)

Since the just are in a state of habitual grace, actual grace for them is *gratia excitans* by which the soul is enabled to initiate salutary acts and also *gratia*

adjuvans, which supports the soul during the act and also gratia sanans in that it heals the soul of the wounds left after sin has been forgiven.

No definite decision of the Church has been given regarding the necessity of this grace. However, the definitions of the Second Council of Orange and of the Council of Trent speak of the influence of the grace of God and of Christ on the good works of the justified, without expressly distinguishing between actual and habitual grace. D 809: "Christ Jesus Himself . . . allows His strength to pour out into the justified incessantly. This constantly goes before their good works, accompanies them, and follows them." Cf. D 182. According to the practice of the Church, the justified pray for Divine assistance for every good work they propose to do (*Actiones nostras*, etc.).

Christ's assertion: "Without me you can do nothing" (John 15, 5) suggests that the just also require the assistance of actual grace for the performance of salutary acts. St. Paul teaches that God prompts and perfects the salutary work of the justified. Phil. 2, 13: "It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will." 2 Thess. 2, 17: "Exhort your hearts and confirm you in every good work and word." Hebr. 13, 21: "May the Lord of peace fit you in every goodness, that you may do His will."

St. Augustine extends the necessity of actual grace to the just also. "Even as the eye in the body, though it be entirely healthy, cannot see, if it is not assisted by the brilliance of the light, so also man, even if he is entirely justified, cannot live rightly if he is not assisted by the light of the eternal justice of God" (*De nat. et grat.* 26, 29).

Speculatively, the necessity of actual grace for the works of the just is founded on this, that every creature, on account of his entire dependence on the Creator, requires for the strengthening of the powers at his disposal an actual influence on the part of God (*gratia excitans* and *adiuvans*). As the consequences of original sin remains even in the justified man, it is clear that also, on this ground, he requires a special assistance of grace to counterbalance his moral weakness (*gratia sanans*). Cf. S. th. I II 109, 9.

4. Necessity of Grace for Final Perseverance

Without the special help of God the justified cannot persevere to the end in justification. (*De fide*.)

The Second Council of Orange teaches, in opposition to the Semi-Pelagians, that the regenerate also must constantly pray for the help of God, so that they may attain to a good end, and that they may be able to persevere to the end (D 183). The Council of Trent calls perseverance to the end: "a great gift" (*magnum illud usque in finem perseverantiae donum*; D 826), and teaches that the justified without the special help of God cannot persist in the justification received: *Si quis dixerit, iustificatum vel sine speciali auxilio Dei in accepta iustitia perseverare posse vel cum eo non posse*, A.S. (D 832) The "special help of God" necessary for final perseverance, consists in a number of actual graces.

We may distinguish :

- a) *perseverantia temporalis* or *imperfecta*, i.e., transient perseverance, and *perseverantia finalis* or *perfecta*, i.e., perseverance to the end of life.
- b) *Perseverantia (finalis) passiva*, i.e., the coincidence of death with the state of grace, and *perseverantia (finalis) activa*, i.e., the constant co-operation of the justified with grace. The perseverance of the child before the use of reason is purely passive, that of the adult as a rule is both passive and active at the same time. The proposition applies only to the latter.
- c) *Potentia perseverandi* (*posse perseverare*), i.e., the ability to persevere, and *perseverantia actualis* (*actu perseverare*), i.e., perseverance in fact. While the ability to persevere is, on the ground of God's universal desire for salvation, the prerogative of all the justified, actual perseverance is the lot of the predestined only.

Holy Script ascribes the perfection of the work of salvation to God : Phil. 1, 6 : "that He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus." Cf. Phil. 2, 13 : 1 Peter 5, 10. It stresses the necessity of incessant prayer in order to be able to combat the dangers to salvation (Luke 18, 1 : "We ought always to pray, and not to faint." 1 Thess. 5, 17 : "Pray without ceasing"), and at the same time the necessity of loyal co-operation with Divine grace (Mt. 26, 41 : "Watch ye ! and pray that ye enter not into temptation"); cf. Luke 21, 36.

Towards the end of his life, St. Augustine wrote a monograph, *De dono perseverantiae*, against the Semi-Pelagians, in which he specially refers to the prayer-practice of the Church : "Why is this perseverance besought of God, if it is not given by God ? Or is this prayer to be a mockery, in that man seeks something from Him, of Whom one knows that it is not He who gives, but rather, that it lies in the power of man?" (2, 3).

If final perseverance as a grace cannot (*de condigno*) be merited, still it can with unfailing success, be achieved by proper prayer (performed and persevered in, in the state of grace) : *Hoc Dei donum suppliciter emerit potest* (*De dono persev.* 6, 10). The certainty of the prayer being heard is founded on the promise of Jesus (John 16, 23). As, however, the possibility of a fall always exists for man, to the extent that he is not unshakably rooted in good, nobody without a special revelation can know with infallible certainty whether he will, in fact, persevere to the end. Cf. D 826. Phil. 2, 12 : 1 Cor. 10, 12.

The intrinsic basis of the necessity of grace of perseverance is that the human will in consequence of the constant revolt of the flesh against the spirit, has not of itself the power to stand fast and unshakably in virtue (active perseverance). Again, it is beyond the power of man to secure that the moment of death coincides with the state of grace (passive perseverance). Cf. S. th. 1 II 109, 10.

5. Necessity of a Special Privilege of Grace for the Permanent Avoiding of All Venial Sins

The justified person is not able for his whole life long to avoid all sins, even venial sins, without the special privilege of the grace of God. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the teaching of the Pelagians, according to which man, of his own natural powers, can avoid all sins his whole life long, that for this a special privilege of grace is necessary : *Si quis hominem*

semel iustificatum dixerit . . . posse in tota vita peccata omnia, etiam venialia vitare, nisi ex speciali Dei privilegio, quemadmodum de beata Virgine tenet Ecclesia, A.S. (D 833) ; cf. D 107 et seq. ; 804.

For the proper understanding of the dogma, the following must be observed : By "peccata venialia" are to be understood chiefly peccata semideliberata. "Omnia" is not to be conceived collectively, but distributively, that is, individual venial sins can be avoided with the help of ordinary grace, but not all venial sin, together. "Tota vita" means a long space of time. The "non posse" designates a moral impossibility. The "speciale privilegium" referred to embraces a total of actual graces, which form an exception to the usual order of grace, and indeed a very rare (speciale) exception.

According to Holy Writ, nobody is entirely free from all sin. James 3, 2 : "For in many things we all offend." Our Lord teaches the just also to pray : "forgive us our trespasses" (Mt. 6, 12). The Council of Carthage (418) rejected the Pelagian interpretation, according to which the saints ask for forgiveness, not for themselves but for others, or not according to the truth but only out of humility (humiliter, non veraciter) (D 107 et seq. ; cf. 804).

St. Augustine makes this charge against the Pelagians : If all the saints could be assembled on earth and asked if they were without sin, they would, with one voice, answer with the Apostle St. John (1 John 1, 8) : "If we were to say that we were without sin, then we would deceive ourselves, and the truth would not be in us" (De nat. et grat. 36, 42).

The intrinsic reason lies in the weakness of man's fallen will in face of his disordered motions, and in the wise ordinance of Divine providence, which permits lesser faults, in order to preserve the just man in humility and in the consciousness of his entire dependence on God. Cf. S. th. I II 109, 8.

§ 9. Human Nature's Capacity to Act without Grace, and the Limits of This Capacity

The Catholic doctrine of grace stands between two extremes. Against the naturalism of the Pelagians and of modern Rationalism, it defends the absolute necessity of gratia elevans, and the moral necessity of gratia sanans. Against the exaggerated supernaturalism of the Reformers, Baians, and Jansenists it defends man's natural capacity to act in the sphere of religion and morals without grace. In opposition to both extremes, Catholic Theology distinguishes sharply between a natural and a supernatural order, between a natural and a supernatural religion and morality.

1. The Capacity of the Merely Natural Man to Act

a) Even in the fallen state, man can, by his natural intellectual power, know religious and moral truths. (De fide.)

This possibility is founded on the fact that man's natural powers were not destroyed in the Fall (*naturalia permanserunt integra*), although they were weakened by the loss of the preternatural gifts. Cf. D 788, 793, 815.

Pope Clement XI rejected the Jansenistic proposition that without faith, Christ and charity, we are but darkness, confusion and sin. D 1398 ; cf. 1391

The Vatican Council dogmatically defined that man can know God by the sole light of reason. This is clearly stated in Wis. 13, 1 et seq., and Rom. 1, 20. D 1785, 1806, cf. 2145 (demonstrability of the existence of God). The natural knowability of the moral law is attested by Rom. 2, 14 et seq. The highly developed culture of many pagan peoples gives testimony of the capacity of natural human reason. (See doctrine of God, Par. 1-2.)

b) For the performance of a morally good action Sanctifying Grace is not required. (*De fide.*)

Although the sinner does not possess the grace of justification, he can still perform morally good actions and, with the help of actual grace, even supernaturally good (though not meritorious) works, and through them prepare himself for justification. Thus all works of the person in mortal sin are not sins. The Council of Trent declared: *Si quis dixerit, opera omnia, quae ante iustificationem fiunt, quacunq[ue] ratione facta sint, vere esse peccata vel odium Dei mereri . . .* A.S.D 817; cf. 1035, 1040, 1399.

Holy Scripture enjoins the sinner to prepare himself for justification by works of penance. Ez. 18, 30: "Be converted and do penance for all your iniquities." Cf. Zach. 1, 3; Ps. 50, 19; Mt. 3, 2. It is inconceivable that actions enjoined by God and intended to prepare for justification could be sinful. The Church's penitential and catechumenical practice would be meaningless, if all works performed without grace of justification were sins. The words of Mt. 7, 18: "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit," no more denies the possibility of a morally good work to the sinner, than the parallel words: "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit," denies the possibility of sinning to the justified.

St. Augustine teaches that even the life of the worst man is hardly without some good works (*De spiritu et litt.* 28, 48). The phrase of St. Augustine invoked by the Jansenists: *Regnat carnalis cupiditas, ubi non est Dei caritas* (*Enchir.* 117) does not prove that every single action of the sinner is sinful, but expresses the idea that there are in the moral life two directions, one dominated by the striving after the good (love of God in the wider sense), and the other by the disordered concupiscence (love of the world and love of self). Cf. Mt. 6, 24: "No man can serve two masters." Luke 11, 23: "He that is not with me, is against me." For the significance of the concept of charity in St. Augustine, cf. *De Trin.* VIII 10, 14; *caritas=amor boni*: *De gratia Christi*, 21, 22: *caritas=bona voluptas*; *Contra duas ep. Pel.* II 9, 21; *caritas=boni cupiditas*.

c) The Grace of Faith is not necessary for the performance of a morally good action. (*Sent. certa.*)

Even infidels can do morally good works. Thus not all the works of infidels are sins. Pope Pius V condemned the following proposition of Baius: *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia*. D 1025; cf. 1298.

Holy Scripture recognises the ability of pagans to perform morally good works. Cf. Dn. 4, 24; Mt. 5, 47. According to Rom. 2, 14 pagans are by nature able to fulfil the prescriptions of the moral law. "For when the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; these having not the law are a law unto themselves"

St. Paul had in mind real pagans, not lapsed Christians, as Baius wrongly held (D 1022). The passage Rom. 14, 23 : *Omne autem, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est*, does not refer to the Christian Faith as such, but to the conscience (*πίστις*=firm conviction, judgment of the conscience).

The Fathers unreservedly admit the ability of infidels to perform morally good works. St. Augustine praises the temperance, selflessness and incorruptibility of his friend Alypius, who, at that time, was not yet a Christian (Conf. VI 7, 10) and the civic virtues of the ancient Romans (Ep. 138, 3, 17). When we find in his writings many sentences which are almost word for word in agreement with Baius in which he appears to depict the good works and virtues of pagans as sins and evils (cf. *De Spirit et litt.* 3, 5), these are to be explained by his polemic attitude towards Pelagian naturalism, according to which he admits as truly good and as truly virtuous only that which bears on the supernatural end of man. Cf. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, IV, 3, 17. 21. 25.

d) Actual Grace is not necessary for the performance of a morally good action. (*Sent. certa.*)

Fallen man can perform good works without help of Divine grace, by his natural powers alone. Therefore not all works which are achieved without actual grace are sins. Pope Pius V condemned the following proposition of Baius : *Liberum arbitrium, sine gratiae Dei adiutorio, non nisi ad peccandum valet.* (Free will, without the help of God's grace acts only in order to sin.) D 1027 ; cf. 1037, 1389.

The necessity of actual co-operating grace for all morally good works cannot be proved from Scripture, or from the older Tradition. Opponents wrongly invoked St. Augustine. When the latter repeatedly declares that without the grace of God no work free from sin is possible, it must be observed that he calls everything sin, which does not bear on man's supernatural final end using the word sin therefore in a special sense. In this sense, also, can. 22 of the Second Council of Orange must be understood : *Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum* (Nobody has anything of his own save untruth and sin) (D 195 = Augustinus, *In Ioan.* tr. 5, 1).

2. Limits of Natural Capability

a) In the state of fallen nature it is morally impossible for man without Supernatural Revelation, to know easily, with absolute certainty and without admixture of error, all religious and moral truths of the natural order. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declared in concurrence with St. Thomas (S. th. I 1, 1) : "It must be ascribed to this Divine Revelation that those Divine things which are not inaccessible to the human understanding in itself, can also in the present condition of the human race be understood by all easily, with definite certainty, and without admixture of error." D 1786.

The reason why, without supernatural Revelation, in point of fact only few men achieve a perfect knowledge of God and of the natural moral law lies in the "wound of ignorance" (*vulnus ignorantiae*) caused by the Fall, that is in the weakening of man's power of cognition.

b) In the condition of fallen nature it is morally impossible for man without restoring grace (*gratia sanans*) to fulfil the entire moral law and to overcome all serious temptations for any considerable period of time. (*Sent. certa.*)

As, according to the doctrine of the Council of Trent, the justified "require a special help of God," that is, an actual assistance of grace, in order permanently to avoid all serious sin, and thus to preserve the state of grace (806, 832), there is all the more reason for teaching that the non-justified man without the actual help of grace, cannot avoid all serious sins for any considerable time, even if in virtue of his natural freedom, he is able to avoid individual sins, and to fulfil individual commandments.

In Rom. 7, 14-25, the Apostle St. Paul describes the weakness of fallen nature by reason of concupiscence, against the assaults of temptations, and stresses the necessity of Divine help in order to overcome them.

CHAPTER 3

The Distribution of Actual Grace

§ 10. God's Freedom in the Distribution of Grace or the Gratuity of Grace

1. Grace cannot be merited by natural works either *de condigno* or *de congruo*. (*De Fide.*)

Against the Semi-Pelagians and the Pelagians, the Second Council of Orange teaches that no supernatural merit precedes grace: *Nullis meritis gratiam praevenientibus debetur merces bonis operibus, si fiant*. D 191. The Council of Trent teaches that justification in adults commences with antecedent grace, i.e., "from their vocation, to which they are called, without merits existing on their part" (*nullis eorum existentibus meritis*). D 797. In the Epistle to the Romans St. Paul says that justification can be achieved neither by works of the Old Testament Law nor by observance of the natural law, but that it is a free gift of the love of God, "being justified freely by His grace" (*δωρεάν*; *gratia*) (3, 24), cf. Rom. 3, 9, 23; 9, 16. The concepts grace and natural merit are mutually exclusive. Rom. 11, 6: "And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no longer grace." Cf. Eph. 2, 8 et seq.; 2 Tim. 1, 9; Tit. 3, 4 et seq.; 1 Cor. 4, 7.

Amongst the Fathers, St. Augustine especially defended the gratuity of grace against the Pelagians. Cf. Enarr. in Ps. 30 Sermo 1, 6: "Why grace? Because it is given as a gift (*gratis*). Why is it given as a gift? Because thy merits have not gone before it." In Ioan. tr. 86, 2: "It is not grace if merits have preceded it. But it is grace; therefore grace did not discover merits; it effected them." That the first grace cannot be merited is obvious from this that there is an intrinsic